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
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Indo-Aryan Ethnic Origins

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH.

II.

In my last paper I traced the Rosy-Blond Aryas (*śūklo, svityam*) as far as Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, the "Land of the Seven Rivers," whither they had diffused themselves from their former settlements around Lake Zarah (modern Sēistān), and where they found the country already occupied by two types of humanity—(1) the aboriginal *Viṣūdas*, a black, rudimentary, and repulsive ethnos; and (2) the *Dasyūs*, who, I pointed out, were a branch of the far-flung Kūṣa or Kāssi-descended Tokhs, Dahyūs, or Vehrkaṇvō-Danghavō ("Wolf-Folk"), the previous possessors, at that time, of Central Asian Airyo-Tūrān. It is important to remember this last fact. In remoter days these same "Wolf-Folk" had been known to the Akkadians, Sūmerians, Babylonians, and Assyrians as the denizens of *Nūm-Mā* (in Hittite *Sī-Nīm*); "Wolf-Lands"—the wild country stretching indefinitely east of the Tigris Valley, and for the most part mountainous. *Nūm-Mā* afterwards acquired the imported or secondary signification of "Highlands." *Elām*, or *Eil-ām*, like *Aga-dē*, or *Akkad*, meant the same as *Nūm-Mā* in its secondary sense: and *Airyān* (now *Irān*) was simply a variant of *Eil-ām*, and therefore also meant "Highlands." Research does not seem to have arrived yet at any definite

conclusion regarding the affinities of *Ārya*, save for the very doubtful suggestion that it means "Kinsmen," which does not commend itself to me. *Dahyūs* ("Hill-People") was Airyānian for *Tokh*, or *Togh* ("Snowy-Range Folk"), and equated with Vedic *Dasyūs*. This word *Dasyūs* is quite distinct from *Dāsas*, which means "Slaves," and, unlike *Dasyūs*, has no ethnic signification. *Dahyūs* and "Wolf-Folk" were the names given to these practical autochthons of Airyo-Tūrān by the pure Rosy-Blond migrants from Rhodo-Leuko-Tūrānia (the regions from the Halys to the Caspian, including what came to be known as Mitanni), when first these Rosy-Blonds entered the country called after them Airyavō-Vaēja, where, as the Airyānians, or "Highlanders," they eventually developed the Avestan language. By the Chinese of the 2nd or 1st century B.C. the Tokhs, or Dahyūs, of Airyo-Tūrān were called the Tā-Hia. Locally, they were then known as the Tokh-āri, "Dominant Tokhs," and the Tokh-ārā, "Descendants of the Tokhs." In India, *Tokhārā* became *Tūshārā*. In Greek and Latin *Dahyūs* was rendered *Daci* and *Dakae*. In Europe they were represented by the *Daci* and *Ālamāns*, ancestors of the Germans proper, or *Ālboches*. Avestan was very similar to the speech of the Zarah-Lake and Vedic *Sūkla* Āryas, which latter is better known as the language of the *Rgveda*, or shortly Vedic.

We may therefore conclude that the language spoken by the Airyavō-Vaējans, and that spoken by the Zarah-Lake Āryas, were simply two complementary branches of one common linguistic trunk—which trunk, there can be no doubt, was the language spoken by the theretofore migrant main-mass of the ancient Rhodo-Leukochroi, or Rosy-Blonds, of the full blood.

It may, of course, be taken for granted that, on arriving in Sapta-Sindhavah, the Āryas had to win their new

settlements there from the Dasyūs and Nišādas at the point of the sword. The cause, it will be remembered, which induced or compelled the Āryas to abandon Zarah-Lake land, was the advent on their western borders of a multitudinous, well-armed, and aggressive collection of ethnoi, whose names have come down to us as (1) the *Pūrūs*, or *Pūracās*, (2) the *Yādūs*, or *Yādarās*, (3) the *Tūrvaśas*, (4) the *Anūs*, or *Anavās*, and (5) the *Drūhyūs*. In the *Pūrūs*, I said, we can almost certainly see a fugitive body of those *Pūra-Satiū*, or *Pūla-Satiū*, who had headed the big invasion of Khem, which, issuing out of Kilikia, had been repulsed and scattered by Rāmēsēs III, circa B.C. 1151. Similarly, in the *Yādūs* it was fairly obvious, I argued, that we find a fugitive body of the *Amorites of Yādāi*, in Northern Syria, or *Nāharīn* ("Rivers-Land"), who had been swept out of their homes by the same tide of invasion, as, pouring out of Kilikia, it surged irresistibly over *Nāharīn* and the whole empire of the *Khatti* in that part of the world. As regards the other three ethnoi, I admitted, we cannot be so sure. All we know is that *Tūrvaśa* possibly means "Clothed like the *Tūr*," or "Dwelling with the *Tūr*"; that, as suggested by its obvious affinity with the Avestan word *Drūj*, "Lie," or "Fiend," the word *Drūhyūs* may have been the name of some more or less barbarous Central Asian folk whom the fugitive *Pūra-Satiū* and *Yādāi* Amorites had picked up on their way east; and that, as there was once a place called *Anau* on the northern edge of what was later the Persian plateau, overlooking what is now called Russian *Türkistān*, the *Anavās*, or *Anūs*, may originally have hailed from there, and have joined up with the fugitives in much the same way.

These *Pūrūs*, *Yādūs*, *Tūrvaśas*, *Anūs*, and *Drūhyūs*, I further remarked, are also said to have been known as

the *Pāñcha-Janāh*, *Pāñcha-Kṛṣṭi*, and *Pāñcha-Manūṣya-Jātani*, i.e., as "The Five Races, Peoples, Tribes, Communities." This, however, I doubt. *Pāñcha-Manūṣya-Jātani* apparently means "Five Classes of Men." Granted. Possibly also *Pāñcha-Kṛṣṭi* has some similar signification of its own which is more specific and limited than the broad general expression "Five Races." Sanskritists will know. Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda informs us that—

"In the Ṛgveda the term *pañcajanāh* and its synonyms occur very often. According to Yāska (III. 8) the term means, 'Gandharvas, manes, gods, demons, and monsters according to some, and the four varnas with the Niṣāda as the fifth according to the Upamanyus.' But in two other places (X. 3. 5. 7) Yāska himself explains *pañca-kṛṣṭi* of the Ṛgveda as '*pañca manuṣyajātani*,' 'five classes of men,' which is explained by the scholiast as the four varnas with the Niṣādas as the fifth. The author of the Bṛhad-devatā attributes this interpretation to Sākatāyana also (VII. 69)" (*The Indo-Āryan Races*, p. 4).

This may be so: and I concede that, wherever these phrases occur, even in the *Ṛgveda*, their special signification for the time being, i.e., *in loco*, must be gathered primarily from the context. For instance, in *Ṛgveda* Man. I, Ash. I, Adh. VI, Suk V. § 10, we read, "Aditi is the five classes of men." That certainly does not refer to these 5 communities in Saptā-Sindhavaḥ. It means something much wider. Also, we may be very sure that, so far as in Brāhmanistic belief such an end could be attained, the *Samhitās*, as reduced to writing, conveyed no meaning that Brāhmanism did not wish, or would not wish, them to convey. Nevertheless, there is obviously a sense in which, broadly, these phrases (or at least one of them, *Pāñcha-Janāh*), may be deemed to equate with the expression "Five Races," "Five Ethnoi," or "Five Nationalities," indicating the Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs (who also happen to

have been five), as distinguished from all other neighbouring communities—even, nay, especially, the *Śūkla* Āryas proper, from whom, indeed, they were still further distinguished by the fact that they are expressly said to have been *kṛṣṇa*, *dhūmra*, and *ścāva*, i.e., “swarthy.” Moreover, that these expressions, *Pāñcha-Janāh*, *Pāñcha-Kṛṣṭi*, and *Pāñcha-Manūṣya-Jātani* (especially if inclusive of the *Niṣādas*) were not restricted in their meaning to that of *Pāñcha-Manūṣya-Jātani*, “Five Classes of Men,” is demonstrated by the fact that later on, in a less prehistoric age, there arose the expressions *Pāñch’ālas* and *Kūrū-Pāñch’ālas*, the connotation of which is well known. I venture to think that the *Pāñch’ālas* of *Madhyā-dēśa* would have displayed considerable annoyance, had they heard it said that they were merely an aggregation of “classes,” “orders,” and “social grades,” or that they consisted, even in part, of *Niṣādas*, however camouflaged. Furthermore, from this name *Kūrū-Pāñch’ālas* we learn something else. There is reason to believe that in the *Kūrūs* of *Madhyā-dēśa* we have nothing more or less than our old acquaintances the *Dasyūs* (*Krivis* ?) of early *Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*, under what, in a sense, was a new name descriptive of their claims, ambitions and eventual achievements. Originally, *Kūrūs* or *Krivis* probably meant something like *Khāns* or *Meleks*. Lastly, with reference to the above citation from *Yāska*, the scholiast’s comment thereon, and the allusions to the *Upamanyus* and *Sākatāyana*—all of whom speak of the 4 *Varnas* and the casteless *Niṣādas* as having made up the “Five”—their opinion (which was obviously a ready and superficial answer to the question) may very well have appeared to themselves and their contemporaries a plausible and even acceptable explanation of the matter in the days in which they lived, since *Yāska* himself flourished as late as the

5th century B.C., and the others were even more recent. By then the "Āryan" delusion had become a fixed belief in the general mind, and Caste (*Varṇa*, in the Brāhmanistic sense) had achieved its grip upon the land; but, as already pointed out, in early Sapta-Sindhavaḥ days, Caste (in that sense) was utterly unknown. If, in the *Rgvedic* expression "Five Races," or "Tribes," there was no hint of some vague reminiscence of the 5 more or less distinct communities who had once been settled at and around the North Pole, it clearly (at least as used in subsequent times) had reference, not to the 4 Varṇas and the Niṣādas, but to the 5 intruding ethnic groups hailing from Syria who were then dwelling alongside of, nay, are conventionally supposed to have been identical with, the *śūkla* Āryas, and also amongst the Indo-Dasyūs.

Professor Macdonell's text frequently reveals him as still unemancipated from the thralldom of the old orthodox notion that the *śūkla* Āryas and the Dark Warrior Clans were all ethnically identical; and he even represents the *Dasyūs* and the *Dāsas* as one and the same, as both meaning "fiends," as outside the pale of the Varṇa Folk, and as eventually becoming the 4th caste under the later name of *Çūdras*—a view which at once brings the proud *Kūrū* tradition toppling down like a house of cards, seeing that the *Kūrūs* were simply the Indo-*Dasyūs* transformed and re-named. Yet even Professor Macdonell speaks of "the Five" thus—

"The most important part, if not the whole, of the Indian Aryans" (*sic* for "Āryas," which, however, he does use elsewhere) "is meant by the 'five tribes,' an expression of frequent occurrence in the *Rigveda*. It is not improbable that by this term were meant five tribes which are enumerated together in two passages, the Purus, Turvaṣas, Yadus, Anus, and Druhyus. These are often mentioned as engaged in intertribal conflicts. Four of them, along with some other clans, are named as having formed a coalition under ten kings against Sudās, chief of the Trītsus. The opposing forces met

on the banks of the Parushni, where the great 'battle of the ten kings' was fought. The coalition, in their endeavours to cross the stream and to deflect its course, were repulsed with heavy loss by the Tritsus" (*History of Sanskrit Literature*, 1913, pp. 152, 153, 154).

This is rather anticipatory, from the point of view which I shall presently take up; but the reference to "intertribal conflicts" amongst these 5 Races throws a significant light on what are generally called the "internecine conflicts amongst the Āryas themselves." For in fact these 5 communities were *not* Āryas.

Also, let us notice that while, even yet, the idea of Caste (in the sense of *Jāti*, i.e., "Occupation," or "Vocation") is commonly associated with the word *Varṇa*, in early Sapta-Sindhavaḥ days, and probably throughout even the Vedic period, this was apparently not so. Then, *Varṇa* signified (not even "class," or "order," or "social grade," but) "colour"—at any rate something different from *Jāti*. And so, we are told, it should be to-day. Obviously there must have been *Jātis*, even in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ times. What did *not* exist in those days was the Brāhmanistic sense which ultimately attached to both words, *Varṇa* and *Jāti*.

Accordingly, from the expression "The Five Races," "Tribes," or "Communities," we must exclude, not only the *śūkla* Āryas proper who came from Zarah-Lake Land, the land of the original Sarasvatī; together with the black Niṣādas; but also the more or less dark-white Dasyūs, or eventual Kūrūs (Compare the names of the *Kūravās* of the Tamil country, and the *Kūricchans* of the Malabar hill tracts)—for in the very expression *Kūrū-Pāñch'ālas* a clear distinction is revealed between the two. It is a deliberately compound name, and arose—if not out of an eventual political federation between these two originally separate communities—at least out of the

fact of their juxtaposition and their contrasting characteristics.

When, therefore, the curtain first rises in early Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, that country is discovered to us inhabited by the following distinct peoples—(1) the Rosy-Blond *Āryas*; (2) the *Pūrūs*, *Yādūs*, *Tūrvaśas*, *Anūs*, and *Drūhyūs*, some fair, like the *Āryas*, but most describable as Dark-Whites; (3) the *Dasyūs*, originally a species of Dark-Whites, yet whose whiteness, like that of the modern Germans proper, was rather of the parchmenty, pasty, and yellowish kind, and who were doubtless even then beginning to blend with the dusky aborigines; and (4) the black and multitudinous *Niśādas*, dwelling all around these higher, and comparatively higher, stocks.

Of these various inhabitants of early Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, the Rosy-Blond *Āryas* were in no sense barbarous. On the contrary, they were essentially cultured: though the particular forms wherein their culture just then expressed itself had apparently been simplified and otherwise affected by the unsettled life which they had previously been leading. Moreover, they were a markedly peace-loving folk, yet by no means unapt in matters military, if and when fighting was forced upon them by envious neighbours incapable of recognising true character when they saw it. Lastly, the *Āryas* were spiritually-minded, *i.e.*, they were pre-eminently intuitional rather than intellectual or emotional—though they were by no means lacking in these latter respects. But they were never intellectually dishonest, and their emotions were always well under control. And even as an intuitional people, they exercised, or had a tendency, or at least the capacity, to exercise their faculties, not so much on the plane of *Existence*, as on that of *Subsistence*. In other words, though practical enough in ordinary life, their deeper mentality worked for the most part in the sphere of abstract Reality, of the Eternal

Verities. And, subject of course to the limitations of our common humanity, their lives were a faithful mirror of their essential psychology. On the other hand, the "Five Races" (at least we are fairly sure of it as regards the Pūrūs and the Yādūs) were very highly civilised, with the civilisation probably of the "Syrians" of the 12th century B.C., which, in some respects, is said to have been superior to that even of Khem. Also, they were certainly not barbarians. At the same time, as a group, they were very much "of this world"—being excelled in that connection only by the Dasyūs. Though highly intellectual, and even intuitional, as regards their faculties, they were not *spiritually*-minded like the Āryas. Probably they did not even know what "spirituality" really meant: though doubtless they were able to discuss the term with considerable verbal subtlety. Mentally, they were familiar with objectivity, and with that alone. Of the transmutation of the formal and materialistic into the formless and substantial—of the objective into the subjective—as a condition ever necessarily precedent to its becoming pabulum fit for assimilation by the *soul*, as distinguished from the *mind*, they were entirely ignorant. Even their intuitional faculties functioned, not on the *subsistential* plane (in which they were in no way interested, because they had never yet got into touch with it), but on the *existential* plane. Furthermore, being intensely egoistic, proud and aggressive, they were pre-eminently obsessed with the spirit of what our German neighbours call *Militarismus*. So much so, indeed, that in Vedic literature they are frequently referred to distinctively as "The Warrior Tribes," and, by reason of their complexions—especially, no doubt, in later days, after they had mixed themselves with the Dasyūs and the Niṣādas—even as "The *Dark* Warrior Tribes" (*śvāva*, *kṛṣṇa*, *dhūmra*).

This brings us to the fact—of which it is very necessary that early notice should be taken—that after the settlements in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, while the *śūkla* Āryas were resolutely bent upon maintaining, as far as possible and as long as possible, the purity of their blood, and therefore never intermarried with any of the surrounding ethnai, whether “the Five,” the Dasyūs, or the Niśādas, but held aloof from them all in every way, politically, socially, and culturally, “the Five,” in course of time, did enter into relations, which gradually became more and more intimate, first, no doubt, with the dark-white Dasyūs, and eventually even with the black and almost sub-bestial Niśādas: until at last they constituted the binding frame-work of a very mixed and multitudinous community which (dominated by the Dasyūs, and swarthy in various degrees of darkness), was in marked contrast with the rosy-blond complexion and the yellow or red tresses of the *śūkla* Āryas.

How long this state of things lasted in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ nobody now can tell. It is a commonplace to say that the Indians have always been deficient in what is called “the historic sense.” And in regard to chronology Indian history is said to be particularly weak. The latter is indisputable; but I much doubt the former saying. Doubtless the Dasyū-Kūrūs and their ambitions had something to do with the state of the record. Be this as it may, in the late Mr. Vincent A. Smith’s recent *Oxford History of India* we read—

“Definite chronological history begins about 650 B.C. for Northern India. No positive historical statement can be made concerning the peninsula until a date much later. Even in the north all approximate dates before the invasion of Alexander in 326 B.C. are obtained only by reasoning back from the known to the unknown. The earliest absolutely certain precise date is that just named, 326 B.C.” (*Introduction*, p. xiv).

In view, however, of the testimony which I have adduced from ancient Romie records regarding Rāmēsēs III's "victory" over the Pūra-Satiū and their allies in Western Asia, and what ensued therefrom, we have now at least *two* specific dates upon which we may confidently rely—(1) B.C. 1151, or thereabouts, the year when the Pūra-Satiū and the Yādāi Amorites set out from Nāharīn, or the "Rivers'-Land" in the West, to arrive as the leading members of the "Five Races" in other "Rivers'-Lands" in the farther East, and (2) this B.C. 326 mentioned by Mr. Vincent Smith—the date of Alexander the Great's invasion of India. Between these two fixed dates, therefore, all the changes that took place in early Sāpta-Sindhavaḥ while the *sūkla* Āryas, the Five Races, the Dasyūs, and the Niṣādas were all dwelling there together; and all that happened afterwards in the way of schisms, secessions, migratory movements eastward, and ethnic, political, social, and cultural developments, during what have hitherto been regarded as Vedic and Neo-Vedic times; must have occurred.

Before entering on a discussion of these matters, let us note one or two facts with regard to which no dispute can possibly arise. First, the schism that took place (for there *was* a schism) took place between what has hitherto been styled the "fair division of the Ārya folk" and the "Dark Warrior Tribes" above-mentioned. Secondly, we know that the communities which seceded and removed themselves farther eastward, were these Dark Warrior Tribes and the mixed ethnai who arrayed themselves under the Bhārata banners. Thirdly, we know that the *sūkla* Āryas proper never left Sāpta-Sindhavaḥ. It is usual to cite the longitude of modern Sirhind (*Sahrind*) as the limit of their diffusion eastward. Obviously, however, that district was merely the extreme eastern limit ethnically of the Dasyūs (Kūrūs). More accurately, the

farthest eastern limit for the Āryas would seem to be describable as the western part of later Uśīnara. And fourthly, we know that the Pūrūs, or some of them, also never left the Panjāb, at any rate up to so late a period as the invasion of Alexander the Great, for he unquestionably found them strongly represented in those regions on his arrival.

Thus, in connection with the origin, development, and spread of Brāhmanism, Caste (Varṇa), and what is commonly called "Āryan" Civilisation and Culture—indeed, in connection with all subsequent traditions preserved, not only in *Madhyā-dēśa*, but in the regions specifically known as *Kūrūkshetra*, or *Brahmāvarta*, or, as all Kūrū-land may be styled, *Brahmā-ṛṣi-dēśa*, and in the adjacent *Land of the Pāñchālas*, and with all subsequent institutions and happenings associated with these famous names—we may (nay, we must) leave altogether out of account the *sūkla* Āryas proper and, at least to a great extent, the Pūrūs. Even as regards the Yādūs, or Yādavās—a particularly fair-complexioned folk, like the *sūkla* Āryas, though historically associated with the Dark Warrior Clans—theirs is a special case, and will receive due consideration shortly.

How far, between say B.C. 1151 and B.C. 326, in India, and especially in Northern India, are those ethnic and cultural developments which, as well in learned circles as popularly, have ever heretofore been regarded as distinctively "Āryan" in their origin and their nature, really entitled to be so regarded?

This question has never yet been answered: though India's future—in the sense of her Self-Realisation—depends very largely on the correct answer to it. In fact, up to date, the subject has been studiously avoided—at least by those who are supposed to be our authorities. After all, it is not an overwhelmingly difficult problem to

solve. Undoubtedly it is circumvallated and entrenched all round with conventional tenets of very long standing : and in these our authorities appear determined to continue to ensconce themselves. But this preliminary exclusion of the particular topics above enumerated, cuts away at a stroke many of the entanglements which might otherwise have embarrassed us.

At the outset, it will be well to show up, as vividly as possible, the tremendous gulf that from the very beginning, and throughout the period which may be described as early historical times, has ever yawned between, on the one side, the *śūkla* Āryas proper, and, on the other side, the creators and fashioners of *Brāhmanism*, *Caste*, *Saṁskṛit*, and *Madhyā-dēśan Culture* generally, *i.e.*, the "five Tribes" and their associated communities; the Dark Warrior Clans and their pushful "friends," the *Dasyūs*, and other allies; in short, the so-called *Kūrū-Pāñch'ālas*."

First, however, let us note how the central vortex of so-called "Āryan" development (political, social, religious, ethnic, and cultural) gradually moved farther and farther eastward, and how, concurrently with this eastward shift, the old names were from time to time augmented by entirely new names, perhaps ethnic, but more commonly political, while sometimes one of the familiar old names dropped completely into desuetude and was succeeded by another and very different one.

Needless to say, it is impossible, except very approximately, to locate any of these very early settlements and ethnic movements by reference to the names found on modern maps, however excellent these may be. Says Mr. Vincent Smith—

"Let us consider for a moment the changes in the great rivers of India, which, when seen in full flood, suggest thoughts of the ocean rather than of inland streams..... Old beds of the Sutlej can

be traced across a space eighty-five miles wide..... Who can tell where the Indus flowed in the days of Alexander the Great? Yet books, professedly learned, are not afraid to trace his course minutely through the Panjab and Sind by the help of some modern map, and to offer pretended identifications of sites upon the banks of rivers which certainly were somewhere else twenty-two centuries ago. We know that they must have been somewhere else, but where they were no man can tell. So with the Vedic rivers, several of which bear the ancient names. The rivers of the Rishis were not the rivers of to-day." (*Oxford History of India*, Introduction, pp. iii, iv)

It is possible, of course, to be hyper-critical in this connection; for the local area, or country, in which these early Indo-Āryas and Indo-Anāryas all dwelt or camped within reach of each other in their several settlements, can be broadly recognised. Also with a little care, it is not difficult to follow the *general trend*, in an eastwardly or south-eastwardly direction, of those ethnic shifts which, in course of time, themselves, or in the shape of peaceful penetration, eventually resulted in the diffusion of what to this day are generally called the "Āryan" race and "Āryan" culture throughout well-nigh the whole of India. And that is really all that we need bother about.

As a matter of fact, nowhere in the record are we actually told of the advent of the *śūkla* Āryas in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ. The record only speaks of the *non*-Āryan Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Druhyūs, and of the Dasyūs and Niśādas. And when we read in *Sanskrit Literature* that—

"Some of the Vedic tribes, however, still remained on the farther side of the Indus, occupying the valleys of its western tributaries, from the Kubhā (Kabul), with its main affluent to the north, the Suvāstu, river 'of fair dwellings' (now Swat), to the Krumu (Kurum) and Gomati, 'abounding in cows' (now Gomal), farther south" (p. 140),

we have no reliable means of judging whether these laggards were *śūkla* Āryas proper, or a loitering division

of those (for the most part) Dark-Whites from Western Asia and Tūrān whose startling appearance, some time after B.C. 1151, had occasioned the Āryan flight from Zarah-Lake land. What we do get from the record are a number of geographical data found in the *Rigveda* and other saṃhitās, largely consisting of references to over a score of streams, all but two of which belong to the Indus river-system. Among them are the five from which the country gets its present name of "The Panjāb." These are the *Vitastā* (later called the Hydaspēs, and now known as the Jhilam); the *Asikni* (later Akesinēs, present Chināb); the *Parūshnī* (later Hydraōtēs and Airāvati, now Rāvi); the *Vipac* (later Hyphāsis, modern Biās); and the biggest and most easterly, the *Çatudri* (Satlaj). To these, in Sapta-Sindhavah times, we ought doubtless to add the *Indus* itself, and the *Sarasvatī* of Zarah-Lake land, or possibly the *Kūbhu* (Kābul) and the *Sushomā* (Sohān). Or again, we may prefer the little *Sarasvatī* (midway between the Satlaj and Yamunā, or Jamnā) and the *Driśhadvatī*. But indeed anything we thus decided upon would be merely conjectural; and no advantage can possibly accrue from striving to be meticulously exact. All we can reasonably say is that, if any of the rivers west of the Indus (particularly the *Sarasvatī* of Zarah-Lake land) have to be included, that might indicate, what indeed is in itself quite probable, that once there was a time—say shortly after B.C. 1151—when the settlements of the disturbed Āryas were to be found *both* east and west of the Indus. In other words, Sapta-Sindhavah, as a name, does not exclusively, or even specially, denote the country now called "the Panjāb" as it existed under riverine and other physical conditions which have long since passed away, but connoted both that old-time Panjāb and broad regions stretching west of the Indus—nay, perchance more particularly

the latter. This view is certainly not prejudicially affected when we recall that in Avestan records we also come across the similar expression *Hapta-Hendū*, and when, further, we consider the fact that the evidence for the presence of the *śukla* Āryas at all in the Panjāb is astonishingly meagre.

Doubtless the Afghāns were merely a host of further emigrants from Western Asia who at a later time emulated the example of the Pūra-Satiū and the Yādāi Amorites. Their traditions actually point to this.

Now, in the *R̥gveda* various communities are named and described as dwelling, or at any rate camping, on the banks of certain of these Indus confluent. But who are those ethnoi? Are they *śukla* Āryas? Not one of them! At least there is nothing in the text which can be regarded as evidence that any of them belonged to the *śukla* Āryan group. They are, beyond all doubt, the "Five Ethnoi," or "Tribes," referred to *supra*—those *Pūrūs*, *Yādūs*, *Tūrvaśas*, *Anūs*, and *Drūhyūs* who, we are told, are "enumerated together in two passages" of that *saṃhitā*. But, in addition to these familiar names, mention is also prominently made of others—*e.g.*, the *Tritsūs* and the *Bhāratas*—with regard to whom, however, there is also never anything to show that they were of *śukla* Āryan stock, but rather that they were some special or local federations (as to the *Tritsūs*, within the Pāñcha-Janāh group, and, as to the *Bhāratas*, between the *Dasyūs* and some of "the Five") which had assumed or been given the names *Tritsūs* and *Bhāratas* for political reasons. It may, however, be that *Bhāratas* simply means "Warriors," and, as such, was, as we have seen, the general popular designation for those "Five Tribes," the black Niṣādan hordes who had cast in their lot with them, and the more or less dusky *Dasyūs*, or *Krivis*, whose hegemony they acknowledged—all of

whom, in the Vedas themselves, are differentiated from the "fair" communities by phrases equating with the specific name "Dark Warrior Clans." Or, more correctly, *Bhāratas* possibly only connotes the masterful *Dasyūs*, and those of these *Anāryas* who joined with them in their conspiracy.

These enumerations of group-names are at first always headed by the *Pūrūs*—which quite accords with my submission that the *Pūrūs* were of Philistinic stock; for in former days, in the west, the *Pūra-Satiū* had ever been the head and front and backbone of whatever confederation they were connected with. Says Professor Macdonell—

"The Purus are described as living on both banks of the Sarasvati. A part of them must, however, have remained behind farther west, as they were found on the Parushni in Alexander's time. The *Rigveda* often mentions their king, Trasadasya, son of Purukutsa, and speaks of his descendant Trīkshi as a powerful prince (*Sanskrit Literature*, p. 154).

This seems to indicate some early time when the far-seeing *Dasyūs* had craftily succeeded in effecting a matrimonial alliance with *Pūrū* royalty. Some of the *Pūrūs* may have been fair, but with the fairness of *Homo Alpinus* rather than with that of the *Rhodo-Leukochroi*, though doubtless there was even a strain of this latter stock in their veins. As a community, therefore, in the matter of complexion, they are probably to be classed as Dark-Whites. But, as regards stature, they appear to have been exceptionally tall. Poros, or *Pūrū*, their king in the days of the Macedonian invasion, when they occupied the country between the *Vitastā*, or *Hydaspēs* (Jhilam), and the *Asikni*, or *Akesinēs* (Chināb), is traditionally remembered as a magnificent specimen of humanity, six and a half feet in height. In this connection, of course, we naturally

recall the Biblical story of Goliath of Gath (1 *Sam.* XVII). Professor Macdonell proceeds—

“The Turvaṣas are one of the most frequently named of the tribes. With them are generally associated the Yādus, among whom the priestly family of the Kaṇvas seems to have lived. It is to be inferred from one passage of the *Rigveda* that the Anus were settled on the Parashuī, and the priestly family of the Bhrigus, it would appear, belonged to them. Their relations to the Druhyus seem to have been particularly close. The Matsyas, mentioned only in one passage of the *Rigveda*, were also foes of the Tritsus. In the *Mahā-bhārata* we find them located on the western bank of the Yamunā” (*Ibid.*, p. 154).

This last remark, however, has reference to times considerably later than those we are concerned with just now. Doubts seem to have arisen in the minds of some writers as to whether the Yādūs can really be regarded as having settled in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ at all. In my opinion they did so settle, at least in very early times. They are frequently associated with the Tūrvaśas; and these certainly were in the country. In *The Indo-Aryan Races*, Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda (who seems to think that because the Yādūs are constantly included amongst the ethnai who made up the original “Five Tribes,” they were therefore, like the Rājanyas as a group, *dhūmra*, *i.e.*, “swarthy”), has a long and interesting argument in support of the view that the Yādūs and the Tūrvaśas came to India *viā* the Arabian Sea from South Western Asia, and that, settling originally in Saurāṣṭra (Surat), *i.e.*, Kathiawār and part of Guzerāt, they subsequently spread to Mathurā (Muttrā) on the Yamunā (Jamnā). I quite agree that they hailed originally from Western Asia, since I hold them (*i.e.*, the Yādūs) to have been Yādāi Amorites, and therefore blonds—hence, not *dhūmra*, “swarthy”; that they were once inhabitants of Saurāṣṭra; and that they afterwards became domiciled in Mathurā, and probably appear again under the new

name of the *Mātsyas*. But I cannot accept Mr. Chanda's sea-voyage hypothesis, especially as the Yādūs were admittedly accompanied by the Tūrvaśas, who, I believe, joined them, like the Anūs and the Drūhyūs, in their plunge off eastwards from Nāharīn, and may have been Hittites. Mr. Chanda quotes *Rigveda* VI. 20. 12—

“O hero (Indra)! when you crossed the sea (*samūdra*), you brought Turvaśa and Yadu over the sea.”

Also stanza vi. 45. 1—

“Indra, who brought Turvaśa and Yadu from afar by his wise policy, is our youthful friend.”

Mr. Chanda also adds—

“In x. 62. 10 Yadu and Turva (Turvaśa) are called Dāsas or barbarians” (p. 25).

This last seems rather a strange statement; but the fact is that Mr. Chanda has not given us quite the correct rendering. *Dāsa* does not really mean “barbarian,” and the Yādūs were certainly not barbarians. *Dāsa* means “captive,” “prisoner,” and in that sense “slave.” Yādū and Tūrva are personifications of the Yādūs and the Tūrvaśas. Hence, all I gather from this passage is that Yādū and Tūrva may have been taken captive in some real or imaginary battle, and had thereby acquired the temporary status of “slaves.” To deem Yādū and Tūrva “barbarians” would, moreover, be highly inconsistent with the laudations bestowed on Indra for having brought them to India.

Now, as regards the sea-voyage theory. With majestic rivers, lakes and floods the *post* B. C. 1151 Indo-Āryas and Anāryas were familiar: but—whatever may be said of the *pre* B. C. 1151 Aryas—of oceans and seas these later ethnoi personally knew nothing whatever. If, then, the expression *Samūdra*, in the *Rigveda*, as written, be taken to have referred to the “Gathering of the Waters” as

represented by the mighty Indus flood ; and if we take the Yādūs and Tūrvaśas as having necessarily had to cross that flood on their way into the Panjāb from Zarah-Lake land, when they and their associates followed the migrating Āryas some time after B.C. 1151 ; what the *Rigveda* says about the Yādūs and Tūrvaśas could not possibly refer to any supposed former Rajputana *Samūdra* such as Professor Abinash Chandra Das, I understand, has in mind. On the other hand, it would exactly dovetail into my submission that the Pūrūs were the Pūra-Satiū from Kilikia, and the Yādūs were the Amorites from Yādāi. With further reference to the Yādūs or Yādavās, Mr. Chanda states—

“Two conflicting legends are given in the *Harivamśa* relating to the origin of the Yadus or Yādavas. In chapter 30 Yadu, the eponymous ancestor of the Yādavas, is represented as a son of king Yayāti of the lunar race. But in chapter 94 it is said that Yadu belonged to the solar Ikṣvāku race ” (p. 28).

It is on this latter version that Mr. Chanda relies in support of his view that the original home of the Yādavās was in Ānarta and Saurāṣṭra, and that subsequently they became associated with Mathurā. Of Ikṣvāku Professor Macdonell observes—

“It is interesting to note that the *Rigveda* refers to a rich and powerful prince called Ikshvāku. In the epic this name recurs as that of a mighty king who ruled to the east of the Ganges in the city of Ayodhyā (Oudh) and was the founder of the Solar race ” (*Sanskrit Literature*, p. 157).

The *Harivamśa* was the 19th (supplementary) *parvan*, or book, of the *Mahābhārata*, which is the “epic” alluded to by Professor Macdonell. Without attaching to the statements of this *parvan* more value than is now accorded to the analogous traditions in early Greek literature regarding Hellenic ethnic origins—*e.g.*, that which represents Iōn as the eponymous ancestor of the

Iōnians—we may note that, in any case, the period in which Ikṣvāku of Ayodhyā is supposed to have flourished was far removed from the early Vedic days which are occupying our attention just now.

Next, Professor Macdonell refers to the *Bhāratas*—a name which, as already remarked, was probably that of a confederacy, and therefore political rather than ethnic. As a matter of fact, they were the *Dasyūs* and their supporters—resolutely bent on crushing and ousting the *Ṛtsūs*, whom they did eventually supplant.

“One hymn (iii. 33) describes them as coming to the rivers Vipāç and Cutudrī accompanied by Viçvāmitra, who, as we learn from another hymn (iii. 53), had formerly been the chief priest of Sudās, and who now made the waters fordable for the *Bhāratas* by his prayers” (p. 154).

This does not give us any information as to where the *Bhāratas*—if they were a distinct tribe, clan, or community, which I reject—had their settlements. They are only described as “coming to” these two streams, the *Biās* and the *Satlaj* (wherever their channels ran in those days)—the *Ṛtsūs*, though victorious on the *Parūsh-nī*, having presumably retired eastward. Note “*Viçvāmitra*” instead of “*Vasiṣṭha*.” Have we here a case of Brāhmanistic “editing”?

As just stated, the leading spirits of this *Bhārata* coalition were the dark-white, barbarous, yet assuredly not always uncivilised, *Dasyūs*. True, they are not referred to under that name. Moreover (unless we assume that already they had acquired the name *Krivis*), the time had not yet arrived for the assumption by them of their more renowned name *Kūrūs*—wherein, if it had any affinity with “Akkadian” (probably Kāssite Babylonian) *Kūrū*, “Governor,” and Hittite *Khu*, “Prince,” “Ruler,” there was obviously a suggestion of that royal status which they did in fact enjoy under it. It was not

till the age of the *Brāhmaṇas* (B. C. 800-500) that they became definitely and permanently known by this name *Kūrūs*; though, at the same time, we are told in the *Çatapatha Brāhmaṇa* that *Krivis*—doubtless a variant of *Kūrūs*, *Kūravās*, *Kauravās*, etc.—had really been an old name borne by the *Pāñch'ālas* (a mistake for the *Kūrūs*) in early times. Speaking of the later *Brāhmaṇa* days, Professor Macdonell says—

“It is natural to suppose that the numerous Vedic tribes, under the altered conditions of life in vast plains, coalesced into nations with new names. Thus the Bhāratas, to whom belonged the royal race of the Kurus in the epic, and from whom the very name of the *Mahābhārata*, which describes the great war of the Kurus, is derived, were doubtless absorbed in what came to be called the Kuru nation. In the genealogical system of the *Mahābhārata* the Purus are brought into close connection with the Kurus. This is probably an indication that they too had amalgamated with the latter people. It is not unlikely that the Tritsus, whose name disappears after the *Rigveda*, also furnished one of the elements of the Kuru nation” (pp. 156, 157).

To this last statement I demur. Much more probably the Tritsūs eventually lost their identity under the Pāñch'āla name. Further, the only inference (by way of indication) that we can draw from the genealogies in the *Mahābhārata* is that of Brāhmanistic “editing.” Again—

“The Tritsūs appear to have been settled somewhere east of the Parushṇī, on the left bank of which Sudās may be supposed to have drawn up his forces to resist the coalition of the ten kings attempting to cross the stream from the west. Five tribes, whose names do not occur later, are mentioned as allied with Sudās in the great battle. The Srinjayas were probably also confederates of the Tritsūs, being like the latter, described as enemies of the Turvaças” (p. 155).

This seems to support the inference (also, I submit, otherwise well-founded) that the disputes and hostilities now under notice were between various divisions (probably factions) of the “Five Races” and their Dasyū

and Niṣādan associate themselves—not between the various sub-divisions (if any) of the *śūkla* Āryas, or genuine Arya Folk. Further—

“Of some tribes we learn nothing from the *Rigveda* but the name which, however, survives till later times. Thus the Uçīnaras, mentioned only once, were, at the period when the *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* was composed” (late in B.C. 800-500), “located in the middle of Northern India; and the Chedis, also referred to only once, are found in the epic age settled in Magadhā (Southern Behar). Krivi, as a tribal name connected with the Inlus and Asikni, points to the north-west. In the *Catapatha Brāhmaṇa*” (even later than the *Aitareya*) “it is stated to be the old name of the Panchālas, who inhabited the country to the north of modern Delhi” (pp. 155, 156).

To this last statement, despite its setting, we need not attach much importance. If not wholly baseless, except as founded on nebulous reminiscences of the past, it is clearly a very loose and woolly-minded allusion to the old *Kūrū-Pāñch'āla* “State.” We are now fairly well acquainted with the concrete facts. In days much later than Sapta-Sindhavaḥ times—days when the geographical area associated with the kaleidoscopic fortunes of the “Āryan” ethnoi popularly so called, and as described in the *Yajurveda*, was very different and considerably removed from that described in the *Rigveda*—we are confronted with an entirely new epoch of religious and social life in India. Nay more: we see two neighbouring but markedly individuated ethnic groups—the *Kūrūs* and the *Pāñch'ālas*—each settled in its own proper territories, yet, though thus ethnically and locally distinct, possibly united by some powerful political bond. Possibly also, however, kept apart by political or other animosity. The *Kūrūs* (the old Krivis) were nothing more or less than the *Dasyūs* of early Vedic times. Just as the *Kāssites* of Elām, established dynastically under Gandash and his successors in B.C. 16th century Babylon, or just

as the Prussians after A.D. 1864 and 1866, and the Prusso-Germans after 1870, though innately barbarous, attained to enormous power, political, military, and economic, and even to a high degree of cunningly counterfeit civilisation, so, by the time (B.C. 800-500) when the *Brāhmaṇas* were composed, these Dasyūs, Krivis, or Kūrūs (of the very same ethnic stock as the Kāssite conquerors of Babylon and the later Prusso-Germans of Central Europe), had done the same. It was *they* (*not the Pāñch'ālas*) who inhabited the country north of modern Delhi. Their neighbours, occupying the country east of the Jamnā as far as modern Allāhabād, were the old *Pāñcha-Janāh*, *Pāñcha-Kṛṣṭi*, or "Five Tribes"—now, in these *Brāhmaṇa* days, known shortly as the *Pāñch'ālas*, *i.e.*, "Consisting of 'the Five.'" Professor Macdonell refers to the position thus—

"The centre of Vedic civilisation is now found to lie farther to the east. We hear no more of the Indus and its tributaries; for the geographical data of all the recensions of the *Yajurveda* point to the territory in the middle of Northern India occupied by the neighbouring peoples of the Kurus and Panchālas. The country of the former, called Kurukshetra, is specifically the holy land of the *Yajurvedas* and of the *Brāhmaṇas* attached to them. It lay in the plain between the Sutlej and the Jumna, beginning with the tract bounded by the two small rivers Drishadvatī and Sarasvatī, and extending south-eastwards to the Jumna. It corresponds to the modern district of Sirhind. Closely connected with, and eastward of this region, was situated the land of the Panchālas, which, running south-east from the Meerut district to Allahabad, embraces the territory between the Jumna and the Ganges called the Doāb ('Two Waters'). *Kurukshetra was the country in which the Brāhmanic religious and social system was developed, and from which it spread over the rest of India.*"

These last italics are mine. I use them to draw special attention to the fact that *this* was the *fons et origo* of *Brāhmanism* and the so-called "Āryan" Civilisation. Not in *Pāñch'āla*-land did they germinate.

"It claims further historical interest as being in later times the scene of the conflict described in the *Mahābhārata*, between the Panchālas and Mātsyas on the one hand, and the Kūrūs, including the ancient Bhāratas on the other."

This is a mix-up. The Mātsyas were the old Yādavās under another name—hence included under *Pāñch'ālas*: the Kūrūs the final outcome of Bhārata development—hence included under *Bhāratas*. *Kūrū*-land, as confronted by *Pāñch'āla*-land, was the last then phase of Dasyū ambitions—the "Five" having revolted at some indefinite date against Dasyū dominance and pretensions. Note that this far-famed conflict, so far as it was really historical, is here said to have occurred in times even later than B.C. 800. Henceforward, Proteus-like, the Kūrūs assumed quite a different character and rôle, and sought to gain their ends by other and subtler methods. This time, as the world knows, they succeeded. What Northern India became under them and *Brāhmanism*, is an object lesson for all. In particular the Occident may paint its own picture of the future that awaited the Western-World, had Mittel-Europa, and not the Allies, won the War.

"In the famous law-book of Manu" (which by the way, Mr. Vincent Smith maintains has been wholly misconceived, having been really the mere rulings, or let us say *dicta*, of 'a text-book writer,' and not 'veritable laws' at all) "the land of the Kūrūs is still regarded with veneration as the special home of Brāhmanism, and as such is designated *Brahmāvarta*."

In this connection our mind naturally reverts to the ceaselessly and blatantly *bajāo'd* "Vaterland" of the Kūrūs of modern Central Europe, as the *sacro-sanct* "home" of a special brand of "spirituality" and of *Kultur* generally. How history repeats itself! And how blood will out!

"Together with the country of the Panchālas, and that of their neighbours to the south of the Jamna, the Mātsyas (with Mathurā, now

Muttrā, as their capital) and the Çurasenas, it is spoken of as the land of Brāhman sages" (Brahmā-ṛṣi-dēśa), "where the bravest warriors and the most pious priests live, and the customs and usages of which are authoritative" (*Sanskrit Literature*, pp. 174, 175).

Almost might we imagine that here we are listening to the familiar voice of "Fritz," *more suo* lauding Germania and everything that is German! Obviously, then, the Kūrūs were ethnically quite distinct from the Pāñch'ālas; and, as obviously, it was *not* the Pāñch'ālas, but the Kūrūs, who were identical with the old Krivis. Indeed, *Krivis* would seem to have been simply some curious variant of *Kauravās*.

I incline to think that the Pāñch'ālan "revolt" began in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ days, at the time of the departure of the Trtsūs under Sudās; that, as a group, "the Five" really remained faithful to Sudās, and even accompanied him eastward; that the Dasyū-led Bhāratas pursued up to the Parūshnī, where a rear-guard action was fought and won by Sudās; that subsequently the Bhāratas followed the strategically retreating "Five" as far as the the Vipac and Çatudrī; and that the so-called *Kūrū-Pāñch'ālan* "State" was not a State at all, but represented the final position when, behind their "Marne" defences at the Yamunā, the Pāñch'ālas had succeeded in definitely arresting the Bhārata on-rush with a very effective: "Thus far, and no farther!" After that, Dasyū policy executed a complete *volte-face*—physical force being discarded in favour of diplomacy and priestcraft.

These—or some such sequence—may have been the concrete historical events on which, as on a peg, was long afterwards hung the story that forms the central theme of the *Mahābhārata*—much as, on the Mediterranean achievements of Meren-Ptāh and Rāmēsēs III; in the

12th century B.C., Homer (or whatever that name stands for) long afterwards hung the epic of the *Iliad*. And if, subsequently, as the outcome and crowning triumph of Dasyū cunning, Kūrūs and Pāñch'ālas at first united politically (though this is doubtful), and in the end completely fused, do we not, in the famous name *Madhyā-dēśa*, see quite plainly how, once, in the past, in Northern India—just as also in modern times in *Mittel-Europa*, nay, as ever—the soaring ambitions and almost incredible worldly wisdom of a mimetically civilised, but inherently barbarous, ethnos succeeded in deluding their good-hearted but purblind neighbours; in bluffing them out of their status, power, and very identity; and in foisting their imitational, exaggerated, and in some respects monstrous, Culture—then under the names of *Brāhmanism* and “Āryan” Civilisation, as recently under the impudently flaunted cloak of *Kultur* and “The Germanic, or Teutonic, Ethnic Idea”—upon their entire racial environment: thus demonstrating how, again and again, alas, it is possible for well-nigh the whole of humanity to “believe a lie”?

Wherein, then, consists the truth? In this: that the truly spiritual and gloriously beautiful conceptions and ideals of the *śūkla* Āryas proper, as enshrined throughout Antiquity in say the esoteric profundities of the original Āryan, or rather Rhodo-Leukochroic, doctrine of the *Ātman*, properly understood, ancient Mithrāism, ancient Osirism, and ancient Pagan Pantheism generally, were *not* the same as the merely intellectually objective subtleties, the bewildering ritualistic complexities, the appallingly deliberate callousness, and the overwhelmingly elaborate addenda of degradingly materialistic, and frequently unspeakably stupid, fantasies and practices of historical *Brāhmanism*, any more than they were the same as the theological inanities, the idolatries, the *jādū*,

and the enlightened selfishness of historical *Christendom*. Also, that the genuine *śūkla* Āryas on the one side, and the Dasyū-Krivis, the "Five," and the Niśādas, on the other side, were *not* of one and the same ethnic stock. They were *not* "all Āryas"—conscious or unconscious of any unity whatever in race, religion, and language. Not one of the three last-named was Āryan; though of course the Yādūs could claim a sort of affinity with the *primitive* old Rhodo-Leukochroi of the Mediterranean World. And lastly, that the Civilisation and Culture brought into India by the *śūkla* Āryas not long after B.C. 1151 were *not* identical with the later pretentious but counterfeit ideals, institutions, and usages which, as we have just been told, originated in the period of the *Brāhmaṇas* (B.C. 800-500) amongst the Kūrūs, as their ethnic source, and in that part of Kūrūkshetra which is specifically known as Brahāmāvarta, as their local cunabula.

Hitherto, of course, even scholars have been under the fixed delusion that they *were* all identical. Referring ostensibly to the original Āryan "invasion"—but drawing no ethnic distinction between the *śūkla* Āryas and the Dark Warrior "Five Races," and merely distinguishing between all of these on the one side and the "*Dasyū* or *Dāsa* 'fiends,' " or aborigines, on the other side, no less an authority than Professor Macdonell says—

"The invaders, though split up into many tribes, were conscious of a unity of race and religion. They styled themselves Āryas or 'kinsmen,' as opposed to the aborigines, to whom they gave the name of *Dasyū* or *Dāsa*, 'fiends,' in later times also called *anarya* or non-Āryans" (*Sanskrit Literature*, p. 152).

An almost perfect specimen of bovrilised inaccuracy! Again, a little farther on, he says—

"It is clear from what has been said that the Vedic Aryans" (*sic*) "were split up into numerous tribes, which, though conscious of

their unity in race, language, and religion, had no political cohesion. They occasionally formed coalitions, it is true, but were just as often at war with one another" (*Ibid.*, p. 157).

How, with his knowledge of the record, and wider information, Professor Macdonell can countenance these vapid conventionalisms, is amazing. That the alleged race-consciousness above alluded to had no existence whatever, is really beyond further discussion; yet I shall discuss even it further. As regards language and religion—apart altogether from what is glaringly evident from the record itself—if my views are sound concerning the origin of the *śukla* Āryas, *viā* Zarah-Lake land, from Airyavā-Vaēja, and the identity of the Pūrūs and Yādūs with the Pūra-Satiū of Kilikia and the Yādāi Amorites, and their out-rush from Nāharīn in West Asia not long after B.C. 1151, then it follows that when the Pūra-Satiū and Yādāi Amorites and their associates made their *début* in Airyān, neither their languages nor their religions could possibly have been the same as those of the *śukla* Āryas; and later on, after the Pūra-Satiū had become metamorphosed into the Pūrūs, and the Yādāi Amorites into the Yādūs, some considerable time must necessarily have elapsed before any change in these respects could have manifested itself. As to political or other coalitions, they are the very luxuries that we see these "Āryan invaders" indulging in incessantly. But *amongst whom* do they arise? *Always* amongst the Dasyūs, the "Five," and their Niṣādan associates! *Never* amongst any of these and the *śukla* Āryas proper! *Never* amongst the sub-divisions (if any) of these latter! If I am wrong, perhaps Professor Macdonell, or some other scholar on his behalf, will point out one single instance of any such coalition. Of course, a general fusion, both ethnic and cultural, did eventually take place; but that was long after early Vedic days, and was confined to the "Dark

Warrior Clans"—the *Dasyūs*, the "Five," and their *Niṣādan* surroundings.

And if, in this connection, I disagree outright with Professor Macdonell, there are others who do not exactly support him. In Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda, for instance, author of *The Indo-Aryan Races*, we see an observant, thoughtful, and scholarly writer who, being an Indian, is naturally, I presume, inclined to hold in considerable respect the dogma of Āryo-Indian Origins, both ethnic and cultural, even in the sense in which it is still, and has for centuries been, popularly and dominantly in vogue. Speaking of what he calls "the Rgvedic people," he views them broadly as divided into two great groups—(1) the black, degraded, and repulsive aborigines, or *Niṣādas*, and (2) all the other communities, not any of them black, like the *Niṣādas*, but some of them dusky and even swarthy, in various shades, and some exceedingly fair. At the same time, he sub-divides this great second group into two distinct kinds, though he calls both of these sub-divisions "the Ārya folk." Group (1) he describes as "the *deva*-less and rite-less *Dasyū* or *Dāsa*," and Group (2) as "the *deva*-worshipping Ārya." Though from his remarks here and there, he appears to glimpse the correct meaning of *Dāsa* (save that once he mistranslates it "barbarian"), yet he does not seem to be aware who the *Dasyūs* really were, seeing that (as I gather) he vaguely includes them amongst the aborigines. Now, with regard to his two sub-divisions of Group (2), *i.e.*, what he calls "the Ārya folk," he does not, by way of stating his own position, say that they were sub-divided on an ethnic basis, though in one place he adduces evidence, apparently emanating from these two sub-divisions themselves, which reveals the fact that in reality the sub-division *was* a consequence of ethnic differentiation. Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda himself, however, appears

to wish us to understand that the two sub-divisions merely represented two different *classes, orders, or social grades*. Let me quote his own words—

“The other division of the R̥gvedic people—the Arya folk—did not constitute a homogeneous body. We discern two different social grades within its pale—the R̥ṣi or priest-poet clans such as the Atharvans, Aṅgirasas, Bhṛguṣ (Jamadagnis), Atriṣ, Vasiṣṭhas, Bharadvājas, Gotamas, Kaśyapas, Agastyas, Kaṇvas, and Viśvāmitras (Kuşikas); and the other class included the warrior tribes such as the Yadus, Turvaśas, Pūrus, Anus, Druhyus, Tṛtsus, Bharatas, Sr̥ñjayas, Ruśamas, Matsyas, Cedis, Krivis and others” (p. 11).

Note here the separate mention of (1) the *Yādūs* and the *Mātsyas*, and (2) the *Bhāra'tas* and the *Krivis*—though, as regards (1), these were very probably names borne by one and the same community at two very different and considerably removed periods; and the Krivis were only the leaders of the Bhārata coalition. Also note that, while the name *Dasyūs* does not appear in this list (which, looking at the matter from Mr. Chanda's point of view, is quite understandable), and while the name *Kūrūs* is also omitted, yet we have the name *Krivis*. To appreciate this point, the reader must remember that *Krivis*, *Kūrūs*, and *Dasyūs* were all different names borne by one and the same people (Dark-Whites of Kāssite descent, through the Dahyūs, or Tokhs, of Central Asian Tūrān) at different periods of history, and in different geographical areas. When, therefore, Mr. Chanda mentions the *Krivis* in his list, he really thereby includes in it the *Dasyūs*, and—as these were a branch of the Dahyūs, or Tokhs—also unconsciously discloses the fact that the *Krivis* were not Āryas.

“These two social grades did not form endogamous castes as yet; nor were the R̥ṣi clans collectively known as Brāhmanas and the warrior tribes as Kṣatriyas. But the former constituted a regular social order with a hereditary calling—that of officiating as sacrificial

priests and hymn-making, though they did not eschew other occupations" (*Ibid.*).

Farther on we find Mr. Chanda making the following express statement—

"Like the regular varnas (castes) of later days the two sections of the Āryas—the priests and warriors—did not consider themselves as offshoots of the same stock" (p. 17).

This is surely very important testimony. Far from being conscious of any racial unity, the *śūkla* Āryas and the Five Tribes or Nationalities and their associated ethnai, of various degrees of darkness, themselves knew quite well that they were *not* identical, or even related, racially. As a matter of fact, it is in no way surprising to see and hear them emerging from their obscurity, stepping into the witness-box, and frankly deposing thus. Their testimony is only what one would expect from any common sense person in view of the evidence. Moreover, it was not they who introduced the confusion. Others, in a much later age, were responsible for that. Indeed, so great, in every way, was the distinction subsisting between the two ethnic groups—(1) the *śūkla* Āryas, and (2) the Dark Five and their colleagues—that the only appropriate way which popular Tradition could devise, whereby to preserve the memory of it, was to aver that Group (1), as a whole, was of what it naïvely calls *direct divine origin*—the only Ṛṣi clans for which such an origin was *not* claimed being the *Viṣvāmitras* and the *Kāṇvas*—while Group (2) were presumably regarded as merely sharing in the common descent of mankind at large from "Father Manu," son of the sun-god Vivasvat. And when we discover *who* the personifications Viṣvāmitra and Kāṇva really were, and realise *what their identity means*, the whole secret is out!

In early Vedic days, it seems, every tribal chief kept what we would now call a domestic chaplain or priest.

This was the *Purohita*. Originally the purohita of Sudās, king of the Trtsūs and pre-Bhāratas, was Vasiṣṭha (one of the *śūkla Ṛṣi* group), who indeed is said to have “consecrated him to sovereignty”—either when Sudās was only king of the Trtsūs, or when he ascended the loftier throne of the “Five” and their associates. But in Sudās’s royal *entourage*, apparently in Kuṣa, *i.e.*, Dasyū circles, were a number of priest-poets belonging to the dark Kuṣika clique of the then forming Bhārata faction; and amongst these was one named Viṣvāmitra, head of his order, who claimed the office of purohita to the king. Out of this arose a tremendous quarrel, which I shall revert to presently. Note here that, as a branch of the Bhārata coalition, the Kuṣika Viṣvāmitras pertained to what afterwards became known as the *Yajamāna* class (non-Brāhman clients). Such gentry, it seems, were not *Ṛṣis* of the kind recognised as of *divine origin*, but were only *Ṛṣis by adoption*. With regard to Kāṇva, *Rgveda*, x. 31. 11. gives his father’s name as Nṛṣad. But according to the *Purāṇas*, Kāṇva was originally a Kṣatriya. Ajamīda was a descendant of Pūrū, the eponymous ancestor of the *Rgvedic* Pūrūs.

“From Ajamīda was born Kāṇva, from Kāṇva Medhātithi, and from Medhātithi the Brāhman of the Kāṇva clan (Kāṇvayanāh) (*Viṣṇu Purāṇa*, iv. 19. 10).” “In one passage of the *Atharvaveda* (ii. 25) they (the Kāṇvas) seem to be definitely regarded with hostility” (*Vedic Index*, i. p. 134).

Thus, reading between the lines, we find that, of these two priestly clans, or personifications thereof, one (Viṣvāmitra, or the Viṣvāmitras) came of Kūṣa or Dasyū stock—which explains their ascendancy in *Brāhmaṇa* days, the Kūrūs having been Dasyūs; while the other (Kāṇva, or the Kāṇvas) came of Pūrū, *i.e.*, Pūra-Satiū, or Philistinic, stock. As such, we have seen, they both belonged to the Dark-White (Melano-Leukochroic) variety of mankind.

All this, in effect, is set forth by Mr. Chanda in *The Indo-Āryan Races*, p. 18. Also, why Kāṇva is styled priest of the Yādūs and Tūrvaśas (confederates of the Pūrūs) is now understandable. Further on—apparently forgetting his own view (which, however, I expect he only holds half-heartedly) that the basic difference between the two great Groups of what he calls “the Ārya folk” was one of class, order, or social grade, and not ethnic—Mr. Chanda tells us very definitely and frankly that—

“The two sections of the sacerdotal class, Brāhman by descent and Brāhman by adoption, were of different physical types. In the *Rgveda* (vii. 33. 1) the Vasisthas, who represent the first group, are described as *svityam*, ‘white,’ while Kāṇva (x. 31. 11)” (priest of the Yādūs and Tūrvaśas), “representing the second group, is *svāva* or *kṛṣṇa*, ‘dark.’ In the Gopatha Brāhmaṇa (i. 1. 223) the Brahman’s colour is white (*śūkla*). The tradition of the existence of a group of Brāhman with white complexion and yellow hair survived down to the time of the grammarian Patañjali (about 150 B. C.) who writes in his *Mahābhāṣya* (on Pāṇini V. 1. 115): ‘Penance, knowledge of the Veda, and birth make a Brāhman. He who is without penance and knowledge of the Veda is a Brāhman by birth only. White complexion, pure conduct, yellow or red hair, etc., are also characteristics that constitute Brāhmanhood.’ The Brāhman with white complexion and yellow hair seems so strange a being to Kaiyaṭa, the scholiast of Patañjali, that he assigns him to a previous cycle of existence. He writes, ‘White complexion, etc., were seen in Brāhman who flourished in a previous cycle of existence and whose descendants are rarely met with even now.’

The second division of the Rgvedic Āryas, the Yādūs (Yādvajana), Pūrūs, Drūhyūs, Anūs, Turvaśas, Bhāratas (Bhārata jana) and other Yajamāna tribes were traditionally akin to the dark section of the Rsis, the Kāṇvas and the Visvāmitras. The *Kāthaka Samhitā* (xi. 6) calls the Vaisya ‘white’ (*śūkla*), the Rājanya ‘swarthy’ (*dhūmra*). To explain the difference of colour of skin and hair between the two groups of Vedic Āryas we have to assume that the ancestors of the ‘white and yellow-haired’ group migrated to India from the temperate region in the far North, and the dark section had their home in the tropics.”

After this, then, let us hear no more about "consciousness of race-unity"! Notice, however, that the phrase "Rgvedic people"—quite unobjectionable—has now become "Rgvedic Āryas."

"There is clear traditional evidence in the *Rgveda* to show that two at least of the tribes of the latter group, the Turvaśas and the Yādūs, came to India from South-Western Asia" (*The Indo-Aryan Races*, pp. 24, 25).

With Mr. Chanda's argument on this last head I have already dealt. The final position, therefore, is clear and simple. I have stated that the evidence for the presence of the *Sūkla* Āryas at all in the Panjāb, is astonishingly meagre. I now submit that practically it consists solely of the bare names of what Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda calls the fair Priest-Poet (Ṛṣi) Clans, or personifications thereof, who claimed to have been of *direct divine origin*—i.e., the *Atharvāns*, *Āngirases*, *Atris*, *Vasiṣṭhas*, *Bharadvājas*, *Gotamas*, *Kaśyapas* and *Agāstyās*—thus excluding the *Kuśika Viśvāmitras* (really of Dasyū, i.e., Kūṣa, connection and stock), the *Kāṇvas* (really of Philistinic descent), and the *Bhṛgūs*, who, it appears, were the priests of the Anūs and Drūhyūs: in which case the odds are heavily against the probability of their having had in their veins a single drop of *sūkla* Āryan blood. Indeed, it is even said by some that the above list should really be reduced to *four* names—the *Āngirases* the *Atharvāns*, the *Vasiṣṭhas* and, strange to say, the *Bhṛgūs*. But the explanation of this last addition lies ready to our hand. These four were regarded as the so-called *Ṛṣi*-Clans "among whom the Vedic sacrificial cult originated, and other clans became members of the sacrificial class by adoption. This early Vedic sacerdotal class afterwards came to be known as Brāhmanas" (*The Indo-Aryan Races*, p. 10).

Thus—in the peculiar sacerdotal setting in which we find them after centuries of Brāhmanistic "control" (not

only of institutions, life, and thought, but also of the record)—these *R̥ṣi* names turn out to have reference, not at all to the very early *R̥gvedic* days when the Panjāb riverain was inhabited by the “Five Tribes,” and when one or other of the names is associated with one or other of these “Five” in connection with the office of *purohita*, but to the long subsequent days when historical *Brāhmanism*, with its elaborate sacerdotal ritual, had assumed that definite form in which it eventually ensouled itself, *i.e.*, in which the worldly mentality and spirit characteristic of the *Dasyū*-dominated “Five” and their associates (as distinguished from the very different psychology of the *śukla* Āryas) found so perfect an organic basis for their extraordinary activities. In the *Śāntiparvan* (296. 17-18), we find these four original *R̥ṣi* clans stated somewhat differently.

“Originally only four gotras arose, O King, *viz.*, Aṅgiras, Kāśyapa, Vasistha, and Bhṛgu ” (*Ibid*, p. 20).

In those later days, of course, recognised membership of the sacerdotal order (which did not come into existence till the age of the *Brāhmaṇas*—B.C. 800-500—when “the Five” and their associates, overshadowed by the *Dasyūs*, were dwelling in the territories of the Kūrū-Pāṇch’ālas, as described in the *Yajurveda*), depended on qualifications very different from any connected with Āryan descent. Hence, we need feel no surprise whatever when we see names such as Kāṇva, Viṣvāmitra, and Bhṛgū included in the list of priests. But we must then take that list as a list of priests (priests of the days spoken of in the *Yajurveda*), and nothing else. With these three *Yajamānic* names in it, at any rate, it could not have had any ethnic signification. It cannot, for instance, possibly exalt the Kāṇvas, Viṣvāmitras, and Bhṛgūs into the rank of tribal representatives of the *śukla* Āryan ethnos.

A little way back I spoke of a tremendous quarrel that had broken out between the Vasiṣṭhas and the Viṣvāmitras ; and I said I would return to it. I do so now ; for thereby hangs a tale.

So essentially different were the two great ethnic groups—the *śukla* Āryas and the Dark Warrior “Five” and their associates—that at last it was realised that they could not possibly continue to dwell together in the same country. Accordingly, the “Five” and their supporters, or rather the masterful Dasyūs and their at first obedient satellites, abandoned Sapta-Sindhavaḥ *en masse*, and migrated east by stages. But there were schisms within schisms : wheels within wheels.

In those days (at least so far as “the Five” were concerned) Sapta-Sindhavaḥ had been under the political rule of the Sudās dynasty—the founder of which was originally Prince or King of the Trtsū sub-group. It was in connection with a conspiracy to overthrow that dynasty in favour of a Dasyū (eventually known as Kūrū) family of the dark Bhārata coalition, that a *State Hierarchy*, under the contemplated new Bhārata *régime*, was instituted, and the germs arose of that complexly organised Priesthood which in due course of evolution developed into *Historical Brāhmanism*. The hierarchy thus inaugurated was a Dark Hierarchy, specially associated, it is said, with the name of the Kuśika (Kūṣa, *i.e.*, Kāssitic) Viṣvāmitras, identified by Mr. Chanda as a branch of the Bhārata tribe of the *Yajamāna* group” (p. 18)—which at once and effectually relegates the Viṣvāmitras and their primacy to a much later age, when, and when only, “non-Brāhman clients” (like Brāhman themselves) originally came into existence. As a matter of fact, the first ordained Primate of this scheming, ambitious sacerdotal body in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ itself, was a treacherous, seceded member of the Vasiṣṭha *Rṣi* Clan, who—though

head of his own *sūkla* order—had secretly sought out, and flung in his lot with, the dark Bhārata conspirators, on the strength of a grievance which had long rankled in his mind against the royal House of Sudās. Artfully wrapped up in picturesque pietistic language, the story of how this astute prelate induced the Bhāratas to rise against their sovereign (incidentally dishing and ousting the faction represented by the name Viṣvāmītra); how the plot he conceived is cantingly described as a revelation by Indra to Vasiṣṭha of Indra's own dread being; and how Indra is made to say

“But then do not inform other Rishis that I am Indra.”

in other words (Vasiṣṭha himself, not abstract Indra, being the speaker)—

“Do not inform my Āryan folk that I am hand-in-glove with you in this underhand, nefarious business.”;

is quaintly set forth in the *Taittirīya Saṃhita* III. 5. 21, and also in the *Tanḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa* (*Pañchavimsa Brāhmaṇa* XV. 5. 24).

In due course the migration takes place. The Trtsūs (Sudās's original subjects) are the first to depart: for by then the Dasyūs had successfully undermined their position. Afterwards, well-nigh the entire host of the “Five Races,” followed by the Dasyū-Kriviś (the Prussians of those days) at the head of the powerful Bhārata coalition, also abandon Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, settling down at various centres in the Doab and the Gangetic Valley: and thereupon the drama of subsequent history develops majestically along the well-known lines.

Pūrūs, *Yādūs*, *Turvaśas*, *Anūs*, *Drūhyūs*—even *Bhāratas*, and in particular *Dasyūs*—all these old names (noticeably the last) vanish outright, or fade away, as, confronting whatever of prosperity or disaster awaited them in the future, the communities they represented

plunged deliberately into the ocean of Niṣādan and modified Niṣādan humanity that thenceforth surged around and eventually engulfed them.

Brahmā-ṛṣi-dēśa, *Kūrū-Kshetra*, *Brahmā-varta*, and *Madhyā-dēśa*—these and the scenes connected with them pass before our eyes.

In this *Kūrū-Pāṇchāla* State, as it is called—or say, shortly, *Madhyā-dēśa*—we behold a vast area of newly arisen power and transformed culture, stretching from Uśīnara (trenching on the Vāhikas) in the north-west to Videgha, or Videha (Tirhūt), in the east, and, within these limits, including the Vāsas, Mātsyas, Kūrūs, Pāṇchālas, Kāśis, and Kosālas (Ayodhians), though the status of these last seems to have been peculiar for a time.

Here, in *Madhyā-dēśa*—say some time vaguely during B. C. 800-500—the *Brāhmaṇas* were developed; here *Caste* (in the Brāhmaṇistic sense) was invented, organised, and established; and here *Saṁskṛit* was patiently and imperceptibly fashioned into what it ultimately became. Beyond, extended a vast outer circle of all the *Vṛātyas*. And, if some ethnic and political names had disappeared, others became mysteriously prominent, *though in a strictly sacerdotal sense*—Aṅgīrasas, Atharvānas, Bhṛgūs, Vasiṣṭhas, Kāśyāpas, and so forth. But where, now, were the rosy-blond, flesh-and-blood communities for whom they had formerly stood? Where now, the beautiful and noble-minded *sūkla* Āryas?

Alas, in those days—we have it on the unimpeachable authority of the *Mahābhārata* (*Karnaparv* m, XLV. 40)—*Sapta-Sindhavaḥ*, and with it the ethnos from whom the ‘Five’ and their *Dasyūan* masters and Niṣādan followers had deliberately chosen to secede, were regarded as the country and the people of the *Vāhikas*, or *Bālīkas*, “the

Excluded"—*i.e.*, forsooth, excluded from the "Aryan" pale! Rājputāna also—which geographically belonged to Madhyā-dēśa—was for long left severely alone.

With a doubt, perhaps, regarding early Kos'āla, all within this "sacred" *Middle-Land* as it originally stood, and as its civilisation, and especially the cult and social system of *Brāhmanism*, gradually extended into the Outer Circle—this area alone (we are calmly asked by historical *Brāhmanism* to believe) constituted *Āryavarta*.

But *neti, neti*: it is not so.

The story, so told, has only gained acceptance, because, from then onwards even until to-day, Kūrū-inspired *Brāhmanism* has "held the field." For more than 2500 years it has been the dominant factor in India—and so has been able to impose its propaganda on all. Its strength now lies, not in its merits, but in its age-long prescriptive hold upon the general mentality of an ignorant and for the most part indifferent world. Proudly, therefore, and gaily, Brāhmanists blew their gorgeous, beautiful bubble. And, as long as it floated and scintillated in the air, unpricked, the whole world, Oriental and Occidental, gazed and wondered and admired *and believed*.

In what light, then, do we—now and henceforth—intend to regard the above-mentioned mysterious old *Rṣi* names—*Āṅgirases*, *Atharvānas*, *Bhṛgūs*, *Fasiṣthas*, etc.? How does modern Scholarship (Indian or European)—how does *Brāhmanism*—wish us to regard them?

Two alternatives—and two only—lie before us, and before *Brāhmanism*.

(1) Are these *Rṣi* names to be taken *merely in the sacerdotal, Brāhmanistic sense, i.e.*, as the names of divers Priest-Poets attached as Purohīts to the various Dark Warrior Clans who are revealed in the *Rigveda* as settled, or at least camped, in very early days (some indefinite time between B. C. 1151 and B. C. 326, but nearer the

former than the latter date) on the misty banks of some of the Indus tributaries ?

If so, then verily all those Indians who have hitherto flattered themselves that they are more or less of Āryan lineage, will have to resign themselves to the cold fact that, *apart from these shadowy names*, there is in Indian records *no evidence at all that the śūkla Āryas ever even entered the country lying immediately east of the Indus*.

Then (2)—turning to the other alternative—are we to take the *R̥ṣi* names as representing (after historical *Brāhmanism* had done with them) all that remained and remains in proof of the belief that, as a concrete red-corpuscle race, the *śūkla* Āryas, like the “Five Tribes,” the Dasyūs, and the Niṣādas, did once, in those ancient days, dwell or camp by one or more of the Vedic streams aforesaid ?

In that case—seeing that racially the Āryas were so superior to the Dasyūs, the “Five,” and their associated ethnoi, and were possessed of a spirituality which (lacking) these latter could only imitate on objective, noetic lines, and had also a culture with which that of the *śvāva* Group (wonderful though it was, as coming from Western Asia) could not really compare—does not the conclusion insistently suggest itself that, when first they formed their deep-laid plans for the creation of *Brāhmanism* and *Caste*, the Dasyū-instigated priestly factions amongst the Dark Five and their associates made up their minds to do what we know was actually done, *i.e.*, to *filch* all these vital elements from the *śūkla* Āryas—race-name, race-tradition, language, religio-philosophy (in a disguised form), and culture generally; then to cut themselves adrift from their exploited victims; to throw them aside, like sucked oranges; to have nothing more to do with them, except by way of aspersion; to brand them in the country's

archives as *Vahikas* or *Balhikas*, i.e., as "Excluded"; to consign them, as far as possible, to utter oblivion; in short, to rob them of their personality, their life-blood, and their reputation, and cast them into outer darkness as wandering ghosts; and finally, having brought *Madhyā-dēsa* into being, and established themselves with all their booty in that renowned centre, there, throughout ensuing centuries, the cynosure of all eyes, but blind to the accusing evidence of their own epidermis, unashamed to stand forth before a hypnotised universe, proclaiming their "identity" and their "greatness" thus: "Behold! We are the Ārya Folk; *Brāhmanism* is the Āryan religion-philosophy; *Caste* is a divinely-based social-system; *Sanskrit* is the original Aryan speech: *our* Culture is the Āryan culture"—much as the Prusso-Germans, before the War, yearned and intended to do with regard to themselves and the British and their respective ideals.

These appear to be the two horns of the dilemma with which Pandits are to-day confronted in connection with the problem of "Indo-Āryan origins." Which alternative they prefer to adopt and stand by, is a matter for their own decision.

Also, European scholars may well re-consider whether there is really any need or place for Dr. A. F. R. Hoernle's theory of *two* series of Āryan invasions.

In view of all the foregoing considerations, are we not now in a position to comprehend how it has come about that *Sanskrit*—though undoubtedly rooted in a once actually living language—that of the early *śūkla* Āryas—is no longer regarded by orientalists as a really natural language, like Greek or Arabic, but as a wonderfully devised artificial language—a titanic and bewilderingly complex *ersatz*—a sort of super-Volapük?

Just as the Kūrūs of modern Central Europe—though really only intellectual "Gideonites"—do possess mental

talent of a certain order, and have in fact, amongst some easily impressed people, won a reputation for a "learning" which they themselves claim to be transcendent, so the Kūrūs of ancient Brahmā-ṛṣi-deśa had their super-pandits—men of outstanding erudition and even of intuition, but mainly of exceptional intellectual ability (of the kind which doggedly and exhaustively analyses facts), and of a tireless, ant-like industry which first collects those facts by the mountain-load. Also they were astoundingly worldly-wise. Is it not clear that—in pursuance of their general gigantic scheme, and as one vast organic department thereof—it was these old-time Madhyā-deśan Bopps and Grimms who "invented" *Sanskrit*—first possessing themselves of the living language of the unfortunate *śukla Vāhikas*, or *Balhikas*, and then, out of its meticulously dissected and more or less metamorphosed carcase, integrating and galvanising and "polishing" that phenomenal *chef-d'oeuvre* of linguistic mechanics which, (admittedly perfect in its way), may not inaptly be designated the Glorified Esperanto of the Indian Orient? Its very name (*Samskritā*) is a revelation and enshrinement of its nature and origin.

And what about Bengal? Hitherto Bengal has been in Dreamland. To-day it is time that she should awake, and realise vividly who and what she *is*—and also who and what she is *not*. Thus only will she *continue* to lead in this great and glorious India—destined now to be even greater and more glorious than in the past. Doubtless, as regards culture, Bengal does owe something to Madhyā-deśa—"Āryan" Culture. But ethnically she owes it little or nothing. In her social structure she really knows only of Brāhmans and non-Brāhmans. She has no intermediate castes of undisputed status. Even what she has of *Caste* is not organic—in no way part of herself—but is purely and

even notoriously exotic. For instance, as regards her Brāhmans, true there are indications that once (but not till the 11th century A.D.) Brāhmans from Kānyakūbjīya (Kanauij) belonging to certain so-called *Ṛṣi gōtras* did enter Bengal somewhat freely. Undoubtedly these are represented somewhere to-day. But that 80 per cent. of the total Brāhman population in modern Bengal are descended, through 30 to 35 generations, from 5 such immigrants, as also that certain ubiquitous sub-Brāhman families, after only 22 to 25 generations, are descended from 4 progenitors who were the personal servants of these same 5 immigrants, and one who protested (to his cost) that he only accompanied them; may be dismissed with a smile.

And before the 11th century? According to Rādhiya genealogy there were 700 Brāhman families in Bengal at the time of the advent of the 5 from Kānyakūbjīya.

"But now-a-days representatives of the seven hundred families are nowhere to be met with, whereas the descendants of the five immigrants fill the whole country." (*The Indo-Aryan Races*, p. 177.)

No: Bengal is not of Madhyā-dēśan stock. Hence, she is not of so-called "Āryan" descent. Much less, therefore, is she of *śukla* Āryan descent. She is better than Pāñch'ālan: immeasurably better than Dasyūan. She is *herself*. And, that that is something worth being, is evident from the fact that to-day she is easily "First in India." Bengal, in short, does not stand in need of Caste. She has only to be true to her own soul.

For the spoliation of the original Aryas, the misappropriation of their illustrious name and glorious traditions, and the blotting out of their memory, Bengal is in no way responsible. Also, in the creation and establishment of historical *Brāhmanism* and *Caste*, she had no hand. In those connections her conscience is clear. The only charge that can be brought against Bengal is that hitherto

she has been unaccountably shy of recognising her own identity. Instigated and supported by a visionless, perverted, and parrot-voiced Scholarship (largely European), she has weakly and persistently cherished the fond belief that she is somebody else !

Bengal is *sui generis*. Her own individuality is well worth acknowledging ; her own True-Self well worth realising. Let her, then, see to it that she does acknowledge the one, and does realise the other. Heights upon heights tower up before her, for her to climb—*Semper ad astra* !

In a future paper I propose to examine sundry passages in some of the *Samhitās* which, in certain quarters, have hitherto been regarded as meaningless, yet which, interpreted in the light of modern knowledge concerning (*inter alia*) ancient kosmic conditions, and from the entirely novel and independent standpoint which I have heretofore adopted, may really give us just the help that we want in our researches into Antiquity.

Popular belief regarding the *Rgveda* and the other *Samhitās* assumes that they were all composed by the *sūkta* Āryas themselves—or rather by the “Āryas” as understood by conventional scholarship—in the days when these Āryas dwelt in Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, and that their poetical descriptions of celestial positions and changes, of thunder, lightning, rain, drought, river-action, the dawn, and so forth, had reference to the drama of natural phenomena as it actually went on around them daily in those days—say B. C. 1151 to B. C. 800. In this connection both scholarship and popular belief would seem to be in need of a little enlightenment. It will probably turn out that—whatever the dates when these *Samhitās* assumed the precise forms in which they are known to us—their abstract contents occasionally relate to geographical areas much farther west than the Indus, or even

than Zarah-Lake land and Airyavō-Vaēja ; to epochs and periods long anterior to the advent, some indefinite time after B. C. 1151, of the "Five Tribes" in the territories east of the Indus ; and to the ancestors and cultural predecessors of the *śūkla Āryas* in ages and countries when and where they were known, not as *Āryas* at all, but by names quite different from that, and in circumstances wholly foreign to all that is usually and so very vaguely associated with it.





PLATE I. PARKHAM IMAGE INSCRIPTION (IMPRESSION).



Four Ancient Yakṣa Statues

BY

RAMAPRASAD CHANDA, B.A.

Seldom have the handful of men in India and abroad interested in Indian Archaeology experienced so much excitement as during the last year. The agitation began with the announcement from Patna of the discovery of the portrait statues of two Śaiśunāka or Śaiśunāga kings, Udayin and Nandivardhana, of Magadha in the *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, March, 1919. This announcement evoked some criticism from Calcutta and London which was followed by the further announcement of the discovery of the statue of the more famous Ajātaśatru and the expulsion of Maṇibhadra from the rank of the Yakṣas in the December issue of the same *Journal*. The current issue of the *Journal* (June, 1920) contains detailed statement of the reasons that have led to the discovery of the statue of Ajātaśatru. The term "discovery" in connection with these statues is not to be understood in the ordinary sense, for the stones have long been known, and two of them known for a century, but, as the author of the discoveries, Mr. K. P. Jayaswal, puts it, it is to be understood in the sense of "restoration." He writes, "If my countrymen and those who own no limit of country—that Brotherhood of Scholars—find restored to them the statue of Ajātaśatru Śaiśunāga,

contemporary writing becomes to-day their possession, grateful thanks are due to His Honour without whom the recovery would not have been our privilege." (J.B.O.R. S., 1920, p. 175.) This momentous archaeological "restoration" is mainly due to the revised reading of the inscriptions on these statues. As a result of the controversy quite a large school of Archaeology has gathered round Mr. Jayaswal. Veterans like Mahāmahopādhyāya H. P. Śāstri of Calcutta, Rai Bahadur Gauriśankar H. Ojha of Ajmere, and Mr. R. D. Banerji of Poona have declared their agreement with the views of Mr. Jayaswal. Fresh recruits have also ranged themselves on the side of the champion of the Śaiśunāgas. In Europe, the late Dr. Vincent A. Smith, endeavoured to express his benediction on the new theory almost with his last breath. In the Joint Session of the Oriental Societies of the allied countries of Europe and America held in London in September, 1919, the theory was discussed by Senart, Grierson, and Barnett, among whom only the last named scholar, as the official report shows, ventured to express his disagreement (J.R.A.S., 1920, pp. 155-156). The present writer was one of those who first expressed his dissent from the Śaiśunāga theory (*Indian Antiquary*, 1919, pp. 29-32). As fresh facts and arguments have been put forth by Mr. Jayaswal and his followers since then, it is thought necessary to rediscuss these questions in some detail. In this connection particular thanks due to the Hon'ble Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Kt., C.S.I., President of the Council of Post-graduate Teaching in Arts, University of Calcutta, who was kind enough to give me all possible facilities for studying the records afresh and depute me and Pandit Ram Karṇa to visit the Mathura Museum of Archaeology to study from the stone, and take fresh paper casts and inked impressions, of the Parkham image inscription.



PLATE II. PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PLASTER MOULDS OF THE PARKHAM IMAGE INSCRIPTION.

Is Maṇibhadra a Yakṣa or a Bodhisatva ?

Besides the epigraphical questions involved, the main issue of the controversy is, whether the two Patna statues in the Bharhut gallery of the Indian Museum, Calcutta, and the Parkham statue in the Mathura Museum of Archæology, are statues of Yakṣas as held by older archæologists, or are the portrait statues of three Śāisunāga kings. Not only has the latter view been contested on the ground that the names of the Śāisunāga kings are not traceable in the inscriptions, but Mr. O. C. Gangoly has expressed the opinion that these three statues resemble the statue of the Yakṣa Maṇibhadra too closely to be anything but Yakṣa statues (*Modern Review*, October, 1919). Before taking up the epigraphical arguments I shall deal with this iconographical issue. The statue of Maṇibhadra or Māṇibhadra in question was discovered by Mr. Garde, Superintendent of Archæology, Gwalior State, at a place called Pawaya within the state and is described by him in an article entitled "The site of Padmāvati" published in the *Annual Archæological Report*, 1915-16. The front face of the pedestal of this statue bears a Brāhmī inscription in six lines which records the installation of the image of Māṇibhadra in the following terms.—*gaushṭhyā Māṇibhadra-bhaktā garbha-sukhitāḥ Bhagavato Māṇibhadrasya pratimā pratishṭhāpayanti.*

Mr. Garde calls Māṇibhadra a Yakṣa on the authority of Monier-William's Dictionary. Mahāmahopadhyāya H. P. Śāstrī in an article published in J.B.O.R.S., (December, 1919, p. 552) proposes to reject this identification and writes :—

"Maṇibhadra is there called Bhagavan an epithet which can never be applied to a Yakṣa, unless we strain very much the meaning of the word Bhagavan. From

the way Maṇibhadra is spoken of in the inscription on the statue he seems to be the Bodhisatva Maṇibhadra of the Buddhists."

The reason why Māṇibhadra should be identified with "the Bodhisatva Maṇibhadra" is not clear. The proposition, "from the way in which Maṇibhadra is spoken of in the inscription" is rather vague. What is there to show that this Maṇibhadra is "the Bodhisatva" and can be nothing else? The epithet Bhagavat is not a monopoly of the Bodhisatvas of the Buddhists. Who again is "the Bodhisatva Maṇibhadra"? Is there any evidence, whether archæological or literary, that proves the existence of the cult of a Bodhisatva named Maṇibhadra in any part of India in any epoch? Mr. Garde assigns the statue of Maṇibhadra to the first or second century A.D. It may be even older. Up to now no archæological evidence has been discovered in the area in which Brāhmī script was used from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D. to indicate the prevalence of the cult of such well-known Bodhisatvas as Avalokiteśvara, Mañjuśrī, or even Maitreya, to say nothing of this unknown and unheard of Bodhisatva Maṇibhadra. The reason why the epithet Bhagavat "can never be applied to a Yakṣa" is not even hinted at. In a Mathurā inscription (Lüders' List, No. 85) Nāga Dadhikarṇa is called Bhagavat. If a Nāga can be called Bhagavat why not a Yakṣa by his own worshippers, for the *goṣṭhī* or corporation that installed this image of Maṇibhadra call themselves *Māṇibhadra-bhaktā*, 'devotees of Māṇibhadra.' In the Mahābhārata Vaiśravaṇa, the lord of the Yakṣas, is often designated Bhagavat.¹ It appears from the confident manner in which Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasād Śāstrī rejects Mr. Garde's identification that he is not aware of the fact that Sanskrit,

¹ E. W. Hopkins, *Epic Mythology* (Strassburg, 1915), p. 145.

Pāli, and Prākṛit literatures contain ample evidences of the prevalence of the cult of the Yakṣa Maṇibhadra in ancient India. Some of the Sanskrit texts are referred to in the St. Petersburg Dictionary under Maṇibhadra. I shall quote one of these texts. In the Kathāsarit-sāgara, Part I, Chapter XIII, we are told:—

“In our country, within the city, there is the shrine of a powerful Yakṣa named Maṇibhadra, established by our ancestors. The people there come and make petitions at this shrine, offering various gifts, in order to obtain various blessings.”¹

“In order to obtain various blessings” of this text reminds us of *Gauṣṭhyām Bhagavā āyu balam vācham kalyānābhyudayaṁ prītō dīśatu* in the inscription of our statue. Hopkins writes on the authority of the Mahā-bhārata, “Maṇibhadra or Maṇivara, a Yakṣarāj (Yakṣendra) like Kuvera (5, 192, 44 f), is Kubera’s chief attendant. He is called lord of wealth and of treasure (Yakṣapati, adhipa, Nidhiśa, Dhanapati, Draviṇādhipati, Dhanada; his name also appears as Mānicāra) and is invoked as patron of merchants with Kubera.”²

From the Pāli canon of the Buddhists and the Prākṛit canon of the Śvetāmvara Jains it is evident that Yakṣa Maṇibhadra was a popular deity in Eastern India. In the Yakkha-Saṃyutta of the Saṃyutta-Nikāya (X, 4) Maṇibhadra is one of the Yakṣas who is made to sing praise of the Buddha. About the haunt of Maṇibhadra it is said:—

“*Ekam samayaṁ Bhagavā Magadhesu viharati Maṇimālake cetiye Maṇibhaddassa yakkhassa bhavane.*”³

“The Blessed one was once staying in Magadha at the Maṇimāla caitya in the haunt of Yakṣa Maṇibhadra.”

¹ C. H. Tawney, *Kathāsaritsāgara* (Eng. tr.), Vol. I, p. 91.

² *Epic Mythology*, p. 144.

³ *The Saṃyutta Nikāya of the Sutta-Piṭaka*, Part I (London, 1884), p. 208.

The Sūrya-prajñapti, one of the Upāṅgas of the Śvētāmbara Jainas, begins thus after the customary invocations :—

*te ṇaṃ kālenam te ṇaṃ samae ṇaṃ Mihilā nāman
nayarī hotthā.....tise ṇaṃ Mihilāe nayarīe bahiyā
uttarapurachchhime disibhāe etthaṇaṃ Māṇibhadde nāman
ceie hotthā.*

“At that time and at that hour, there was a city named Mithilā. To the north-east of the city of Mithilā was the Māṇibhadra Caitya.”

The Jainas recognise Soma, Yama, Varuṇa, and Vaiśramana (Vaiśravana, Kubera) as the four Lokapālas or the guardian deities of the four cardinal points. In the Bhagavati-Sūtra, III, 7, it is said of Vaiśramana :—

*Vesamaṇassa ime devā ahāvuccā abhinṇāyā hotthā
taṃ jahā—Punṇabhadde Māṇibhadde Sālibhadde Sumanā-
bhadde Cakkarakkhe Punṇarakkhe Sarvāṇe Sarvajase
Sarvakāme Samiddhe Amoke Asānte.*

“The following devas are obedient to Vaiśramana—Punṇabhadra, Māṇibhadra, Sālibhadra, Sumanabhadra, Cakshuraksha, Punṇaraksha, Sarvāṇa, Sarvayaśas, Sarvakāma, Samiddha, Amogha, Asānta.”

Vaiśramana or Vaiśravana is the king of the Yakṣas, and his followers, also called the *Vaiśramana-kāyika devas* (gods of Vaiśramana's family), are of course Yakṣas. So the canonical books of the Brahmans, the Bauddhas, and the Jainas agree in recognising Māṇibhadra or Māṇibhadra as a Yakṣa, whereas Bodhisattva Māṇibhadra is unknown. It may be noted that both in the inscription and in the Jaina texts Māṇibhadra is written with the first syllable lengthened. The artistic and other iconographic considerations on which Mr. Gangoly recognises in the Patna and the Parkham statues images of Yakṣas are thus set forth by him :—

“If we take into consideration the proportion of the

different parts of the body, both the Parkham and the Maṇibhadra image correspond to the *Madhyama-navatāla* proportions laid down in the *Śilpaśāstras* being the canonical measure in which the images of Yakṣas are prescribed by the texts to be constructed. The Patna images also answer the *navatāla* canon. If the Parkham image is connected with the Maṇibhadra image by the iconographical formulæ indicated above, the 'pot-belly' of both the figures assume more significance than an accidental resemblance of type. From examples of Gandhara sculptures we know the 'pot-belly' is the invariable characteristic of Yakṣas, *e.g.*, Jambhala, Kuvera, etc. In fact one of the Yakṣas, the presiding genius of Laṅkā (Ceylon), actually bears the appellation Kalasōdara. Dr. Vogel has suggested that the Parkham image is Kuvera. Most probably the image represents Gardhabhako, the presiding genius of Mathurā, and its left hand probably carried the purse, the ordinary insignia of a Yakṣa, as in the Maṇibhadra image. In the Parkham image both hands are broken away but from the indication of the place near the waist where the left hand touched the torso it is almost certain that the left hand had a similar attitude as the image of Maṇibhadra. The right hand of the latter image obviously carried the fly-whisk.

"The two statues from Patna curiously enough imitate the Maṇibhadra image in the attitude of his left hand, which is obviously of a hand carrying some heavy object. The almost identical bent at right angle of the left hands of the two Patna statues as also the repetition of the folds of the draperies are difficult to explain on the supposition of the so-called family resemblance between the two. There is not only a similarity in gestures but also in the folds of the *dhoti*, the hanging ends and the nobs of the garments, which along with the other common

features of the two figures undoubtedly proclaim them as 'twins.' As we shall presently see they are twins iconologically. The mysterious identity of dress and attitude preclude any supposition of their being individual portrait statues. They are in fact 'icons.' And if the study of the two other figures cited above and the attitude of the left hand offer any data, they proclaim very loudly that they are images of Yakṣas" (pp. 421-422).

It is not easy to improve upon Mr. Gangoly's treatment of the iconographic aspect of the Mañibhadra statue, the Parkham image, and the Patna statues. Mahāmahopādhyāya Śāstrī's article on "Śīsunāga-statues" is partly a reply to Mr. Gangoly. M. M. Śāstrī endeavours to meet Mr. Gangoly's strong arguments in support of the view that the Parkham image is a Yakṣa image by stating that the inscription on the pedestal of the image contains the name of another Śāisunāga king, Kuṇika-Ajātaśatru, and so it is also a portrait statue. This leads us to Mr. Jayaswal's last and greatest "restoration."

The Parkham Image inscription.

In the same number of the J. B. O. R. S. (December, 1919) in which M. M. Śāstrī contributes the above-mentioned article appears Mr. Jayaswal's first note on the discovery of the statue of Ajātaśatru in the Parkham image in the Mathura Museum. In the current number of the same Journal (June 1920) appears Mr. Jayaswal's promised article, "The statue of Ajātaśatru-Kuṇika and a discussion on the origin of Brāhmī" with Plates. The latest and the best known reading of the Parkham image inscription is that of Vogel published in the Catalogue of the Mathura Museum of Archæology. I reproduce

Vogel's and Jayaswal's reading side by side as well as Sten Konow's reading of the inscription on the proper right side of the image for comparison : —

- (1) Vogel—(Right side)...[*ni*] *Bhadapugarinā*[*ka*]
 ...(Between the legs)[*ga*] *aṭha...pi*.
 (Left side)...*Kuni* [*ka*] *te vāsinā*
 [*Gomitakena*] *katā*
- (2) Jayaswal—(Right side) *Nibhada praśeni Ajā*
śatru rājo S[i]ri (Between the legs) 4,
thū (=10) *do* (=10), 4, *hri* (=8) (Left
 side) *Kuṇika Śevāsināgo Māgadhānam*
Rājā
- (3) Sten Konow—*Om Bhadapugarikū ga raña*
 (Between the legs) *aṭha he*¹

Vogel puts within square brackets the value of signs that are partly effaced yet readable. In his Plates I and II Mr. Jayaswal reproduces the impressions, photograph of paper casts, and "tracing by Mr. Bishun Swarup from casts in plaster" of the right and left sides of the inscription. Unfortunately the impressions and its sections and the photograph of paper casts are produced on a small scale evidently to make room for the reproduction of Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing in "original size." The use of tracing for deciphering defaced inscriptions is a new departure in the field of Indian epigraphy, and, so far as I know, it owes its inauguration to the "restoration" of the Śaīsunāga statues. In connection with the inscriptions on the two Patna statues (J. B. O. R. S., Vol. V, Plate 1 facing p. 516) Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing of letters from paper casts is published together with the eye-copies of two other persons. In the case of

¹ *In. Ant.*, 1909, p. 147, n. In place of *om* Mr. Nanigopal Mazumdar of the Calcutta University proposes to read *ma* and recognises the name Manibhada in the beginning of the record.

the inscription on the Parkham statue the use of eye-copies have been very properly dispensed with. The eyes often see what the mind expects. So eye-copies prepared by one cannot have as much value for another as mechanical reproductions. The tracing is open to the same objections. For the hand traces what the eyes see, and the eyes may see what the mind may expect. We do not know the date on which Mr. Bishun Swarup prepared his tracing of the Parkham image inscription from casts in plaster. It is published in the *J. B. O. R. S.*, Vol. VI, 1920, June. In the *J. B. O. R. S.*, Vol. V, 1919, December, p. 556, Mr. Jayaswal writes,

“I went and inspected it (the Parkham statue) in the Mathura Museum..... It bears an inscription round the statue on the pedestal. I examined it carefully and came to the conclusion that there was no trace of a Yakṣa and that the whole inscription is readable except one letter. The left side which was exposed to light gave me the reading—

Kuṇika Sevāsināgo Māga nam...

“Kuṇika Śevāsināga—of the Magadhas.”

“This made me pray His Honour Sir Edward Gait to kindly obtain impressions and casts of the inscription for leisurely study. In response to His Honour’s request Sir Harcourt Butler *had casts and impressions prepared by Mr. Dikshit. I have now utilized these.* Their fac-similes will be published in the next number. In the meantime I give my reading of the inscription.”

The reading given after this passage is the same as reproduced above as No. 2. It will be seen from the lines put in italics by me that the reading was originally based on casts and impressions prepared by Mr. Dikshit and not on Mr. Bishun Swarup’s tracing. This may




PLATE III. PAPER MOULDS OF THE PARKHAM IMAGE INSCRIPTION.

Photo-engraved & printed at the Offices of the Survey of India, Calcutta, 1921.

lead one to suppose that the tracing was prepared after the reading was published and the maker of it might very well have quite unconsciously been influenced by it. In order to test the new reading and the tracing that supports it I have used the following materials :—

(a) A set each of paper moulds and inked impressions kindly lent me by Mr. K. N. Dikshit, now Offg. Superintendent of Archaeology, Eastern Circle.

(c) A set of plaster of Paris moulds prepared under the direct supervision of Rai Bahadur Dayārām Sahni, Superintendent of Hindu and Buddhist Monuments, Northern Circle, which he very courteously placed at my disposal and of which a photograph by Munshi Ghulam Nobi has been reproduced in Plate II.

(d) The stone bearing the inscription (upper surface of the pedestal of the Parkham image which I examined with light in the company of Pandit Ramkarna and Rai Bahadur Rādhākṛiṣṇa, Curator of the Mathura Museum).

(e) Paper moulds and impressions by Pandit Ramkarna (reproduced in Plates III and I).

To begin with the part of the inscription on the right side of the pedestal, Mr. Jayaswal's difference with Cunningham, Sten Konow, and Vogel begins with where Cunningham reads *pugarā*, and others read *pugari*, and he reads *pra seni*. The reason for reading *pra* in place of *pu* is thus stated : "That it is not *pu* but *pra* is indicated by the higher placing of *p* and the length of *r* which is too long to be an *u*-mark; if *p* had been the main member it would have occupied the level of the other letters" (p. 183). Mr. Jayaswal leaves us in the dark as to which is the main member of the conjunct *pra*, for neither *p* nor *r* is fully (*i.e.*, on both ends) on the level of other letters. Other objections such as

“higher placing” and the length of the lower sign which he urges against the reading *pu* may with as much or as little force be urged against *pra*. If the lower sign was really *r*, in so old an inscription according to Mr. Jayaswal we should expect a screw-like or some other archaic type of *r* in place of straight-lined *r* usually found in the Brāhmī inscriptions from the second century B.C. onward.

The reason for reading the next letter which all others read as *ga* as *śe* is thus stated: “The next letter has its left arm partially missing owing to an abrasion and consequently it was read as *g*.” (p. 183). On another page (p. 180) he writes of this so-called *śe*, “The Aśoka variety of *ś* is found in *śeni* and *śatru*, while the *ś* in *Śevāsi* has the archaic top vertical.” An Aśokan *ś* may be roughly defined as an angle made up of two straight lines of equal length with another straight line bisecting the angle \angle . What Mr. Jayaswal calls the left arm of his *śe* is traceable nowhere except in the tracing of Mr. Bishun Swarup. What is visible on the stone and traceable in the impression and on the moulds is a big hole to the left of the apex of the angular *g* bordering on the left arm and a much smaller hole to the left of the big one.

I pass over the next letter which Vogel reads *ni* and Mr. Jayaswal reads *ni* with the remark that what Mr. Jayaswal terms “the right base” is invisible except in Mr. Bishun Swarup’s tracing, and even there it does not appear as a regular base line of *n* at right angle to the vertical line.

The next following letter which Konow reads *ka* and Vogel reads *nā* assumes great importance because in it Mr. Jayaswal recognises the *a* of the name Ajātaśatru. The cause of difference of opinion between Konow and Vogel may be easily explained. An old Brāhmī *k* is a

simple cross made up of two straight lines, in most cases of equal length, that cut each other at right angles $+$; and a Brāhmī n is a simple Roman τ turned upside down \perp . So if the lower half of the vertical line of k is not visible it has the look of n . The horizontal line of k stretches along the middle of the row of letters whereas the place of the horizontal base of n is at the lower end. In the case of the letter in question it is a n with the base line higher up on the level of the middle of the row of letters, and has the look more of a k with the lower half of the vertical line obliterated than a n . But in the stone no trace is found of such a lower line. So it appears to me safer to read it as $nā$ than as $kā$. The two hooks on the right of this sign are not hooks at all, as the stone and moulds distinctly show, but are the semicircular borders of two superficial cavities on the surface of the stone. The outline of the upper cavity is quite distinct and clearly distinguishable from the horizontal line of n , and the upper outline of the lower cavity does not touch any of the visible lines of the letter. Even if we admit, for the sake of argument, that the hook-like outlines of the two cavities are really engraved lines belonging to a partly defaced sign, this sign cannot be read as a . All the known Brāhmī a -s have the arms on the left. But if we recognise Mr. Jayaswal's a as a regular letter, we get an a with two hooked arms on the right of the vertical line. Mr. Jayaswal asks us to "see the form of the Parkham, Patna and Vaisāli letters" (p. 183). But nowhere in any published Brāhmī inscription do we find a with two arms on the right.

The four letters that follow this imaginary a which Mr. Jayaswal reads *jāsatru* are hopelessly defaced. So it seems absolutely impossible for us to say how far Mr. Jayaswal's restoration of these letters is correct. Then follows *rājo* of Mr. Jayaswal the *jo* of which

we shall discuss below. The letters on the middle portion of the pedestal need not detain us, for, here also, though we are unable to see eye to eye with Mr. Jayaswal, there is found nothing relating to the Śaīsunāga dynasty.

Though the occurrence of the name *Ajā. śatru* on the left side of the pedestal of the Parkham image is extremely doubtful, there cannot be the least doubt about the occurrence of Kuṇika, a name by which King Ajātaśatru was also known, on the right. But the sense yielded by the letters that follow have hitherto prevented epigraphists from identifying this Kuṇika with the famous King Kuṇika Ajātaśatru. Mr. Jayaswal of course has come forward with a reading that purports to describe Kuṇika as the self-same king of Magadha. Let us see how far this reading is accurate. Most of the letters on the right side of the pedestal are tolerably legible. I shall repeat the different readings:—

Cunningham-Kunika te vā ni nā go mā ta ke na ka tā

Vogel— Kuṇi [ka] te vā si nā [Go mi ta ke na] ka tā

Jayaswal—Kuṇika Śe vā si nā go Māgadhaṇām rājā
(1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7)(8)(9)(10)(11)(12)(13)(14)(15).

There is a very wide divergence of opinion between Mr. Jayaswal and his predecessors relating to the value of the letters 2, 4, 10, 11, 13, 14. To explain these and other different readings Mr. Jayaswal sets forth an elaborate series of arguments. The examination of all these arguments will require a big volume. Here I can only deal with a few to further illustrate his fallacious method. He writes, "The letters which are most archaic and differ strikingly from the Aśokan ones are : *n* in *pra-śeni* and *māgadhaṇām* ; *a* in *Ajātaśatru* ; *ś* in *Śevāsīnāgo* ; *s* in *Siri* ; *j* in *Ajāta*, *rājo* and *rājā* ; *ṇ* in *Kuṇika* ; *dh* in

Māgadhānam; *th* in the front line; and the vowel marks denoting *e* in *Śevāsi*, *ā* in *Māgadhānam*, *rājā*, and *rājo*, and *o* in *rājo* and *nāgo*. In other words about 50 per cent. of the letters are markedly archaic, so much so that 25 per cent. are entirely new forms." (p. 179.)

Some letters are here called archaic for the only reason that they "differ strikingly from the Aśokan ones." As we shall see later on, these so-called archaic letters, though they differ strikingly from some Aśokan letters, they fully agree with other Aśokan letters and have been read accordingly. However, even if we admit for the sake of argument that they do differ strikingly from Aśokan letters, is not any other explanation of this difference conceivable? In the rock and pillar edicts we have a full manual of Aśokan letters. But we possess no such dated manual of any type of pre-Mauryan alphabet. So it cannot be assumed that letters that strikingly differ in form from the Aśokan ones are necessarily "most archaic." Without being perturbed by any such doubt Mr. Jayaswal proceeds, "In other words, about 50 per cent. of the letters are markedly archaic, so much so that 25 per cent. are entirely new forms." Is "markedly archaic" synonymous with "entirely new"? Mr. Jayaswal's arithmetic indicates that this is not so to the full or cent. per cent. extent, but to the extent of 25 out of 50. A modern form as contrasted with a "markedly archaic" form of the same letter means minor recognisable difference. But an "entirely new" form as compared with a known form involves radical non-recognisable differences. For what is even partially known cannot be declared "entirely new." Arithmetically speaking, any thing cent. per cent. characteristics of which are new can only be declared "entirely new." If the twenty-five per cent. of the

letters are "entirely new" to the student of Brāhmī writing, how could Mr. Jayaswal ascertain their value with so much certainty? He has, however, endeavoured to anticipate this objection by tracing the origin and development of Brāhmī in India from 2000 B. C. to the time of Aśoka, and identify the 50 per cent. "markedly archaic" including the 25 per cent. "entirely new" forms with the sixth century B. C. links of this evolutionary chain. I shall briefly describe some of the links:

(1) Letters on pottery dug out of the cairns of the Deccan and published by Mr. G. Yazdani in the *Journal of the Hyderabad Archaeological Society*, 1917 (Plate facing p. 57). Mr. Jayaswal writes, "Their time as indicated by the decay of the stone coffins and the pottery shown to me by Dr. Hunt of Hyderabad may be circa 2000 B. C." (p. 200).

(2) The Harappa seal letters. "Their date may be before 1000 B. C." (p. 201).

(5) Piprahwa vase inscription, B. C. 544-434. Other links are well-known Brāhmī inscriptions on coins and seals of unknown date that are made to fill the gap of about two hundred years between the Piprahwa vase inscription and the edicts of Aśoka.

This chain of evolution of Brāhmī alphabet in India from 2000 to 300 B. C. looks more like a tracing on sand. The chart illustrating this chain is not yet out. But copies of original plates and impressions that served as materials for the charts are accessible to us and therefore the scheme may be examined without the charts. The dates assigned to the pottery dug out of the cairns of the Deccan and to the Harappa seals, and the recognition of the marks and signs on these as alphabetic forms, are open to serious objections. By what

standard does Mr. Jayaswal measure the time "indicated by the decay of the stone coffin and the pottery?" unearthed from the cairns? Has he taken into consideration other factors than mere lapse of time, such as the peculiar chemical action, if any, of earth, air, and water of the locality that hastens or retards decay? May not these marks and symbols be owner's or potter's marks, pictographs, or phonograms? Mr. Jayaswal himself introduces us to a new type of marks called by him "sept marks" which he noticed on celts in the Indian Museum originally found in Bihar (p. 200, note). We may also hold that the Harappa seals "do not bear writing but sept marks." In estimating the age of the Harappa seals the style and technique of figures of animals on them should not be ignored.

Leaving these questions to the consideration of specialists, we shall examine Mr. Jayaswal's views relating to the date of the Piprahwa vase inscription. He writes:—

"The Piprahwa inscription refers to the relics of the relatives of the Buddha as Fleet has argued (J.R.A.S., 1906, p. 149). A stūpa was given to the massacred Śākyaas 'secretly' (ibid. 166) and later, in the reign of Virudhaka probably no one dared to erect the memorial. It should be noticed that the reference to the Buddha in the inscription shows the already established position of Tathāgata as 'Bhagavat Buddha' and 'the Famous One.' We would not be far from the actual date if we place it, after Fleet, within a century from the Buddha's death (544 B. C.—434 B. C.). Its letter-forms confirm this view. Compare its *bh*, its angular *dh*, its *s*, its *n* with the Parkham letters. In each case its forms are later, while some letters are older in form than the Aja statue, as *dh*, *g*, and some later as *bh* and *n*" (pp. 201-202).

Curiously enough here the writer totally ignores the views of other equally eminent authorities, Senart, Barth and Lüders, who have dealt with the record subsequent to Fleet and who have offered quite a different interpretation. The text of the inscription, as pointed out by Fleet, begins and ends thus :—

*Sukitibhatinam sabhaginikanam saputadalanam iyam
sailanidhane Budhasa bhagavate Sakiyanam.*

Fleet takes *sukiti* (*sukīrti*) as a designation of Buddha, *sakiyanam* as equivalent to Sanskrit *svakiya*, 'relations, kinsmen,' and thus translates the record :—

"Of the brethren of the World-famed One, with (their) sisters, with (their) children and wives, this deposit of (their) relics—of the kinsmen of Buddha, the blessed one."

With very good reasons Barth, in agreement with Senart, translates the inscription thus :—

"This receptacle of relics of the blessed Buddha of the Śākyas (*is the pious gift*) of the brothers of Sukirti,* jointly with their sisters, with their sons and their wives."¹

This rendering is accepted by Lüders in his List No. 939. Thus interpreted the inscription does not "supply us with materials for constructing a chronological system." But along with this interpretation Mr. Jayaswal has endeavoured to throw into oblivion certain very valuable observations of Barth on the date of this inscription, Barth writes :—

"In the first place there is *the writing*, which is so perfectly identical with the inscriptions of Aśoka engraved in the same characters that it seems impossible to separate

¹ *Ind. Ant.*, 1907, p. 124.





PLATE IV. INSCRIPTION ON PATNA STATUE B (IMPRESSION).

Photo-engraved & printed at the Offices of the Survey of India, Calcutta, 1921.



the two by an interval of more than two centuries. Bühler, who with good reason was ever on the look-out for any facts that might prove an early use of writing in India, simply declared that he considered the inscription to be anterior to Aśoka; but he died, without telling us by how much or why. I suppose that his sole reason was the absence of any notation of the long vowel. But, in addition to the fact that this notation is practised with a certain amount of laxity in the authentic inscriptions of the king—(it is well known that in the other system of writing which reads from right to left it has never been in use)—it is entirely absent from one of the inscriptions on the Rāmgarh-Hill, which no one has yet desired to date before Aśoka, and it is equally absent from the copper-plate inscription of Sohgaura, with one single exception. And it is this very exception that, as it would seem, ought to give us a hint as to what was the real state of matters. The simplest explanation clearly is to see in the general absence of the long vowel the result of an intentional simplification, and to regard the exceptional occurrence of it in the plate as a mere slip of the writer or engraver who at the very end and in this one case only reverted to a practice that came familiar to him, not, as Dr. Fleet wishes, as a sign of the still uncertain use of a newly introduced notation. In our inscription, on the other hand, there is no inadvertency; here the simplification is a consistent one, and is moreover justified in this kind of griffato, where the characters, slender and somewhat cursive, are traced distinctly but very slightly, as if cut with a knife, but yet without presenting either in detail or in their general aspect any trace of those modifications that usually reveal a difference in time. It is certainly rash to judge of the age of document from simple palæographic analogies. But when, as is the case here, there is a complete identity, not only

as to the component parts, but also as to the style, with memorials of the same origin, hesitation is no longer permissible. It would require an incontrovertible proof to make us separate our inscription from the neighbouring ones of Nigliva and Rumendei by two centuries or more." (*Ind. Ant.*, 1907, pp. 118-119.)




Further on Barth states his views regarding the date of the Piprahwa vase inscription with greater definiteness thus:—"In our inscription, which, moreover, does not mark the long vowel—(I have already stated what should be thought of this omission),—*sakiya* would still be taken in its original sense; the inscription must, therefore, be anterior, by at least a full century, to that on the pillar of Aśoka (the middle of the 3rd century B.C.), in which the notation of the long vowel is established and in which the designation of the Buddha as *Śākyamuni*, "the hermit of the Śākyas," shows that the possessive adjective has had time to change into an ethnical term." (p. 124.) It is difficult to withhold assent from this cautious and well-considered surmise. But for our present purpose Barth's observation that the writing on the Piprahwa vase is "perfectly identical with the inscriptions of Aśoka engraved in the same characters" is of great importance. Mr. Jayaswal writes, "Compare its (Piprahwa vase's) *bh*, its angular *dh*, its *s*, its *ns* with the Parkham letters. In each case its forms are later." This statement is *absolutely wrong*. Both Piprahwa vase inscription and the Parkham image inscription are of unknown date. But we know the date of the inscriptions of Aśoka and the Besnagar pillar inscription of Heliodoros, ambassador of Antialkidas, approximately. Now, let us compare Mr. Jayaswal's four test letters *bh*, *dh*, *s*, *n* of these inscriptions.

(1) The *dh* of the Piprahwa vase inscription and Aśoka's edict is a plain Roman capital D. (Plate VII) The

dh of the Besnagar inscription is the same sign with the sides reversed \cap . This latter type of *dh* is met with in the Bharhut inscriptions, one of which, that on the gateway, belongs to the regime of the Śuṅgas, and in the inscriptions of the Kṣatrapas and the Kushans. So *dh* resembling a plain Roman capital *D* may be recognised as the archaic form of the letter, and *dh* with the sides reversed as the later form. On the left portion of the Parkham image inscription neither the archaic nor the later form of *dh* is traceable. In Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing there is a right-angled triangle with sides of unequal length and the hypotenuse on the right in the place where Cunningham and Vogel find a Brāhmī *k*. This triangle Mr. Jayaswal recognises as the pre-Piprahwa *dh*. As we are ignorant of any Brāhmī writing that can be assigned to the pre-Piprahwa period on incontrovertible grounds we are not competent to give any opinion on the value of this discovery. But we can clearly trace a plain cross (Brāhmī *k*) where Messrs. Jayaswal and Bishun Swarup find a triangle of the type described above.

(2) The *n* of the Piprahwa vase, the Aśokan edicts, and all other Brāhmī inscriptions is a plain Roman capital \top turned upside down \perp . The same type of *n* occurs also in the Parkham image inscription. So there is nothing in the *n* of the Parkham image inscription that can induce us to assign the record to the sixth century B.C.

(3) A Brāhmī *bh* consists of four short straight lines, one horizontal and three vertical, two of which are placed below the horizontal line and one above it. Most of the *bh*-s in the edicts of Aśoka have the horizontal line a little extended beyond the right lower vertical line and the upper vertical line standing at right angle to its right end

. This we call *bh* type 1. In the edicts the two following types of *bh* are also met with—(2)  (3) . In the Piprahwa vase inscription there are three *bh*-s, all of type 1. In the Besnagar inscription of Heliodoros there are three *bh*-s all of type 2; and in later inscriptions of known date we have almost exclusively *bh*-s of type 3. In our Parkham image inscription there is a solitary *bh* and that of type 3. So if the Parkham image is to be dated in accordance with the form of the letters of its inscription, it should be assigned to a date later than the Besnagar pillar inscription. The straight-lined *r* in the Parkham image inscription as compared to the screw-like *r* in the inscription of Heliodoros points to the same conclusion.

(4) The solitary *s* in *Kunikevasinā* in the left portion of the Parkham image inscription is slightly different in form from the Aśokan and Piprahwa vase *s*. But its shorter vertical indicates that it should be classed with *s* of the Brāhmī inscriptions of a much later period. (See *Memoirs A.S.I.*, No. 1, plates V and VI.) As compared with other letters of the Parkham image inscription it should be treated as an advanced form.

Now to return to Mr. Jayaswal's reading of the right portion of the Parkham image inscription, we shall deal with the archaic forms of Mr. Jayaswal one by one in the order in which they occur in the text.

(2) According to Mr. Jayaswal *n* in Kunika is one of the "most archaic" letters. Here the top of the vertical line has been flattened in consequence of damage of the stone. This was perceived by Cunningham and Vogel and so they did not hesitate to read the syllable as *ni*. But in Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing the triangular cavity on the stone is ignored and its upper side is

represented as a line. Even as it is, the difference between Aśokan *ṇ* and this sign is not great.

(4) Mr. Jayaswal writes, "The akshara now read as *śe* was read as *te*, evidently the middle stroke had been disregarded for *ś* with an upper bar had been unknown, the instance on the Patna statue having been missed owing to the misreading *ke*" (p. 184). This "middle stroke" is not discernible either in the stone or in the casts and impressions. The space between the two lower arms of the letter is damaged. But there is nothing that justifies the "middle stroke" shown in Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing. So there is no necessity for creating a *ś* hitherto unknown to Indian epigraphy to read a sign which is a clear Aśokan *t*. Cunningham, Lüders and Vogel have all recognised it as *t*. Mr. Jayaswal bases his reading *śe* on the analogy of the last letter of the inscription on the Patna statue A (his King Aja). About this letter he writes in J.B.O.R.S., 1919, p. 93 :—

"The last letter is still more original and its identification was a matter of some time. A long perpendicular line is drawn first and then by its sides, about the middle two hooks are added in two separate strokes. At first sight one would be inclined to take it as a fourth century (A.C.) two-stroke *k*, but the absence of seraph and the lower flourish together with the number of strokes would dislodge that proposal. It is radically different from *k*. If we follow the method of presuming an earlier form, we can on palæographic considerations trace the ancestry of the Aśokan and Bhattiprolu *ś* to this letter. The pivotal line has been contracted in the latter, its upper portion totally disappearing and the lower still remaining longer than the sidal legs. The legs, again, tend to hang down, while they hang on in the Śāisunāka letter."

Here, in the matter of the two *śe*-s, Mr. Jayaswal surpasses himself. The two signs in question on two of the so-called Śaiśunāga statues differ from each other as much as *ke* and *te* of the ordinary mortals. These latter may be wrong as regards the values they assign to the signs, but are they also wrong in considering the two signs as radically different in form? This difference is quite clear in Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing of letters of the two inscriptions. For his tracing of the inscription on the Patna statue A the reader is referred to J.B.O.R.S., 1919, Plate facing p. 516. I give below the tracing of Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing of the two so-called *śe*-s.

On Patna
Statue A.



On Parkham
Statue.




If these two signs can be recognised as identical, any sign can be identified with any other sign that happens to be radically different from it; and by following "the method of presuming an earlier form," that is to say, by begging the question freely, any name can be read in any piece of damaged writing.

(10) Mr. Jayaswal reads the sign as *g* evidently on account of the shortness of the vertical line above the angle. But the vertical is quite clear on the stone and appears on the casts and impressions, though in Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing it is non-existent.

(11) I have already dealt with the mysterious *dh* traceable only in Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing.

(13) In Mr. Dikshit's impression even as reproduced by Mr. Jayaswal, *k*, a plain cross, is clear. In Rai Bahadur Rādhākṛishṇa's impression the right arm of the cross is not clearly produced, though its place on the vertical line is indicated. If this indication is ignored, one may read the letter as *rā*. On the stone *k* is quite clear. Of course in Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing this right arm is conspicuous by its absence.

(14) Like *dh* and *ś* already discussed, *j* is a novel creation of Mr. Jayaswal. He writes, "The last letter (*ja*) is a new form; when the full form is taken into account it cannot be read as *tā*. It should be compared with *ja* of *rājō* and the pre-Mauryan *j*-s reproduced from other records" (p. 185). The *j*-s of *rājō* in the inscription on the right side is thus traced by Mr. Bishun Swarup



, and the *ja* of *rājā* on the left, thus



Mr. Jayaswal has no difficulty in showing that both these signs represent the same letter *j*. Of course they do represent the same letter, *t*, and not *j*, as found on the paper cast, but not as traced by Mr. Bishun Swarup who makes no distinction between engraved lines of the letters and cracks and cavities due to damage of the surface of the stone. Mr. Jayaswal writes in support of his view, "The *j* is peculiar. It is composed of a slanting

stroke and a curve or loop arising from the middle of that to the right, the two being joined at the base either by a straight line or by the loop. (In one case, in *rājā*, they seem to have been left unjoined, thus showing a tendency to form the open *j* " (p. 181). The second sign, as is even clear from the impressions published by Mr. Jayaswal, is a *t* just to the left of the right leg of which is a triangular cavity. This cavity is represented by Mr. Bishun Swarup as a regular right-angled triangle with the left leg of the letter as the hypotenuse in his tracing.

(a).

The Patna Statues.

If the damaged condition of the stone renders the decipherment of the Parkham image inscription very difficult, and the complete decipherment well nigh impossible, in case of the Patna Statues in the Bharhut gallery of the Indian Museum, Calcutta, the difficulty is further enhanced by the fact that both the inscriptions are very carelessly engraved on the scarves on the proper left shoulders of the statues with deep cut lines conventionally marking the folds of the scarves. The lower and upper strokes of the letters of the inscriptions are in many instances merged in these lines of the scarves, and a line passes (in case of some of the letters two lines pass) through the inscriptions cutting the letters into two halves.

(b).

The present writer has already dealt with these inscriptions, in a paper published in *The Indian Antiquary*, 1919, pp. 28-32. Dr. Barnett, as I find from a note published in the J. B. O. R. S., 1919, pp. 513-516, has independently read the records in very nearly



PLATE V. PHOTOGRAPH OF THE PAPER MOULDS OF THE INSCRIPTIONS ON THE TWO PATNA STATUES IN THE
INDIAN MUSEUM, CALCUTTA.

the same fashion. I give below the three sets of readings :—

A.

| | | | | | | | | | |
|----------|-----|-----|----|---|----|-----|----|-----|----|
| Jayaswal | ... | Bha | ge | A | co | cho | nī | dhī | śe |
| Barnett | ... | Bha | ge | a | ce | cha | nī | vī | ke |
| Chanda | ... | Bha | ge | A | ca | cha | nī | vī | ka |

B.


| | | | | | | | | |
|----------|-----|------|-----|-------|-----|----|-----|----|
| Jayaswal | ... | Sapa | kha | te | Va | ta | nam | dī |
| Barnett | ... | ya | kha | ta | va | ta | nam | dī |
| Chanda | ... | ya | kha | Sa(?) | rva | ta | nam | dī |

As regards inscription A, it will be seen that the difference between my reading and Dr. Barnett's is very slight. Our difference with Mr. Jayaswal mainly concerns the two last letters; where he sees *dhīśe*, we see *vike* or *vika*. I trace below the two specimens of this strange Śaīsunāga *dh* brought to light by Mr. Jayaswal from Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracings :—

Patna A.



Parkham.




Like the two unknown Śaīsunāga *ja*-s and two unknown Śaīsunāga *śa*-s these two Śaīsunāga *dha*-s neither resemble each other nor any known form of *dh*.

As regards B, the main difference lies in the reading of the first letter. Dr. Barnett, Mr. Allan, and myself

read it as *ya*, as did Cunningham long ago, but Mr. Jayaswal and his followers see here two letters, *sapa* or *saba*. I trace below this sign from the impression reproduced on Plate facing p. 93 of J. B. O. R. S., 1919, and from Mr. Bishun Swarup's tracing and Mahāmahopādhyaya Śāstri's eye-copy.

(1) Impression. (2) Bishun Swarup. (3) Śāstri.



It will be seen at a glance that No. 1 is a *ya* of the Kushan type with a line of the scarf passing through it. I wonder how could Mr. Jayaswal read it as *sapa* when he wrote his first article published in the March issue of the J.B.O.R.S., 1919, and had not before him the tracing of Mr. Bishun Swarup and the eye-copy of Mahāmahopādhyaya Śāstri.¹ As regards this tracing and the eye-

¹ Mr. Jayaswal thus explains the process. "Coming to the palæography of the second inscription, the first letter is a new form. I was first inclined to take it as an older form of *sh*. Dr. Mazumdar, whom I consulted about the letter, discovered on the rock a fine chiselled line from the elbow joint upwards of the fold-line above. This line is so thin that the impressions do not reproduce it sufficiently. It is equally, or more, probable that the letter is a dental *s*." (J.B.O.R.S., 1919, p. 93). Dr. R. C. Majumdar whom Mr. Jayaswal consulted writes thus in this connection: "The first letter is a characteristic Kushan *y*, as remarked by Mr. Chanda, and no comment would have been necessary but for the fact that in his article Mr. Jayaswal has referred to me in a manner which might imply that I read it as *s*. The fact is that I read it as *y* the very first time it was shown to me by Mr. Jayaswal, but he contended that the two parts of what I read as *y* were really two separate letters, and I suggested that in that case the left portion may be taken along with a fine line I discovered above it and read as *s*. I have since examined the inscription with great care and am convinced that the fine line is not a chiselled one but has been produced by a crack in the stone, and that the first letter must be read as *y*." *Ind. Ant.*, 1919, p. 33.

copy, a careful study of the impression published with Mr. Jayaswal's first article, a paper mould prepared under the direct supervision of the Hon'ble Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, Kt., C.S.I., President of the Board of Trustees of the Indian Museum, Calcutta, by Pandit Rām Karna of Jodhpur, of which a photograph is published herewith (Plate V. 6), and repeated examination of the stone force me to the conclusion that they are inaccurate. I believe further remarks are not necessary with regard to the inscriptions on the Patna statues. Dr. R. C. Majumdar, though proposing alternative readings, has no doubt about the occurrence of the word *yakha* in B, and also considers our readings possible (*Ind. Ant.*, 1919, pp. 29-36). On palæographic grounds, as I have already stated in my article in *The Indian Antiquary*, these inscriptions cannot be assigned to an earlier epoch than the first century A.D. Regarding the age of the statues themselves I can do no better than reproduce Professor Fouchér who writes—"As to the Patna statues, I have no hesitation in telling you that I would, from the point of view of their artistic treatment, ascribe them to the second century B.C. and on the analogy of the Parkham and Bharhut images, identify them as yakṣas, that comes to say that I share the common opinion prevailing on the subject." (*J.B.O.R.S.*, 1919, p. 519). The letters of the inscriptions on the image of Maṇibhadra discovered at Pawaya in the Gwalior State more resemble the letters of the inscriptions of the time of the Mahākṣatrapa Śōdāsa than those of the Kushan inscriptions and may therefore be pushed back to as early an epoch as the second half of the first century B.C.

That one at least of these two Patna statues does not represent royalty, but is an attendant figure of inferior rank,—I mean the one that bears the inscription *yakha*.

vata Nandi, is patent from the remains of a *chowri* or fly-whisk on its right shoulder. This is how Mr. Jayaswal endeavours to explain away this *chowri* :—

“The device on the right shoulder of the statue of Nandi which Buchanan and Cunningham took to be a representation of a Tibetan ‘bull’s tail’ or ‘Chowri’ is by no means clear owing to mutilation. I could not come to a decision as to what it was. Mr. Bhandarkar considered it very doubtful to have been a *chowri*. If it was a *chowri* our idea that *chowri*-bearing denotes necessarily an attendant must now change. Curiously enough I found simultaneously in a painting copied from Ajanta in the house of Sir John Woodroffe a prince holding a *chowri* on his shoulder, to whom a lady, probably his queen, is presenting lotuses on a tray. It is evidently the king in the Hamsa-Jātaka, for two swans are seated on thrones. Then we must also take into consideration the Jain practice of carrying *chowri* or fly-whisk referred to by Dr. Buchanan and Nandi was a Jain as evidenced by Khāravela’s inscription and also according to some other evidence which Mr. V. Smith has not yet published.” (J.B.O.R.S., 1919, pp. 103-104.)

I am glad to find that Mr. Jayaswal has his doubts about the object being anything other than *chowri*, but *chowri* or no *chowri*, he has no doubt as regards the statue being that of a Śāisunāga king. But the evidences which he has produced regarding the existence of *chowri*-bearing kings appear to be baseless. In the Ajanta painting he describes, the position of the king is not occupied by the *chowri*-bearing prince, but by the two swans “seated on the thrones.” So the painting indicates that the so-called prince has placed the swans on the throne, and thereby ceasing to be a king, has assumed the humbler role of a *chowri*-bearer. In the Rājasūya ceremony of Yudhiṣṭhira as described in the

Mahābhārata sovereign princes are made to play humbler roles. A sovereign prince may stoop to play the part of a *chowri*-bearing attendant under certain circumstances, but that does not elevate the *chowri* to the level of an insignia of royalty. As regards Mr. Jayaswal's King Nandi being a Jain, this view rests on the equally baseless assumption that Nanda-rāja named in the inscription of Khāravela is identical with Vāta Nandi. In the Purāṇic list of the kings of Magadha there are three kings bearing such names, Nandi-varḍhana, Mahānandī, and Nanda. Why should Nanda-rāja of the inscription of Khāravela be identified with Nandivardhana and not Nanda passes comprehension.

Yakṣa Worship in Eastern India.

Now to return to the iconographic aspects of these statues, I shall make another extract from Mr. Gangoli's article referred to above. He writes :—

“While Parkham image is divergent in many points from the image of Maṇibhadra, the ‘twins’ from Patna are inseparably connected with each other by more points of contact than could be expected on the basis of a common yakṣa type. This mysterious connection seems to be explained by the text of the *Mahāmāyūrī* which gives an invaluable catalogue of Yakṣas, which according to the text has seats at different places in ancient India each city having its tutelary yakṣa. Apart from the *Mahāmāyūrī*, we have independent evidence of the existence of widespread cults connected with the yakṣas in various parts of India before the advent of the Christian era. But the *Mahāmāyūrī* by its geographical and iconological data helps us to identify various sites with which the various yakṣas enumerated were associated. Thus the archaeological evidence of the

identity of the image of the Yakṣa called Maṇibhadra derives authentic corroboration from the text which recites that the two brother Yakṣas, Maṇibhadra and Pūrṇabhadra, had their seats or shrines in Brahmavatī, which was probably a place near the Punjab. Another passage in the same text affords the key to the mysterious resemblance of the two statues from Patna we have been considering. Says our text, *Nandi ca vardhanaścaiva nagare Nandivardhane*. 'The twins Nandi and Vardhana had their seats or shrines in the city Nandivardhana.' In the course of a very elaborate note which could only be worthy of such a great savant, Monsieur Sylvain Levi lays under contribution various Chinese authorities bearing on the question of the identity of this city. According to one Chinese authority Howez-wan, who composed a glossary on the Avatamsaka Sūtra, the city of Nandivardhana was in the kingdom of Magadha as mentioned in the original sūtra. The text itself suggests that the names of the two yakṣa tutelaries obviously gave to the city the name of Nandivardhana. The cumulative weight of all these considerations taken together with the obvious identity of the two statues with yakṣa types familiar to us in other examples, pushes us involuntarily to the conclusion that one of these Patna images represents 'Nandi' and the other 'Vardhana.' And it seems to be in the fitness of things that they should have been discovered in Behar (Magadha)"—(pp. 422-424).

To this weighty statement M. M. Śāstrī replies, "The art critic invokes the authority of Mahāmāyurī, one of the five Rakṣās of the later Buddhists, which cannot go beyond the ninth century A. D. and is unreliable. It can be of no use on the points in controversy." (J. B. O. R. S., 1919, p. 558.) If M. M. Śāstrī here means that Mahāmāyurī cannot be older than the ninth century A. D. he is wrong. In Bāṇa's Harsacarita (a work

written in the first half of the seventh century A. D.), Chapter V, it is said that when Harṣa's father Prabhākaravardhana was suffering from his last illness, "Mahāmāyurī was being read" (*paṭhyamāna-Mahāmāyurī*). It is difficult to say whether the Mahāmāyurī published by Sylvain Levi is the same as the text referred to by Bāṇa. But we may safely infer the similarity of the subject-matter from the identity of the name of the texts. Śaṅkara, the commentator of Harṣacarita, writes:—

Mahāmāyurī Bauddha-vidyā, Śivamantra iti kecit

"Mahāmāyurī is a Buddhist text; some say it is a Śivite formula." As Mahāmāyurī was recognised as a holy text in the first half of the seventh century A. D., it must have been considerably older. But even if the testimony of the Mahāmāyurī be not accepted as conclusive evidence of the existence of a widespread Yakṣa cult in ancient India, other evidences are not wanting to prove it.

As Mr. Gangoli states, "Apart from the Mahāmāyurī, we have independent evidence of the existence of widespread cults connected with the yakṣas in various parts of India before the advent of Christian era." We shall now turn to the evidences that indicate that the Yakṣa cult was prevalent in Eastern India, in the dominion of the Śaiśunāga kings and the neighbouring states, in the sixth century B. C.

Those who believe that the Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra has come down to us in exactly the same form as it had when it came hot out of the head of Kauṭīliya himself, and that Bhāsa's dramas including of course the *Pratimā-Nāṭaka* are older than Kauṭīliya Arthaśāstra, can have no difficulty in believing that the Pāli Buddhist sūtras and the Prākṛit Aṅgas and Upāṅgas of the Jainas preserve traditions that carry us back to the time of the Śaiśunāga

kings Bimbisāra and Ajātaśatru when Mahāvīra and Buddha lived and taught. Those who are more critical will admit that where the Jaina and the Bauddha traditions agree there may be a substratum of fact. We shall examine the Jaina and Bauddha traditions relating to Yakṣa worship in the Śāisunāga period from this critical standpoint.

In a short dialogue of the *Āṅguttara-Nikāya* we are told, when Buddha was staying at Sārāṇadā-cetiya (caitya) at Vaiśālī, a very large party of the Licchavis came to him. Buddha explained to them the seven conditions of welfare (*satta अपarihāniye dhamme*). These are :—(1) holding meetings of the clan regularly, (2) concord, (3) observation of the time-honoured customs and usages, (4) obedience to the elders, (5) abstinence from detaining by force or kidnapping women and maidens of the clan. The two other conditions relate to the religious practices and may be translated in full :—

“(6) So long as the Licchavi-Vajjis honour and esteem and revere and support the Vajjian cetiyas¹ in the city or outside it, and allow not proper offerings and rites as formerly given and performed to fall into desuetude, so long may the Licchavi-Vajjis be expected not to decline but to prosper.

“(7) So long as the rightful protection, defence, and support shall be fully provided for the Arahants of the Licchavi-Vajjis, so that Arahants from a distance may enter the realm, and the Arahants therein may live at ease, so long may, etc.”

In the *Mahāparinibbāna-Suttanta* Buddha is made to repeat the seven conditions of welfare of the Vajjis when addressing Vassakāra the Brahman, the prime minister of King Ajātaśatru of Magadha, and concludes, “When

¹ Sanskrit caitya, Pali cetiya, Ardha-Māgadhi, *ceie*.



PLATE VI. THE FIRST LETTER (YA) OF THE INSCRIPTION IN THE PATNA STATUE B.
(SIZE DOUBLE THE ORIGINAL).

I was once staying, O Brahman, at Vesālī at Sārāṇḍada shrine, I taught the Vajjians these conditions of welfare.” So it will be seen that the *Anguttara-Nikāya*, VII, 19, was known to the compiler of the *Mahāparinibbāna-Suttanta* and therefore earlier in date. Buddhaghōṣa in the *Sumaṅgala-Vilāsinī* explains Vajji-cetiya as yakka-cetiya and about the Sārāṇḍada-cetiya he writes “that this was a *vihāra* erected in the site of a former shrine of Yakkha Sārāṇḍada.”¹ The passage of the *Saṃyutta-Nikāya* referred to on p. 5 wherein Maṇimāla-caitya is called the haunt of Maṇibhadra, and the very name of Punnabhadde ceyie (Pūrṇabhadra-caitya) mentioned in most of the Jaina Aṅgas and Upāṅgas lend support to the view of Buddhaghōṣa that the caityas of old were the sanctuaries of the yakṣas. In Udānam, 1, 7, the Ajakapālaka cetiya at Pātali is called the haunt of Yakṣa Ajakapālaka. In the Gujrāṭī gloss on the Jaina texts the caityas (ceyie) mentioned therein are called Yakṣa caityas. There is also negative evidence to show that the caityas or sanctuaries of Eastern India of the time of Buddha and Mahāvīra were the sanctuaries of the Yakṣas and not of the Devas or other classes of super-human beings. I shall give the names of some of the caityas mentioned in the Bauddha and Jaina texts.

Pāli Bauddha Texts—

Caityas near Vaiśālī—

- (a) Udena Cetiya.
 - (b) Gotamaka-Cetiya.
 - (c) Sattamvaka-Cetiya (Shrine of the Seven Mangoes).
 - (d) Bahuputta-Cetiya (Shrine of Many Sons).
 - (e) Sārāṇḍada-Cetiya.
- (Mahāparinibbāna-Suttanta, III, 47).

¹ Rhys Davids, *Dialogues of the Buddha*, Part 2, p. 80, notes 2 and 3.

Near Rājagriha—

Supatitṭha-Cetiya (Vinaya-Piṭaka, edited by H. Oldenberg, Vol. I, p. 35).

Between Rājagriha and Nālandā—

Bahuputta-Cetiya (Saṃyutta-Nikāya, P.T.S., Part III, p. 220)

At Ālavi—

Aggālava-Cetiya (mentioned in several texts).

At Bhoganagara on the way from Vaiśālī to Pāvā
Ānanda-Cetiya (Mahāp. Suttanta, IV. 7).

Svetāmbara Jaina Ardha-Māgadhi texts (Aṅgas and
Upāṅgas)—

(1) Chatrapalāśa-caitya to the north-east of Kajaṅgala.

(2) Purnabhadra-caitya to the north-east of Champā.

(3) Guṇaśīla-caitya to the north-east of Rājagriha.

(4) Dutipalāśa-caitya to the north-east of Vāṇiyagāma.

(Vaiśālī).

(5) Maṇibhadra-caitya to the north-east of Mithilā.

(6) Nandana-caitya to the north-east of Moka.

(7) Puṣpavatī-caitya to the north-east of Tuṃgiya.

(8) Koṣṭhaka-caitya near Benares.


(9) Koṣṭhaka-caitya near Śrāvastī. (Nos. 2, 3, and 5 are of common occurrence. Nos. 6 and 7 have come across in the Bhagavatī-Sūtra and the rest in the Upāsaka-daśā-Sūtra).

It will be seen from these two lists that the names of no well known Devas, Nāgas, or of any other class of superhuman beings than the Yakṣas are associated with the caityas. So we may hold with Buddhaghosa, the author of Sumaṅgala-Vilāsini, that the caityas of the Śaīsumāga period were the shrines of the Yakṣas. Buddha, as we have already seen (p. 53), is made to refer to the proper worship and maintenance of the Vajji-caityas as one of the seven conditions of welfare of the Vajjis, the only other condition that partakes of the nature of



PLATE VII. PIPRAHWA VASE INSCRIPTION.

Photo-engraved & printed at the Offices of the Survey of India, Calcutta, 1921.



religious practice being the maintenance of the Arahants. So it is quite clear that the cult of the Yakṣas occupied a very prominent place in the religious life of the Vajjis, and also of the peoples of Magadha and Aṅga in the Śaiśunāga period.

Now to sum up :—(1) A statue in round of the type of the two Patna and the Parkham statues and bearing an inscription wherein it is called Bhagavat Māṇibhadra has been discovered by Mr. Garde at an ancient site in the Gwalior State. Mr. Garde identifies the image as Yakṣa Māṇibhadra. M. M. Haraprasād Śāstrī declares that this Māṇibhadra is not a Yakṣa but a Bodhisatva. In the Brāhmaṇic, Bauddha and Jaina literatures only one Māṇibhadra is known, and that a Yakṣa, whereas Bodhisatva Māṇibhadra is yet unknown.

(2) Mr. Jayaswal finds evidence of identifying Kuṇika of the Parkham image inscription with the king of Magadha of the same name also called Ajātaśatru by mistaking the outlines of the breaks and cavities on the stone due to damage as part of engraved letters and by identifying partially damaged known letters with unknown imaginary forms.

(3) That one at least of the Patna images, B, is of a Yakṣa, is certified by its inscription which begins with the epithet *Yakhe*. Mr. Jayaswal splits *y* into two letters, *sa pa*. He attempts to explain away the remnant of a *chowri* on the proper right shoulder of this statue by arguing in a circle. In the inscription on statue A Mr. Jayaswal reads *dhīse* by first regarding two known letters, *v* and *k*, as unknown, and then identifying them with unknown forms of *dh* and *ś* respectively.

The method followed by Messrs. Śāstrī and Jayaswal may be briefly described as one of treating what others treat as *known* as something *not known*, and then identifying this *not known* thing with what is absolutely *unknown*.

If this method is strictly followed it will not be difficult to find references to the most sensational events of the Rāmāyaṇa and the Mahābhārata in some of the partly damaged Brāhmī inscriptions.

Vātsyāyana—the Author of the Kāmasūtra : Date and Place of Origin

BY

HARANCHANDRA CHAKLADAR, M.A.

Vātsyāyana stands pre-eminent in early Indian literature as an author who brought the analytical power of a keen logician to bear on the science of erotics which, in our modern days, has only lately begun to be studied with the care that it deserves. The science had attracted the serious attention of the Indian savants very early, as far back, perhaps, as the time when the text of the Rigveda was being fixed, and in the centuries that elapsed before Vātsyāyana made his appearance, the various sections of the science were being studied separately and individually. But it was Vātsyāyana who synthesised the whole science and revived the popular interest in this branch of knowledge. Apart from its interest as a work on the science of love, Vātsyāyana's Kāmasūtra, at the present day, is of immense importance to us as throwing a flood of light on the manners and customs of his contemporary Indian society. To appreciate the full value, for the social history of India, of the picture that Vātsyāyana presents, we must, in the first place, try to ascertain, as closely as possible, the time when he flourished and for this purpose it will be necessary to trace the history of his science, to ascertain his relation to other departments of Indian literature, and

also to analyse critically the few references that may be gleaned from his work, to the political history of India.

Vātsyāyana's Reference to Earlier Works on the Science of Love.

In speaking of the origin of the *Kāmasāstra*, Vātsyāyana says at the beginning of his work¹ that at first, *Prajāpati*, the 'Lord of Beings,' for the welfare and preservation of his progeny composed a huge encyclopædia in a hundred thousand chapters dealing with the three objects of human life, *viz.*, *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma*²; the first two of these subjects were next taken up by *Manu* and *Bṛhaspati* respectively and *Nandī*, the attendant of Mahādeva, took up the third which he dealt with in a thousand chapters. This last work was condensed into five hundred chapters by *Śvetaketu*, the son of Uddālaka. The work of Śvetaketu was further abridged into a hundred and fifty chapters and divided into seven sections by *Bābhṛavya*, a native of the Pañcāla country. Next, *Dattaka*, at the request of the

¹ Vide Chapter I of the *Kāmasūtra*, pp. 4-7 of the Benares edition. The quotations from the *Kāmasūtra* have been made throughout from the Benares edition, edited by Pandit Śrī Dāmodarlāl Gosvāmī and published in the *Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series*, and the references are to the pages of this edition. The Sanskrit text edited by Mahāmahopādhyāya Pandit Durgāprasāda of Jaipur had been published earlier, but the Benares edition is fuller specially in the commentary. There is also a Bengali edition of the text and the commentary with a Bengali translation published by Babu Maheś Chandra Pal of Calcutta. There is some difference in the arrangement of the chapters; otherwise the readings are much the same with only occasional variations.

² This agrees with what is said in the *Mahābhārata*, Śāntiparva, Ch. 59, with regard to the origin of the sciences—

ततोऽध्यायसहस्राणां शतत्रये खबुद्धिजम् ।

यत्र धर्मस्तथैवार्थः कामश्चैव निवर्तितः ॥२८॥

But there is no agreement as regards the subsequent development except that in the *Mahābhārata* also Bṛhaspati is one of the authors of *Danḍanīti* or *Arthaśāstra*.

courtesans of Pātaliputra, wrote a separate treatise dealing with the *Vaisika* section of Bābhravya. His example was followed by six other writers—*Cārāyaṇa*, *Suvarṇanābha*, *Ghoṭakamukha*, *Gonardīya*, *Goṇikāputra* and *Kucumūra*, each of whom took up a section of Bābhravya and wrote a monograph on it. As the science treated in this fragmentary fashion by numerous writers was about to be mangled and spoiled and as the work of Bābhravya, being huge in bulk, was difficult to be mastered, Vātsyāyana proposes to give an epitome of the whole subject in a single work of moderate dimensions. Towards the end of the *Kāmasūtra*, again, Vātsyāyana says that having mastered the significance of the sūtras of Bābhravya (from his teachers, as one would do in the case of a sacred text or *āgama*) and having pondered over them in his mind, he composed the *Kāmasūtra* in the approved method.¹ He thus admits that the great work of Bābhravya formed the groundwork of his own book as is also quite evident from the frequent references that he makes to it in every part of his *Kāmasūtra*: one out of his seven sections, the *Sāmprayogika*, covering about a fourth part of the whole work, is entirely taken from Bābhravya, as he says at the end of that section.² There can, therefore, be no doubt that Vātsyāyana had before him the great work of Bābhravya Pāñcala. The commentator, Jayamaṅgala, also quotes several verses stating the opinions of the followers of Bābhravya and about a sūtra of Vātsyāyana he observes that it is a verse of

1

वाभवीयांश्च सूत्रार्थान् आगमस्य विमृश्य च ।

वात्स्यायनश्चकारिदं कामसूत्रं यथाविधि ॥

Kāmasūtra, Benares edition, p. 381.

2

एवमेतां चतुःषष्टिं वासव्येण प्रकीर्त्तिताम् ।

Benares edition, page 182. Besides, at pp. 68, 79, 94, 238, 273, 274, 296, 353, etc., the school of Bābhravya has been referred to.

Bābhravya¹; he seems, therefore, to have access to some treatise specially belonging to Bābhravya's school.

It may be noted that Vātsyāyana speaks of having treated Bābhravya's book like an *āgama*, a work of holy scripture, indicating that it was considerably ancient. A Bābhravya who is called Pāñcāla by Uvaṭa, the commentator, is mentioned in the *Ṛk-prātiśākhya* as the author of the *Krama-pāṭha* of the Ṛgveda and Professor Weber² holds that this Bābhravya Pāñcāla, and the Pāñcāla people through him, took a leading part in fixing and arranging the text of the Ṛgveda. The Mahābhārata also says that the author of the Kramapāṭha was a Pāñcāla of the Bābhravya-gotra and that his proper name was *Gālava*.³ This connection of the Pāñcāla people with the Ṛgveda receives a confirmation from what Vātsyāyana tells us in connection with the sixty-four varieties of *Samprayoga* or connubial intercourse. He says that they belonged to the Pāñcāla country and were

¹ The commentator is named here *Jayamaṅgala* in accordance with the Benares edition. The other two editions name him Yaśodhara and call the commentary *Jayamaṅgalā*. The commentary (Ben. edn., p. 279) says, यथाहुर्वासवीयाः—

पुत्रिकां चित्ररूपाणि पशवः शुक्रसारिकाः ।

सर्वेषां गृध्रभावानां दूतकर्माणि कुर्वन्त इति ॥

Besides, the commentator quotes eight verses—*Bābhravyāyāh Ślokaḥ*—at pp. 37-38. Moreover, he introduces the sūtra सुरतात्ते सुखं पुंसां, etc. (p. 81) with the remark अमुनेवार्थं वासव्यगीतेन श्लोकेनाह.

² *History of Indian Literature*, translated by J. Mann and T. Zachariæ, Popular edition, pp. 10 and 34.

³ *Mahābhārata*, Calcutta edition, *Śāntiparva*, ch. 342, vv. 102-104 and the Kumbākonam, South Indian Recension, ch. 352, verses 37-38.

वामादिशितमार्गेण मत्प्रसादान्महात्मना ॥

पाञ्चालिन क्रमः प्राप्तस्तस्मादभूतात् सनातनात् ।

वासव्यगोत्रः स वसौ प्रथमं क्रमपारगः ॥

नारायणाद्वरं लब्ध्वा प्राप योगमनुत्तमम् ।

क्रमं प्रणीय शिञ्चाच्च प्रथयित्वा स गालवः ॥

collectively called *Catuhśhasṭi*¹—"The sixty-four"—from analogy with the Ṛgveda. He avers that the Ṛks collected in ten maṇḍalas are called the *Catuhśhasṭi* (being divided into eight Asṭakas of eight chapters each) and the same principle holds in the case of the *Samprayogas* too (as they are divided into eight times eight varieties); and besides, because they are both connected with the Pāñcala country, therefore, the Bahvṛicas, the followers of the Ṛgveda, have out of respect given this appellation of *Catuhśhasṭi* to them.² It may be noted here that the followers of Bābhravya (Bābhravīyāḥ) are mentioned in the Mahābhāṣya (on Pānini I. 1) but we cannot be certain whether a Vedic school or a Kāmasāstra school is there meant. If Bābhravya, the author of the work on the Kāmasāstra, is the same as the great author of the Kramapāṭha, then he has to be placed in a very early age indeed. But Bābhravya is merely a *gotra* or family name and it may be doubted whether the science of erotics could have been systematized so early; though it must be admitted that erotics and eugenics, the sciences that the Kāmasūtra embraces in its scope, had received particular attention from the Ṛshis at the time of composition of the hymns of the Atharvaveda, many of which deal with philtres and charms to secure love and drive away jealousy, with the means for obtaining good, healthy children and other allied matters.

The Pāñcala country where Bābhravya flourished appears to have been the part of India where the science of erotics was specially cultivated. We have seen how

¹ पाञ्चालिकी चतुःषष्टिरपरा; Ben. ed., p. 40. संप्रयोगाङ्गं चतुःषष्टिरित्याचक्षते चतुषष्टि-प्रकरणत्वात्; *ibid*, p. 92.

² ऋचां दशतयीनां च संज्ञितत्वादिहापि तदर्थसंभवात् पञ्चालसंभवाच्च बह्वृचैरिषा प्रज्ञाऽथै संज्ञा प्रवर्तितेत्येके ॥ अष्टानामष्टधा विकल्पमेदादष्टावष्टकायतुःषष्टिरितिवाच्यीयाः; *ibid*, pp. 93-94.

great was the debt of Vātsyāyana to Bābhavya Pāñcāla specially with regard to the section dealing with *Samprayaṇa*, the subject-matter proper of the Kāmasūtra. Some of the most revolting ceremonies in the Aśvamedha sacrifice seem to have originated in the Pāñcāla country.¹ The Pāñcāla people were evidently credited in ancient times with extraordinary powers in connection with matters relating to the sexes, extending even to a change of the natural sex, as we see in the case of Śikhaṇḍin, the son of the Pāñcāla king, Drupada.² Polyandry as we see it in the case of *Draupadī Pāñcālī*, may be regarded as an ancient institution of the Pāñcāla country and the Pāṇḍava brothers belonging as they did to the allied tribe of the Kurus, as we see from the common Vedic phrase *Kuru-Pāñcāla*,³ were certainly familiar with it and could have no difficulty in acceding to it; in fact, the Kurus of Hastināpura and the reigning dynasties in North and South Pāñcāla are said, in the Purāṇas, to belong to the same stock and to be descended from the same great ancestor Bharata.⁴ In this connection, a statement of Vātsyāyana is very significant. He says that according to the followers of Bābhavya, who belonged to Pāñcāla, as we have seen, a woman's chastity may not be respected when she is found to have intimacy with five lovers⁵ (in addition to her husband, explains Jayamaṅgala), showing that five was considered as the limit beyond which it was not decent for a woman to go; if she did so, she could be approached with impunity by any one. Jayamaṅgala explains that in the case of Draupadī this limit was not passed especially as the five

¹ See Weber, op. cit., pp. 114-115.

² *Mahābhārata*, *Udyoga Parva*, ch. 190-194.

³ See Macdonell and Keith, *Vedic Index*, i, pp. 165-169.

⁴ F. E. Pargiter, *North Pāñcāla Dynasty*, J. R. A. S. 1918, p. 238.

⁵ दृष्टपञ्चपुरुषा नागम्या काचिदस्तीति वाच्यवीयाः, *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 68.

were all her husbands.¹ We thus see that it is not necessary to go to Tibet for explaining this peculiar case of polyandry or to see in it a symbolic meaning as is done by Dahlmann.² It is worthy of remark in this connection that Āpastamba from whom, as we shall presently see, Vātsyāyana quotes several aphorisms, refers to the bestowal of a single woman in marriage to a whole family.³

Of the predecessors of Bābhravya mentioned by Vātsyāyana, the earlier ones appear to be mythical, but Śvetaketu, the son of Uddālaka, is better known. He is mentioned in the Mahābhārata as having established a fixity in sexual relations which before him were entirely free and promiscuous like those of the lower animals, the institution of marriage having not yet come into existence.⁴ This refers to a primitive stage of society, and it is hardly possible, I am afraid, that this Śvetaketu Auddālaki could have been the author of the work in five hundred chapters referred to by Vātsyāyana. However, in the *Chāndogyopanishad* and the *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*,⁵ in the portion called the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad*, we meet with a Śvetaketu who may be connected with the tradition of the authorship of a work relating to the *Kāmaśāstra*. Here we find three generations of Vedic teachers, Brāhmaṇas of Kurupāñcāla—Aruṇa,

¹ स्वपतिव्यतिरेकेण दृष्टाः पञ्च पुरुषा पतित्वेन यथा सा स्मैरिणी कारणवशात् सत्त्वेनैव गम्या । तथाच पञ्चातीता वन्धकीति पराशरः । द्रौपदी युधिष्ठिरादीनां स्वपतित्वादन्वेषामगम्या, कथमेका सत्यनेकपतिरिति चैतिहासिकाः प्रष्टव्याः ; *ibid.*, p. 68.

² *Das Mahābhārata als Epos Und Rechtsbuch*, von J. Dahlmann, S. J., pp. 97-98.

³ कुलाय हि स्त्री प्रदीयत इत्युपदिशन्ति, Āp. Dharma Sātra, II. 27. 3. See also Winternitz, *Notes on the Mahābhārata*, J. R. A. S., 1897, p. 758.

⁴ *Mahābhārata, Ādiparva*, ch. 122, Calcutta Edn.; अनाहता हि सर्वेषां वर्णानामङ्गना भुवि ॥ यथा गात्रः स्थितास्तात स्त्रे स्त्रे वर्णे तथा प्रजाः । ऋषिपुत्रोऽयं तं धर्मं श्वेतकेतुर्न चक्षते ॥ चकार चैव मर्यादाभिर्मां स्त्रोपुंसयोर्भुवि । मानुषेषु महाभागे न त्वेवान्येषु जनुषु ॥ See also Kumbakonam edn., ch. 128.

⁵ *Satapatha Brāhmaṇa*, x. 6. 1. 1. He is also referred to in two places in the *Taittirīya Saṃhitā*, vi, 1. 9. 2 and 4. 5. 1.

his son *Uddālaka Āruṇi*, and his grandson *Śvetaketu Auddālaki Ārūṇeya*.¹ A story is told in almost the same words in both the *Chāndogya* as well as the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upanishads*² how the young *Śvetaketu* after finishing his education went to the assembly (*samiti* or *parishad*) of the *Pāñcāla* people and was there discomfited by some questions put to him by *Pravāhaṇa Jaivali*, a *kshattriya*; he was mortified at thus being nonplussed by a mere *Rājanya* and complained to his father who also being unable to answer the questions, sought *Pravāhaṇa Jaivali* himself for being taught in the matters broached by him. Among the matters taught by this *Kshattriya* of *Pāñcāla* we find a symbolic interpretation of the relations between the sexes.³ A few chapters later in the *Bṛhadāraṇyakopanishad*,⁴ we find the same thing related with further additions including rules for approaching a woman, for dealing with a lover of one's own wife and specially rules for obtaining good progeny, and *Uddālaka Āruṇi* is there referred to as one of the foremost teachers of this science⁵ which represents some of the earliest attempts made in India for the discovery of eugenic laws. These matters were afterwards more fully developed in the *Gṛhyasūtras* but the beginnings were made in the *Upanishads*, and, in fact, *Āśvalāyana* in his *Gṛhyasūtra* refers to the *upanishad* or the secret lore as the proper source in these things.⁶ It is

¹ *Chānd. Up.*, V. 3. 1. ; VI. 8. 1. *Śatap. Br.*, *Māndhyandina* Text, x. 3. 4. 1 ; xi. 4. 1. 1. ; xi. 6. 2. 1 ; xii. 2. 1. 9, etc.

² *Chānd. Up.*, *Adhyāya* V, *Khaṇḍas* III-X, specially *Khaṇḍas* viii and ix ; *Bṛhad. Up.* VI. 2. 1 ff.

³ योषा वा अग्निं गीतम तस्या उपस्थ एव समिद्धोमानि धूमो योनिरर्धिर्यदन्तः करोति तेषां हारा अभिनन्दा विष्कुलिं गास्तस्मिन्नेतस्मिन्नेतस्मिन् देवा रितो जुहति तस्या आहुत्यै पुरुषः संभवति स जीवति यावज्जीवत्यथ यदा म्रियते, *Bṛh. Up.*, VI. 2. 13.

⁴ *Bṛh. Up.*, VI. 4. 3 ff.

⁵ एतद्वक्ष्ये वै तद्विद्वान् उद्दालक आरुणिराह ; *Bṛh. Up.*, VI. 4. 4.

⁶ उपनिषदि गर्भलक्षणं पुंसवनमनवलीभनं च ; *Āśvalāyana, Gṛhyasūtra*, I. 13. 1.

significant that both Pravāhaṇa Jaivali and Uddālaka, of the Upanishad story belonged to the Pāñcāla country where, as we have seen before, the Kāmaśāstra was specially cultivated. From what we have said above, it is evident that Uddālaka considerably advanced the science the rudiments of which he had received from Pravāhaṇa Jaivali, and his son, Śvetaketu, must have carried it still farther as is evident from the body of tradition that has accumulated round his name as the first human founder of the Kāmaśāstra which appears to have been specially studied in his family. There can be no doubt that Śvetaketu and his father were historical personages and lived in a highly cultured age, an age of intense philosophical speculation, as we see from the many stories connected with them in the Brāhmaṇas and the Upanishads and it is not improbable that he had composed an upanishad or secret work in which matters relating to marriage, love and the begetting of children were specially dealt with; at any rate, a body of eugenic rules of which a few fragments have been preserved in the Brhadāranyakopanishad, must have come down from him and his family. That Śvetaketu left behind him some such work may be gathered from the fact that a personal statement by him has been quoted by Āpastamba in his *Dharmasūtra* where Sveta- ketu is represented as having said that even after his marriage he carried on Vedic studies at his teacher's house for two months every year and thus acquired a greater knowledge of the *Śruti* than before,¹ and we may note that this passage which seems to be a direct quotation from Śvetaketu, has not been traced as yet in any of the Vedic works where he is referred to. Āpastamba further states, in another chapter, that though Śvetaketu was a

¹ निरिच्छेदो संवत्सरः संवत्सरं द्वौ द्वौ मासौ समाहित आचार्यकुले वसेद् भूयः श्रुतिमिच्छन्निति श्वेतकेतुः । एतेन ह्यहं योगिनः भूयः पूर्वस्मात् कालाच्छ्रुतमकुर्वीति, *Āpastamba Dh. Sūtra*, IV. 13, 19 and 20.

person belonging to a comparatively recent age, yet he had become a Ṛshi.¹ Coming back to Vātsyāyana we find that the opinions of Auddālaki are referred to by Vātsyāyana in three places² in his Kāmasūtra and in one of them he contrasts the opinions of Auddālaki and Bābhavya, thus proving the connection of Auddālaki with the Kāmaśāstra beyond any doubt. It does not, however, necessarily imply that Vātsyāyana had access to Auddālaki's work in five hundred chapters, as in that case he would have made ampler use of it; certain opinions must have been current in Vātsyāyana's time among the teachers of the Kāmaśāstra (whom he frequently refers to as the *Ācāryas*), as having come down from the reputed human founder of the science; or, the legend of Auddālaki and his opinions might have been taken from the work of Bābhavya on whom Vātsyāyana mainly depends.

The monographs written by the successors of Bābhavya,—Dattaka and others—are quoted by Vātsyāyana in the respective chapters of his book. Dattaka's book on the courtesans appears to have been in use in the eighth century A.C. when Dāmodaragupta wrote his *Kuṭṭanīmatam*³ and it may have been availed of by Jayamaṅgala who quotes a *sūtra* of Dattaka where Vātsyāyana has translated the

¹ श्रुतर्षयस्तु भवन्ति केचित् कर्मफलशिषेण पुनः सम्भवे श्रुतकेतुः ; *ibid.*, II. 5, and 6. See Bühler, S. B. E. II, pp. xxxviii and xliii.

² कथमेतदुपलभ्यत इति चेत् पुरुषो हि रतिमधिगम्य स्वेच्छया विरमति, नस्त्रियमपेक्षते । नलेवं स्त्रीष्वौद्दालकिः ; *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 76 ; नासंस्तुतो दृष्टाकारयोर्द्वयमस्त्रीष्वौद्दालकिः ; *ibid.*, p. 273 ; इत्यौद्दालकेरुमयतोयोगाः ; *ibid.*, p. 353. The commentator refers (*ibid.*, pp. 74, 78) two of Vātsyāyana's *sūtras* to Auddālaki, evidently from the context.

³

वात्स्यायनमयमनुधं वाह्यान्दूरेण दत्तकाचार्यान् ।

गमयति सन्मथतन्त्रे पश्यतुल्यं राजपुत्रं च ॥

वात्स्यायन-मदनोदय-दत्तक-विटपुत्र-राजपुत्रादयैः ।

उल्लपितं यत्किञ्चित्तस्या हृदयदेशमध्यासि ॥

—verses 77 and 122 in *Kuṭṭanīmatam* in
Kāvya-mālā, Guccaka III.

substance of it.¹ Of the other writers, *Gonardīya* has been quoted by Mallinātha in his gloss on *Kumārasambhava*, VII, 95, and on *Raghuvamśa*, XIX, 29, 30.

Rājaśekhara in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*² refers to *Śuvarṇa-nābha* as the author of a treatise on a branch of poetics, viz., *Rītinirṇaya* and speaks of *Kucumāra* as having dealt with the *Aupanishadika* section. The latter is evidently the same as Vātsyāyana's *Kucumāra*, the author of a monograph on the *Aupanishadika* portion of the *Kāmaśāstra*, and most probably one and the same work has been referred to by the two authors, there being nothing extraordinary in the fact that the sections dealing with the secrets and mysteries (*upanishad*) of both poetics and erotics should coalesce. Kautīlya in the *Arthaśāstra* has quoted³ *Dirgha Cārāyana* and *Ghoṭamukha* who, as Professor Jacobi holds,⁴ are probably the same persons as the *Cārāyana* and *Ghoṭakamukha* of Vātsyāyana; they would therefore have lived prior to the fourth century B.C. and Dattaka and Bābhavya who preceded them must be thrown back to a much earlier date. Dattaka, of course, could not have lived earlier than the fifth century B.C. when Pātaliputra became the capital of Magadha. Goṇikāputra is mentioned by Patañjali in the *Mahābhāṣya* as a former grammarian⁵ and Professor Jacobi is inclined to believe that he is the same person as the Goṇikāputra of Vātsyāyana. But in his case, as also in that of Gonardīya by which name Patañjali himself is known, the identifica-

¹ “भाण्डसंप्रवे विशिष्टयहणमिति” दत्तकसूत्रम्, अस्य स्पष्टार्थ सूत्रान्तरमाह—प्रतिगणिकानामिति : *ibid*, p. 321.

² *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, edited by C. D. Dalal and R. A. Shastri, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, p. 1.—रीतिनिर्णयं सुवर्णनाभः, * * * औपनिषदिकं कुचमार (समाप्तासीत्) इति।

³ ‘दृणमिति’ दीर्घशरायणः। “शीता शटीति” घोटमुखः। *Arthaśāstra*, ed. R. Shama Sastri, 2nd edition, p. 253.

⁴ *Sitzung. Königl. Preuss. Akad. d. Wissenschaften*, 1911, pp. 959-963.

⁵ अथेह कथं भवितव्यं नेताश्च स्व सुमित्राहोस्त्रिनेताश्च स्व सुत्रसेति। उभयथा गोणिकापुत्रः—*Mahābhāṣya* on Pāṇini, I. 4. 51.

tion is rather doubtful as grammar and erotics are not very allied subjects. The works of Bābhavya and Goṇi-putraka who must be the same as our Gonikāputra, as well as that of Vātsyāyana, appear to have been used by Jyotirīśvara Thakkura while composing his *Pancasāyaka*,¹ a work on erotics which was written in Mithila by the end of the thirteenth century, the author being the great-grandfather of the celebrated poet, Vidyāpati who flourished in the middle of the fourteenth century A.C.²

*The Upper Limit of the Date of Vātsyāyana from
the Authors quoted by him.*

Vātsyāyana has quoted freely from the works of earlier authors not only in his own subject, but in other departments of Sanskrit literature as well. But while he has taken care to mention the authorities whom he cites and discusses when referring to his predecessors in the science of erotics, in the other cases he has not cared to acknowledge his debt by mentioning the sources. Some of them may, however, be indicated, and we shall be enabled thereby to fix a *terminus a quo* for him on literary grounds.

There is a wonderful agreement between Vātsyāyana and the Kalpasūtra of Āpastamba. In Chapter I on the selection of a bride (वरणविधान-प्रकरणम्), the *Kāmasūtra*

1

दृष्ट्वा मन्वथतन्मसीश्वरदितं वात्स्यायनीयं सतं
गोणीपुत्रक-सुखदेवभणितं वासव्यवाक्यान्वृतम् ।
श्रीनन्दीश्वर-रतिदेवरचितं चोणीन्द्रविद्यागमं
तेनाकल्पितं पञ्चसायक इति प्रीतिप्रदः कामिनाम् ॥

This passage was kindly pointed out to me by my friend, Mr. Gangāpati Singh, Lecturer in Maithil at the Calcutta University, from a Maithil manuscript in his possession. This verse has also been quoted by R. Schmidt in his *Beiträge zur Indischen Erotik* (p. 50) with several differences in reading the most important of which is Kshemendra for Kshonindra in line 3.

² Dr. Hoernle, *Comparative Grammar of the Gaudian Languages*, p. xxxv.

has सुप्तां रुदतीं निष्क्रान्तां वरणे परिवर्जयेत्.¹ This is exactly the same as that given by Āpastamba in his Gr̥hya-Sūtra, I. 3. 10.² The next two sūtras show only slight modifications, but making allowance for differences in reading they are exactly identical. Vātsyāyana has³ :

गुप्तां दत्तां घोनां पृषतामृषभां विनतां विकटां विमुण्डां शुचिद्रूषितां
सांकरिकीं राकां फलिनीं मित्रां खनुजां वर्षकारीं च वर्जयेत् ।

नक्षत्राख्यां नदीनान्नीं वृक्षनान्नीं च गर्हिताम् ।

लकाररेफोपान्तां च दरणे परिवर्जयेत् ॥

Āpastamba reads⁴ :—

दत्तां गुप्तां द्योतामृषभां विनतां विकटां मुण्डां मडूषिकां सांकारिकां
रातां पालीं मित्रां खनुजां वर्षकारीं च वर्जयेत् ॥११॥

नक्षत्रनामा नदीनामा वृक्षनामाश्च गर्हिताः ॥१२॥

सर्वाश्च रेफलकारोपान्ता वरणे परिवर्जयेत् ॥१३॥

The next sūtra of Vātsyāyana again reads exactly the same as Āpastamba's Gr̥hyasūtra, I. 3. 20. यस्यां मनश्चक्षुषो-
र्निवन्धस्तस्यामृद्धिर्नेतरामाद्रियेत्येके.⁵

The first sūtra of the next chapter of the Kāmasūtra is again the same as in Āpastamba's Gr̥hyasūtra, III. 8. 8. The Kāmasūtra has संगमयोस्त्रिरात्रमधःशय्या ब्रह्मचर्यं क्षारलवण-
वर्जमाहारः; Āpastamba reads त्रिरात्रमुभयोरधःशय्या ब्रह्मचर्यं
क्षारलवणवर्जनं च.⁶

About the sources of the *Dharma* also, Vātsyāyana shows a wonderful agreement with Āpastamba, but this time with his Dharmasūtra. Vātsyāyana after giving a definition of Dharma says that it should be learnt from the Vedas and from the assembly of those who know the

¹ Benares edition, p. 187.

² The *Āpastambīya Gr̥hyasūtra*, edited by Dr. M. Winternitz, p. 4

³ Ben. ed., pp. 187-188.

⁴ Winternitz, *Āp. Gr. Sūtra*, p. 4.

⁵ *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 188, and Winternitz, *Āp. Gr. S.*, p. 5.

⁶ *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 191; Winternitz, *Āp. Gr. S.*, p. 11.

Dharma,¹ just as he says that the *Kāmasūtra* should be learnt from the books on the subject and the assembly of the citizens.² Āpastamba says much the same thing in his *Dharmasūtra*.³

In another chapter Vātsyāyana quotes a verse referring it simply to the *Smṛti* (स्मृतिः)—⁴

वत्सः प्रस्रवने मेध्यः श्वा मृगग्रहणे शुचिः ।

शकुनिः फलपाते तु स्त्रीमुखं रतिसंगमे ॥

This verse is found in the *Dharmasūtras* of *Vasishṭha*⁵ and *Baudhāyana*⁶ with very slight and immaterial variations. With some further modifications it is found in the *Saṁhitās* of Manu⁷ and Vishṇu⁸ also. Its occurrence in almost identical forms in so many works shows that it must have been borrowed from some common and ancient authority on *Dharma*. Again, in a verse in his chapter on marriage, Vātsyāyana shows an agreement in idea with Baudhāyana. Vātsyāyana says that as mutual affection between a couple is the object of all forms of marriage, therefore the *Gāndharva* form which has its basis in love, is easier to celebrate,

¹ तं युतेर्धर्मं ज्ञसमवायाच्च प्रतिपद्येत—Benares Edition, p. 13.

² तं कामसूत्रागारिकजनसमवायाच्च प्रतिपद्येत, *ibid.*, p. 15.

³ *Āpastambīya Dharma Sūtra* edited by Dr. G. Bühler, C. I. E., p. 1 :—

अथात सामयाचारिकान्वर्मान् व्याख्यास्यामः ॥

धर्मं ज्ञसमयः प्रमाणम् ॥ वेदाश्च ॥

⁴ *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 167.

⁵ *The Vāsisṭha Dharma-Sūtram*, edited by Dr. A. A. Führer, ch. 28, 8, p. 77.

⁶ *The Baudhāyana Dharma Sūtram* edited by L. Śrinivāsachārya, Mysore, I, 5. 49, p. 57. Bōdhayana reads :

वत्सः प्रस्रवने मेध्यः शकुनिः फलपातने ।

स्त्रियश्च रतिसंगमे श्वा मृगग्रहणे शुचिः ॥

⁷ *Mānava Dharmasūtra*, edited by Dr. J. Jolly, V. 130.

नित्यमास्यं शुचि स्त्रीणां शकुनिः फलपातने ।

प्रसवे च शुचिः वत्सः श्वा मृगग्रहणे शुचिः ॥

⁸ *Vishṇusmṛti*, edited by Dr. J. Jolly, XXIII. 49.

and is free from the technicalities of a long wooing, is the best of all¹ and Baudhāyana refers to this as the opinion of some authorities.² This idea we also find in the Mahābhārata.³ From the above, it is clear that Vātsyāyana has embodied in his work at least five sūtras from the Grhyasūtra of Āpastamba, though we cannot feel quite certain with regard to his debt to Baudhāyana. We are not quite sure about the date of these sūtra works, but the period to which this Vedic literature belonged, is supposed to have extended to about 500 B.C.⁴

Next, we find that Vātsyāyana has embodied in his book a considerable number of passages from a work whose date is more definitely known, viz., from the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya⁵ which is now generally considered to have been written about 300 B.C., and he has followed the method of Kauṭilya throughout the Kāma-sūtra. This has led to the absurd identification of Kauṭilya with Vātsyāyana and a host of other authors in some of the *Koshas* or lexicons.⁶

¹ *Kūmasūtra*, Benares edition, p. 223 :

व्यूढानां हि विवाहानामनुरागः फलं यतः ।
मध्यमोऽपि हि सद्योगो गान्धर्वस्ते न पूजितः ॥
सुखत्वादबहुक्लेशादपि चावरणमिदम् ।
अनुरागात्मकत्वाच्च गान्धर्वः प्रवरो मतः ॥

² *Bodhāyana*, Mysore edition, I, 11, 16, p. 137.

गान्धर्वसम्यक् के प्रशंसन्ति सर्वेषां स्नेहानुगतत्वात् ॥

³ विवाहानां हि रम्यो गान्धर्वः श्रेष्ठ उच्यते—*Mahābhārata*, Ādiparva, ch. 73, verse 4.

⁴ Winternitz, *Geschichte der indischen Litteratur*, Bd. I, pp. 246—258.

⁵ Mr. R. Shāmasastry has brought together a number of parallel passages in the *Arthaśāstra* and *Kāmasūtra* ; see his *Arthaśāstra*, second edition, pp. xii-xvi.

⁶ In the *Modern Review*, March, 1918, p. 274, Mr. Śris Chandra Vasu Vidyārjuna quotes the following verse from the *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* :—

वात्स्यायनो मल्लनागः कुटिलश्चणकात्मजः ।
द्रामिलः पचिलस्त्रापी विष्णुसोऽङ्गुलश्च सः ॥

See also, *A Note on the Supposed Identity of Vātsyāyana and Kauṭilya*, by Mr. R. Shāmasastry, in the *Journal of the Mythic Society*, Vol. vi, pp. 210-216.

Coming down to still later times, we observe that Vātsyāyana quotes from the *Mahābhāshya* of Patañjali. The latter observes with regard to unavoidable faults or defects in grammatical definitions, that simply because certain defects cannot be avoided, one should certainly not desist from formulating rules of interpretation (*paribhāshās*) or from giving a definition, just as one does not refrain from cooking his food merely because there are beggars to ask for a share of it, nor from sowing barley-grains simply for the reason that when the plants grow up there may be deer to destroy the corn. Vātsyāyana says the very same thing in exactly the same language with regard to defects inherent in *Kāma* or desire.¹ This quotation from the *Mahābhāshya* brings down the upper limit of the date of Vātsyāyana to the second half of the second century B.C., in round numbers to circa 150 B.C.

Besides the above, there are many references to narrative literature in Vātsyāyana's *Kāmasūtra*. In one passage,² he says that when a girl shows some signs of listening favourably to the proposals of a lover, she should be propitiated by reciting to her such stories as those of *Ahalyā*, *Avimāraka* and *Śakuntalā*. The story of *Ahalyā* is given in the *Rāmāyaṇa* about the date of which, however, there is much controversy; but *Ahalyā* is also alluded to by Aśvaghoṣa in the *Buddhacarita*.³ *Avimāraka*'s story forms the subject matter of one of the dramas of Bhāsa whom some scholars have placed

¹ न हि दोषाः सन्तीति परिभाषा न कर्त्तव्या लक्षणं वा न प्रवेष्टव्यम् । न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति स्थावरो नाधिगम्यन्ते । न च स्मृताः सन्तीति यवा नोप्यन्ते । *Mahābhāshya* on Pāṇini, I, 1. 39. Vātsyāyana has, बोद्धव्यं हि दोषेष्विव, न हि भिक्षुकाः सन्तीति, etc. (Ben. ed., p. 25); the rest is exactly the same.

² शृण्वत्यां चाहल्याऽविमारक-शकुन्तलादीन्यन्याथपि लौकिकानि च कथयेत्तदुक्तानि ।
Benares edition, p. 271.

³

कामं परमिति ज्ञात्वा देवोऽपि हि पुरंदरः ।

गीतमस्य सुनिः पद्मीमहल्यां चकमे पुरा ॥

Buddhacarita, IV. 72.

about the middle of the first century B. C. while others would assign him to the third century A. C.¹ In any case there could not have been much distance in time between Bhāsa and Vātsyāyana because we find pictured in the works of the dramatist a state of society very closely resembling that depicted in the Kāmasūtra. We cannot be sure, however, that Vātsyāyana derived the story of Avimāraka from the drama because Bhāsa's treatment of it seems to indicate that it was a well-known story like that of Udayana; and, besides, the commentator, Jayamaṅgala, gives some particulars that are wanting in the drama.

The story of Śakuntalā is referred to by Vātsyāyana in another place also. In his chapter on the courtship of a maiden, he says that the wooer should point out to the girl courted the cases of other maidens like Śakuntalā who situated in the same circumstances as herself obtained husbands of their own free choice and were happy by such union.² This refers to the story of the love between Śakuntalā and Dushmanta as we know it from the great drama of Kālidāsa, but Vātsyāyana was certainly not indebted to him for it; it is given very fully in the Mahābhārata.³ Aśvaghoṣa in the *Buddhacarita* also narrates how Viśwāmitra, Śakuntalā's father, was led astray by an Apsaras whom however he calls *Ghṛtācī* instead of *Menakā*; in his *Saundaranandakāvya* also, the same author speaks of Kaṇva who brought up Bharata, the son of Śakuntalā, and he says further that the young son of Dushmanta displayed great skill in

¹ Mr. K. P. Jayaswal (J. A. S. B., 1913, p. 265) has advanced the first view, while Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar (*Carmichael Lectures*, 1918, p. 59) supports the second one.

² यास्याः अपि समानजातीयाः कन्याः शकुन्तलायाः खड्गद्वारा भर्ताः प्राप्य संप्रयुक्ता मोदन्त्येव तासां निदर्शयेत्, *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 278.

³ *Ādiparva*, ch. 68 ff.

sporting with the beasts of the forest.¹ In his *Sutrālaṅkāra* again, Āsvaghosha speaks of Bharata as one of the great kings of India.² He was evidently well acquainted with the story of Śakuntalā. The *Kaṭṭhaharī Jātaka* certainly reminds us of the story of Dushmanta and Śakuntalā.³ The legend, however, was known in still more ancient times, *viz.*, the period of the composition of the Brāhmaṇa portion of the Vedas. While we observe that Śakuntalā's mother, Menakā is known as an *apsaras* in both the White and Black Yajurvedas,⁴ Śakuntalā herself is spoken of in the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa⁵ as having borne at Nāḍapit⁶ the great Bharata who is also called there the son of Duḥshanta, and even the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa quotes the legend as having been sung in

1

विश्वामित्रो महर्षिश्च विगाहोऽपि सहत्तपाः ।

दशवर्षाण्यख्यस्थो वृताचाप्सरसा हतः ॥

Buddhacarita, IV. 20.

कण्वः शकुन्तलस्यैव भरतस्य तरस्त्रिनः ।

Saundarananda Kāvya, I. 26.

जिज्ञासमाना नगिषु कौशले श्रपदेषु च ।

अनुचक्षुर्वनस्थस्य दीप्तन्ते देवकार्त्तव्यः ॥ *Ibid.*, I. 36.

² *Sutrālaṅkāra* traduit en Francois sur la version Chinoise par E'douard Huber, p. 395.

³ Fausbøll's *Jātaka*, Vol. I, No. 7. This has been pointed out by Signor P. E. Pavolini in the *Giornale della Società Asiatica Italiana*. Vol. Ventesimo, p. 297. See also note by Mr. R. Chalmers in his English translation of the First Volume of the *Jātaka*, p. 29.

⁴ मेनका च सहजन्ता चाप्सरसौ—*Vājasaneyi-Saṁhitā*, xv. 16; *Taitt. Sam.*, 4. 4. 3. 2 *Maitrāyaṇī Sam.*, II. 8. 10.

⁵ XIII. 5. 4. 11-14.

एतद् विष्णोः कान्तम् । ते ह्येतन् भरतो दौःषन्तिरीजि तेनेद्देसां व्यष्टिं व्यनशे येयं भरतानां तदेतद् गाययामिगीतमष्टासततिं भरतो दौःषन्तिर्यसुनामनु गङ्गायां हवन्ने ऽवधत्त पञ्चपञ्चाशत् हयानिति । अथ तृतीयया । शकुन्तला नाडपित्यप्सरा भरतं दधे परः सहस्रानिन्द्रायाश्चान्मेध्यान् य आह्वरहिजित्य पृथिवीं सर्व्वामिति । अथ चतुर्थ्या । महदय भरतस्य न पूर्व्वं नापरे जनाः । दिवं मर्त्य इति वाङ्मन्यं नोदायुः पञ्च मानवा इति ।

⁶ Harisvāmin, the commentator, explains that the hermitage of Kanva where Śakuntalā was nurtured, was called Nāḍapit. See the English translation by J. Eggeling of the *Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa*, Part v, p. 399, foot-note 2.

*gāthās*¹ connected with the great hero who gave his name to the whole continent of *Bhāratavarsha*; so that the legend appears to belong to the earliest stock of legends of the Indian Aryans.

Besides the above mention of certain well-known stories, there are many references throughout the work of Vātsyāyana to love-stories in general, showing that story-telling was very popular in the days of our author; and when we are reminded that the enormous mass of narratives in the *Mahācastu*, *Dīrghadāna* and Aśva-ghosha's *Sūtrāṅkārā* on the one hand, and the *Śānti* and *Anuśāsana Parvas* of the *Mahābhārata* on the other, as well as those in the *Tantrākhyāyika*, were mostly embodied in their present form about the early centuries of the Christian era, we feel inclined to think that it was in this period when narrative literature flourished most in India, that his treatise on love was composed by Vātsyāyana who found the recital of love-stories the readiest means of rousing the tender passion in the hearts of maids and swains.

*The Lower Limit of the Date of Vātsyāyana from
References to Kāmasūtra in later Literature.*

We may now proceed to fix the *terminus ad quem* for the date of Vātsyāyana from an examination of the

¹ The *Gāthās* are quoted in a fairly large number in the *Brāhmaṇas* and the Vedic literature generally, and they are referred to in the earliest portions of the *R̥gveda* itself (1, 190, 1, etc.). For the most part, these *Gāthās* contain historical matter singing about the mighty deeds of great heroes in still older times, as we see from the *Gāthās* quoted above chanting the great achievements of the eponymous hero Bharata. The *Aitareya Brāhmaṇa* (VII. 18) makes a distinction between the *Ṛks* and the *Gāthās*, saying that the former refer to the Gods and the latter to men. It is no wonder that with the Aryan Indians who placed spiritual concerns far above the temporal from the very earliest times, the literature dealing with the deeds of mere men fell into comparative neglect and was not preserved with the same care as was bestowed upon the *Ṛks*, though occasional verses were preserved in memory and transmitted orally.

references to his work in later literature, and for this purpose we shall take into account only those that will be immediately helpful to us. In the first place we observe that the great Kālidāsa was well acquainted with the Kāmasūtra. In describing the dalliance of the voluptuary Agnivarṇa who reminds us so much of the Kāṇva Devabhūti, Kālidāsa has often followed, in Canto XIX of the *Raghuramśa*, the description in the Kāmasūtra, using even its technical expressions, *e.g.*, the word *sandhayaḥ* which is used in verse 16 in the very same sense as that given by Vātsyāyana in his chapter on *Viśrñapratīsandhāna*.¹ In verse 31, however, there is a more definite and verbal agreement. Vātsyāyana in his chapter on the means of knowing a lover who is growing cold (*Virakṣa-pratīpatti*) gives as one of the indications of such a one *मित्रकृत्यमपदिश्य अन्यत्र शेते*.² Kālidāsa in describing Agnivarṇa under similar circumstances uses the very same language—*मित्रकृत्यमपदिश्य पार्श्वतः प्रस्थितं तमनवस्थितं* ॥ ५॥. Another very striking agreement has been pointed out by Mallinātha and dilated upon by modern scholars. Describing the marriage of Aja and Indumatī, Kālidāsa says that when the two touched each other's hands the hair on the bridegroom's forearm stood on end and the maiden had her fingers wet with perspiration.³ Here Mallinātha quotes Vātsyāyana who speaks exactly the same thing happening under the same circumstances.⁴ In Kumārasambhava VII. 77, however, Kālidāsa has

¹ *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 327 ff.

² This is the reading given by Mallinātha. The *Kāmasūtra* reads *मित्रकार्यमपदिश्य*, etc., Ben. ed., p. 323.

³ आसीदरः कण्टकितप्रकोष्ठः खिन्नाङ्गुलिः संवहते कुमारी ।

⁴ “कन्या तु प्रथमसंभागे खिन्नाङ्गुलिः खिन्नमुखी च भवति । पुरुषस्तु रोमाञ्चितो भवति ; एभिर्नयोर्योर्भावं परीक्षति ।” This passage, quoted by Mallinātha, is slightly different from the reading in the printed editions of the *Kāmasūtra* where we have *खिन्नकरचरणाङ्गुलिः खिन्नमुखी च भवति*, Benares edition, p. 286.

reversed this order, saying that it was Hara, the bridegroom, who perspired and the hair stood on end on the bride's hand.¹ But the language is almost the same and we think Kālidāsa's memory did not serve him quite right when he wrote the Kumārasambhava passage and that he improved himself, as Professor Jacobi holds, in the Raghuvamśa.² The violation in the one case only proves more strongly that Kālidāsa had a knowledge of Vātsyāyana's work and made use of it. Arguing from a similar agreement in another passage of Kālidāsa, Dr. Peterson has come to the definite conclusion that Vātsyāyana is quoted there by the poet. He refers to the following verse (in Act IV) which is considered to be one of the best in his Abhijñāna Śakuntalam.³

शुश्रूषस्व गुरुन् कुरु प्रियसखौवृत्तं सपत्नीजनैः
भर्तुर्विप्रक्षतापि रोषणतया मास्व प्रतीपङ्गमः ।
भूयिष्ठं भव दक्षिणा परिजने भोगिष्वनुत्सेकिनी
यान्धेवं गृहिणीपदं युवतयो वामा कुलस्याधयः ॥

Dr. Peterson then goes on to say: "The first, third and fourth precepts here are taken verbally from one sūtra; the second occurs elsewhere in our book; the third we have already had. Scholars must judge: but it seems to me to be almost certain that Kālidāsa is quoting Vātsyāyana, a fact, if it be a fact, which invests our author with great antiquity."⁴ It will be observed from an examination of the corresponding sūtras of Vātsyāyana⁵ that in

¹ रीसोदगमः प्रादुरभूदमायाः सिन्नाङ्गुलिः पुङ्गवकेतुरासीत् ।

² *Die Epen Kālidāsa's*, p. 155. In this connection, see R. Schmidt, *Beiträge Zur Indischen Erotik*, 1902, pp. 4-5.

³ *Kālidāsa's Śakuntalā*, the Bengali Recension, edited by Richard Pischel, p. 89.

⁴ *Journal of the Anthropological Society of Bombay*, 1891, p. 465; see also J. B. B. R. A. S., Vol. XVIII, pp. 109-110.

⁵ Dr. Peterson here evidently refers to the following sūtras of Vātsyāyana on the duties of a wife : श्रुश्रुश्रुपरिचर्यां तत्पारतन्त्र्यमनुचरवादिता, etc., भोगिष्वनुत्सेकः परिजने दक्षिणम् ॥ Benares edition, p. 230. Vātsyāyana devotes the whole of Chapter

the first two lines of the verse quoted above, Kālidāsa has translated the ideas of Vātsyāyana but in the third line he has followed our author verbally. On the authority of this agreement evidently Mahāmahopādhyāya Hara Prasād Śāstri has also expressed the opinion that Kālidāsa's "knowledge of the Kāmasāstra was very deep indeed."¹ Dushmanta's words in Act V of Śakuntalā—"नागरकवृत्त्या शान्तयेनाम्"—shows that Kālidāsa has used the word *nāgaraka* there in the full sense imparted to it by Vātsyāyana in his section called *Nāgarakavṛttam*, viz., a city-bred man skilled in speech and love-making. There is, moreover, a set of sūtras in Vātsyāyana's chapter on *Kanyā-visrambha* which reminds the reader at once of the first act of Kālidāsa's Śakuntalā as will be seen from the translation here given: "When a girl sees that she is sought after by a desirable lover, conversation should be set up through a sympathetic friend (*sakhī*), who has the confidence of both; then she should smile with head bent down; when the *sakhī* exaggerates matters, she should take her to task and quarrel with her; the *sakhī*, however, should say in jest, 'This was said by her,' even when she has not done so; then when the *sakhī* is set aside and she is solicited to speak for herself, she should keep silent; when, however, this is insisted upon, she should mutter sweetly, 'O no! I never say any such thing' in indistinct and half-finished sentences; and she should, with a smile, cast occasional side-long glances at the lover, etc."² From what we have said above, there can be no doubt that the Kāmasūtra was known to Kālidāsa and that he

III of the *Bhāryūdāhikārika* section to the mutual conduct of co-wives (p. 234ff). Corresponding to the second line of the verse Vātsyāyana has नायकापचारैर्वा किञ्चित् कलुषिता नात्यर्थं निवर्देत् ॥ १९ ॥ साविदिपवचनं तेन मित्रजनमव्यस्यसेकाकिनं वा, यूपालभेत न च मूलकारिका स्यात् ॥ Benares edition, p. 227.

¹ *Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society*, Vol. II, p. 185.

² *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 195.

made verbal quotations from the work. Now Kālidāsa could not have lived later than the middle of the fifth century A.C., because he places the Hūnas on the banks of the *Vaṅkshu*, the Waksh or Oxus in Bactria,¹ before they had been pushed towards the west or towards the Indian frontier.² In all likelihood Kālidāsa lived during

¹ The passages of Kālidāsa referred to here are verses 67 and 68, *Raghuvamśa*, Canto IV, beginning—विनीताध्वजमासस्य वंचूतीरविचिष्टनैः। In the *Journal of the Behar and Orissa Research Society* (Vol. II, p. 35 ff. and 391 ff.) Mahamahopādhyāya Haraprasād Śāstrī has sought to place Kālidāsa about the middle of the sixth century A. C. depending on the garbled reading of Mallinātha who reads *Sindhu* instead of *Vaṅkshū* in the line quoted above. With all due deference to the great authority of Pandit Śāstrī, I would venture to differ from him here. There cannot be the shade of a doubt that *Vaṅkshū* is the correct reading here and not *Sindhu*. Vallabhadeva of Kashmir, who lived about five centuries earlier than Mallinātha, reads *Vaṅkshū*, and the unquestioned genuineness and reliability of Vallabha's text as compared with that of Mallinātha has been fully established in the case of the *Meghadūta* where all those verses that had been accepted by Mallinātha as genuine, but had been rejected as spurious by modern critics like Pandit Īśvarachandra Vidyāsāgara, Gildemeister and Stenzler, are found to be absent from the text of Vallabha. The superiority of Vallabha's text thus established in the case of *Meghadūta* applies with equal force to the *Raghuvamśa*. To an editor like Mallinātha living in the far south in the fourteenth or fifteenth century, *Vaṅkshū* or *Vakshū*, a river in Bactria, was an unfamiliar, outlandish name, and he had no hesitation in substituting for it *Sindhu* which was nearer home, forgetting though that it would have been geographically absurd for Raghu to have marched northwards from the Persian frontier and met the Hūnas on the Indus. It is significant again, as has been shown by Professor K. B. Pathak, who first drew pointed attention to Vallabha's reading (*Ind. Ant.* 1912, p. 265 ff. and the introduction to his *Meghaduta*) that Kshīrasvāmin who lived about four centuries earlier than Mallinātha speaks in his commentary on the *Amarakosha*, of Bactria as the province that is referred to in this passage of Kālidāsa; this shows that so late as the eleventh century, Bactria through which the river *Vaṅkshū* or Oxus flows was considered to be the country where Kālidāsa placed the Hūnas. *Vaṅkshū* is a well-known river in the *Mahābhārata* (Cf. *Sabbāparva*, 51. 26). Moreover, an examination of the variants given in Mr. G. R. Nandargikar's splendid edition of *Raghuvamśa* shows that Ārītravardhana, Sumativijaya, Dinakara, Dharmamera and Vijayagapi, in fact, most of the great old commentators, follow Vallabha, and adopt the old reading.

² M. Chavannes has shown from Chinese sources that the Huns had won great power in the basin of the Oxus towards the middle of the fifth century A. C. (*Document sur les Toukiue Occidentaux*, pp. 222-3). We do not know yet exactly when the Hūnas settled themselves in the Oxus valley. But there can be no doubt that the Hūnas were known in India even before the time mentioned by M. Chavannes. The *Lalitavistara*, thought to have been written about three hundred

the reigning period of Chandragupta Vikramāditya in the early years of the fifth century A.C. Varāhamihira who unquestionably lived in the sixth century A.C. has in his *Bṛhat-Saṃhitā* certain chapters, specially two, named *Kāndarpikam* and *Puṁstri-Samāyoga*,¹ in which he has dealt with matters falling within the sphere of the Kāmaśāstra and in them he seems clearly to have availed himself of Vātsyāyana's work, though he nowhere mentions his name.

The author of the Kāmasūtra is mentioned by name in the *Vāsavadattā* of Subandhu who is supposed to have flourished about the same time as Chandragupta Vikramāditya, viz., at the beginning of the fifth century A.C.² While describing the Vindhya mountains, Subandhu says: "It was filled with elephants and was fragrant from the perfume of its jungles as the Kāmasūtra was written by Mallanāga and contains the delight and enjoyment of mistresses."³ Thus from the evidence offered by Kālidāsa and Subandhu we can feel definitely certain that the Kāmasūtra was written before 400 A.C.

The name Mallanāga referred to by Subandhu is the proper name of the author of the Kāmasūtra, Vātsyāyana being his *gotra* or family name as pointed out by the commentator Jayamaṅgala and as is corroborated by some of

years after Christ (Dr. Winternitz, *Geschichte der Indischen Litteratur*, Band II, p. 199), mentions *HūnaLipi* as one of the scripts learned by the young Siddhārtha (*Lalitavistara* edited by Dr. S. Lefmann, Vol. I, p. 126; 1A, 1913, p. 266). Besides, Dr. J. J. Modi has shown from an examination of passages in the *Āvestā* that the Huns were known in Persia as a wandering or pillaging nation not later than the seventh century before Christ (*R. G. Bhāndārkar Commemoration Volume*, pp. 71-76). It stands to reason therefore that the Huns should be known to the Indians also, especially since their occupation of the Oxus Valley, seeing that Bactria was very well-known to Vātsyāyana and was considered a part of India so late as the sixth century A.C. when Varāhamihira wrote his *Bṛhat-Saṃhitā*.

¹ Chapters 76 and 78 of *Bṛhat-Saṃhitā* edited by Dr. H. Kern, Calcutta, 1865.

² Mahāmahopādhyāya Haraprasād Śāstrī in the J. A. S. B., 1905, p. 253.

³ *Vāsavadattā*, translated by Dr. Louis H. Gray, p. 69.

the lexicons.¹ Two branches of the *Vātsa-gotra* to which our author belongs are mentioned by Āśvalāyana in his *Śrautasūtra*,² and in the history of Sanskrit literature, there are two great representatives, besides our author, of this family: one of them is the great poet Bāna, who in one of the introductory verses to his *Kādambarī* speaks of his grandfather as a scion of the Vātsyāyana family,³ and the other is the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya*. This latter has sometimes been identified with our author as in the verse from Hemacandra's *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* quoted before⁴; but we have seen that Hemacandra in the same passage identifies our author also with Kautilya, Cāṇakya or Viṣṇugupta who, we definitely know, preceded him by several centuries. The long period that separated these authors from Hemacandra has made him lose the historical perspective and his opinion in this connection does not deserve much consideration. Another argument based on internal evidence may be urged in favour of the identity of the two Vātsyāyanas. The *Kāmasūtra* defines *Kāma* or desire as the consciousness of the enjoyment of appropriate objects through the five organs of sense (and especially through the organ of touch) controlled and directed by the mind associated with the soul.⁵ Now, this is exactly the position held with regard to the method of direct perception or *pratyakṣa* expounded in the *Nyāyasūtra* as well as in the *Bhāṣya*. The *Bhāṣyakāra*

¹ वात्स्यायन इति खगौवनिमिता समाख्या । मल्लनाम इति च सांस्कारिकी ; *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 17 ; see also note 5, p. 1.

² *Āśvalāyana Śrauta Sūtra*, Bibliotheca Indica, XII, 10, 6-7, p. 875.

³ वभूव वात्स्यायनवंशसंभवो दिजो जगद्गीतगुणोऽद्वितीयः सताम् ।
अनेकगुणाच्च तपादपङ्कजः कुवेरनामांश्च इव स्वयंभूवः ॥

Kādambarī, Introductory verse, 10.

⁴ See footnote 6, p. 99, *ante*.

⁵ श्रोत्रत्वक्-चक्षुर्जिह्वाग्राणानामात्मसंशुक्तेन मनसा धिष्ठितानां स्पर्शस्पर्शविषयेष्वनुकूलतः प्रवृत्तिः कामः । स्पृशविशेषविषये त्वस्यासिमानिकसुखादनुविद्धा फलवत्यर्थप्रतीतिः प्राधान्यात् कामः ।

Kāmasūtra, Ben. ed., p. 14.

in his comment on *Nyāyasūtras* I. 1. 4 and 9, and I. 2. 20-27 makes it sufficiently clear that it is the *Ātmā* or soul that receives perception with the help of the mind acting through the senses upon objects.¹ 'This identity of view of the two *Vātsyāyanas* with regard to experience or perception is no doubt true, but it will be observed that this view is held also by other schools, for example, the earlier *Ve-dānta*. The *Kāthopanishad* lays down in unmistakable terms that it is the soul that enjoys things acting through the mind and the senses, and the *Bhagavadgītā* upholds the same doctrine²; *Brahmasūtra*, II. 3. 18 (or 19 according to *Rāmānuja*) also appears to support the *Upanishad* view as shown by almost all the commentators.³ It is only *Śāṅkara* who in his comment on *Brahmasūtra*, II. 3. 29⁴ attempts to prove that pleasure and pain are the qualities of *buddhi* or intellect; but with regard to the *Vyavahārika* or *Samsāra* stage with which we are concerned in the *Kāmasūtra*, there is not much ground of difference even with *Śāṅkara*. It will be observed, therefore, that the doctrine of perception adumbrated by the *Kāmasūtra* does not particularly belong to the *Nyāyabhāṣya* but

¹ *Vide* the *Bhāṣya* particularly on the following *sūtras*: 'इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्न' ज्ञानमन्यपदेश्यमन्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मकम् प्रत्यक्षम् (I. 1. 4) and नात्ममनसोः सन्निकर्षाभावे प्रत्यक्षोत्पत्तिः (I. 2. 21), etc.; cf. तत्रात्मा सर्वस्य द्रष्टा, सर्वस्य भोक्ता, सर्वज्ञः, सर्वात्मभावी, तस्य भोगायतनं शरीरम्। भोगसाधनानीन्द्रियाणि भोक्तव्या इन्द्रियार्थाः, etc., in *Vātsyāyana's* comment on *Nyāyasūtra*, I. 1. 9.

² इन्द्रियाणि हयानाहुर्विषयांसेषु गोचरान्।
आत्मेन्द्रियमनोयुक्तं भोक्तव्याहुर्मनीषिणः॥ *Kāthopanishad*, III. 4. Similar passages from the *Upanishads* might easily be multiplied.

शान्तं चक्षुः स्पर्शनं च रसनं दृष्टिमेव च।

अधिष्ठाय मनश्चायं विषयानुपसेवते॥ *Gītā*, XIV. 9.

³ ज्ञोस्त एव, *Brahmasūtra*, II. 3. 18; *vide* *Rāmānuja's* commentary on the same and also that of *Śrīkaṇṭha*.

⁴ तस्या बुद्धेरुपासकदृश्या इच्छा हेतुः सुखं दुःखमित्येवमादयस्तदृश्याः, etc. * * * बुद्ध्याधि-धर्माध्यासनिमित्तं हि कर्तृत्वभोक्तृत्वादिलक्षणं रसारित्वमकर्तृभोक्तृत्वासंसारिणो नित्यसुक्तस्य सत आत्मनः। *Śāṅkara Bhāṣya* on तदृश्यासारत्वाच्च तद्व्यपदेशः प्राप्तवत् *Brahmasūtra*, II. 3. 29.

was very generally held among the philosophical schools at the time that our sūtra was written, and this identity of view does not necessarily imply an identity of authors. Then again, the two Vātsyāyanas appear to have been separated by more than a century. Prof. Jacobi has shown that the *Nyāyasūtras* were composed between 200 and 450 A.C. and that the *Nyāyabhāṣya* was also written during the same period,¹ of course, towards the end of it. Mahamahōpādhyāya Dr. Satishchandra Vidyābhūṣaṇa has proved by a more detailed analysis that the author of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* "flourished at about A.D. 400, when Chandra Gupta II called Vikramāditya was King of Magadha."² By this time the author of the Kāmasūtra was, as we have already seen, an authority on erotics and, as we shall show more definitely below, at least a century had passed since he produced his work. Moreover, the styles of composition of the two authors are quite distinct. Then again, the author of the Kāmasūtra belongs most probably, as we shall show hereafter, to Western India while Dr. Vidyābhūṣaṇa assigns the writer of the *Nyāyabhāṣya* to the Drāviḍa country.³ From all these considerations, we see that at present there is no valid reason for thinking that the two authors are one and the same.

Coming back to other works in Sanskrit Literature referring to Vātsyāyana, we notice that in some editions of the *Pañcatantra* there are two passages in which Vātsyāyana is mentioned by name.⁴ However, in the *Tantrākhyāyika* which is considered to be the earliest recension of the *Pañcatantra*, the name of Vātsyāyana

¹ *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, Vol. XXXI, 1911, p. 29.

² *Indian Antiquary*, 1915, p. 88.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 87-88.

⁴ *Pañcatantra*, edited by Dr. F. Kielhorn, p. 2, कामशास्त्राणि वात्स्यायनादीनि and p. 38 वात्स्यायनोक्तविधिना निषेव्य ; see Schmidt, *op-cit.*, p. 6.

does not occur, but in enumerating the usual subjects of study it mentions first grammar and then the *Dharma*, *Artha* and *Kāma Śāstras* in general.¹ The *Tantrākhyāyika* has been supposed to have been written about 300 A.C.² The mention of the *Kāmasāstra* in it shows, at least, that the science of erotics had, in the third century A.C. obtained an equal footing with the sister sciences of *Dharma* and *Artha* as branches of learning that princes were required to acquire. This position it had not attained in 300 B.C., when, as we see from the *Arthasāstra* of Kauṭilya, though *Kāma* had been recognised as one of the objects of human interest (*trivarga*), it had not as yet a *locus standi* as a science worth study, because it does not find a place in Kauṭilya's list where we find *Dharma*, *Artha*, *Itihāsa*, *Purāṇa*, and *Ākhyāna* (narratives) but not the *Kāmasāstra*.³ In view of the fact, therefore, that it was Vātsyāyana who made popular the science which was almost extinct (*utsanna-prāya*) in his time, the presumption is that the author of the *Tantrākhyāyika* had his *Kāmasūtra* in mind when he wrote the passage above referred to. What we have said about the *Tantrākhyāyika* applies with equal force to the *Parvasaṃgrahaparva* which forms the introduction to the *Mahābhārata* and gives a summary of the whole story; it is certainly later than the main body of the work and may have been composed about the time we are speaking of. It describes the *Mahābhārata* as a veritable encyclopædia that embraced in its scope the *Arthasāstra*, the

¹ ततो धर्मार्थकामशास्त्राणि त्रैयानि—The *Pañcatantra* edited by Dr. J. Hertel, Harvard O.S., Vol. 14, p. 1.

² Das *Pañcatantra*, seine Geschichte und seine Verbreitung von J. Hertel, 1914, p. 9; see also Prof. Lanman's introduction to the *Pañchatantra*, Harvard O. S., Vol. 14, p. X.

³ परागमितिब्रह्मसाध्याधिकोदाहरणं धर्मशास्त्रनर्थशास्त्रं चैवीतिहासः; Kauṭilya's *Arthasāstra*, edited by R. Shāma Shāstry, p. 10.

Dharmaśāstra and the *Kāmasūtra*¹ shewing that the science was well-known at the time this chapter was added to the epic. It is significant in this connection that the *Lalitavistara* generally assigned to the third century A.C.,² in its enumeration of the subjects that the young Siddhārtha learnt, does not mention the *Kāmasūtra* in general but knows various sections of the science such as *Strīlakṣhaṇa*, *Puruṣhalakṣhaṇa*, *Vaiśika*, etc., besides many of the *Kalās*.³ We know that these subjects had been dealt with by Vātsyāyana's predecessors and that there was a monograph on *Vaiśika* by Dattaka of Pāṭali-putra, and it is no wonder that the author of the *Lalitavistara* who here seeks to exhaust all the branches of learning known under the sun, should refer to these subjects though known in his time only to a very few, and on the other hand, it seems to indicate an earlier date for the *Lalitavistara* than that of the *Kāmasūtra*, though unquestionably both of them belong to the same period, and nothing can be asserted as certain from only a negative piece of evidence.

We thus see that from the literary data given above, the earlier limit to the composition of the *Kāmasūtra* may be assigned on the basis of Vātsyāyana's quotations from the *Gṛhya* and *Dharma Sūtras*, the *Arthaśāstra* of Kauṭilya and the *Mahābhāṣhya* of Patañjali and that the lower limit may be fixed at circa 400 A.C. based on the dates of Kālidasa and Subandhu and, further, that there are strong reasons to believe that it was known in the third century A.C. From the historical data that the *Kāmasūtra* affords we can come to a more definite determination of Vātsyāyana's date.

अर्थशास्त्रमिदं प्रोक्तं धर्मशास्त्रमिदं मङ्गत् ।

कामशास्त्रमिदं प्रोक्तं व्यासिनमितवुद्धिना ॥

Ādiparva, ch. ii, 383 (Calcutta), 384 (South Indian).

² Dr. M. Winternitz, *Geschichte der Indischen Litteratur*, Band II, p. 199.

³ *Lalitavistara*, edited by Dr. S. Lefmann, p. 156 ff.

Historical Data about the Date of Vātsyāyana.

The well-known passage¹ referring to the Andhra monarch Kuntala Śātakarṇi first pointed out by Sir R. G. Bhandarkar² furnishes important data. According to the Puranic list of the Andhra monarchs Kuntala Svāti or Svātikarṇa is the thirteenth in descent from Simuka, the founder of the family. Śrī Malla Śātakarṇi, the third monarch in this list, has been identified by Mr. K. P. Jayaswal with the Śātakarṇi mentioned in the Hāthigumphā inscription of Khāravela and it has been shown by him that an expedition was undertaken by Khāravela in 171 B.C. against this Śātakarṇi.³ Kuntala is separated from him by 168 years according to the Puranic enumeration⁴ which is held as substantially correct. Kuntala therefore reigned about the very beginning of the Christian era.⁵ Calculating again back from the great Andhra monarch Gautamiputra. Śātakarṇi who according to Professor D. R. Bhandarkar came to the throne in A.C. 133⁶ and who according to the Puranic list is separated from Kuntala Śātakarṇi by about 123 years, we find that the reigning period of Kuntala falls in the early years of the first century A. C.

¹ कर्त्तव्या कुललः शतक्षिः शतवाहनो महादिवी सत्यवतीम् (जघान), *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 149.

² *Early History of the Deccan*, p. 31. I beg leave to submit that *Kartari* here does not mean "a pair of scissors" as translated by Sir R. G. Bhāndārkar, but it is a technical term to denote a kind of stroke dealt by a man with one or both of his hands at a woman's head at the parting of the hair (*Śimanta*). Vātsyāyana says that these strokes are in vogue among the people of the south (*Dākṣhīṇyātṛāṇām*) and he condemns them as they sometimes proved fatal. The case of Kuntala Śātakarṇi is an example in point. See *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., pp. 147-9.

³ *J. B. O. R. S.*, Vol. III, pages 441, 442.

⁴ Pargiter, *Dyansties of the Kālī Age*, pp. 38-40.

⁵ Mr. Ramaprasad Chanda would place Śātakarṇi of Khāravela about B. C. 75-20. Kuntala then would belong to the end of the first century A. C. (*Memoirs of the Arch. Sur. of Ind. No. 1*, p. 11, 1919).

⁶ *Dekkan of the Śātavāhana Period*, Ind. Ant., 1918, p. 73.

This is then the upper limit of the composition of the *Kāmasūtra* which was therefore written between the first and the fifth centuries after Christ. We may next attempt to come to a closer approximation.

Vātsyāyana mentions the *Ābhīras* and the Andhras as ruling side by side at the same time in the South-West of India. He speaks of an *Ābhīra Kottarāja*¹ a king of Kotta in Gujerat, who was killed by a washerman employed by his brother. Then again, in his chapter on the conduct of women confined in harems, Vātsyāyana describes the sexual abuses practised in the seraglio of the *Ābhīra* kings² among others. Now, King *Īśvarasena*, son of the *Ābhīra Śivadatta*, is mentioned as a ruling sovereign in one of the Nasik inscriptions and is thought to have reigned in the third century A.C.³ Besides, *Mahākshatrpa Īśvaradatta* is considered on very reasonable grounds to have been an *Ābhīra*, and his coins show that he reigned some time between circa 236 and 239 A.C.⁴ About a century later, in the early years of the fourth century A. C. (circa 336 A. C.), the *Ābhīras* were met by *Samudragupta*.⁵ The period when the *Ābhīras* most flourished, therefore, was the third century A. C., on epigraphic and numismatic grounds. The Andhra rulers are also referred to by Vātsyāyana but certainly as mere local kings. In his chapter on *Īśvara-kāmita*, or "The Lust of Rulers," Vātsyāyana describes various forms of sexual abuse practised by kings and it is

¹ आभीरं हि कोट्टराजं परमेवमगतं माहप्रयुक्तो रजको जघान *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 287. Vātsyāyana here mentions a *Kāśīrāja Jayatsena* about whom very little is known.

² क्षत्रियसंज्ञकैरनःपुररक्षिभिरेवार्थं साधयन्त्याभीरकानाम्, *Ibid.*, p. 294.

³ *Archæological Survey of Western India*, IV, p. 103. See also Professor D. R. Bhāndārkar's paper on the Gujjaras, *J. B. B. R. A. S.*, Vol. xxi, p. 430.

⁴ *The Western Kshatrapas* by Pandit Bhagwānlal Indraji, *J. R. A. S.*, 1890, p. 657 ff. See also *Catalogue of the Coins of the Andhra Dynasty* by E. P. Rapson, pp. cxxiii ff. Prof. D. R. Bhāndārkar assigns *Īśvaradatta* to A. C. 188—90 (*Arch. Sur. Ind.*, An. Rep., 1913-14, p. 230).

⁵ J. F. Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, p. 8.

significant that all the rulers here mentioned are referred to by the names of the people they ruled over and belong to South-Western India, *viz.*, the Kings of the Aparāntakas, the Vaidarbhas, the Saurāshtrakas, the Vātsagulmakas and the Andhras.¹ The Andhra monarchs here referred to evidently ruled over the Andhra people proper, and the social customs and practices of the Andhra people are described in various other parts of the book also.² There is no reference in the Kāmasūtra to the position of the Andhras as sovereigns exercising suzerain sway. The time therefore described by Vātsyāyana is that when the line of the great Andhra emperors had come to an end and the country was split up into a number of small kingdoms, among which the most considerable were those ruled over by the *Andhra-bhṛtyas*, or dynasties sprung up from the officers of the imperial Andhras. Among them the Purāṇas mention the Ābhīras, the Gardabhinās, the Śakas and also some Andhras³ who evidently ruled over a limited territory at the time referred to. The time when Vātsyāyana flourished is therefore the period when these later Andhra Kings and the Ābhīras ruled simultaneously over different parts of Western India, that is, subsequent to circa 225 A.C.,⁴ when the line of the great Andhras disappeared and before the beginning of the fourth century A.C.,

¹ *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., pp. 287-288.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 126, 135, 287, etc.

³ Pargiter, *Dynasties of the Kali Age*, p. 45; the Mātsya, Vāyu, and Brahmaṇḍa Purāṇas read—

अन्ध्रानां संस्थिते राज्ये तेषां भृत्यान्वया नृपाः ।

सत्तैवान्धा भविष्यन्ति—दशभौराक्षया नृपाः ।

सप्तगर्दभिनश्चापि शकाश्चाष्टादशैव तु ।

⁴ Dr. V. A. Smith, *Early History of India*, 3rd ed., p. 212. Prof. D. R. Bhandarkar, *Dekhan of Śātanāhāna Period* (Ind. Ant. 1918, p. 85), also holds that "the Śātanāhāna power came to an end in the first half of the third century A.D."

when the Guptas of whom there is no mention in the *Kāmasūtra*, were again uniting Northern India under a common sway. From this the conclusion is inevitable that the *Kāmasūtra* was composed about the middle of the third century A.C. and this agrees with the conclusion arrived at from an examination of the literary data.

The Place of Composition of the Kāmasūtra.

It has been held by some that Vātsyāyana wrote his *Kāmasūtra* at the city of Pāṭaliputra, or modern Patna; but there is hardly any justification for this belief in the book itself. It depends upon the explanation offered by the commentator Jayamaṅgala of the word *Nāgarikyāḥ*¹ in one passage of Vātsyāyana by *Pāṭalipūtrikyāḥ* and of *Nāgarakāḥ* in another passage by *Pāṭaliputrakāḥ*.² Jayamaṅgala has not stated on what authority this explanation of his is based. His identification of *Nagara* with *Pāṭaliputra* is not worthy of much consideration because his knowledge of the geography of Eastern India was anything but accurate; *e.g.*, he explains, *Gauḍāḥ* as a kind of Eastern people living in *Kāmarūpa*³ and that *Kaliṅga* is to the south of this *Gauḍa*⁴; he says further that *Vaṅga* lies to the east of the *Lohitya* or *Brahmaputra* and *Aṅga* to the east of the *Mahānadi*.⁵ We can therefore have no hesitation in rejecting his identification as a mere haphazard guess. Besides, there is evidence offered by the book itself which shows that the two words referred to above do not refer to Pāṭaliputra. In the

¹ तथाविधा एव रहसि प्रकाशन्ते नागरिक्यः ; *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 127.

² न तु स्वयमौपरिष्कृताचरन्ति नागरकाः ; *Ibid*, p. 166.

³ गौड़ाः कामरूपकाः प्राच्यभिर्ज्ञेयाः, *Ibid*, p. 295.

⁴ कलिङ्गा गौडविषयाद् दक्षिणेन, *Ibid*, p. 295.

⁵ वङ्गा लोहित्यात् पूर्व्वेण । अङ्गा महानद्याः पूर्व्वेण । *Ibid*, p. 295.

first place, Vātsyāyana in another passage of the *Kāmasūtra*, mentions Pātaliputra by name when he speaks of Dattaka as having written a monograph at the request of the courtesans of that city. He expressly says there *Pātaliputrikāṇām* and not *Nāgarikāṇām* as he might be expected to do on the analogy of the other two passages; there is no reason why he should use different words in speaking of the same place in different parts of his book.

Next we see that though Vātsyāyana appears to possess more or less knowledge of all parts of India yet he is acquainted more thoroughly with Western India than with the other portions. Of the country from Rajputana, to the south up to the Konkan coast, he speaks of almost all the various provinces and peoples. For example, he speaks of *Avanti* and *Mālava* (i.e., eastern and western Mālava), *Aparānta*, *Lāṭa*, *Saurāshtra*, *Vidarbha*, *Vanavāsī*, *Mahārāshtra*, etc; he mentions twice the *Vatsagulmakas*, a people living in the south,¹ and the Andhras and the Ābhīras are mentioned again and again; of the countries to the north-west he speaks of the *Sindhū*, of the people living in the regions lying between the watercourses of the six rivers including the Indus² and he even describes the customs of the Vāhlika country or Bactria. The people in the south he knows only as the *Dākshinātyas* and their country as *Dakṣhiṇāpatha* and he once mentions the *Drāviḍas* and a *Colarāja*. The people in the east he speaks of as the *Prācyas*, "the

¹ Jayamaṅgala says that two princes Vatsa and Gulma lived in the Dakṣiṇāpatha; the country where they resided was called Vatsagulma—दक्षिणपथे सोदर्यौ राजपुत्रौ वत्सगुल्मी ताम्रामध्यासितौ देशौ वत्सगुल्मक इति प्रतीतः *Kāmasūtra*. Ben. ed., p. 288). The Vatsa country is mentioned by Varāhamihira along with Vidarbha and Andhra शैलिकविदर्भवत्सामुचेदिकाः (Kern, *Bṛhatsaṃhitā*, ch. xiv, 8). Rājasekhara in his *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā* (op. cit. p. 10) says तवासि विदर्भेषु वत्सगुल्मं नाम नगरम्.

² सिन्धुषट्ठानां च नदीनामन्तरालीयाः, *Kāmasūtra*, Ben. ed., p. 126.

eastern people," but he seems to know the *Gaudas* and he makes a collective mention of *Vaṅgāṅgakaliṅga* in one passage. He does not even once speak of Magadha, and of the entire country from Magadha to Rajputana he has very little to say. Once only he speaks of the *Madhyadeśa* and once each of the *Saurasenā*s and the people of *Sāketa* and *Ahicchatra*, the capital of northern Pañcāla.¹ This meagre mention of the countries of the central and eastern portions of Northern India and the detailed description of the customs of Western India make it abundantly clear that Vātsyāyana had personal knowledge of the western portion alone and that his information about the eastern regions was probably derived from the works of his predecessors like that of Dattaka of Pāṭali-putra. That Vātsyāyana belonged to Western India may also be guessed from the fact that he makes a large number of quotations from Āpastamba's *Gr̥hyasūtra* as we have shown before and it is known that the Vedic School of the Āpastambins flourished in Western India, specially in the land of the Andhras.²

The question next presents itself as to what may be the meaning of the words *Nāgarikyāḥ* and *Nāgarakāḥ* in the two passages referred to above. Jayamaṅgala is certainly right in holding that they are proper names referring to a particular place and do not mean the women or men of a city in general as will be evident from the context in which they occur. In neither of the cases is there any contrast between the town and the village. Both the words are used in connection with other proper names, the former in the order Andhryāḥ, Māhārāshtrikeyāḥ, Nāgarikyāḥ, Dravidyāḥ, Vānavāsikyāḥ, etc., and the latter in the order Ahicchatrikāḥ, Sāketāḥ,

¹ He also refers to a *Kāśirāja*, *Ibid*, p. 287.

² Bühler, *Āpastamba Dharmasūtra*, Introduction, p. xxxiii.

Nāgarakāh. In the second case it is found that the names are those of well-known towns, Ahicchatra, the capital of the North Pañcāla, and Sāketa or Ayodhyā, and the conclusion becomes irresistible that *Nagara* is also the name of a particular town, and as we have seen that Vātsyāyana is more familiar with Western India than with the other parts of the country, we are led to expect *Nagara* there. We find here "the great ancient city of *Nagara*"¹ the ruins of which now lie scattered over an area of nearly four square miles in extent in the territory of the Maharaja of Jeypore, 25 miles to the south-south-east of Tonk and 45 miles to the north-north-east of Bundi.² Mr. Carlleyle who made an archæological survey of the place, picked up here several thousands of the most ancient types of coins ever found in India, many of the punch-marked variety and many bearing the legend *Jaya Mālavāna* in Brāhmī characters.³ The city is not very far from Malwa and we think the democratic coin legend speaking of the "Triumph of the Mālava people" refers to the celebrated Mālavagana who are known to have instituted the era now called the Samvat.⁴ There is another ancient city Nāgri or Tamvabatī Nāgari (about eleven miles north of Chitore) which has been identified with the Madhyamikā of Patañjali⁵; this city might also claim identity with Vātsyāyana's *Nagara*, but I think the former is the more probable one as the latter

¹ Mr. A. C. L. Carlleyle in Cunningham's *Report of the Archæological Survey of India*, Vol. VI, pp. 161-162.

² *Ibid*, p. 162.

³ These coins are described by Mr. Carlleyle and also by Sir A. Cunningham, *ibid*, pp. 180-183, also Cunningham, Vol. xiv, p. 150.

⁴ Fleet, *Gupta Inscriptions*, pp. 87, 158; *J. R. A. S.*, 1913, pp. 995-998, and 1914, p. 747; Prof. D. R. Bhāndārkar, *Indian Antiquary*, 1913, p. 161; Thomas, *J. R. A. S.*, 1914, pp. 1012-1013, etc.

⁵ Carlleyle, *op cit.*, pp. 200 ff.; Cunningham, Vol. xiv, p. 146. See also Prof. D. R. Bhāndārkar, *The Archæological Remains and Excavations at Nagari*, *Mém. Ar. S. of India*, No. 4.

was evidently called *Majhamikā* or *Ma'iyamikā*¹ about the beginning of the Christian era. Pāṇini appears to have known *Nagara* as the name of a particular city as it appears in the *Gaṇa* or group *Kattryādi* referred to in one of his *Sūtras*.² The *Kāśikā* commentary enumerates fifteen names as belonging to this class; that the word *Nagara* in this list is older than the *Kāśikā* and is a proper name appears from what the *Kāśikā* says in connection with another *sūtra* of Pāṇini (IV. 2, 128); it states there that *Nagara* is read in the *Kattryādi* group as the designation of a particular city as it occurs in company with other such names there.³ From a city called *Nagara* also the *Nāgarī* alphabet may have derived its name. The existence of a city called *Nagara* therefore cannot be questioned. There is, however, no justification for holding that the *Nagara* we have referred to was the city where Vātsyāyana composed his work, it being only one of the many places that he has mentioned in illustrating his *sūtras*; the utmost that we can say is that from the uncompromising and straightforward manner in which he has exposed the evils practised by kings, officials and queens,

¹ The coins found here bear the legend *Majhamikāya Sibiṇanapadasa*, Carlleyle, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

² कत्त्रादिभ्यो ढकञ् Pāṇini, iv. 2. 95. Prof. D. R. Bhāṇḍārkar who first drew attention to this *sūtra*, says in the *Indian Antiquary*, 1911, p. 34, footnote 45, "Nagara as the name of a town, was known to the author of *Kāśikā*." He considers *Nagarkot* or *Kāṅgḍā* as the *Nagar* from which the *Nāgar* Brāhmaṇas derived their name.

³ कत्त्रादिषु तु संज्ञाशब्देन साहचर्यात् संज्ञानगरं पठ्यते तस्मिन् नागरव्यकमिति प्रत्युदाहार्यम् (*Kāśikā* on Pāṇini, IV. 1. 128). The last part of this quotation would have *Nāgareyuka* as the correct form of derivative to designate a citizen of this particular *Nagara*, but Vātsyāyana has apparently not followed Pāṇini, here, perhaps in deference to popular practice. The *Kāśikā* in accordance with the *sūtra* of Pāṇini, here lays down that the form *Nāgaraka* is derived from *Nagara* to signify abuse or expert knowledge (कुत्सन-प्रावीण्यः); otherwise, it will be *Nāgara* and the example given to illustrate this point is नागरा ब्राह्मणाः; does it show that the *Nāgara* Brāhmaṇas were known to the *Kāśikā*?

he must have belonged to a *Gaṇarājya* or a democratic government like the city of the Mālavas described above. This is also apparent from the importance he attaches to the assembly of citizens (*Nāgarika-Samavāya*) alluded to before.¹

¹ The subject has been more fully treated here than in the Bihar and Orissa Research Society's Journal. 1919 (June), where much of this paper first made its appearance.

On a Bihāri Ceremonial Worship of Totemistic Origin

BY

SARAT CHANDRA MITRA, M.A.,

University Lecturer on Cultural Anthropology.

In his *The People of India*,¹ Sir Herbert Risley says: "In the case of totemism, we can distinguish these two (*i.e.*, the effective and ineffective factors) pretty clearly. The magical ritual of the Arunta tribe (of Australia) obviously belongs to the ineffective class. No one outside the Arunta—and even among them one would think there must be augurs—supposes that, by performing the most elaborate parody of the demeanour of certain animals, a man can really cause them to increase and multiply."

"In India, on the other hand, our totemistic people have got rid of all antics, if indeed they ever practised them, and retain only the unquestionably ineffective factor in the system, the rule that a man may not marry a woman of his own totem. They have, it is true, also the rule that people may not eat, injure or make use of their totems; but this prohibition is relatively weak and, in some cases, the totems are articles such as rice and salt which the members of the totem-kin can hardly do without."

¹ *The People of India*. By Sir Herbert Risley. Revised Edition of 1915.
Page 107.

From the foregoing remarks of Sir Herbert Risley, we find that, among some of the totemistic tribes and castes of India, the prohibition to injure the totem-animal or totem-plant has become weak.

In this paper, I shall describe the instance of an Indian people, among whom all traces of their having ever been divided into totemistic clans or septs have altogether disappeared, who still present food-offerings to certain birds and mammals which, for aught we know, might very probably have once been their totem-animals, but among whom the prohibition to injure or kill their totem-animals has altogether fallen into desuetude.

This is the case with the Hindus of Bihār. Although there is not the slightest trace among them of their having ever been divided into totemistic clans or septs, they still perform a curious ceremonial worship in the course of which they present food-offerings to kites (*Milvus govinda*) and jackals (*Canis aureus*)—a fact which raises the presumption that these birds and mammals might once have been their totem-animals. Then again, the prohibition to injure or kill these birds and mammals has altogether disappeared among them, for they kill them without the least religious scruples.

This curious Bihāri ceremonial worship of probably totemistic origin, which is known as the *Jiutiya* (जिउतिया), is performed on the eighth day in the light fortnight of the Hindi month of Bhādo (August-September).

At about 2 or 3 A.M. in the night of the preceding day, that is, of the *saptamī* day (the seventh day in the light fortnight of the same month), the Bihāri woman, who is celebrating this worship, partakes of a meal, and, at the first streak of dawn, puts some *puris* or pancakes fried in clarified butter, *dahi* or curdled milk and fish on platters made of the leaves of the cucurbitaceous plant known as *dhundul* [धुंदुल (*Luffa aegyptiaca*)], places these

articles of food on the leaf-platters on the terrace of her house as offerings to the kites [*chilho* (चिल्हो)] and the jackals [*siāro* (शिआरो)]. She remains fasting completely and does not even wash her mouth and cleanse her teeth.

Then, on the morning of the next day, she listens to the following legend, which is recited by the other women of the household, and thereafter breaks her fast.

THE LEGEND OF THE JIUTIYĀ VRAT.

There were two sisters named Chilho (चिल्हो) and Śiāro (शिआरो). They used to perform all sorts of ceremonial worship (*vrats*). But Śiāro used to partake of meat on the day she performed her *vrat*.

The time for performing the *Jiutiyā* (जिउतिया) came near. Then Chilho said to her sister Śiāro: "Let us perform the *Jiutiyā*."

Śiāro replied: "You have performed this *vrat*. As the result thereof, you have got seven sons. [Note that seven is a sacred number.] I also perform this *vrat*. But I have not been blessed with any sons. I shall not perform it."

However, the two sisters fasted with a view to perform this *vrat* or ceremonial worship.

When Chilho went away to attend to her other duties, Śiāro brought some meat and bones and secretly partook of the same. While she was partaking of the meat, Chilho returned and heard the crunching of the bones munched by the former.

Thereupon the latter enquired of the former: "Śiāro! are you eating something?"

Śiāro angrily retorted: "What shall I eat? As I have fasted, the bones in my body are rattling. You have got seven sons. This has made you proud. I have got no children. How shall I have strength in my body? Hearing the rattling of the bones in my body, you are laughing."

Chilho, however, did not say anything by way of reply to these stinging remarks of her sister.

Whenever Śiāro caught sight of her sister's sons, she got jealous of the latter's good luck. One day, in a fit of jealousy, the former sent for her nephews clandestinely, killed them, and cutting off their heads, placing the same in an earthen pot, and covering up the vessel, sent it over to her sister with the following message: "Dear sister Chilho! I am sending you this present of sweet-stuffs. Do be good enough to eat some of these sweets and give the rest to your dear children."

Receiving this present, Chilho called out to her children, saying: "Come, come, my boys. There are some nice sweets sent by your aunt for you to eat."

By the blessing of the deity Jitu (जितु) or Jitavāhana, Chilho's seven sons, who had been killed by their aunt, came to life again and came running to eat the sweets.

When Chilho opened the earthen pot, she found therein the heads of her seven sons. Then she came to know all that had taken place.

Then, placing the fringe of her *sāri* round her neck, she prayed to the deity Jitu or Jitavāhana and said: "O deity! by your mercy, I have got back my seven sons alive."

Chilho further said: "Whoever will perform this ceremonial worship (or *vrat*) and hear this legend, her children will remain alive wherever they will remain (*lit.*, in war and forest) by Jitavāhana's mercy." [The objects for which the analogous Bengali ceremonial worship known as the *Jitāśhtamī Vrata* is performed are (1) that the woman who performs it may be blessed with sons and (2) that her sons may remain alive.]

Then seeing that her nefarious acts had availed her nothing, Śiāro went to a forest and was transformed into a jackal and began to howl. These howlings are still heard and known as jackals' cries.

If we treat the foregoing legend as a folktale, we find that it has also its moral to inculcate, namely, that the virtuous are ultimately rewarded and the wicked are punished.

The most noteworthy features of this ceremonial worship are :—

- (a) That neither are any prayers offered up, nor are any offerings presented, to the deity Jitu or Jitavāhana from whom this *vrat* derives its name *Jititiyā*. [But the contrary is the case with the analogous Bengali ceremonial worship known as the *Jīmūtāshṭamī Vrata* wherein the deity Jīmūtavāhana is actually worshipped, though the Sanskrit text on which this worship is based does not mention the offerings which have to be presented to his deityship];
- (b) That the name of this deity is only incidentally mentioned in the legend which is recited at the finale of this worship;
- (c) That, on the other hand, the kites (*Milvus govinda*) and the jackals (*Canis aureus*) appear to be treated as deities for propitiating whom this ceremonial worship is performed, and to whom the food-offerings of *puris*, curdled milk and fish are presented;
- (d) And the mysterious significance of the facts that the aforementioned food offerings have to be put upon platters made of the leaves of the cucurbitaceous *dhundul* [in Hindi, *nenuā* (ननुआ)] plant (*Luffa Egyptiaca*), and that these offerings have to be placed out on the terrace of the celebrant's house, cannot be made out.

This is most curious, considering that the fruits of this plant are highly esteemed as culinary vegetables and largely eaten by the Hindus of Bihār and that I have never come across any instance of its being treated as a sacred plant by the Hindus of both Bihār and Bengal.

With reference to the point (c) *supra*, I might state here that the only other instance of the jackal's being treated as a deity or totem has been recorded from North Bihār where the Mahārājā of Hāthwā (in the district of Sāran) presents food-offerings to this mammal on the Rāmanavamī Day (or the ninth day in the light fortnight) of the month of Chait (March-April), as will appear from the italicized portion of the following extract from *The Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* for 1893 (page 77):—

“Mahārājā Yuvarāja Sāhi Bāhādur, 95th in descent from the founder of the Hāthwā Rāj, was several times defeated in his wars with the neighbouring Rājā Kābul Mahammad of Barhariā. After his last defeat, the Mahārājā was fleeing through the jungles with a handful of followers when the goddess Bhavānī appeared to him in a dream, and complained that she was very miserable under the Mahomedan rule. She encouraged the Mahārājā to fight and promised her aid. “The moment you commence your journey,” she said, “you will see a jackal and a serpent, bow down to the former and kill the latter.” The Mahārājā acted according to her instructions and gained a complete victory over his adversary at the battle of Rāmachandrapur a mile east of Thāway [a station on the Bengal and North-Western Railway].”

“The image of Durgā was found in the forest of Thāway under a singular and peculiar tree. * * * * It is reported that one of the feet of the goddess has sunk to a fathomless depth and the other is out resting on the figure of a lion.”

“The Mahārājā of Hāthwā has raised a splendid temple for the goddess *and still regards the jackal with very kindly feelings. They are given balibhog by the Rāj on the Chait-Navamī day.*”¹

The recent census operations have brought to light the interesting fact that a good deal of totemism still prevails among the Orāons, the Mundās and the Hos of Chota Nagpore, the Santāls of Santālia, the Bhils of Central India, and among several tribes and castes of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies. But the kite (*Milvus gorinda*) and the jackal (*Canis aureus*) are not to be found among the totems of all these tribes and castes.

We should now consider the following questions which rise in connection with the subject-matter of this paper :—

(1) Whether any analogue of the aforedescribed Bihāri ceremonial worship prevails in the adjoining province of Bengal ?

(2) If so, whether any trace of totemism survives in this Bengali analogue ?

We shall answer the question (1) *supra* in the affirmative and that No. (2) in the negative. For we find that the ceremonial worship known as the *Jitāshṭamī Vrata*, which is analogous to the *Jiutiyā Vrat* of Bihār, is prevalent in Bengal.

As will appear from the Sanskrit text relating to this Bengali analogue, which is published in Appendix A of this paper, and the English translation thereof in Appendix B hereof, this *vrata* or ceremonial worship is performed in Bengal on the eighth day in the dark fortnight of the lunar month of Āśvina (September-October). [But the *Jiutiyā* is performed in Bihār on the eighth day in the light fortnight of the Hindi month of Bhādo

¹ Vide the paper on “Further Antiquities of the Hāthwā Rāj” in *The Proceedings of the Asiatic Society of Bengal* for 1893, pp. 76-78.

(August-September)]. Its performance confers the blessing of sons on those women who perform it, and causes their sons to live. [This is the point of similarity between this Bengali ceremonial worship and the Bihāri one.] On this day the deity Jīmūtavāhana, who is stated to be the son of King Śālivāhana, is worshipped by those women who are desirous of having sons. [On this point, this Bengali ceremonial worship differs from the Bihāri one. *Vide* my remark *supra*.] They abstain from taking any food whatever on the day of this ceremonial worship. [On this point also, this Bengali ceremonial worship is similar to the Bihāri one.]

But no detailed description of the offerings to be presented to this deity, and of the rites to be performed in connection with his worship, are given in the aforementioned Sanskrit text. Only this much is stated therein that the woman, who performs this *vrata*, has to dig a square pond in the courtyard of her house. [Compare this with the excavation of the two ponds—one to be filled with milk and the other with water—in the Karmā Dharmā worship of North Bihār. But the Sanskrit text does not state for what purpose this pond has to be excavated in this Bengali ceremonial worship.]

But the most noteworthy feature of this Bengali ceremonial worship is that no offerings whatever are presented in it to the kite (*Milvus gorinda*) or the jackal (*Canis aureus*) or, for the matter of that, to any other animal. On the other hand, a deity named Jīmūtavāhana, who is stated in the Sanskrit text to be King Śālivāhana's son, is worshipped in this Bengali *vrata*. This shows that this Bengali ceremonial worship is not of totemistic origin.

Then again, *it is performed on the eighth day in the dark fortnight of the lunar month of Āśvina (September-October)*. I am, therefore, humbly of opinion that this

Bengali ceremonial worship has been evolved independently of the Bihāri one.

In this connection, I may state that this apotheosis of Rājā Śalivāhana's son Jīmūtavāhana is curious. I do not know whether there is on record any other instance of the elevation of an historical personage to the Hindu Pantheon. [Since writing the above, I have come to know that Śivaji, the great founder of the Marātha confederacy, has been deified and is worshipped by the Gauda caste of fishermen in the Bombay Presidency. A temple has been erected in his honour in one of the bastions of the fort at Malvan in the Ratnagiri district of that Presidency, and an image of his has been installed in that shrine.¹]

¹ Risley's *The People of India* (Edition of 1915), p. 229.

APPENDIX A.

SANSKRIT TEXT RELATING TO THE JĪTĀSHṬAMI VRATA.

जीताष्टमी व्रतं ।

गौणाश्विन कृष्णाष्टमी सैव जीमूताष्टमी । यथा आश्विन कृष्णाष्टम्यां जीमूतवाहन पूजा । व्रताष्टमी प्रदोषव्यापिनी आह्वा । भविष्योत्तरे ।

इषे मास्यसिते पक्षे चाष्टमी या तिथिर्भवेत् । पुत्रसौभाग्यदा स्त्रीणां ख्याता सा जीवपुत्रिका । शालिवाहनराजस्य पुत्रो जीमूतवाहनः । तस्यां संपूज्यनारीभिः पुत्रसौभाग्यलिप्सया । प्रदोषसमये स्त्रीभिः पूज्यो जीमूतवाहनः । पुष्करिणी विधायार्थं प्राङ्गने चतुरास्त्रिकां । किञ्चविष्णु-धर्मोत्तरे ।

पूर्वे द्युरपरि द्युर्वां प्रदोषे यत्रचाष्टमी तत्र पूज्य सदा स्त्रीभिः राजा जीमूतवाहनः इति । तथाच यद्दिने प्रदोषव्यापिनी अष्टमी । तत्रैव व्रतं उभयदिने चेत् परदिने त्रिसन्ध्याव्यापित्वात् । उभये दिने प्रदोषव्यापृतौ उदयगामिन्यां यदुक्तं निर्णयान्मृतसिन्धौ ।

लक्ष्मीव्रतं चाभ्युदिते शशाङ्के यत्राष्टमी चाश्विनकृष्णपक्षे तत्रोदयं वै कुरुते । दिनेस्तदा भवेज्जीवित पुत्रिका सा इति ।

अस्यामष्टम्यां स्त्रीभिर्न भोक्तव्यं । आश्विनस्यासिताष्टम्यां या स्त्रीयो-
ऽन्नं हि भुञ्जते । मृतवत्सा भवेयुस्तु वैधव्यञ्च भवेत् ध्रुवं । इति वचनात् ।
इति वाचस्यति मिश्रकृत चमत्कार चिन्तामण्युक्ते जीताष्टमी व्रत समाप्तं ।

APPENDIX B.

ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF THE SANSKRIT TEXT RELATING TO THE JĪTĀSHṬAMĪ VRATA.

The Account of the Jitāshṭamī Vrata.

The eighth day in the dark fortnight of the lunar month of Āśvina (September-October) is otherwise known as (*lit.*, is the same as) the Jīmūtāshṭamī. That is to say, (the deity) Jīmūtavāhana is worshipped on the eighth day in the dark fortnight of Āśvina (September-October). (This) *vrata* or ceremonial worship of the eighth day has to be performed in the afternoon.—(The foregoing account is given) in the *Bhaviṣya Purāṇa*.

The (ceremonial worship performed on the) eighth day in the dark fortnight of the month of Āśvina (September-October) confers the blessing of sons on women, and is well-known as *Jīva-puttrikā* or “the worship which causes one’s sons to live.” Jīmūtavāhana is the son of King Śālivāhana. On that day, the women worship (the deity Jīmūtavāhana) actuated by the desire of obtaining the blessing of sons. The women should worship (the deity) Jīmūtavāhana in the afternoon. A (small) square pond should be dug in the courtyard (of the celebrant’s house).—The (foregoing) short account (is given) in the *Vishṇu Purāṇa*.

The women should always worship King Jīmūtavāhana in the afternoon of the preceding or the following day—on whichever day the *aṣṭamī* [(eighth) *tithi* may commence]. If the *aṣṭamī tithi* should commence in the afternoon and continue into the morning and the afternoon of the next day, the *vrata* or the ceremonial worship

should be performed on both the days. It is thus stated in the treatise entitled : “*Nirṇayāmṛita Sindhu*.”

On the eighth day in the dark fortnight of Āśvina (September-October), when the moon will rise, the Lakshmī *vrata* [which appears to be another name of the Jītashtamī-*vrata*] should be performed. By the blessing of (the deity) Sun, all the sons of the woman, who performs this *vrata* or ceremonial worship, will remain alive. The womenfolk should not partake of any food on this *ashṭamī* (eighth) day. The children of those women who partake of cooked rice on the eighth day in the dark fortnight of Āśvina (September-October) will die ; and those women will surely become widows.—

Here (the account of) the Jītashtamī-*vrata* as described in Vāchaspati Miśra's *Chamatkāra Chintāmaṇi* ends.

What is Buddhism?

BY

R. KIMURA.

For attaining a perfect idea of Buddhistic philosophy and its various aspects the most important and necessary problem that presses itself upon us should receive due consideration. The problem is—What is Buddhism? Before discussing this problem let us first examine what bearing the Science of Religion has upon this particular problem. The Science of Religion divides religion into two sections:—

(1) The Natural Religion, or the National Religion which is confined to one or the other country or nation and (2) the Ethical Religion or the Universal Religion which unlike the former, takes the whole world under its survey. The latter has several successive stages and according to Dr. G. Kato,¹ the author of the Science of Religion, Buddhism belongs to the highest stage, *i.e.*, Buddhism is the highest Ethical Religion in the world.

Buddhism, from my point of view, is not only Ethics but a Philosophy and a Religion as well. It has philosophical truth at its back, emotional faith in its front and Ethics as its goal. These three aspects—religious, philosophical and ethical are combined and harmonized through the personality of Buddha. Without philosophical truth, religion cannot arise; without religion

¹ Dr. G. Kato is one of the greatest authorities on this subject in Japan.

the highest truth cannot be obtained and without these two Ethics or morality cannot be brought into practice.

The moment Buddha Gotama obtained the Truth or Enlightenment, he transformed it into Religion and through his personality he began to preach it with benevolence and sympathy for the suffering humanity and established the foundation of the Ethical Religion in the world. We must not forget that Buddha's personality is in the very centre or in the heart of Buddhism; in other words, Buddhism would be no Buddhism at all without Buddha's personality, without which Buddhism would be a mere "Ethical movement" as Tiele justly observes in his "Outlines of the History of the Ancient Religion," p. 136. Through Buddha's personality man can attain the highest truth and by assimilating it and by harmonizing himself with it can attain Nirvāna or salvation. Buddha's personality is the highest and purest ideal that men may have recourse to, and through that ideal finite man can obtain infinitude, the absolute truth or reality.

By the above I do not think that I have been able to give out a clear conception of what Buddhism is and so it is necessary to deal with the question in further details. In doing so, we at once face two more problems—(1) What is "Buddha"? and (2) What is Dharma (Buddha's doctrines)? Let us take up these two one by one.

Shut your eyes, put a stop to the functions of your senses, cut off all your connection with the world and with the society, withdraw your affection from your family and return to yourself,—your mind within your body. What will you find? You will find many ultimate questions are vexing you, arising within your mind from the inward self. What are these questions? These are—What is man? What is the world? What connection

has the man with the world? Why man is born in the world? What is the instinct of man? What is the destiny of man? Among these the question—What is man—is the most important, for all other questions have a principal bearing on this question; for if there be no man, what on earth the other questions will arise for? This question must be solved first, and with its solution, other questions may be solved automatically.

Humanity consists of all classes of human beings, either wise or ignorant, either higher or lower, either rich or poor. Whatever may he be, at one time or other, in his life, the question what is man—must arise in his mind, and those who attempt at solving the question by thinking deeply are called wise and those who act to the contrary are called ignorant. The former can make swift progress in their spiritual culture and the latter cannot.

From the very beginning up to the present day like the sages or Rishis of India wise men have been born in the world. All of them were great heroes who faced these questions and struggled very hard to obtain their solutions. Siddhārtha, the son of Suddhodana, was a hero of this kind. The former half of his life shows a distinct trace of this struggling for the solution of such questions and the latter half of his life was engaged in obtaining the solution of his questions, and preaching it to the mankind in order to acquaint them with his solution. I hope, however, all of you know more or less, about the life of Buddha.

Born of an aristocratic¹ family at Kapilavāstu Siddhārtha gave up his kingdom against his father's will,

¹ In some places Suddhodana, Buddha's father, is called Rājā; while in another place he is mentioned as a simple citizen. This apparent contradiction may be reconciled when we take account of the system of administration prevalent at Kapilavāstu in his time which was republican in type. The president of the council of administration enjoyed the title of Rājā. Suddhodana was, therefore, for a time president of the council of administration. *Vide* Rhys Davids' *Buddhist India*, p. 19; and Kautilya's *Arthashastra*, p. 376, 1st Edition.

cut off all communal connection and withdrew all affection from his wife and only child, and entered the Śramana life with a deep conviction and resolution. And the aim of his renunciation was not like that of a wandering mendicant, who enters the ascetic life, practises all sorts of penances for future happiness and finally wanders about from place to place discussing useless problems of life, society or philosophy. But Siddhārtha on the other hand, was overwhelmed with the most difficult and intricate problem—What is man?—and that is the remote reason why he abandoned the world. He saw four ominous visions—when he was passing through the streets—the sight of an old man, a sick man, a corpse and a monk—the pictures or embodiments suggestive of the kinds of human sorrows that exist in the Saṃsāra. These visions brought in a very great change in his mind, and a feeling of deep melancholy made him a thorough pessimist. This is the immediate reason why he renounced the world.

As a matter of fact, when Siddhārtha came to this world, there were great minds and great thinkers in ancient India meditating upon the sorrows, miseries and sufferings of mankind as well as the ultimate questions of philosophy. Siddhārtha also inherited the spirit of the time and renounced the world with a two-fold object, *viz.*, to seek after the highest philosophical truth as well as to understand the nature and remedy of human sufferings. Consequently he embraced monkhood which is but the natural way of attaining the absolute truth. He, thereafter, became an enthusiastic seeker of the truth of reality to transform thereby the world of woes and sufferings into a world of peace and happiness and to hold up salvation to humanity. With this object he became a disciple of Ālāra Kālāma and Uddaka, son of Rāma—the two renowned teachers of philosophy at that time—and learnt from them the successive degrees of ecstatic

meditation (Samāpatti). But he soon discovered that that is not the way to enlightenment. Then with a deep conviction and direct resolution, he began to practise the severest austerities in the jungles of Uruvela near the present Buddha-Gayā, until he became emaciated and wasted away to a mere shadow by fasting and self-mortification.¹ But success did not attend his efforts. And he perceived that mortification is not the way to enlightenment and discovered that it is only by following the Middle Path² (majjhima patipada) and realizing one's own spirit or soul by meditation that enlightenment can be obtained.

Buddha not only discovered this conception of Middle Path which is the natural way to obtaining enlightenment, but also followed the same. By following the Middle Path, by his extreme effort to obtain the truth of reality, by his sympathy for the suffering mankind, and by his exertion to bring about their salvation, Buddha attained Enlightenment under the Bodhi tree at Buddha-Gayā. All this Buddha himself described in the *Sad-dharma-Pundarika*.³

¹ Cf. Rhys Davids, *Buddhism*, p. 35 and H. Kern's *Buddhism*, p. 18.

² "Yo cāyaṃ kāmesu kāmasukhallikānuyogo hīno gammo pothujjaniko anariyo anattasamhito; yo cāyaṃ atta-kilamathānuyogo dukkho anariyo anattasamhito, ete kho bhikkhave ubho ante anupagamma majjhima paṭipadā Tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇī ñāṇakaraṇī upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbāṇāya saṃvattati (S. N. 56, 11. Dhamma-cakka-ppavattanasuttari).

English Translation.—"There are two extremes, O Bhikkhus, which the man who has given up the world, ought not to follow—the habitual practice, on the one hand, of those things whose attraction depends upon the passions, and especially of sensuality—a low and pagan way (of seeking satisfaction) unworthy, unprofitable, and fit only for the worldly-minded—and the habitual practice, on the other hand, of asceticism (or self-mortification) which is painful, unworthy and unprofitable. There is a middle path, O Bhikkhus, avoiding these two extremes, discovered by the Tathāgata—a path which opens the eyes and bestows understanding which leads to peace of mind to the higher wisdom to full Enlightenment to Nirvāṇa."

³ *English Translation*.—"Now has the Lord Sākyamuni, after going out from the home of the Sākyas, arrived at supreme perfect enlightenment, on the summit of the terrace of enlightenment at the town of Gayā." (S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 299.)

The culminating moment of his meditations is the moment of the solution of the question upon the truth of reality and at the same time the moment of the attainment of the said truth is the moment of Buddha's Enlightenment.

At that moment he understood both the external world—the world of sorrows—the world of appearance—as well as the internal world—the real world—the world of peace and happiness, and therefore the man Siddhārtha, the son of Suddhodana became the enlightened Buddha, and Tathāgata.¹

So that the meaning of Buddha is that his personality is harmonized with the truth of reality, and it is erroneous to suppose that he attained Buddhahood from the very beginning, *i.e.*, from his birth. He was an ordinary mortal like us, but when he solved his great question, he became Enlightened Buddha. This is a very important idea in Buddhism. Prof. H. Kern's conception of Buddhahood lies in his misunderstanding of this great idea.² About this Buddha himself afforded a good description several times in the Suttanta:—

“Ahaṃ pi sudam pubbe va sambōdhā anabhisambuddho bodhisatto va samāno attanā jātiddhammo samāno jatiddhammaññeva pariyesāmi ...jarādhammam...byādhidhammam maraṇadhammam, sokadhammam sankilesādhammaññeva pariyesāmi.”³

¹ Cf. Iti pi so Bhagavā loke uppajjati, araham Sammāsambuddho, vijjācaraṇa-sampanno, sugato, lokavidū anuttara-purisadammasārathi, satthā deva-manussānaṃ, Buddho, Bhagavā so imaṃ lokaṃ sadevakāṃ samārakaṃ subrahmakāṃ sassamaṇa-brāhmaṇiṃ paṇaṃ sadevamanussaṃ sayam abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti. So dhammaṃ deseti ādikalyāṇaṃ majjhekalyāṇaṃ pariyośānakalyāṇaṃ sātthaṃ savyaṇṇaṇaṃ, kevalaparipuṇṇaṃ parisuddhaṃ brahmacariyaṃ pakāseti.

M. N., Vol. I, p. 179, Hatthipadopama.

See Rhys Davids' Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. III, Pt. 2, pp. 99-100.

² “Consequently in all periods of the creed the Buddha is the only anthropomorphic, not a man.”

Manual of Buddhism, pp. 64-65.

³ *M. N. Ariyapariyesana, Vol. I, p. 163.*

English Translation.—And before I attained Enlightenment, when I was not awakened and was a Bodhisatta, I, too, O Bhikkhus, was subject to the conditions of birth and followed the conditions of birth, was subject to the conditions of old age and followed the same, was subject.....of disease, of death, of sorrow, of sinfulness, and followed the same.¹

This suttanta clearly shows that he was at first an ordinary man like ourselves and he attained Buddhahood with his attainment of the truth. And as soon as he was harmonized with the truth, the man Siddhārtha became Enlightened Buddha and no more he was an ordinary man but the Jina of all (Sabbabhibhu), the knower of all (Sabbavidu).² He is no more the son of Suddhodana but the Father of the whole world.³

After all, it is a great problem of Buddhism, because with its true conception we come to learn that all human beings may obtain Buddhahood. The Dharma or the truth of reality is itself absolute and eternal and therefore

¹ Translated by Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

² Sabbābhibhū zabbavidū'ham asmi
Sabbesu dhammesu anupalitto,
Sabbajāho taṇhakkhaye vimutto,
Savaṇṇaṃ abhiññāya kam uddiseyyaṃ.

Ariya-pariyesana,
M. N., Vol. I, p. 171 ff.

English Translation.—I am the all-conqueror, the all-knower, I am free from all conditions, I have left all, and am emancipated through the destruction of desire. Having attained to Supreme Wisdom by my own self, whom shall I point out (as my teacher)!

Translated by Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ Traidhātukaṃ ca māmidam parigraho ye hyatra dahyanti mamaiti putrāḥ.
Saddharmapundarika,
Vol. I, p. 90.

English Translation.—"This triple world is my domain and those who in it are suffering from burning heat are my sons."

S. B. E., Vol. XX, Saddharmapundarika,
Part II, pp. 87-88.

Buddha's personality, too, is eternal and absolute.¹ This conception of oneness of both Buddha and Dharma is the root of the conception of Dharma-kāya-Buddha and thereby the historical Buddha becomes the Nirmāna-kāya Buddha, and finally these two combined together form what is called the Sambhoga-Kāya Buddha.

Above is the meaning of what Buddha is and the whole thing summarised would be that the Buddha is one who possesses the personality which is harmonised with the truth.

Now let us turn to our next problem WHAT IS DHARMA? By Dharma is meant the doctrine of Buddha or the perception of Buddha; in other words, Buddha's perception when preached among men, becomes a doctrine which is called Dharma. Speaking more definitely Dharma means the doctrine that passes through the personality of Buddha, who obtained the truth of reality, which remained with him as a potential truth and never before came to conduct human beings. Potential truth is motionless, therefore inactive, and consequently, is of no use to humanity. But when it was transformed to Dharma, through the personality of Buddha, his knowledge gave rise to Philosophy—his faith, religion and his will became the source of Ethics.

These three all combined constitute what is called Dharma so that the truth of reality is modified through Buddha's personality, thereby a differentiation is made between the Dharma and the potential truth. An example will explain it better. For example, there is a potato which is represented by the ultimate truth, and unless the potato is cooked by some cook, it is useless and

¹ Dhammañ hi so bhikkhu passati, Dhammañ passanto mañ passati (Itivuttaka, 92, p. 21). *English Translation*.—"The bhikkhu who penetrates Dharma can see me."

tasteless ; so the ultimate truth, unless it passes through the agency of some human being, cannot be of any use to the people or society. It is only when the truth transforms itself into Dharma, it can influence society and can conduct human beings from bad to good, from lower to higher. So the Dharma corresponds to Buddha's doctrines, passing through his personality to the people, modified by his knowledge, faith and will. Without Buddha's personality truth never can be Dharma¹ and without it also Dharma cannot come to influence our society.

The question of Dharma being finished, let us now turn to the question of how many aspects of Dharma did Buddha Preach :

When under the Bodhi tree Buddha attained enlightenment, he at once understood both the aspects of this world,—(i) The peaceful, real state of the world and (ii) the sorrowful, apparental state of the world. There he obtained two kinds of conception of knowledge—one is transcendental truth of the world, and the other is the truth of the apparental world or rather the true state of the transitoriness of all things and all beings of the world. In other words, when Buddha looked over this apparental world from the standpoint of the truth, he at once understood the phenomenal world ; and from the same standpoint when he looked into the

¹ *Tathāgata eva śāriputra Tathāgatasya Dharmaṃ deśayed yān dharmestathāgato jānāti. Sarvadharmānapi śāriputra Tathāgata eva deśayati, sarvadharmānapi Tathāgata eva jānāti, ye ca te Dharmā yathā ca te dharmā yādṛśāśca te dharmā yallakṣaṇāśca te dharmā yatsvabhāvaśca te dharmā, ye ca yatha ca yādṛśāśca yallakṣaṇāśca yatsvabhāvaśca te dharmā iti, teṣu dharmeṣu Thathāgata eva pratyakṣa parokṣaḥ* (Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Vol. I, p. 30).

English Translation : "None but a Tathāgata, Śāriputra, can impart to a Tathāgata those dharmas which the Tathāgata knows, and all laws, Śāriputra, are taught by the Tathāgata and by him alone ; no one but he knows all dharmas, what they are, how they are, like what they are, of what characteristics and of what nature they are."

(S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 32. H. Kern.)

reality of the world, he understood the truth of reality. These two kinds of perceptions—though they appear to be quite different—are yet really the two aspects of one and the same perception. When Buddha attained the ultimate truth, *i.e.*, the real perception, naturally these two aspects or observations came to him. So Buddha's doctrine—later on, his Dharma—is nothing but the embodiments of these two kinds of perception or the two kinds of observation.

Now the question may arise, what are these two aspects of his doctrine or Dharma? One aspect of the Dharma demonstrates the appearance of the world and the other demonstrates the reality of the world; the former may be called the Negative and the latter the Positive aspect of his doctrine. The so-called Hīnayāna doctrine is based upon the negative aspect while the Mahāyāna doctrine is based on the latter. In the Hīnayāna, Buddha never demonstrated his conception of the reality of the world but only his conception of the actual apparent world. Therefore Hīnayāna doctrine denies all existence and demonstrates only the external appearance of the world. And that is the reason why it is called negative. He shows thereby that "all is impermanent" (*Sarvaṃ anityaṃ*), that "all is suffering" (*Sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ*), that "there is no Ego" (*Sarvaṃ anātmaṃ*), as also that Nirvāṇa can only be attained by men only after the understanding of the Four Noble Truths (*Catvāri-Ārya-Satyāni*) and the Twelve-linked chain of causation (*Dvādaśa-Pratitya-Samutpāda*), which are but explanations of the apparent world.

Mahāyāna Buddhism can be traced through several stages, but, generally speaking, it rather affirms all existence of the world and demonstrates the reality of all existences from the standpoint of the essential reality of the world, showing that the world is not impermanent, but permanent, not suffering but happy, not that there is no

Ego, but that there is Ego¹ and that is why it is called positive.

As in the above, Buddha demonstrated both the negative and positive aspects of his doctrine, which deal with one and the same world. Following these two aspects, two distinct schools of Buddhism were established, the *Hīnayāna* (small vehicle) based upon the negative aspect and *Mahāyāna* (greater vehicle) based upon the positive aspect of his doctrine. The former is the doctrine which Buddha preached, following the standpoint of human beings and their notions, whereas the latter is the doctrine which he preached according to his own standpoint, without considering any notion of man.

Dharma properly so called consists in a reconciliation or rather in a harmonious combination of the above two aspects through which man can realise the true state of *Nirvāṇa*, and this peculiarity separates Buddhism from all other religions.

The above is a summary of the discussions regarding the questions of Dharma and Buddha. Through Buddha's personality the truth of reality was transformed into Dharma and through the truth of reality *Siddhārtha* attained Enlightenment, *i.e.*, became Buddha and through both, Dharma and Buddha, human beings can attain Buddhahood, after adequately understanding the two aspects of the world said before. This is what is called Buddhism.

The General Conceptions of the two aspects of Buddhism—(1) Mahāyāna and (2) Hīnayāna.

The problem "What is Buddhism" has been dealt with in the last section, and under that question I have also explained, "What is Buddha" and "What is Dharma"

¹ This is not Brāhmanical sense; see Southern Book of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*. This point shall be taken up for explanation in the main book. Vol. IV, Yin Bundle No. 7, p. 21, right side. See also Nanjio's Catalogue, p. 39, No. 114.

dealing with the two aspects, the negative and the positive under the latter. I have also shown that the first of these two aspects consists in the denial of everything, demonstrating the world as sorrowful and full of miseries, *i.e.*, what Buddha considered about the world from the standpoint of all men. Through the second, Buddha demonstrated the reality of the world, *i.e.*, what he understood about the world from self-introspection. Later on, among the Buddhists, two terms were applied to these two aspects, *viz.*, Hīnayāna on the first aspect and Mahāyāna on the second. Here I will give you a general idea of the doctrines of both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna in order. Let us take up the former first, and the latter, later on.

I. What is Hīnayāna doctrine?

When Buddha obtained Enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, he understood at once through his extraordinary knowledge (Prajñā) the reality as well as the appearance of the world which is unreal. These are the two main aspects of his conception and it is in the light of these that we can best understand the two fundamental aspects of Buddhism.

Hīnayāna is the doctrine which deals chiefly with the appearance of the world considering very little the question of its reality. Mahāyāna is just the opposite. In the Hīnayāna doctrine Buddha has indicated his understanding about the apparenatal world—the denial of all things which exist in the world by demonstrating the sorrow, impermanence and the absence of ego in it. He insisted enthusiastically on men's renouncing attachment of all external objects, and what is more important on their realising their own selves in order that they might become Arhats. Such negation is the main principle of the

Hīnayāna doctrine. In order to explain the whole thing in details it is necessary to divide the Hīnayāna doctrine into 5 parts—

- (1) Sūtra (canon).
- (2) Dharma (doctrine).
- (3) Karma (practice of religious austerities),
- (4) Mokṣa (emancipation).
- (5) Buddha-Kāya.

(1) *Sūtra*.—The Hīnayāna teachings are all recorded in Book form which is technically called the Tripiṭaka (the three baskets) in Pāli, viz., Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma.

The Vinaya, as the name implies, deals chiefly with discipline and questions connected with it.

The Sūtra Piṭaka is much more extensive and diversified than the Vinaya and it may roughly be said that it treats of various subjects more or less related to doctrine.

The Abhidharma deals with subjects more or less in a purely scholastic and technical manner with some variation in regard to the order and arrangement of the numerous details connected with the Buddhist creed and seems to have taken up such only as are discussed at full length in the Nikāya.¹

The Pāli Buddhistic canons were composed at different times between about 500 and 250 B.C.² At present the Buddhism of Ceylon, Burma, Siam and Anam or what we call the southern Buddhism is based on these canons.

(2) *Dharma*.—Next, let us consider what is the Hīnayāna doctrine or the original Buddhism on which the

¹ Dr. H. Kern's *Manual of Indian Buddhism*, pp. 2-3.

² Rhys Davids' *Buddhism*, p. 86.


Sūtras have a bearing on the whole. The original or the Hīnayāna Buddhism deals with the three formulæ—the doctrines which Lord Buddha evolved from within when he had attained full enlightenment and subsequently revealed to the world, are represented as the fundamental truths of his teachings. The first of these three formulæ is the “Four Noble Truths” (Catvāri Ārya Satyāni), *viz.*, Suffering (Duḥkhāni), its cause (Duḥkha-Samudayāni), its suppression (Duḥkha-Nirodha) and the path leading to its extinction (Duḥkha-nirodhagāmini pratipada). The Second is the “Twelve-linked chain of causation” (Dvādaśa Pratitya Samutpāda). The links in the chain are—Ignorance (avidyā), Impressions (Saṃskārāḥ), Consciousness (Vijñānam), Name-and-Form (Nāmarūpam). The Six Organs of Sense (Ṣaḍāyatanam), contact (sparśa), sensation (Vedanā), Desire (Trīṣṇā), clinging (upādāna), Existence (Bhava), Birth (Jāti), old age and death (Jarāmaraṇam).

The Third Formula: The *three-fold corner-stone of Buddhism*, *viz.*, that all is impermanent (Sarvam anityam) that all is suffering (Sarvam Duḥkham), that all is without self (Sarvam anātman).

The above three fundamental truths of the Hīnayāna doctrine are nothing but the three-fold explanation of Buddha's teachings regarding the phenomena of the world. Among the three, the “Four Noble Truths” indicate only the suffering that exists in the world, showing side by side its suppression and extinction; the twelve-linked chain of causation is more detailed and more minute explanations of “How this suffering phenomenon arises,” indicating thereby its causal connection and the chain of causation and therefore these correspond to nothing more than a fuller explanation of suffering and its cause among the Four Noble Truths. The three-fold corner-stone is chiefly the minute explanation of the “fact of suffering” of the world with the three formulæ—all is

impermanent, all is suffering and all is without ego—as said before.

To explain further and for the sake of convenience Hīnayāna doctrine (Dharma) may again be divided into three problems, *viz.*, Ontology, Phenomenology and the theory of Human Life.



The original Buddhism records Buddha's phenomenological conception and his conception of human life. His aim was to explain the phenomena of the world, *i.e.*, the appearance of the Samsāra where we experience directly throughout whole life. So the chief doctrine of the original Buddhism is not Ontology but phenomenology proper, the former belonging wholly to Mahāyāna doctrine. This is the reason why the Four Noble Truths, the Twelve-linked pratitya samutpāda and the three-fold corner-stone are regarded as the fundamental doctrines of the Hīnayāna Buddhism; for these three formulæ are nothing but explanations of phenomenology and Human Life. So I shall take up the phenomenology and the theory of Human Life at first, according to this system, and shall then proceed to consider its Ontological aspect.

A. Phenomenology and the theory of Human Being.

In the Pre-Buddhistic period India was particularly a country which produced many philosophical thinkers both orthodox and heterodox and seers of both Karma-Kāṇḍa and of Jñāna-Kāṇḍa. Though they generally

entered their thinker-hoods after experiencing the sufferings and miseries of the world, just as Gotama did, yet they cast aside their struggle of the sorrowful world, and became enthusiastic seekers after the reality underlying all phenomena, *i.e.*, they became searchers of the truth of reality, truth of the creation of the world and finally they observed that there is only one universal entity in the world, which is termed as Brahman, Prajāpati or Mahātmā. This universal entity is as if the centre of the universe and all phenomena have no independent existence but are creations of this Mahātmā. Besides this, there are many individual entities (Jīvātmā) in all human beings conducting all sorts of actions either good or bad, and these individual entities or souls have their essential unity with the highest Paramātmā. This kind of philosophical speculations naturally lead ignorant people to become more and more selfish and egoistic which is mainly the cause of sufferings in the world.

But Buddha was strictly against such ideas, because he never considered it necessary to attempt at a solution of the problem of the primary origin of all things. So when Malunka asked Buddha whether the existence of the world is eternal or ephemeral, he made him no answer. But the reason is not far to seek. It was considered by the teacher as an enquiry binded to no profit,¹ a kind of enquiry which would never lead to salvation. In one of the Sūtras he has explained this idea by an example :—

“It is not the time to discuss about fire for those who are really in burning fire but it is the time to escape from it.”²

And for this obvious reason he simply takes for granted as ultimate fact the existence of the phenomenal world and the conscious being living in it and holds that

¹ Rhys Davids' Buddhism, p. 87.

² M. N., Vol. I, p. 29.

“all is impermanent,” “all is suffering” and “all is without Ego.”

According to Buddha's teachings in the original Buddhism all phenomena, either inorganic or organic, either physical or mental, are but the aggregate productions of the “Hetu” (cause) or “Pratyayas” (conditions).¹ So the Buddhist term for the phenomenal world is “Saṃskṛtaloka” which etymologically means the loka which is put together and the term for all things that exist in the world is “Saṃskṛta Dharma” or composite things.

The Abhidharmakośaśāstra clearly explains this point, *e.g.*, “Hetupratyaya-janitarūpādayaḥ Saṃskṛtāḥ.” Vasubandhu goes a little further and lays special stress on the plurality of causes, because according to Buddhistic philosophy no effect can ever be produced by a single cause; there must be at least two causes to produce a single effect, as is evident from the following quotation :—

“Natveka-pratyaya-janitaṃ sarvathāpa-pratyayatvepi avaśyaṃ dvau pratyayaustaḥ.”²

Again according to Buddhist Philosophy, all composite things, both inorganic and organic, are included in the five Skandhas,³ *viz.*, Rūpa, Vedanā, Saṃjñā, Saṃskāra and Vijñāna. All these five Skandhas are the productions of the “hetu” and “pratyaya” and the cause of such aggregation of the Skandhas, *i.e.*, of birth and re-birth; or in other words, the combining cause of the “hetu” and “pratyaya” is simply Saṃskāra or Karma. So all things, organic or inorganic, that exist in the world are only the combinations of “hetu” and “pratyaya” and they come

¹ “Hetu” means “direct cause” and “Pratyaya” (Pali—Paccaya) means etymologically “condition” or that which helps the cause or the indirect cause. The latter corresponds to the Nyāya term “Karaṇa.”

² S. Yamakami's Systems of Buddhistic Thought, p. 117.

³ The Five Skandhas will be explained later on in the main body of the book.

to exist from time to time in the world by the Law of Causation.

Composite things must come to dispersion or dissolution some time after, because all things are subject to an invariable Law of Change as they are subject to the Law of Cause and Effect. Everything is constantly changing, so nothing in this phenomenal world can exist without cause (*hetu* or *pratyaya*) while the very name phenomenon presupposes origination which again implies destruction exactly in the same way as destruction invariably implies origination. To this invariable Law of Composition and Dissolution, from inorganic to organic, there is not a single exception and that is exactly what Buddha meant while he preached that all is impermanent. Therefore, shortly before he departed, Buddha himself, as the *Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra*¹ relates, said to his disciples,—“Know that whatever exists, arises from cause and condition and is in every respect impermanent.”

Thus all things or phenomena are impermanent and there is no eternal universal entity, who is as the Creator and Controller of this universe and every human individual is an aggregation of the Five Skandhas. Therefore there can be no individual imperishable soul passing over to Nirvāṇa across the ocean of Samsāra.

So “All is without Ego”—If however, everything is in the process of a constant change, there cannot possibly be any possibility of eternity and if all things are but productions of aggregation there cannot be any performance. Hence all is *Śūnyatā*.

Men of this Samsāra may consider that all is permanent and may believe themselves to be immortal but the

¹ Nanjio's Catalogue, No. 552.

Law of constant change would never allow them their conviction go further, and brings them the four calamities, *viz.*, sorrow, birth, decrepitude and death. "So this Samsāra is Duḥkham." Buddha first preached in the Dhammacakka pavattana sutta thus:—

"Jāti pi dukkhā, jarā pi dukkhā, vyādhi pi dukkhā, maraṇam pi dukkham."

English Translation.—"Birth is attended with pain, decay is painful, disease is painful, death is also painful."¹

All is without Ego but men believe in individual entity or in their individuality. Such idea certainly brings to their minds two kinds of delusions; one is attachment to objective things and the second is the discrimination of I and not-I among human beings.

Man attaches special importance to objective things as is evident from the expressions "This is my wife," "This is my son," "This is my house," "This is my property," etc., but the law of constant change never allows his attachment last long and sweeps away his objective things at once. This must be one of the causes of suffering in this Samsāra.

The idea of discrimination naturally brings various kinds of conflict among men and a fatal fighting ensues in the long run. This is another suffering in the world. Hence Buddha preached in the same sutta—

"Appiyehi sampayogo dukkho, piyehi Vippayogo dukkho, yam pi iccham na labhati tam pi dukkham, saṅkhittena pañc'upādānak-khandhā dukkhā."

English Translation.—"Union with the unpleasant is painful, painful is separation from the pleasant; and any craving that is unsatisfied, that too is painful. In brief, the five aggregates which spring from attachment (the conditions of individuality and their cause) are painful."¹

¹ S. B. E., Vol. XI, p. 148.

This Saṃsāra filled full with these sufferings is exactly what Buddha meant by the real apparental world¹ and he indicated the reason of such condition by preaching first the noble truth concerning suffering among the Four Noble Truths.

How this suffering came to exist? To this the original Buddhism gives an answer. The cause of suffering is nothing but thirst (Tañhā) which is of three kinds, *viz.*, the craving for the gratification of the passions (Kāma), the craving for the success of the present life (Bhāva) and thirdly the craving for a future life which causes the renewal of existence in the Saṃsāra. So Buddha preached the noble truth concerning the cause of suffering (Duhkha samudayāni Āriya Satyāni) after Duhkham Āriya-Satyāni, among the Four Noble Truths. And he has said in Dhamma-cakka-ppavattana-suttam:—

“Idaṃ kho pana, bhakkhave, dukkhasamusayaṃ ariya saccaṃ ; yāyaṃ : taṇhā ponobbhavikānandi-rāgo-sahagatā tatra tatrābhinandinī, seyyathidaṃ ; kāmatāṇhā, bhāvatāṇhā, vibhābatāṇhā.”

English Translation.—“Now this, O Bhikṣus, is the noble truth concerning the origin of suffering. Verily, it is that thirst (or craving), causing the renewal of existence, accompanied by sensual delight, seeking satisfaction, now here, now there,—that is to say, the craving for the gratification of the passions, or the craving for (a future) life or the craving for success (in this present life).”²

Among the Four Noble Truths Buddha lays special stress on suffering and its cause only because the whole world is constituted of suffering and suffering alone. Besides, he gives us an excellent explanation upon the cause of suffering with advanced arguments, what are known as the Twelve Pratitya-samutpādas or 12 caused

¹ Sabbo ādīpito loko, sabbo loko paridīpto. Sabbo pajjalito loko, sabbo loko pakampito (Therīgatha 200). Ablaze is all the world, it is all aflame; it is burning, and it quakes. Translated by Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

² S. B. E., Vol. XI, p. 148.

productions or the 12 nidānas (causes) beginning from avidyā and ending in jarāmaraṇam. This is an advanced explanation in order to show how suffering and its cause are mutually connected.

As has been already stated, Buddha recognized the thirst (tañhā) to be the builder of this Saṃsāra and by tracing back the original source of tañhā, he discovered that ignorance or avidyā is at the root of it and is the prime cause of all our sufferings. He even considered that tañhā is a direct outcome of avidyā which is apparent from a sūtra of the Sanskrit canon known as the "Sūtra on the cause and effect of the Present and the Past"¹ wherein there is a description of his new discovery thus:—

"In the third night of his meditation, the would-be-Buddha examined the nature of all living beings and asked himself, "What is the cause of old age and death"? He then replied to himself, saying, "I know that old age and death are brought about by birth which is not produced by a God or by itself or by chance, but is the effect of causes and conditions, that is to say, it is the outcome of Karma in the Realm of Desire, of form and of formlessness. Again, whence arise the Karmas of these three Realms? They arise from the four-fold attachments. Whence arise those attachments? Forsooth from Desire. Whence arises this Desire? From sensation, and whence arises sensation? From contact. Whence arises contact? From the six organs of sense. Whence the six organs of sense? From name-and-form. Whence arises name-and-form? From consciousness. Whence arises consciousness? From the Saṃskāra or conformations. Whence arise conformations? From ignorance."²

In this way Buddha discovered that Ignorance is the ultimate cause of this Saṃskāra.

"Avidyā" or Ignorance means "not-knowing," i.e., the mistaken notions of truth and falsehood or considering false what is true or true what is false. This notion produces Saṃskāra or conformation, which means etymologically

¹ Nanjio's Cat., No. 666.

² Mr. S. Yamakami's "Systems of Buddhistic Thought," p. 77.

“making up together” (Sam “with” and Kr “to make”) translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids as “action of the mind.” Conformation produces Vijñāna or consciousness which generally means knowledge or understanding, but here it should be interpreted as a primitive mental operation taking place at the very time when a living being enters the maternal womb. This state is induced by Samskāra and Avidyā. From it is produced Nāma-Rupa or Name-and-Form. Name implies what is mental, whereas Form implies that which is material, so that roughly the words may be translated as Mind and Body, as has been done by Mrs. Rhys Davids.

The Śhaḍāyatana or the Six Organs of Sense are the products of these two. At this stage, a baby in the maternal womb is said to have completed the stage of praśākhā or in other words, its eyes, its nose, its tongue, its body and its mind are said to have been fully formed. Sparśa or contact is the outcome of this. At this stage, the child is in the second or third year of his life, before which its consciousness was very dim and so could not notice the objective world. Vedanā or sensation comes after it. Sensations are of three kinds, pleasant, unpleasant and indifferent. From it emanates the tṛṣṇā or thirst which represents according to Buddhistic Philosophy the stage of boyhood or girlhood from the age of eleven to fifteen, when they begin to covet consciously, without striving to obtain them, things for the body, and to feel desires of the flesh without coveting their fulfilment. From it Upādāna or attachment is produced. This stage is the stage of youth in man and woman when not only are various desires produced in their minds but they seek also for their fulfilments in spite of dangers and difficulties that beset them in their way of that fulfilment. From it emanates the Bhava or Existence which is represented by a stage which collects good or evil actions

capable of producing future existences. This is followed by Jarā-maraṇam or old age and death.

To sum up, out of these twelve-fold causal productions or the twelve-linked chain of causation "Ignorance" and "Saṃskāra" represent the Kleśa and Karma belonging to an anterior existence, and bearing fruit in the present. "Vijñāna," "Nāma-rupa," "Śhaḍāyatana," "Sparsa," "Vedanā" are all the effects in the present existence of the "Saṃskāra" in the anterior existence. Trṣṇā, Upādāna and Bhava represent Karma in the present, capable of producing effects in subsequent existences. Birth, old age and death are to be produced in subsequent existence, as effects produced by the cause, *i.e.*, Kleśa and Karma in the present existence. Thus Ignorance is the prime cause of this Saṃskāra and the Saṃskāra is synonymous with Karmā which is but a secondary cause but the latter becomes the actual cause when the phenomena begin to arise. In a word, Ignorance and Karma combined together form, as it were, the real cause of the effect which is the so-called Saṃskāra. The Phenomenology of the original Buddhism is suffering and it arises from Ignorance and Karma. So the Japanese Buddhist scholars designate the cause by a special term "Avidyā-Karma Pratītyasamutpāda" or simply "Avidyā-Karma" (causal production). Hence it may be called "Avidyā-Karma-phenomenon-rise." My friend Mr. Yamakami calls it "Karma-Phenomenology"¹ in his "Systems of Buddhistic Thought."

B. Ontology.

According to original Buddhism, there are two aspects of the world, one is Saṃskṛtaloka and the other is

¹ Mr. S. Yamakami's "Systems of Buddhistic Thought," p. 50.

Asaṃskṛtaloka. The former corresponds to the phenomenology of original Buddhism which I have already explained in the last section and Asaṃskṛtaloka which corresponds to the Ontology of original Buddhism which will be explained presently. Etymologically Asaṃskṛtaloka means the "loka" which is not put together, *i.e.*, the "loka" from the Ontological point of view. According to original Buddhism, there is no cause and effect in the world; it is not subject to the law of causation and to the law of constant change, but on the contrary, is peaceful and eternal. This peaceful and eternal stage of the world is specially called in the original Buddhism as "Sāntaṃ-Nirvāṇa" (*i.e.*, Nirvāṇa is the only calm). It will not be out of place to remind you that in original Buddhism, Buddha has chiefly explained things concerning the apparental or the external world and did not speak much about the real internal world; or in other words, his main subject was Phenomenology and not Ontology, though from his own point of view he at once understood the true perception after having obtained Enlightenment. It seems clear to us, that he was at first hesitating as to whether the men of Samsāra would be able to understand him or not. So that in original Buddhism though he preached the Four Noble Truths, yet he did not explain clearly the idea of the "Path leading to the extinction of sorrow" (Duhkha nirodha) which is the so-called Nirvāṇa from the Ontological point of view; because the extinction of sorrow is itself a condition of Nirvāṇa. Buddha speaks about this in the Ariyapariyesa :—

Tassa mayham bhikkhave etad-ahosi : adhigato kho me yaṃ dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇito atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo ālayārmāya kho paṇāyaṃ pajā ālayaratā ālayasamuditāya ālayarāmāya kho pana pajāya ālayaratāya ālayasamuditāya duddasam idam tṭhaṇam yad idam idapaccayatā paticcasamuppādo,

idam pi kho ðhānam sudaddasam. yaḷ idam sabbasaṅkhārasamatho sabbūpadhi-pañissaggo taṇhakkhayo virāgo nirodho, nibbānaṃ.¹

English Translation.—"Then this thought occurred to me: Verily has this Dhamma been realised by me, the Dhamma, which is profound, which is difficult to perceive and difficult to understand, which is tranquil, and excellent, which has not its foundation upon argumentation, but which is subtle, and comprehensible only by the wise. Now, the general run of men find pleasure in attachment; they are given to attachment and are delighted by attachment; and difficult is this condition for them to perceive, *viz.*, the dependent origination with an inter-related process of development. And difficult, too, is this condition to perceive, *viz.*, the tranquilisation of all compounds, the flowing out of all attachments, the destruction of craving, the absence of passion, the cessation, the Nibbāna."²

Not only is this, but Buddha himself considered deeply that it is very important to show men the way to salvation by demonstrating and explaining the suffering at first and then to show them the way of getting out of it by the destruction of suffering or rather their delusions, so that they may cross over to the Asaṃskṛtaloka (peaceful condition). This is the only reason why Buddha took up phenomenology in the original Buddhism as his chief subject, practically discarding Ontology. Buddha preached about this point many times in the Sutta:—

"It is necessary to come out at once from fire for those who are in the burning flames and it is necessary to take away the arrow from the body for those who have been struck with the poisonous arrow. They are quite ignorant, who think about the condition when they will be coming out of the fire, while they are actually in burning fire; they are also ignorant who, being struck by the poisonous arrow want to know the construction of the arrow without attempting to remove it from the body."³

¹ V. I. Mahāvagga I. 5. 2-3 (Vol. I, pp. 4-5); S. N. VI. I. 1. (Vol. I, pp. 136-7); M. N. (Vol. I, pp. 167-168).

² Translated by Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ M. N., Vol. I, p. 29.

This is the reason why Buddha attached very little value to the Ontological aspect (Nirvāṇa) of the world but put a strong emphasis on its phenomenological aspect. But it cannot be said, therefore, that he failed to explain the Ontological Nirvāṇa. The explanation that was given by Buddha was very scanty.

Then, what is the essential principle of that Nirvāṇa ? This very question was really put nearly two thousand years ago by the Greek King Menander or Milinda to a Buddhist elder named Nāgasena. Though we are far removed from the age of both Menander and Nāgasena, yet how can we expect to give out a more satisfactory answer than that which was given by that learned priest.¹

"Venerable Nāgasena," said the king to Nāgasena, "Nirvāṇa of which you are always talking, can you explain to me by metaphor, elucidation, or argument its figure, duration or measure ?"

"That I cannot, O King," replied Nāgasena, "for Nirvāṇa has nothing similar to it." "I cannot bring myself to believe," continued Milinda, "that of Nirvāṇa, which, after all, is a condition that exists, it should be impossible in any way to make us understand the form or figure, duration or measure. How do you explain this ?"

"Tell me, O King !" said Nāgasena, "is there such a thing as the great ocean ?" "Yes," replied the king. "Now," continued the sage, "Suppose some one were to ask Your Majesty how much water is in the ocean and how many creatures that dwell therein : what would you answer ?" "I would say to him," replied the king, "that such a question should not be asked, and that the point should be left alone, seeing that the physicists have never examined the ocean in that way and no one can measure the water or count the creatures that it contains. Such, Sir, would be my reply." "But why would Your Majesty," enquired the sage, "make such a reply ? The ocean is after all a thing which really exists. You ought rather to tell the man that such and so much and so many are the creatures that dwell therein." "That would be impossible," said the king, "for, the answer

¹ The Question of King Milinda, Part II, pp. 186-7, S. B. E. (Vol. XXXVI).

to such a question is beyond human power." "Equally impossible, O King!" said Nāgasena, "is to tell the measure, form, figure or duration of Nirvāṇa, although Nirvāṇa is a condition that after all does exist. And even if one endowed with magical powers may succeed in measuring the water and counting the creatures in the ocean, he would never be able to tell the form, figure, duration or measure of Nirvāṇa."

So Nirvāṇa is just like the Nirguṇa-Brahman of the Vedānta philosophy. It cannot be explained, but may be expressed superficially as simply the condition after the extinction of all sufferings of this Saṃsāra. This condition cannot however be described as the "Freedom of the mind" (*i.e.*, Ceto-Vimutti); so in the Kathāvatthu we find,—

"Sabba-dhammānam, tatathā asaṅkhatā, nibbānam, tāṇam, lenam, saraṇam, parāyaṇam, accutaṃ, amatam nibbānam asaṅkhatam."¹

English Translation.—"Nibbāna is the deliverance, the safety, the refuge, the highest path, the stability, the eternal (lit. deathless) cessation, the unfathomable."²

And in the Udāna it is stated—

"No ce tam abhaviṣṣa ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhatam nayidha jātaṃ bhūtaṃ katassa saṅkhatassa nissaraṇam paññāyetha?"³

English Translation.—"If that were not unborn, non-existent, not made, not compounded, would not the dissolution (lit. escape) the existent, the made, the compounded be comprehensible?"²

It is also a significant fact that Nāgārjuna himself has recourse to negatives while he describes the characteristics of Nirvāṇa—

"Apratītaṃ samprāptam anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ,
Aniruddham anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ anuṇaṃ."⁴

¹ Kathāvatthu, p. 565.

² Translated by Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ Udāna, VIII. 3. St. 43.

⁴ Madhyamika Sastra, Chap. XXV, karika 3.

English Translation.—"That is called Nirvāṇa which is not acquired, not reached, not extirpated, not eternal, not suppressed, not produced."

But Nirvāṇa is neither to be understood as absolute Nothing-ness nor Emptiness; there is but one existence which may be called the Summum bonum or Atyanta-Śānta and which cannot be explained with human expressions or human knowledge, but this much can be said that Nirvāṇa can be realized by self-introspection. Therefore the Nirvāṇa can only be described in human language as the condition of the extinction from all sufferings. Mr. Hoffding clearly points to this explanation in his "Religious Philosophie"¹ and this is also the reason why Nirvāṇa is compared to the extinction of a lamp. This comparison may remind the Pali scholars of the well-known lines—

"Dipassiva nibhāṇaṃ vimokkho ahu cetaso" (*i.e.*, "The emancipation of my mind was like the blowing out of a lamp").

And "Nibbhanti dhirā yathāyam padipo" (*i.e.*, "the wise attain Nirvāṇa like the lamp's extinction"). On the whole, though of course, Nirvāṇa can be attained only by self-introspection, yet Buddha attempted at its explanation in the Mahāyāna doctrine and not in the Hīnayāna doctrine. So my readers will be able to understand further about it, when the Mahāyāna doctrines would be explained to them later on.

(3) *Dhārmik-Karma or the practice of Religious austerities.*

It is only owing to Kleśa that man is floating aimlessly in the ocean of Samsāra and when he can cut off the bond of Kleśa, then he is said to have attained

¹ Hoffding, *Religious Philosophie*, St. 118 and 119.

salvation. The way in which that can be done is known as Dhārmik Karma or the practice of religious austerities. Before Dhārmik Karma can be explained, it is necessary to explain what Kleśa is.

Kleśa in its general sense, means fatigue or pain in Sanskrit, but in Buddhistic Philosophy it bears another sense, *viz.*, that of delusion. Original Buddhism recognizes two kinds of Kleśa, namely, "Darśanāheya-kleśa" (*i.e.*, the intellectual Kleśa) and "Bhāvanāheya-Kleśa" (or the emotional Kleśa). The former is due to errors of judgment or want of discretion and the latter is the production of our habits of the emotional nature and consequently more difficult to be eradicated than the former. For example, this world is really for ever changing but ignorant people consider it as permanent. This sort of delusion belongs to the domain of Intellectual. Those who are imperfectly wise, may consider this world to be impermanent, yet when they meet others' death, grieve much at their separation. This sort of error or delusion belongs to the emotional sphere.

Intellectual delusions are easy to be removed, because ignorance or want of reason is only at the root of it and when this ignorance is expelled by reason, Intellectual delusion vanishes as it were by magic. But emotions are by no means easy to be conquered because though we understand the reason by our knowledge or wisdom, yet the habits of our emotional nature do not allow us to do so accordingly. For example, though the Brahmins understand that all men are equal yet the habits of their emotional nature would never allow them to be married to Śūdra. The only remedy for such delusions, according to Buddhism, is an adequate training of the mind and the body. And this is why emotional delusions are called in Buddhism as "Bhāvanāheya-Kleśas," *i.e.*, the delusions which can only be eradicated through proper

meditation or training ; whereas the Intellectual delusions are termed as “ Darśanāheya-Kleśas ” or the delusions removable through the realisation of the truth.

Now, when Kleśa has once been explained, let us see what way Buddha has shown in order that the Kleśas can be destroyed. In original Buddhism Buddha has preached many ways and has explained various sorts of religious austerities based upon the fundamental religious austerities which is the so-called “ Noble Middle Path ” (or Majjhima paṭipadā). This excellent way Buddha found out himself, when he attained enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree, by the rejection of the two extremes, *viz.*, Hedonism on the one hand and Asceticism on the other, both of which were prevalent in India at that time. The question here naturally arises as to the nature of this Middle Path. Buddha himself describes it in the “ Dhammacakka ppavattana suttaṃ ” thus—

“ What is that Middle Path, O Bhikkhus, avoiding these two extremes discovered by the Tathāgata—that path which opens the eyes, and bestows understanding, which leads to peace of mind, to the higher wisdom, to full enlightenment, to Nirvāṇa ? Verily, it is this noble eight-fold path ; that is to say—

“ Right views
Right aspirations
Right speech
Right conduct
Right livelihood
Right effort
Right mindfulness and
Right contemplation.”¹

¹ “ Katamā ca sū, bhikkhave, majjhimā paṭipadā Tathāgatena abhisambuddhā cakkhukaraṇi ñāṇakaraṇi upasamāya abhiññāya sambodhāya nibbānāya samvattati ? ”

Ayaṃ eva ariya aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, seyyathidaṃ, Sammādiṭṭhi sammāsāṅkappo, sammāvācā, Sammākamanto sammājīvo, sammāvāyāmo, sammāsatī, sammāsama-dhi.”

So the middle path was summed up in these eight principles or paths. This noble eight-fold path may however be included in the three kinds of learning (Tisrah Śikṣāḥ), *i.e.*, (1) Morality (Śīla), (2) Contemplation (Samādhi) and (3) High knowledge (prajñā) as following:—

- | | | |
|------------------------------------|---|---|
| I. High knowledge (Prajñā). | { | (1) Right view (Sammāditṭhi). (2) Right aspiration (Sammā-sāṅkappo). |
| II. Morality (Śīla)... | { | (1) Right speech (Sammāvācā). (2) Right conduct (Sammā-kammanto). (3) Right livelihood (Sammā-ājīvo). (4) Right effort (Sammā-vāyāmo). (5) Right-mindedness (Sammā-sati). |
| III. Contemplation... (Samādhi) | { | (1) Right contemplation (Sammā-samādhi). |

The well-furnished Tisrah-Śikṣāḥ based upon the Middle Path is the only possible way following which man can cut off his relation from the worldly delusions, and ultimately attain salvation. Without Prajñā we fail to obtain the truth and fail to remove our ignorance which is, as has been shown, at the root of all sufferings in the Saṃsāra. So primarily, highest knowledge is incumbent on man to attain. But without contemplation, again, it is not at all possible to get the highest knowledge, for if our mind roams hither and thither aimlessly, it cannot possibly obtain it. So, contemplation is the second incumbent on man in the path of obtaining highest knowledge. The necessity of the third incumbent, moral conduct (or Śīla) is not far to seek after, for without it all the senses would be roaming about, what to speak of the mind!

The above three co-operate with each other. Without highest knowledge moral conduct and contemplation become useless, as it were ; so also without moral conduct and contemplation the least can be accomplished. In other words, these three must be well-furnished side by side.

(4) *Mokṣa or Emancipation.*

When man has removed both the Intellectual and Emotional delusions, causing both mental and bodily sufferings, and when he has cut off the bond from ignorance, then he is said to have attained emancipation. The condition of this emancipation is known in Original Buddhism as Nirvāṇa, which is of two kinds, *viz.*, the Sopādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa (*i.e.*, Nirvāṇa having the residuum of a substratum) and the Nirupādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa (*i.e.*, Nirvāṇa without the residuum of a substratum). The first can be attained by the Arhats in their life-time and it corresponds virtually with the Jīvanmukti of the Vedānta system. Those who, in their life-time, after removing their delusions, enjoy peace and freedom of mind, they are said to have attained Sopādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa ; though they are endowed with the five organs of sense, yet they have no attachment for the external objects. This is what is called the Sopādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa.

The second is the absolute Nirvāṇa which can only be attained after death by a man who is Jīvanmukta. When the man, who has attained emancipation in his life-time, dies, then he is said to have attained Nirupādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa. Sopādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa is like the condition of fire without any more fuel put into it, whereas, the Nirupādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa is like the condition of even that fire extinguished. For example, when Buddha attained enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree, it was Sopādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa, but when he attained " parinirvāṇa " at Kusināra,

it was Nirupādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa. According to original Buddhism, when man obtains these two kinds of Nirvāṇa, then he is said to have attained what is called the absolute emancipation.

Here the question as to the relative importance of these two kinds of Nirvāṇa, rises. We must see also on which, among these, Buddha lays special stress. The importance of the Sopādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa, commends itself most to me, because of the reason that Buddha has treated of the same with deference in his sayings and also because emancipation under the Bodhi Tree was nothing but this same kind of Nirvāṇa which should be the goal of all human beings and which he tried to impress upon the people by his teachings about it. It seems probable also because Buddha does not speak much about the Nirupādhiṣeṣa-Nirvāṇa.

The Gate of Emancipation or Nirvāṇa is opened alike to any and everybody, but according to different nature and career of Religious austerities, there is a great difference in the matter of velocity among them and according to degrees of removing delusions, there are many stages in the way of attaining Emancipation.

There are four stages, according to original Buddhism, and each of these again, is sub-divided into lower or higher degree, *viz.*, the "Mārga" (or path) and its "Phala" (or result). The first stage is that of the Neophyte or "Srotāpanna" who has entered into the current of stream (Srota) which is saintship. He has got rid of intellectual delusions and the first three bonds of human passion (Samyojana) namely Satkāyadr̥ṣṭi or the heresy of individuality, Vicikitsā or scepticism and Śīlavrataparāmarśa or observance of ascetic or superstitious rites. The doors of the gates of punishment are shut for him. Buddhism recognizes several classes of Srotāpannas, the lowest of which is called Saptakṛdbhavaparama

"or one who will be re-born seven times at the most" and the highest of which is styled Kulāṅkula, or one who will be reborn only twice or thrice. The second stage is that of Sakṛdāgāmin or one who will be reborn but once in the world of men. He is also called Ekabījī. He has eradicated every intellectual kleśa and also a part of the emotional delusions in the Realm of Desire. He has not only freed himself from the first three fetters mentioned above but has in addition eradicated Rāga (passion), Dveṣa (hate) and Moha (folly). The third stage is that of the Anāgāmī or one who will not be re-born in the world of living men or the Realm of Desire. Such a one is expected to have extirpated all Kleśas, intellectual and emotional. He has freed himself from all the Saṃyojanas. He may be born in the world of the Gods once more after which he will forthwith enter the stage of Arhat. An Arhat is, it is needless to say, no longer subject to re-birth. He is the Ārya or the Noble one, although all others who are progressing towards emancipation are entitled to that name. When all men will attain Arhat-ships, it will be called Emancipation.

(5) *Theory of Buddha-kāya in the Original Buddhism.*

In the above, I have treated of the doctrine of Original Buddhism with a description of different aspects beginning from Sūtra and ending in the Mokṣa. Besides these, it is now necessary to speak something about the Hinayāna theory of the Buddha-kāya.

Existence of religion presupposes two factors, one is the religion with the revelation of God as centre and the other is the religion with the personality of the founder as centre. The religion of the Vedas belong to the former class and religions like Buddhism belong to the latter. The seers of the Vedas and Upaniṣads have been

revered by the people, but it should be understood that they have been so revered only as compilers of the Sūtras (Sūtrakāras) or the annotators of the Sūtras that have been revealed by God, never as founders of religion.

But in the case of Buddhism, the personality of the founder Buddha figures in the centre of the Religion. So people worship his personality and consider his teachings as religious doctrines, so that the religion rises and falls with the personality of its founder. In the lifetime of Buddha all disciples felt themselves honoured by his personal influence, venerated his personality, believing at the same time his teachings as true doctrines of emancipation, and in like manner, paid respect to Saṃgha, which was established by Buddha himself as the protective community. In this way the three Śaraṇas which became afterwards "the Ratnas"¹ expressed in Buddhistic terms as the Buddha, the Dharma and the Saṃgha, came to exist. Though we cannot for obvious reasons believe that these three Śaraṇas have been existing from the time when Buddha preached the Dhamma-cakka-pavattana-sutta in the Deer park near Benāres, yet it is clear from the Pāli Nikāyas that the formula of the three Śaraṇas was introduced in the lifetime of the Buddha.

But it is clear that among the three Śaraṇas, the Buddha was regarded by the disciples as the centre.²

¹ Vide "Aśoka's Dhamma" by Dr. Barua and Mr. Mitra, *loc cit.*

² Prof. Śailendranath Mitra has been good enough to point out the following references from the Mahāparinibbāna sutta :—Buddha's injunction to the Brotherhood (attapatisaraṇaṃ hoṭha), when his disciples were pained at the thought that their Master was to pass away soon, presupposes in the Brethren a mentality in which his personality was pre-eminent. For, they were at a loss for a proper refuge, as if the absence of the Buddha would render the other refuges—Dhamma and Saṃgha—impotent. (Digh., II. 100.)

Again, it seems that Ānanda had completely forgotten the Dharma and the Saṃgha when he fell to crying at the painful thought—"Alas ! I remain still but a learner, one who has yet to work out his own perfection. And the Master is about to pass away from me." (Digha., II. 143.)

“What, then, Ānanda, is the mirror of Truth? It is the consciousness that the disciple of the Arhats is in this world possessed of faith in the Buddha believing the Exalted One to be the Arhat, the fully Enlightened One, wise, upright, happy, world-knowing, supreme, the Bridler of men’s wayward hearts, the Teacher of Gods and men.”¹

As Buddha was held in esteem by the disciples in his life-time, so also after his death, he was respected more than ever. His own disciples revered the past great personality as well as the new converts. And this is clear from the following passage :—

“Sacehi mayam suṇeyyāma tam Bhagavantam.....dasasu Visatiyā, timsatiya yojanesu...Yojanasate.....yojanasatampi mayam gachhey-yāma tam Bhagavantam dassauāya arahantam Sammāsambuddham Yato ca kho parinibhuto so Bhagavā, parinibbantam pi mayam tam Bhagavantam Saraṇam gachhāma dhammaṇca bhikkhu Saṅghaṇca.”²

English Translation.—“If we hear that the Buddha Bhagavān is at a distance of ten, twenty or thirty yojanas we would go even one hundred yojanas and one thousand yojanas to pay respects to Bhagavān, the highly Enlightened One, the Noble one. But even though the Buddha has passed away, nevertheless would we take refuge in the Buddha who has attained Parinirvāṇa and in the Dharma Saṅgha.”

Such kind of emotional feeling is quite natural among the disciples of Buddha, and in this way, as time rolls on, the feeling becomes more and more deeper. And they begin at last to hold the theory of Buddha-kāya.

In the above, I have shown the historical development of how Buddha-kāya theory came to exist, or in other words, the theory of the Buddha-kāya in the original Buddhism. Though there are different theories about it among the 18 Schools, yet, on the whole; the original Buddhism believes in Rūpa-kāya and Mahāyāna in the Three-kāya Buddha.

¹ Rhys Davids' Dialogues of the Buddha, Part II, p. 99.

² M. N. Madhura, Vol. II, p. 90.

The Rūpa-kāya Buddha is nothing but the historical Buddha, who was born in the Human world and passing through the eight stages finally attained Buddhahood. The Rūpa-kāya Buddha is able to give emotional satisfaction to the disciples who wish to get salvation through Buddha's personality.

II. *What is Mahāyāna Buddhism?*

Before entering into the main subject, some introductory remark should be made here. The Mahāyāna Buddhism is known to the Buddhist scholars in present days, as a developed doctrine, while Hīnayāna as the original doctrine of Buddha. Here then, the question may arise whether the Mahāyāna Buddhism contained the original ideas of Buddha or not. Let us now discuss and consider this question. I believe that the Mahāyāna doctrine contained the original ideas, but at the same time it underwent development after the death of Buddha. From the historical point of view the Hīnayāna doctrine was only the original Buddhism, for in Buddha's life-time he preached that doctrine to his disciples, while the Mahāyāna doctrine was developed in later ages among the advanced disciples.

According to my opinion this doctrine originated at the time of the Mahāsaṅghika separation at Vesālī Council in 386 B.C. and was developed by Āśvaghoṣa I¹ about 140 A.D. and attained full development from the time of Nāgārjuna to that of Āśvaghoṣa II from about the end of 2nd Century A.D. to 5th Century A.D. This is the reason,

¹ Āśvaghoṣa I is a contemporary of Kaniṣka the Great (140 A.D.). According to me he is author of the "Buddha Carita Kāvya," etc. But there is another Āśvaghoṣa who is author of "Mahāyāna-Śraddhotpāda-Śāstra" and he is regarded as a great Mahāyāna philosopher who flourished about the 5th century A.D. However it will be discussed in the main book.

I think, why the Mahāyāna doctrine has not been stated clearly in the Pāli canons.

But history cannot possibly help us in determining the idea which was a direct result of Buddha's self-introspection. From the point of view of the Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka sūtra, nay even from our own consideration, we may be able to find out that the Mahāyānic doctrine was already present in Buddha's perception when he attained Enlightenment under the Bodhi tree; because the "Perfect Knowledge" must possess all kinds of truths, and therefore, it is reasonable to suppose that Hīnayānic perception and its truth on the one hand and the Mahāyānic perception on the other were both present simultaneously in the "Perfect Knowledge" or Enlightenment. And these are the two aspects of absolute truth which the Buddha attained in this universe as I have stated before.

But Buddha never preached openly the doctrines of Mahāyāna in his life-time because his main mission was to lead human beings to salvation, instead of explaining his own deep philosophical perception of the world or of human being which he obtained through self-introspection. He was engaged whole-heartedly in carving the way to salvation through which one can realise oneself. Buddha's idea was to point out the way to salvation and thus it became necessary for him to show the sorrowful condition of this Saṃsāra, realizing which men naturally can recognize the inner self and be able to eradicate their passions from the objective phenomena; thereby men could or rather can realize themselves. This realization is the only way to salvation.

Besides this, there is another reason as to why Buddha preached Hīnayāna doctrine in his life-time. It was due only to the social and religious condition and the speculations of that time. Every condition then expected a great

reformation in the spiritual sphere, about which I have endeavoured to discuss in the preceding pages.

These reasons make it clear that in conformity to his mission Hīnayānic doctrines came into existence in his original teachings that are collectively designated as the original Buddhism. Though Mahāyānic doctrines were present in his introspection yet they were concealed from the common mass as he hesitated to give out his ideas to the mass obtained through his own introspection. In support of this view, we may find references even in the Pāli canons:—

“Tassa mahyam bhikkhave etad ahoṣi; adhigato kho me ayam dhammo gambhīro duddaso duranubodho santo paṇito atakkāvacaro nipuṇo paṇḍitavedanīyo.”¹

Such high and abstruse ideas about the reality of the world and human beings can be understood only by those who are successful in knowing their own selves by cutting off all their attachments to objective phenomena. If that be the case, it is clear that though from the point of view of history the Mahāyāna seems to be a later development, yet there can be no doubt that it existed in Buddha's perception; and even he went so far as to preach the Mahāyāna doctrines only among the advanced disciples in his life-time. References to this in scattered form may be found in the Pāli Nikāyas though they mainly deal with the apparently negative Hīnayāna doctrine. Dr. M. Anesaki clearly pointed out this idea in his lecture thus:—

“The Pāli Nikāya are the records of the speeches of the Buddha. But in the Nikāya Buddha's teachings are collected in a scraping way and the Saddhamma-puṇḍarikasūtra systematizes them, so that the materials upon which the Saddhamma-puṇḍarika is based are nothing but the scattered ideas in the Pāli Nikāya.”²

¹ V. T. Mahāvagga, 1. 5. 2-3 (Vol. I, pp. 4-5); S. N., V. 1. 1, (Vol. 1, pp. 136-7); M. N. (Vol. I, pp. 167-8).

² Ten-sei-kai-ko-yen-roku, Vol. I, p. 747.

The Saddharma-Puṇḍarīka, as you might know, is regarded as containing the highest Mahāyānic idea. According to that sūtra Buddha taught only the Ekayāna idea which is purely the introspective perception of Buddha, and is known as the Mahāyāna idea attained by Buddha under the Bodhi Tree. Such Ekayāna idea finds expression in the Pāli Nikāya.

“Ekāyanavāyam magga sattānam Visuddhiyā, sokaparidevānam samatikkhamāya dukkhādomavassānam aṭṭhaṅgamāya nāyāssa adhigamāya nibbānassa saccikiriya.”¹

English Translation.—“There is the one way to this Path which exists for the purification of beings, for the overcoming of grief and lamentation, for doing away with sorrow and dejection, for the attainment of the knowable and for the realisation of Nibbāna.”²

So as merely an idea, the Mahāyāna doctrine or Buddha's introspective perception already existed in Buddha's understanding from the very beginning, and is stated even in the Hīnayāna Nikāya, though in a scattered way. This idea was gradually systematized and developed after Buddha's death among the 18 schools (the chief among them being the Mahāsaṅghika Schools) and later on it attained completion and perfection in the hands of the great scholars like Aśvaghōṣa I, Nāgārjuna, Aśvaghōṣa II, etc.

In short, we may conclude that from the historical point of view though the Mahāyāna doctrine is no doubt a development of primitive idea of Buddha, yet there is no gain-saying that it was existent from the very beginning—in the very infancy of Buddhism.

Now, let us proceed to our main problem, What is Mahāyāna doctrine? The Hīnayāna, as I have shown previously, deals mainly with negative ideas and indicates

¹ S. N., 47. 14. (Vol. V, pp. 167-8).

² Translated by Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

the sorrowful condition of the world, whereas, the Mahāyāna, on the contrary, deals mainly with positive doctrines and indicates the ontological truth underlying the world of phenomena. For further explanation I would like to divide this subject into 5 parts or sections, as I have done previously in the case of the Hīnayāna doctrine as follows:—

- (1) Sūtra (canon).
- (2) Dharma (doctrine).
- (3) Karma (practice of religious austerities).
- (4) Mokṣa (Emancipation).
- (5) Buddha-Kāya.

(1) *Sūtra.*

It has been settled beyond all doubts, that the Mahāyāna teachings were recorded somewhat later. Most of them are written in Sanskrit. The languages of the rest are diverse. Some are written in Gāthā language, some in Prākṛit and others in classical Sanskrit. We come across the Gāthā dialect in the Gāthā or poetical portions of the Saddharmapūṇḍarīka, the Amitāyūḥ, the Mahāvīyūha and the Karunapūṇḍarīka sūtras. A few stanzas of the Daśabhūmi Sūtra belong to the same dialect.

Again, some of these sūtras are written in Sanskritised Prākṛit. The prose portions of the Prajñāpāramitā and Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtras bear a stamp of this kind of language. We may conveniently include the Amitāyūḥ sūtra in this list. The prose portions of the Prajñāpāramitā—Hṛidaya sūtra, Śālisambhava sūtra, and Mahāvīyavyūha-ratnarāja sūtra are also written in classical Sanskrit. The character and formation of the Mahāyāna Tripiṭaka (Sūtra, Vinaya and Abhidharma) are not at all different from those of the Hīnayāna canons. But

unfortunately the original manuscripts have been lost at present except a few. It is however a matter of great fortune, on the other hand, that these Chinese and Tibetan translations of these canonical manuscripts have come down to us even to this day. These are technically called Mahāyāna Tripiṭakas or three baskets and are quite independent from the Pāli piṭakas in form and substance.

It is now the proper place to say something regarding the Mahāyāna Tripiṭakas which will be of great importance to the readers. In my opinion the Mahāyāna Tripiṭakas were not in existence from the very beginning but came into being later on. This is why in the Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra, Mahāprajñāpāramitāsūtra, etc., the name Tripiṭaka has been described as a nick-name of the Hinayāna canons; while the Mahāyāna Tripiṭakas are called Bodhisattva piṭakas or Bodhisattva baskets. Of course the date of Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra cannot at present be settled definitely. But it is said that the most ancient text of that sūtra existed sometime before 250 A. D.¹ Nāgārjuna makes mention of many Mahāyāna sūtras in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā śāstra, among which Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-sūtra is one.² Therefore there is no doubt about the fact that this work (Saddharmapūṇḍarīka) had been in existence before the time of Nāgārjuna. The venerable author flourished towards the end of the 2nd century or towards the beginning of the 3rd century of the Christian Era.

We may, now, fairly come to the conclusion that the followers of the Mahāyānist School called their canonical

¹ The oldest Chinese translation known by the title of Kan-ga-hwa-kin is from ku-ga-hu (Dharmarakṣa) of the western Tsin Dynasty (265-316 A. D.): *Vide* Nanjio's Catalogue of the Buddhist Tripiṭaka, p. 45, No. 138 and S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. xx.

² For example in the Mahāprajñāpāramitā śāstra (Vol. IX) Nāgārjuna mentions the name of Saddharmapūṇḍarīkā.

works Bodhisattva piṭaka before 300 A. D. The Tripiṭakas had not yet taken a definite form, however, but these were gradually shaped in imitation of the formation of the Hīnayāna Tripiṭakas.

(2) *Dharma.*

Next let us examine what is Mahāyāna doctrine which is a question of vital importance. The Sūtras containing on the whole, Mahāyāna doctrines, really deal with Buddha's introspectional perception upon the ontological world. But the different schools among the Mahāyānists which developed afterwards held different doctrines and different expressions of Buddha's same introspectional perception. As for example, the Mādhyamika School or Nāgārjuna School mainly based their doctrines upon Prajñāpāramitā sūtra, etc.; and the opinion that "Sarvaṃ Śūnyatā" is really Buddha's ontological perception. Again Yogācāra School founded by Asāṅga and Vasubandhu all based their doctrines upon Avatamsaka sūtra, Laṅkāvatāra sūtra and Sandhinirmochana sūtra, and held such opinions as—"Sarvaṃ Vijñāna." This is nothing other than Buddha's real perception of ontology. Aśvaghōṣa II, moreover, based his doctrines mainly upon the Laṅkāvatāra sūtra, Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra and Prajñāpāramitā sūtra and his opinion "Bhūtatathatā" or "Suchness of existence" which he maintained is really Buddha's perception of the ontology.

Thus according to different schools and different sūtras different explanations have arisen upon Buddha's introspectional perception. But these are rather different aspects of the same perception of Buddha's reality. These may be conveniently called the different steps by which Buddha's ontological perception can be fully exposed.

The explanation of this again we find in the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra which is regarded as the highest authority among the Mahāyānist and this is the only doctrine which has been given by Buddha in full from his introspectional perception. So Buddha expressed this point clearly in the upāyakaśālyā-parivarto in Saddharma-puṇḍarīka sūtra thus :—

“Na hi Śāriputra tathāgatānām mṛśāvādah samvidyate, ekamevedam Śāriputra yānam yadidam Buddhayānam.”¹

English Translation.—“There is no falsehood in the Tathāgatas, Śāriputra ; there is but one Vehicle, Śāriputra, and that is Buddha vehicle.”²

In the same sūtra :—

“Ekam hi yānam dvitīyam na vidyate tṛtīyam hi naevāsti kadāci loke.”³

English Translation.—“There is, indeed, but one vehicle ; there is no second, nor a third anywhere in the world.”⁴

Again in the sukhavihāra parivarto of the same sūtra Buddha says :—

“Esā hi Mañjuśrīstathāgatānām paramā dharmadeśanāyam paścimastathāgatānām dharmaparyāyāḥ sarveṣām dharmaparyāyāṇāmayam dharmaparyāyāḥ sarvagambhiraḥ sarvalokavipratyanikaḥ.”⁵

English Translation.—“For this Mañjuśrī, is the supreme preaching of the Tathāgatas ; this is the most profound discourse on the law, a dharmaparyāya meeting opposition in all the world.”⁶

Again Buddha said in the Bhaiṣajyarājapūvanyoga-parivarto of the same sūtra thus :—

“Tadyathāpi nāma nakṣatrarājasamkusumitābhijña sarveṣāmut-sasarastaḍāgānām mahāsamudro mūrdhnaprāptaḥ Evameva nakṣatra-

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra, Vol. I, p. 44. Edited by H. Kern and B. Nanjio.

² S.B.E., Vol. XXI, p. 42.

³ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra, Vol. I, p. 46.

⁴ S.B.E., Vol. XXI, p. 46.

⁵ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra, Vol. 4, p. 291.

⁶ S.B.E., Vol. XXI, p. 276.

rājasamkusumitābhijñā sarveṣāṃ Tathāgatabhāsitanām sūtrāntānā-
mayam saddharmapunḍariko dharmaparyāyo murdhaprāptaḥ.”¹

English Translation.—“Just as the great ocean, Naksatrarāja-samkusumitābhijñā, surpasses all springs, streams and tanks, so, Nakstrarajasaṅkusumitābhijñā, this dharmaparyāya of the lotus of the True Law surpasses all sūtras spoken by the Tathāgata.”²

From the above quotation, we come to know that Buddha himself had clearly expressed his introspectional perception on ontology in the very sūtras. Though we come across many doctrines in the Mahāyāna school yet the doctrine, inculcated by Saddharmapunḍarika, is regarded as the highest and truest; so it is quite necessary that I should explain to you that aspect of Mahāyāna doctrine which is regarded as the real and direct expression of Buddha's introspectional perception.

Now for the sake of carrying out our explanation of Mahāyāna doctrine more conveniently, let me, first of all, divide it into three aspects as in the case of Hīnayāna doctrine:

- A. Ontology.
- B. Phenomenology.
- C. Theory of human life.

In my previous lectures I have endeavoured to explain that the Mahāyāna doctrines indicate chiefly the ontological view of Buddha's perception (though it indicates also some other problems) while the Hīnayāna doctrines indicate chiefly the phenomenological view of it with some other minor problems. The four noble truths (Catvāri Āriya Satyāni) constitute the main and fundamental factor of the Hīnayānic doctrines. But only three of them—the suffering (Duḥkha), its cause (Duḥkha-smūdayāni) and the path leading to its extinction

¹ Saddharmapunḍarika sūtra, Vol. V, pp. 415-16.

² S.B.E., Vol. XXI, p. 386.

(Duḥkha-nirodhogāmini pratipada) are explained fully in the Hīnayāna doctrine. But the fourth—the suppression of suffering (Duḥkha-nirodha)—has not yet been explained except this much—that “Nirvāṇam Śāntam,” *i.e.*, Nirvāṇa is the only calm. This is because that explanation of the suppression of suffering (Duḥkha-nirodha) is the work of ontology while that of the first three is the work of phenomenology. The condition of a man who is free from all sorts of sufferings or in other words, who has suppressed all sorts of suffering and to whom the truth of everything has been revealed—is described as “Nirvāṇam Śāntam” such being the case it has not been incumbent upon me so long to give a lucid explanation of the fourth truth in the Hīnayāna System.

From the Mahāyānic point of view Buddha's preaching is concerned more with his introspectional perception and ontological ideas than with his phenomenological doctrines. One thing we should not forget, that most of the Mahāyānic philosophers had used two terms in explaining their theory upon the existence of the world. One is the so-called “Paramārtha-satya” or “Transcendental truth,” another is the “Samvṛitti-satya” or “conventional truth.” The former is concerned with ontology while the latter with phenomenology. But the thing is that these expressions were used only for the sake of convenience in explaining Buddha's ontological views. In reality there are no two different existences of the world as “Transcendental world” (Paramārthaka-loka) and Delusional world (Samvṛittika-loka). They are only two different aspects of the existence of the same world. The two aspects are again connected reciprocally; and without the conception of the delusional world, the transcendental world cannot be conceived and *vice versa*. The transcendental aspect of this world was exposed to the Tathāgata while the delusional aspect of it is only exposed to the human beings.

A question may now naturally arise, why the Mahāyānists used both the expressions. This is however very obvious. They used both the expressions only to emphasize the transcendental aspect of this world after explaining the delusiveness of the other aspect.

In the case of Hinayānic doctrine again, Buddha's aim was to lead men to the understanding of reality by making him free from all delusion. For this purpose only, he at first explained the nature of phenomena which consists of suffering, impermanence and non-ego. One who has cut off all attractions for these is alone entitled to understand the ontological aspect of this world and the much-coveted truth "Nirvāṇam Śāntam."

It had been already necessary for us, however, in the previous lectures on Hinayāna doctrines—to give a clear explanation of the ontological aspect of this world side by side with our explanation of the phenomenological aspect—and to deal with each in an independent way. But in the case of Mahāyāna doctrines, on the contrary, Buddha's aim was to indicate his own introspection only. The phenomenal world, here, is identified with the noumenal world invariably. The Mahāyānic school never emphasized their conception of the noumenal world by absolute denial of the phenomenal one—the school, rather, considered the noumenal aspect as part and parcel—the underlying essence—of the phenomenological aspect. From this standpoint a thorough knowledge of this reality implies the understanding of the introspectional perception. Thus phenomenon, here, may be called identical with noumenon and the delusional world with the perceptual world.

This being the case, phenomenology and ontology can never stand by themselves in Mahāyāna doctrine. They bear a marked co-relation. Therefore, though I have mentioned three sub-divisions of Mahāyāna doctrines

yet I shall explain only ontology and human life. The phenomenology will be explained under the guise of the ontology. Let us now come to ontology which is of the first and foremost importance in considering the Mahāyāna doctrines.

A. Ontology.

I have shown in my previous lectures that Mahāyāna dharma is only an explanation of Buddha's introspectional perception which he attained under the Bodhi Tree. Now the question naturally arises what is Buddha's introspectional perception? It is stated in the Sūtras that Buddha attained enlightenment under the Bodhi Tree. But there is no further explanation of what is that enlightenment or perfect knowledge.

According to Mahāyāna sūtras, specially the Saddharmapūṇḍarīka one, Buddha's perfect knowledge is nothing beyond the knowledge of the truth of the world and human life.¹ This point has been lucidly dealt with in the Tathāgata-yuspramāṇa-parivāto in the Saddharma-pūṇḍarīka-sūtra as follows :—

“Traidhātukaṃ Tathāgatena dṛṣṭam yathā bālaprthgjanā na paśyanti pratyakṣadharmā tathāgataḥ khalvasminsthāne asaṃpramoṣadharmā. tatra Tathāgato yāṃ kāṃcīdvācaṃ vyāharati sarvaṃ tatsatyam na mṛṣā nanyathā.”²

English Translation.—“The Tathāgata sees the triple world not as the ignorant, common people, he seeing things always present to him ; indeed, to the Tathāgata, in his position, no laws are concealed. In that respect any word that the Tathāgata speaks is true, not false.”³

¹ According to my view, the truth cannot stand without the existence of the world and human life. If truth had existed alone then such a truth is rather no truth at all to the world or human beings. Perfect knowledge which Buddha attained is simply the true knowledge of the world and human life.

² Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra, Vol. 4, p. 318.

³ S.B.E., Vol. XXI, p. 302.

Even the Samyutta Nikāya contains a similar passage, said to have been spoken by Buddha, which runs as follows:—

“Sabbam lokam abhiññāya, sabbaloke yathā tathā
Sabbaloka viśaṃyutto sabbaloke anūpayo
Sa ve sabbābhibhū dhiro
Sabbagantha pamocano.”¹

English Translation.—“He, the wise, is indeed the all-conqueror and liberator from every fetter, who in all the world has no attachment, who is detached from all the world and everywhere, and who has a perfect knowledge of all the world.”²

Now let us see what were the reflections of Buddha upon the world and human life. In the Upāyakaūśalya-parivarto of Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra, Buddha is said to have stated—

“Tathāgata eva śāriputra Tathāgatasya dharmaṃ deśayed yān dharmāstathāgato jānāti; sarvadharmānapi śāriputra Tathāgata eva deśayati, sarvadharmānapi Tathāgatena jānāti, ye ca te dharmā yathā ca te dharmā yādṛśās ca te yallakṣaṇāsca te dharmā yatsva-bhāvāsca te dharmā, ye ca yathā ca yādṛśās ca yallakṣaṇāsca yatsva-bhāvāsca te dharmā iti, teṣu dharmeṣu tathāgata eva pratyakṣo aparokṣaḥ.”³

English Translation.—“None but a Tathāgata, Śāriputra, can impart to a Tathāgata those dharmas which the Tathāgata knows. And all dharmas, Śāriputra, are taught by the Tathāgata, and by him alone: no one but he knows all dharmas, what they are, how they are, like what they are, of what characteristics and of what nature they are.”⁴

This passage is a clear indication of Buddha's introspectional perception of all existence, on the world in its various aspects—in its form, in its reality, in its characteristics, in its action, all these are considered as permanent

¹ S.N., XII. 21 (Vol. II, p. 24). Quoted from Dr. M. Anesaki. “Rūpakāyacca Dharmakāyacca Buddhasya Tathāgatasya,” p. 44.

² Translated by Mr. Sailendranath Mitra, M.A.

³ Saddharmapūṇḍarīka, Vol. I, p. 30.

⁴ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 32.

which in Buddhistic expression are called "Yathā-Bhutam" (*i.e.*, as it was).

From human point of view every thing, every existence is impermanent but according to Buddha's introspectional perception this kind of consideration is simply due to delusion or false knowledge. In this universe and throughout all existences there is only one permanent thing, *i.e.*, existence of truth; this truth is absolute as well as the permanent root of all phenomena. Every existence of the world is founded upon it; when this fundamental truth is permanent, then every phenomenon also is permanent because it is founded upon the former. Phenomenon is only an appearance of the noumenon and if noumenon is permanent then phenomenon also is such. It appears to be impermanent but this is not the real nature so to say.

For example, the summer follows the spring season and the autumn comes when the summer has ended. The winter comes in due course after the autumn and thus they ever run in a cyclic motion. Again the growing tree and grass inevitably wither—flowers in full bloom naturally wither away in May; man is born and dies and the sun rises and sets. Thus every phenomenon is changing. But though it appears that impermanency exists here yet it is a false estimation. Even here, there is permanency.

Just look at the ocean: waves are rising now and then. They are always changeable. But without water there can be no waves—they are only a form of water. What is water then? It is unchangeable and permanent. The waves are essentially the same water.

This is also the case with the four seasons—They are constantly changing. But yet when one course of the four seasons is finished the seasons which come again are essentially the same as the previous ones. Here also is a

continuous permanency. Even from the ontological point of view the four seasons are themselves permanent and "anādi ananta."

The sun rises and sets. It is also itself permanent and continuously the same. From the ontological point of view it is also "anādi ananta."

The trees or grass grow and wither. The flower blooms and drops. Yet there is a permanency considering its continuity. From the ontological point of view they are also "anādi ananta."

Man is born and dies. There is also permanency considering the continuity of this phenomenon. From the ontological point of view it is also "anadi ananta."

So from the Samvṛittika standpoint the existences of all the phenomena appear to be impermanent but from the Paramārthika standpoint they are permanent and "anādi ananta."

Now the Paramārtha is the only thing which Buddha understands permanent in his introspectional perception of the world. So in the Upāyakaūsalya-parivarto of the Saddharmapuṇḍarika sūtra Buddha is said to have spoken thus :—

"Dharmasthitīm dharmaṇiyāmatām ca nityasthitām lokimāmakampyām."¹

English Translation.—"They shall reveal the stability of the law² its being subjected to fixed rules, its unshakable perpetuity in the world."³

Again in the Udāna—

"No ce taṃ abhaviṣṣa ajātaṃ abhūtaṃ akataṃ asaṅkhatam, nayidha jātaṣṣa bhūtaṣṣa kataṣṣa saṅkhatassa nissaraṇam, paññāyetha :

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarika sūtra, Vol. I, p. 53.

² Prof. H. Kern translates "Dharma" into "law." I think that the best translation of the word is "existence." It becomes sufficiently clear when translated into Chinese.

³ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 53.

Yasmā ca kho atthi ajātam abhūtam akatam asaṅkhatam, tasmā jātaṣṣa bhutaṣṣa kattaṣṣa saṅkhattaṣṣa nissaraṇam paññāyetha..”¹

From the above passage it is sufficiently clear that from the ontological point of view every existence is permanent and real. From the human point of view again, the Saṃsāra is impermanent, and full of sufferings. From the Pāramārthikā standpoint such observation is only delusion. Saṃsāra itself is not suffering and not impermanent. Such consideration is only due to ignorance. When we understand the reality of Saṃsāra the impermanence is transformed into permanency and suffering into happiness. Then there is no birth, decay, or death, etc., which are considered as painful. Buddha clearly explains this in the Tathāgatāyuspramāṇa Parivarto of Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra thus—

“Yadāpi sattvā ima lokadhātum paśyanti kalpenti
ca dahya mānaṃ,
Tadāpi cedaṃ mama Buddhakṣetraṃ paripūrṇa bhoti
marumānuṣāṇaṃ.
Kriḍā rati teṣa vicitra bhoti udyānaprāsādavimānakotyāḥ
Pratiṃḍitaṃ ratnamayaṣca parvataḥ drumaistathā
puṣpaphalāḥ rupetaḥ
Upariṃ ca devā abhilaṇanti tūryāṃ mandāravaraṣaṃ
ca visarjayanti.”²

English Translation.—“When creatures behold this world and imagine that it is burning, even then my Buddha-field (Buddhakṣetra)³ is teeming with gods and men. They dispose of manifold amusements, kōtis (ten millions) of pleasure gardens, palaces, and aerial cars; (this field) is embellished by hills of gems and by trees abounding with blossoms and fruits.”⁴

¹ Udāna, VIII. 3 : p. 169. It., p. 47.

² Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra, Vol. 4, pp. 324-25.

³ Buddha-field means here “this world.”

⁴ S. B. E., Vol. XXXI, p. 308.

B. The Theory of Human Life.

This problem is the most important one in the Mahāyāna doctrines. This is because every religion and philosophy originally rises from the question "What is man?" It is no exaggeration to say that all the Sages of the past had been engaged in solving this question and the future ones also would be engaged with this work. Such had been also the engagement of Buddha. Several questions certainly occurred to the mind of Buddha and this question was undoubtedly the most prominent one among them. Though his aim was to understand the reality yet such question comes under the former. When that important problem is solved then every other minor problem also becomes quite clear. So this question is of the foremost importance in connection with the Mahāyāna system. Saddharmapūṇḍarīka sūtra also deals mainly with this question and there is a vigorous attempt throughout to explain this great problem.

I have already shown you in my previous lectures that Hīnayāna Buddhism or original Buddhism indicates that there is no individual existence of human entity. It is only the aggregation of the five "Skandhas." Had there been any human entity, it must have been of a changeable nature and consequently impermanent, and with impermanence sufferings would also have been inevitable. In this way Buddha made an analysis of human individuality scientifically for the purpose of showing his disciples that there is no "Jīvātmā," otherwise, they would not be able to realise themselves. They, therefore, rejected the beliefs of previous thinkers, in "Jīvātmā" or "Dehātmā" as misleading and wrong on the ground that those beliefs lead men to excessive attachments to every external object.

But in Mahāyāna Buddhism, Buddha gave expression to his self-introspectional perception and showed his disciples that every existence in the world is founded upon the absolute reality and this absolute reality is permanency. Our human individuality is also founded upon the same reality.

When this reality is connected with inorganic things it is called permanent and real existence—"Dharma-tathatā" and when it is connected with organic beings, specially the human beings, then it is called "Dharma-kāya" or sometimes "Buddhacittam" or "Mahātmā"—absolute ego. In Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra also such is the case with human beings.¹ In Mahāyāna Buddhism all the individual beings are identified with the "Mahātmā,"

¹ There are two kinds of Mahānirvāṇasūtras in the Chinese Tri-ṭiṭaka. One deals with Buddha's parinirvāṇa and may be called Hīnayāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra because that sūtra is identical with the Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra of the Pāli canon.

Another one belongs to the Mahāyāna sūtra. Though its name is the same yet the ideas contained are quite different. Its form, however, is similar. The teachings contained are like those imparted by Buddha just before his parinirvāṇa but the aim of these teachings is quite different. Then again, in this sūtra, there is the conception of the "Dharma-kāya" aspect of Buddha and its permanency. So it is proper to call it a Mahāyāna sūtra as has been done by Chinese and Japanese Buddhist scholars.

There are three sūtras in the Chinese Tri-ṭiṭaka belonging to the Hīnayāna mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra.

- (1) Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra—translated by Po-fā-tsu, 290-306 A. D. (Nanjio's Catalogue, p. 139, No. 552).
- (2) Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra—translated by Fa-hien, 317-420 A. D. (*Ibid*, p. 40, No. 118).
- (3) The sūtra on the going for pleasure (vihāra) in the Dīrghāgama-sūtra translated by Buddhayaśas with Ku-Fo-nien. (*Ibid*, p. 131, No. 545 (2)).

There are again seven Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa-sūtras in the Chinese Triṭiṭaka. Among these the latter three sūtras should be properly called the branch sūtras of the same sūtra:—

- (1) Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra—translated by Dharmarakṣa, 423 A. D.
- (2) The same translated by Fa-hien together with Buddhahadra.
- (3) The same translated by two Chinese Śramaṇas Hwui-yen and Howui-kwān, 424-453 A. D. (Southern Book).
- (4) Latter part of the same translated by Jñānabhadra, 618-907 A. D.
- (5) Vaiṣṇavya—parinirvāṇa-sūtra translated by Dharmarakṣa, 205-316 A. D., *Vide* Nanjio's Catalogue, pp. 39-41).

i.e., the absolute ego. The Mahāyānists never admitted the doctrines of previous thinkers regarding the individual entity. But at the same time they never deny the individual existence like the Hīnayānists. They say that an individual does not exist independently but exists in the "Mahātmā" or "Dharma-kāya." Their sense of "Mahātmā" is not different from that of "Nirguṇa Brahma" of Vedānta. Here I should remind you of one thing—that Mahāyāna doctrine regarding human beings does not stop here—it gives further advanced ideas, *e.g.*, that all individual beings are not only existent in the "Mahātmā" or "Dharma-kāya,"¹ but also they are identified with "Mahātmā" or "Dharma-kāya." Besides this, the individual beings are not only identified with such potential reality like "Dharma-kāya" but they are considered as originally the same as personal Buddha who has been harmonized with that absolute reality.² This idea is a much important idea in the Mahāyāna doctrine. Such idea is only the explanation of the human life from the standpoint of Buddha's self-introspectional perception and this is the only explanation of the reality of human being. This point is clearly explained, in the Saddharmapūṇḍarīka Sūtra³ by Buddha.

(6) Mahākaruṇapūṇḍarīka-sūtra, translated by Narendra Yaśas with Dharma-prajñā, 550-557 A.D.

(7) Catuṣṭāra-Samādhi-sūtra, translated by Jñānagupta, 589-618 A.D. (*Vide* Nanjio's Catalogue, pp. 39-41.)

Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra in Pali was composed about the end of the 4th century B.C. (*Cf.* Rhys Davids—Buddhism, p. 14, and S.B.E., Vols. XI and XV). The Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sūtra was composed at least between 2nd and 3rd century A.D. (Shiukyo-Kenkiu, Vol. 70, p. 82.)

¹ The meaning of "Dharma-kāya" or "Mahātmā" in the sense as "Ekacittaṃ" or "Infinite and absolute mind" or "one great spirit." This is stated in the Avataṃsaka sūtra. This is again similar to "Buddhacittaṃ"—the mind of Buddha as stated in the Mahāyāna Parinirvāṇa sūtra and philosophically called "Potential Reality."

² This means "Dharma personified" from the standpoint of Dharma and "Dharmaized personality" from the standpoint of personality.

³ *Vide* Chapter XV, the Tathāgatāyushpramāṇaparivarto.

through his personality. But we should not misunderstand that aim of explaining the theory of human life from both Hīnayānic and Mahāyānic standpoints. In Hīnayāna, Buddha strictly rejected the individual entity or ego, but in Mahāyāna he is said to have admitted the existence of individual entity highly. It should now be clearly understood in what sense he denied the individual entity in Hīnayāna and in what sense he admitted the existence of it in the Mahāyāna. His views cannot be regarded as self-contradictory.

The ego, rejected in the Hīnayāna, constitutes the so-called egoism to which man is naturally attached and this kind of egoism is the root of every suffering in the "Saṃsāra." So without rejecting it man can never cut off his attachment to it. So it is essentially necessary to deny such ego for the purpose of realising the human being. This was the only aim of Buddha in Hīnayāna Buddhism.

Again, when admitting the existence of individual being and identifying it with "Buddha-kāya" or "Mahātmā," Buddha was looking from ontological point of view and really giving utterance to his self-introspectional perception. The Buddha's aim was here only to make men understand.

Then again, why does the Mahāyāna maintain that individual entity is identical with "Buddha-kāya" or "Mahātmā"? I have already shown that Buddha admitted the existence of an absolute reality, in Mahāyāna doctrine, which is called "Dharma-kāya" or "Mahātmā." All the inorganic things and organic beings are founded upon that absolute reality or "Dharma-kāya." When that reality is something existent, the things also founded upon it are existent. So the Mahāyāna system which admitted existence of absolute reality, or "Dharma-kāya" "Mahātmā" or "Dharma-tathatā" must have admitted

the existence of individual entity and its unity with that absolute reality.

In the Hīnayānic sense it seems to be right that Buddha rejected the existence of "Mahātmā" in the sense of Upanishad only for the purpose of denying the individual egoism.¹ But in the Mahāyānic sense Buddha admitted the existence of Upanishadic Mahātmā as "Dharma-kāya" or "Dharma-tathatā."²

Now let us see in what way he considered man to be originally Buddha. As soon as Siddhārtha obtained enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, he was able to penetrate into the existence of "Dharma-tathatā" or absolute reality. Consequently he was harmonized with the "Dharma-tathatā" and was transformed into Buddha at once.

"Dharma-tathatā" or absolute reality is permanence and it has no beginning (Anādi) and no end (Ananta); so as soon as he became harmonized with the "Dharma-tathatā," he also became permanence. It is because Buddha became one with the "Dharma-tathatā." Iti-vuttaka clearly points to this—

"Dhammaṃ hi so bhikkhu passati, Dhammaṃ passanto maṃ passati."³

English Translation.—"One who understands Dharma he also understands me and one who understands me he also understands Dharma."

¹ Such idea of individual egoism which prevailed among the previous thinkers of Buddha's time was simply the outcome of misunderstanding the idea of mahātmā of the Upanishads. This was the reason why he rejected the individual egoism and tried to catch the exact idea of the Upanishadic mahātmā.

² In my opinion Buddha's idea from the ontological point of view is identical with that of Upanishad. So it is clear that the Upanishadic ideas, specially those of Chāndogya and Brihadāraṇyaka, influenced the Mahāyāna Buddhism much. Dr. M. Anesaki also pointed out this idea in his "Original Buddhism" (in Japanese), p. 22.

³ Iti-vuttaka 92 (p. 91). This quotation is taken from Dr. Anesaki's *Rupakāyacca Dharmakāyacca Buddha tathāgatasya*, p. 246.

As soon as he became one with the "Dharma-tathatā" or absolute reality he at once came to know that he was Buddha not only then but was such also from the beginningless beginning and would remain such up to the endless end. So he said, in the Prithivī-Vivara-samudgama of the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka¹—

Anāsravā bhūta iyaṁ mi vācā śruṇitva sarve mama
 śraddadhadhvaṁ,
 Evaṁ ciraṁ prāpta mayāgrabodhi paripācitāścaiti
 mayaiva sarve.

English Translation.—"These words I here speak are faultless, really true, though it you never heard before from me; believe me, all of you who hear me; verily I have reached enlightenment from beginningless period and it is by me alone that all have been brought to maturity."²

The same idea is enumerated in another place of the same sūtra and Buddha tries to explain to men by that, that he has not newly been a Buddha but he was such through eternity.

"Sāṃprataṁ bhagavatā śākyamuninā tathāgatena śākyakulā-dabhiniṣkramya gayāhvaye mahānagare Bodhimanda-varāgragatenā-nuttarāṁ samyaksaṃboddhimabhisambuddha iti. Naivaiṁ draṣṭavyaṁ. Api tu khalu punaḥ kulaputrā bahūni mama kalpakoṭīnayutaśata-sahasrāṇyanuttarāṁ samyaksaṃboddhimabhisambuddhasya."³

English Translation.—"Now, has the Lord Śākyamuni, after going out from the home of the Śākias, arrived at supreme perfect enlightenment at the town of Gayā. But young men of good family, the truth is that many hundred thousand myriads of kôtis of æons ago I had arrived at supreme, perfect enlightenment."⁴

¹ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka sūtra, Vol. IV, p. 310, No. 43.

² Kern's translation of this passage is different from that of mine—vide S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 293, No. 43.

³ Saddharmapuṇḍarīka, Vol. V, p. 316.

⁴ S. B. E., XXI, pp. 298-299.

Again—

“Acittiyā kalpasahasrakotyo yāsāṃ pramāṇaṃ na
 kadāci vidyate,
 Prāptā mayā eṣa tadāgrabodhirdharmaṃ ca deśemyahu
 nityakālāṃ.
 Samādapemi bahubodhisattvāṃbandhasmi jñānasmi
 sthapemi caiva,
 Sattvāna koṭīṇayutānānekānparipācayāmi bahukalpakotyaḥ.
 Nirvāṇabhūmiṃ cupadarśayāmi vinayārtha sattvāna
 vadāmyupāyaṃ,
 Na cāpi Nirvāmyahu tasmi kāle ihaiva co dharmu
 prakāśayāmi.”¹

English Translation.—“An inconceivable number of thousands of kotis of Æons, never to be measured, is it since I reached superior (or first) enlightenment and never ceased to teach the law.

I roused many Bodhisattvas, and established them in Buddha-knowledge; I brought myriads of kotis of beings, endless to full ripeness in many kotis of Æons.

I show the place of extinction, I reveal to all beings a device to educate them, albeit I do not become extinct at the time, and in this very place continue preaching the law.”²

Thus as soon as he was able to penetrate into the absolute truth and to understand his own reality as “Anādi” and “Ananta,” he was also aware, at the same time, that all human beings were Buddha, originally. If all beings were not Buddha originally then it would have been quite impossible for human Siddhārtha to attain Buddhahood and there would have been no way also by which men could be able to attain that Buddhahood. Potato can never become rice and rice can never become potato at all. So also had the human beings been something different from Buddha originally, then they would never have been able to become Buddha. Buddha tried

¹ Saddharmapundarīka, Vol. IV, p. 323, No. 1. 2. 3.

² S. B. E., XXI, p. 307, No. 1. 2. 3.

to make men understand this and taught them to realise that perfect personality which is called Buddha. Thus he said in the Saddharmapundarika-sūtra—

“Ahamapi Śāriputra ekameva yānam ārabhya sattvānāṃ dharmaṃ deśayanti yadidaṃ Buddha-Yānaṃ sarvajñatāparyavśīnaṃ yadidaṃ tathāgatajñānadarśanasamādāpanameva sattvānāṃ tathāgatajñānadarśanasamdarśanameva tathāgatajñānadarśanāvatāraṇameva tathāgatajñānadarśanapratibodhanameva tathāgatajñānadarśanamārgāvatāraṇameva sattvānāṃ dharmaṃ deśayāmi.”¹

English Translation.—“I myself also, Śāriputra, am preaching the truth (dharma) to creatures by means of only one vehicle, the Buddha-vehicle which finally leads to omniscience. It is identical with showing all creatures the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge; with opening the eyes of creatures for the sight of Tathāgata-knowledge; with the awakening (or demolishing) by the display (or sight) of Tathāgata-knowledge, with leading the teaching of Tathāgata-knowledge on the right path.”²

This is the only aim of Buddha's preachings. Again he said—

“Tatkasya hetoh ekakṛtyena śāriputraikakaraṇīyena tathāgato arhan-samyaksambuddho loka utpadyate mahākṛtyena mahākaraṇīyena.”³

English Translation.—“For, Śāriputra, it is a sole object, a sole aim, verily a lofty object, a lofty aim that the Buddha appears in the world.”⁴

This is the only theory of the Mahāyānists about human life and the only Doctrine of Buddha's self-introspectional perception. According to the Mahāyāna doctrine he said that all things existent in this world are existing within Buddha-kāya, i.e., those are the manifestations of the Dharma-kāya. In the Hīnayānic

¹ Saddharmapundarika sūtra, Vol. I, p. 42.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 41.

³ Saddh. P., Vol. I, pp. 39-40.

⁴ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 40.

sense the world is full of sufferings but in the Mahāyānic sense the world is originally Buddhakṣetra or happy world.

We think that the world is full of sufferings and human creatures are miserable. But such idea is due to our delusion, so to say. But when we are free from delusion the idea of individual ego moves away and is harmonized with Dharma-kāya. So the human personality is at once transformed into Buddha's personality and the world is transformed into Buddhakṣetra. Such is the true realisation of human being and such is also the realisation of the world according to Mahāyānism.

The aim of Buddha was to make human beings realise Buddha-hood. When we realise this, the reality of man appears.

In conclusion, it can be said that Buddha-hood consists in the realisation of man. So Buddha-hood is a real stage of man. That impermanency, suffering and non-ego of Hīnayāna become respectively permanency, happiness, and absolute ego in the Mahāyāna is due to different standpoints of view and different ways of teaching.

As the aim of Buddha is realisation of the human being in the Hīnayāna, so he saw the world from phenomenological point of view because it was necessary to reject men's delusion. Again as he wanted to understand the reality of man in Mahāyāna, so he saw the world from ontological standpoint. So "Śāntam Nirvāṇam" in Hīnayāna becomes quite clear in the ontology of Mahāyāna. This is the only reason why it is not explained clearly in Hīnayāna.

(3) *Dhārmik Karma or the practice of Religious austerities.*

Real salvation can be obtained by cutting off Kleśas or delusions. The means by which these can be cut off are called Dhārmik-Karma or practice of religious austerities. Now it is necessary to see what are these kleśas before we enter into a description of them. I have already clearly shown in previous chapters the real significance of Kleśa. According to Mahāyāna there are four kinds of Kleśas :—

(I) Avidyā (Ignorance). (II) Raja-Vāluk kleśas (dust and sandlike kleśas), *i.e.*, numberless hindrances. (III) Darśanāheya kleśa (intellectual kleśas). (IV) Bhāvanāheya kleśa (Emotional kleśas).

The above Kleśas are not different from one another but are so only in their operations. Now let us explain them separately—

(i) *Ignorance* is regarded as the fundamental Kleśa, being a hindrance to the right understanding of the real nature of things. This is, to speak in modern phraseology, the universal Kleśa.

(ii) *The Numberless Kleśas.*—Sex, capacity and condition, etc., of human beings in society are different. Though, in essence, they possess the same human nature, some are found wise while others are foolish, some become ministers, others coolies, and so on. Social order is to be kept by their restriction to respective business which corresponds to their own sex, capacity and condition, etc. As the variety of human beings is infinite in this world, there are numberless kleśas of this kind like the sand in the Ganges,—which hinder them from observing social order. This is called social Kleśa in modern phraseology.

(iii) *Intellectual Kleśa* and (iv) *Emotional Kleśas* have been explained by me already in the previous chapters. Among these *Kleśas* Avidyā is of the foremost importance in the Mahāyāna system. I have already told you that Avidyā is regarded in both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna as the root of all kleśas or delusions. But the sense of Avidyā in Hīnayāna is different from that in Mahāyāna. In the Hīnayānic sense Avidyā is hindrance to the right understanding of the impermanence of phenomenon and in the Mahāyānic sense it is hindrance to the understanding of the reality of noumenon. In other words, it means that men do not understand properly, through ignorance, that they are beginningless and endless Buddha and that the world is a permanent Buddha-kṣetra, and is existent within Dharma-kāya or Dharmatathatā or mahātmā.

The delusion being shaken off, we can naturally realise the reality of human beings, the world and all other existences. The question now arises how can we dispel this Avidyā and Kleśas. The practices of religious austerities are the only means whereby to dispel these kleśas. Then what are these?

Noble Eight-fold Path (Āryāṣṭāṅga-mārga) or three kinds of Learning (Tisraḥ Śikṣāḥ) in which the noble eight-fold path has been included. The fundamental practice of religious austerities in the Mahāyāna as well as Hīnayāna consists in this. Besides this, the Mahāyāna demands the practice of the Daśa-pāramitāḥ and Catvāryapramāṇaḥ which are regarded as the positive ways of the practice of religious austerities. The practice of these religious austerities is effective not only for self-salvation but also for leading others to salvation. These kinds of religious austerities are of great importance in the Mahāyāna Buddhism. Hīnayāna doctrine teaches us only self-salvation. So the

Hīnayānic practice of religious austerities is the way by which each individual only can attain salvation independently and it never thinks of the salvation of others. The Mahāyāna doctrine not only teaches self-salvation but also makes provision for the salvation of others. According to the Mahāyānists the act of leading others to salvation is a more important duty than seeking after one's own salvation and without leading others into salvation one can never attain salvation himself. This is because according to the Mahāyāna every individual is existent in the Dharma-kāya or Dharma-tathatā or mahātmā, *i.e.*, each individuality is a part of one existence of Dharmakāya, Dharmatathatā or mahātmā, and again they are equally mahātmā in each other. For example—From "A's" standpoint "A" is identified with the Mahātmā and others are his parts and from "B's" standpoint "B" is identified with Mahātmā and "A" and others are his parts. In this way each human being is a part of the Mahātmā and identified with him. This being the case, one can never get salvation independently because his individuality means a part of the Mahātmā. Just as in our body, if one part be strong and another weak, then the whole body cannot be called strong. Again if the whole body be strong, a part also must be strong. So if all the human beings attain salvation, an individual also must attain it. These are the reasons why the positive way of the practice of religious austerities in the Mahāyāna became so important. Then what are these Daśapāramitāḥ and Catvāryapramāṇāni ?

(i) *Daśapāramitāḥ* are:—(a) Charity (Dāna), (b) Purity of conduct (Śīla), (c) Patience (Kṣānti), (d) Strenuousness (Vīrya), (e) Meditation (Dhyāna), (f) Intelligence (Prajñā), (g) Employment of right means (Upāya), (h) Resoluteness (Pranidhāna), (i) Strength (Bala), (j) Knowledge (jñāna).

(ii) *Catvāryapramāṇāni* are—

(a) Kindness (*Maitrī*)—mind which gives happiness to all creatures.

(b) Tenderness (*Karuṇā*)—mind which is willing to drive away sufferings from all creatures.

(c) Delight (*Muditā*).

(d) Indifference (*Upekṣā*)—To look upon all creatures equally.

Thus we see that the Dhārmik karmas are the only means by which to realise the salvation of self and also of others.

(4) *Mokṣa or Emancipation.*

When a man has removed his ignorance (*Avidyā*) which is regarded as the root of all sorts of sufferings, both mental and physical, then only is he said to have attained emancipation. The stages through which one is to reach emancipation are somewhat different from the Mahāyānic and Hīnayānic standpoints.

According to Hīnayāna, Emancipation or Nirvāṇa can be attained only by him who has reached the stage of Arhatship, or in other words, Arhatship is the only end to be attained by the practice of religious austerities. But according to Mahāyāna, emancipation can be attained by him only who has attained Buddhahood or, in other words, Buddhahood is the only end to be obtained by practice of religious austerities.

I have already told you in previous chapters that the aim of Hīnayāna Dhārmik-karma is only self-salvation but the aim of Mahāyāna one is not only self-salvation but the salvation of others also.

In the case of Mokṣa also some differentiation is found. The Hīnayānic self-salvation can be called emancipation

and this is also the real emancipation. But in Mahāyāna, self-salvation cannot be called emancipation unless all individuals have attained salvation equally. Here, however, some may doubt whether this kind of emancipation can be attained in this life or after death. It may be said in reply that Mahāyānic emancipation can be attained only in this life and not after death. The so-called "jīvan-mukti" is the only end of Mahāyāna doctrines. I also dare to assert emphatically that this was also the real view of Buddha though he speaks of future salvation or salvation after death side by side with "jīvan-mukti" or salvation in life-time. The main aim is that future salvation can be obtained by him only who has obtained salvation in this life also.

Some are of opinion that Buddhism is a religion for future life. This view has been held even by some Buddhists. The Amitābha sect held that future salvation is the only salvation taught by Buddha.¹ But this is not so. Buddha's aim was salvation in this life. Buddhism would have been of no use to the present world had it not been concerned at all with the present life. Such a religion would have been no religion at all. If a religion does not

¹ Pure-land sect or Amitābha sect prevailed in Tibet, China and Japan. The sect was founded upon three Sūtras :—The great Amitāyus-Sūtra, the small Amitāyus-Sūtra, and Amitāyur Dhyāna-Sūtra.

In India the doctrine of the Pure-land was believed by Nāgārjuna, Vasubandhu and Aśvaghōṣa II. But no sect was founded in India. This idea was introduced in China by the translators of the above Sūtras.

The doctrine of sect may be summarized thus—

The pure-land is the western world where Buddha Amitābha lives. It is perfectly pure and free from faults, so it is called the pure land. Those who wish to go there are born there but otherwise they are not allowed to be born there. The attainment of this world is due to the effect of the actions of all beings. So those who do not wish to be born here are also obliged to come. This world is called the path of pains—viz., birth, old age, disease, death, etc. No attachment, therefore, should be made to it. Disgust with and indifference to this world is good.

speak of the salvation of human beings in this life then what is the necessity of the existence of such a religion? Of course Buddha speaks of future salvation in the Sūtras but that is spoken of only as an expedient way (Upāya-kausalya) for leading men to salvation in this life. This idea is well illustrated in the following passage :—

“adyāsmi bhagavan-nirvāṇapṛāptaḥ. adyāsmi bhagavan-pari-nirvṛtaḥ. adya me bhagavannarhatvaṁ pṛāptaṁ. adyāhaṁ bhagavan-bhagavataḥ putro jyeṣṭha auraso sukhato jāto dharinajño dharmanirmito dharmadāyādo dharma-nirvṛtaḥ.”¹

English Translation.—“To-day, Oh Lord, I have reached complete extinction; to-day, Oh Lord, I have become calm; to-day I am wholly come to rest; to-day, Oh Lord, I have reached Arhatship; to-day, Oh Lord, I am the Lord's eldest son, born from his law, inheriting from the law, accomplished by the law.”²

Now let us see what is the state of a man who has attained emancipation or fully realised form.

Human beings, misguided by their ignorance, make a discrimination of one another, of society, of the country, of the nation and even of the family. Consequently they are to hate one another, fight with one another and break the peace of the nation, country and society and even of family. But as soon as they attain emancipation and realize the Buddha, their personality, their mind and their conduct at once is transformed into the highest stage and becomes the same as that of Buddha Tathāgata.

The teachings of the Saddharmapūṇḍarīka-Sūtra allow no room for such discriminations among the nation, country, society and family. Affectionate relationship

¹ Saddharmapūṇḍarīka Sūtra, Vol. I, p. 61.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 61.

takes the place of such hostile relationship. Thus Buddha said in the Saddharmapundarika-Sūtra :—

“Evamevabrah̃ Śārisutā mahar̃ṣi sattvāna trāṇaṇca pitā ca bhomi,
Putrāśca te prāṇina sarvi mahyam traidhātuke kāmavilagna
bālāh
.....viditva trāṇaṃ ahameva caiṣām.¹

English Translation.—“In the same manner, Śāriputra, I, the great seer, am the protector and father of all beings and all creatures who, childlike, are captivated by the pleasures of the triple world, are my sons.....I had resolved upon saving them.”²

Thus then all human beings become father and son to each other, help each other, save and love each other. There is no enemy to be hated and no enemy to be fought. All nations and countries become united by one love.

The world in this stage becomes the “Buddhakṣetra.” Thus Buddha said in the Saddharmapundarika Sūtra.

“Tadāpi cedam̃ mama Buddhakṣhetraṃ paripūrṇa bhotī marumānu
śāṇāṃ.
Kṛiḍā ratī teṣa Vicitra bhoti udyāna-prāsādavimānakotyāḥ,
Pratiṃḍitaṃ ratnamayaśca parvataiḥ drumaistathā puṣpapha-
laurupetaiḥ.
Upariṃ ca devā abhihananti tūryān mandāravarasam̃ ca visar-
jayanti.”³

English Translation.—“Even then my Buddha-field is teeming with gods and men.

They dispose of manifold amusements, kotis of pleasure gardens, palaces and aerial cars; (this field) is embellished by hills of gems and by trees abounding with blossoms and fruits.

And aloft gods are striking musical instruments and pouring a rain of mandāras.”⁴

¹ Saddharmapundarika, Vol. I, pp. 89-90.

² S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 88.

³ Saddharmapundarika Sūtra, Vol. IV, pp. 324-325.

⁴ S. B. E., Vol. XXI, p. 308.

This is the realisation of the world. As soon as man obtains emancipation, he realises everything—the family, the country and the world.

The Mahāyāna emancipation is contained in the idea—“I am Buddha, and was and will be.” This idea only creates the foundation of all ethics. This is the reason why I dare say that without the help of religion and especially of Buddhism ethics cannot be created.

(5) *The Theory of Buddha-kāya of Mahāyāna Buddhism.*

In the last chapter I have explained the Buddha-kāya theory of the Hīnayāna with some other problems. I had also taken up the Mahāyāna system and have already explained those other problems. Now it is our duty to deal with the Buddha-kāya theory as concerned with the Mahāyāna system. This problem is of some great importance.

In the last chapter, again, I have already shown that Buddha-kāya idea arose immediately after the *parinirvāṇa* of Buddha. We have also observed its development and have clearly made out that the Buddha-kāya of Hīnayāna was conceived as the Rūpa-kāya Buddha. This Rūpa-kāya Buddha means nothing but the Historical Buddha who being born in the human world attained Buddha-hood passing through the eightfold stages.

But from the Mahāyāna standpoint we find three kinds of Buddha-kāyas, *viz.* :—

1. Dharma-kāya Buddha.
2. Sambhoga-kāya Buddha.
3. Nirmāṇa-kāya Buddha.

These three kāyas, however, are not different from one another but are simply the three aspects of the same Buddha.

Now let us see, first of all, what each of them means and how these three kāyas were conceived.

1. *Dharma-kāya Buddha.*

The term Dharma-kāya is the combination of two separate words "Dharma" and "kāya." In the Mahāyānic sense "Dharma" is "Dharmatathatā" or real substance of the universe, though it has been used sometimes in the sense of law or doctrine and kāya may be rendered "body" not in the sense of personality but in the sense of the organised totality of things or the principle of cosmic unity though not as a purely philosophical concept, but as an object of religious consciousness. Hence Dharma-kāya Buddha means Buddha who harmonized himself with Dharma or Dharmatathatā, regarded as a body of cosmic unity. This notion is just the same as that of the "Nirguṇa Brahma" of the Vedānta and God-head of Christianity.

2. *Sambhoga-kāya Buddha.*

Among the three kāyas the conceptions of Dharma-kāya and Nirmāṇa-kāya can be easily comprehended but that of the Sambhoga-kāya is rather difficult to be comprehended. The literal meaning of the term is the body of compensation. As soon as Buddha attained enlightenment, his personality was harmonized with Dharmatathatā or the reality of the universe and as soon as he was harmonized with it the historical Buddha or the Nirmāṇa-kāya Buddha was transformed into the eternal body just as Dharmatathatā is and Sambhoga-kāya appears as a consequence.

So, in short, Sambhoga-kāya is lying partly upon Dharma-kāya and partly upon Nirmāṇa-kāya. In other

words, when the Historical Buddha or the *Nirmāṇa-kāya* Buddha was harmonized with the *Dharmatathatā*, he was transformed into the absolute personality. As he became identical with that absolute reality or *Dharmatathatā* his personality became eternal as regards time and universal as regards space. The Historical Buddha then became the *Dharmatathatā* personified and the Dharma realised. Therefore we see that *Sambhoga-kāya* is just similar to the "Saguṇa Brahma" of the Vedānta and the glory or Holyghost of Christianity. According to the Mahāyāna doctrines *Sambhoga-kāya* Buddha has two aspects—one for self-enjoyment, and the other for enjoyment for the sake of others, as an object fully religious. When we observe these two aspects more minutely we see that the former aspect is only the aspect of self-existence, *i.e.*, for the enjoyment of self. When Buddha became harmonized with *Dharmatathatā* his personality became Dharmaized and he stood as an absolute one of universal existence. This is called Dharmaized personality. In short, the aspect of self-enjoyment is the aspect of Dharmaized personality.¹ The latter aspect indicates the personification of Dharma.² When Buddha became harmonized with *Dharmatathatā* he was turned into a *Tathāgata* or personified Dharma and became a religious object for the *Bodhisattvas*.

This point has been clearly elucidated by the commentators on Vasubandhu's *Vijñaptimātra-siddhiśāstra* (a treatise on the yoga philosophy) as follows—³

"The *Sambhoga-kāya* has two distinct aspects : (i) the body obtained by the *Tathāgata* for his self-enjoyment, by dint of his religious

¹ "Dharmaized personality" means the personality within Dharma. This is just the same as 'Nirguṇa Brahma' of the Vedānta.

² 'Personification of Dharma' means 'Dharma-tathatā' within personality. This carries the same sense as that of *Īśvara* in Hinduism.

³ This is one of the most important philosophical works of the *Yogācāra* School. Vasubandhu wrote the text (Nanjo's Catalogue, No. 1215) which consists

discipline through (i) the body which the Tathāgata manifests to the Bodhi-Sattvas in pure land (Sukhāvati)."¹

The former condition is the personality which is within Dharmatathatā and this can be seen only by Buddha himself or who possesses some perfect knowledge, but never by Bodhisattvas even. The latter condition is the personality which embodies the Dharmatathatā and this can be seen by Bodhisattvas. But as they possess a degree of knowledge different from that possessed by Buddha they find it in a different shape. So it is not wrong to say that the former is pure intellectual observation and that the latter is simply an emotional observation.

3 *Nirmāṇa-kāya Buddha.*

It is literally the body of transformation. So Nirmāṇa-kāya Buddha means the Historical Buddha who was born in human shape, abandoned the world for the sake of sentient beings and practised religious austerities, attained perfection, preached the Dharma and entered parinirvāṇa.

From the religious standpoint of the Mahāyānists this Historical Buddha is regarded as the Incarnation of the eternal Tathāgata or the manifestation of the Dharmatathatā. According to their views, again, the Tathāgata incarnates himself, when time and place requires, for the protection of the good, and for the destruction of the

only of 30 verses. But there arose many commentators, after the death of the author, who naturally entertained widely different views among themselves on the subject-matter, as it is too tersely treated in the text. Hīnen Tshiang made selections out of the ten noted Hindu exegetists in A.D. 659 and translated them into the Chinese language. The compilation consists of 10 fasciculi and is known as Discourses on the Ideality of the Universe (a free rendering of the Chinese title *Chang Wei-Shilun*, Nanjio, No. 1197). The term *Vijñāptimātra-Siddhisāstra*, in Nanjio's Catalogue is stated as "*Vidyāmātra-siddhisāstra*." But Nanjio's statement is wrong according to Dela Vallée Poussin, cf his *Buddhism*, London, 1898, p. 271.

¹ See "Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism" by Suzuki, p. 265.

evil-doer. Śrī Kṛṣṇa also spoke to Arjuna in the same fashion in the Bhagavadgītā—

“Paritrāṇāya sādḥūnāṃ vināśāyaca duṣkṛtāṃ,
Dharmasaṃsthāpanārthāya sambhavāmi yugeyuge.”¹

English Translation.—“For the protection of the good, for the destruction of evil-doers, for the sake of firmly establishing righteousness am I born from age to age.”

The parallelism amongst Buddhism, Hinduism and Christianity—

| <u>Buddhist</u> | <u>Hindu</u> | <u>Christian</u> |
|--------------------------|-----------------------|--|
| (1) <u>Dharma-kāya</u> | <u>Nirguṇa Brahma</u> | <u>Christ in the flesh</u> |
| (2) <u>Sambhoga-kāya</u> | <u>Saguṇa Brahma</u> | <u>Christ in glory or the Holy ghost</u> |
| (3) <u>Nirmāṇa-kāya</u> | <u>Avatāra</u> | <u>Godhead</u> |

I have explained to you the general meaning of the “Tri-kāyas” above, one by one. But you should not forget that these three “Kāyās” are not different from one another but are simply different aspects of the same personality which was harmonized with the Dharmatathatā or “Absolute Reality.” It is rather because without Dharmatathatā the Nirmāṇa-kāya aspect of Buddha cannot come into existence and the Historical Buddha cannot be conceived in his Sambhoga-kāya aspect unless he is harmonized with this Dharmatathatā. Moreover without

¹ Bhagavadgītā, Chap. IV, No. 8.

Nirmāṇa-kāya Buddha or Historical Buddha Dharmatathatā cannot appear as the Dharma-kāya Buddha and as the Sambhoga-kāya Buddha is personified with the Historical one, without Sambhoga-kāya Buddha also the human personality cannot become Buddha after obtaining Dharmatathatā and the Dharmatathatā itself cannot appear as the substantial reality of the world. In other words, these trikāyas are just the same as substance, shape and action, of one and the same existence of the same thing. The Dharma-kāya is substance because it exists as substantial reality of the world. The Sambhoga-kāya is the shape (of Dharma) since it is the personification of Dharmatathatā. The Nirmāṇa-kāya is action (of the Dharma as well as the personality) since the necessity of the world and time requires their births as "Avatārs."

Aryanism and the Rig-Vedic Age.

I.

BY

H. BRUCE HANNAH.

We know now—or think we know—something about the abstract contents of the *Vedas*; Scholarship has committed itself to definite statements regarding the “Āryan” identity of those 5 specific ethnai whose names appear in the *Rig-Veda* as the Pūrūs, or Pūravās, Yādūs, or Yādavās, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs; it has also committed itself to certain views in connection with a number of other and perhaps vaguer names, racial or political—*e.g.*, Dasyūs, Dāsas, Bhāratās, Tṛitsūs, Kūrūs, Krivis, or Kūravās, and Pāñch’ālās; and some of our authorities have also formulated more or less plausible theories regarding the approximate date when the oldest and most interesting of the *Samhitās* was reduced to writing, more or less in the form in which we have it now.

But were the original composers, or any of the early singers, of the famous hymns identical with “the Vedic Peoples” as, by scholars and popularly throughout “Āryan” India, these are now conventionally understood—*i.e.*, the Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs above-mentioned, and perhaps some of the others, or with any of the Chiefs, *Purohitās*, and Priest-Poets whose

names are more or less definitely connected with the *janāhs* just enumerated ?

Or were these composers and singers and their kinsfolk—*i.e.*, were the genuine Āryas—really some entirely other representatives of humanity, living in days long antecedent to those of the Pūrūs and their tribal associates in ancient Sapta-Sindhavaḥ, in regions possibly far removed from the Indus, under a name or names quite different from the name *Āryas*, and amid conditions of existence, natural and artificial, wholly unlike those that we are accustomed to associate with North-Western Vedic India as conventionally understood ?

In other words, “Can we, or can we not, ascertain the age of the Vedas ?”—more especially the *Samhitā* known as the *Rig-Veda* ?

This, said the late Mr. Bāl Gangadhar Tilak, in his book, *The Orion, or Researches into the Antiquity of the Vedas*, p. 2—

“is a question which has baffled the ingenuity of many an ancient and modern scholar, and though I have ventured to write on the subject, I cannot claim to have finally solved this important problem in all its bearings.”

Mr. Tilak made two notable attempts to tackle the subject. One of these was *The Orion*, just mentioned: the other was his later and larger work, *The Arctic Home in the Vedas*. Copies of the latter, whether new or second-hand, are now difficult, if not impossible, to obtain. In connection with a suggestion of mine that the book should be re-printed, I was informed that, before his lamented death, Mr. Tilak had in fact entertained the idea of bringing out another edition; but eventually he gave it up, on the ground that he had modified his views. What that modification was, I did not learn; but my impression is that a theory which has recently been advanced regarding

the possibility of interpreting the *Rig-Vedic* word *Samūdra* in the light of the fact that once upon a time sea-water covered the territories now known as Rājputāna, as also the lower valley of the Indus, and extended far eastwards along the "Gangetic Trough," and that, north of India, another great sea once existed, of which the Black Sea, the Caspian, Aral, and Lake Balkash are merely remains, may have come to his notice, and possibly had something to do with whatever change came over his mental attitude. This theory I shall myself discuss later on.

The subject before us is supremely attractive: but it bristles with difficulties.

As pointed out by the late Mr. Vincent Smith—

"China excepted, no region of the world can boast of an ancient civilization so continuous and unbroken as that of India. Civilized life may have begun earlier in Egypt and Babylonia, but in those countries the chain connecting the distant past with the present was rudely snapped long ago. No living memory of the Chaldees and Pharaohs or of their institutions survives. In India the ideas of the Vedic period still are a vital force, and even the ritual of the Rishis is not wholly disused" (*Oxford History of India*, p. 48).

Elsewhere the same writer says—

"It is a strange fact that the Vedic Indo-Aryans" (*sic*)... "have stamped an indelible mark on the whole country from the Himālaya to Cape Comorin. Modern Hinduism, however much it may differ from the creed and social usages of the ancient Rishis, undoubtedly has its roots in the institutions and literature of the Vedic Indo-Aryans. Plenty of other strangers have come in since, but none of them, not even the Muslims, have produced effects comparable in magnitude with those resulting from the Indo-Aryan settlements made three or four thousand years ago" (*Ibid*, p. 8).

These are undoubtedly facts—and very striking facts too: and they are intelligible on only one assumption. But it is an assumption possessed of two aspects, whereof one has never yet been taken into consideration by our

authorities, much less in popular thought—the assumption that the Culture which we are taught to regard as having been brought into India by the peoples who are here meant by the term “Indo-Āryans” (1) was of a very lofty order, and was full of a perfectly wondrous vitality, and (2) must nevertheless have consisted, not only of the Culture proper to the Pūrūs, Yādūs, etc., but also of *another* Culture that was even superior in quality and vitality to that. As already shown in previous papers, the question *whether the particular ethnoi thus commonly called the “Indo-Āryans” were really “the Āryas,” or even Āryas at all*, is eminently discussible: but for the moment the expression may be allowed to pass. At the same time, it is well to remember that the forms of a civilization may persist, and yet the ethnoi amongst whom they more or less survive be very different from the original possessors and introducers of the civilizations.

Nevertheless, despite this cultural continuity, it is equally undeniable that early Indian history is woefully weak in the important matter of *Chronology*. It has even been said that the Indians of past ages were shockingly, if not absolutely, deficient in what is called “the historic sense.” I decline to adopt this view. I believe that, apart from their literary treasures (if, for the moment, we may style their orally transmitted data of knowledge “literature”), they once possessed an abundance of monuments and other records of sorts, of a nature suited to preserve reliable memories of their racial, communal, or national life. *Some* such concrete or objective evidences of their past must of necessity have accumulated—with them as with all other peoples. Yet, as even Mr. Abinās Chandra Das points out, not only is there a “total absence, in Indian soil, of any monuments as old as those discovered on the banks of the Nile, or in the land watered by the Tigris and the Euphrates” (*Rig-Vedic India*, p. 4),

but "the ancient monuments, hitherto discovered in India, do not go beyond the Buddhistic era, *i.e.*, the Sixth Century B.C." (*Ibid*, p. 2). Hence, in these circumstances—and as indicated in what I have said in previous papers regarding the identity of the early Dasyūs and the later Kūrūs, Krivis, or Kūravās, their character, ambitions and actual achievements, the origin of *Historical Brāhmanism* and *Caste* in Kuru-land, the development and spread of this cult and this institution, and the vampire-like hold which they eventually got upon practically the whole of India—I also believe that, for ulterior purposes connected with the worldly interests and designs of the dominant classes, the above-mentioned original vestiges of Indian antiquity were ruthlessly destroyed or otherwise rendered of no effect *as records of the actual past*; that, in a similar spirit of wholesale camouflage and misrepresentation, everything in the nature of orally transmitted reminiscences was carefully and cunningly remoulded and confused; and that everything in the shape of what eventually became "literature"—*e.g.*, the *Vedas* in the form in which we know them—was ingeniously twisted, added to, re-cast, and "edited" over and over again, and in particular rendered susceptible, in parts, of any desired interpretation, certainly of more interpretations than one: ever, of course, with a single though complex object in view—the building up and strengthening of *Brāhmanism*, the glorification of Kūrū-land, and the complete obliteration of the unpalatable fact that, however "civilized" they had become, the ultimately *soi-disant* "Kūrūs" were, in truth, none other than those old-time Kāssi-descended barbarians, the Dasyūs, transmogrified. So successfully, moreover, was all this effected, that Scholarship (both Indian and Western) even now accepts *Historical Brāhmanism* and its originators at their own face-value, and is complacently unconscious of the fact that our

present-day age-long ideas regarding ancient India are, in many important respects, not only false, but absolutely upside-down. Thus, in the matter of their records (racial, communal, national, or howsoever otherwise we choose to style them), the peoples of ancient India have merely been tragically unfortunate—much as were the illustrious old Romiū of Khem, as a result of the so-called “Ethiopian” (really Kāssite) Conquest. It is therefore not only wrong, but utterly unfair, to accuse them of having been “deficient in the historic sense.”

One outcome of this heartless destruction of, or tampering with, the ancient records, orally transmitted memories, and “literature” of the so-called “Indo-Āryas,” is particularly deplorable. It has opened wide the door to a vast flood of *boundless credulity* on their part. In, or connected with, such well-founded traditions—unwritten or written—as they do now possess, in perfectly serious quarters statements may be met with, or views are held, that seem sufficiently extravagant. But, even on these, popular superstition and patriotic sentiment and zeal have for centuries been at work : till at last—encouraged, in some cases subtly, in others openly, by a crafty and all-powerful priesthood—not only the *hoi-polloi*, but actually also the *bhadralōg*, even in these supposedly enlightened days of ours, readily and naïvely give ear to fairy-tales of the wildest absurdity; are firmly convinced that legends, obviously of the mythological order, are nothing short of actual history : and, in the matter of chronology, have an implicit faith in allegations regarding the happening of specific events, real or imaginary (*e.g.*, the Mahābhārata War), at impossibly remote dates. In short, so far as popular beliefs about India’s past are concerned, not only the crassly ignorant and deliberately misinformed masses, but even the bulk of the more or less “educated” classes, live in a little subjective

world of their own—a veritable Dreamland which, however seemingly delightful and flattering to their *amour-propre*, has absolutely no relation whatever to the solid facts of actual existence. But, however regrettable may be this particular aspect of Indian mentality, in the circumstances it is readily understandable, and therefore surely very pardonable. The only sensible way in which to meet the situation is patiently and courageously to foster, throughout the country, and even beyond its borders—in scholarly circles as well as amongst the masses—a living interest in realities instead of fantasies. Practically, then, the question is reduced to this—*What are the realities?*

The trouble is that Western Scholarship approaches the solution of this problem from one point of view, and India approaches it from quite another point of view. Unfortunately, too, each thinks the other's point of view and *modus operandi* utterly wrong. I look at the position thus.

There is probably no very great (if any) essential difference between the nature of the Oriental, and especially the Indian, mind and that of the Occidental mind. Both are highly intellectual, and, in respect of their intuitional faculties, the one is probably just as well-endowed as the other. What seems to differentiate the two—and what has possibly given rise to current delusions on the subject—really consists in the *attitude* adopted by Westerns and Indians respectively towards their environment (of whatever nature), and even towards their own subjective selves, considered as objects of contemplation, hence as a sort of extra or special environment. In my belief, moreover, that attitude is an expression, indeed the necessary outcome, of *Character*. Character, I hold, depends very largely upon the *milieu* wherein the individual organism naturally and ordinarily

seeks and find its "life." And, to appreciate Western character, as distinguished from Indian character, or Indian character as distinguished from Western character, we must consider each type of mentality from two points of view—(1) that of racial descent, and (2) that of racial experiences, or, otherwise expressed, training.

First, then, with regard to racial descent. Of course, nowhere on Earth, nowadays, can any ethnos be found which is of pure Āryan, or shall we say Rhodo-Leukochroic, *i.e.*, Rosy-Blond, stock. But, so far as the blood of that wonderful stock does run in the veins of modern humanity, who, it may be asked, has the better claim to be regarded as coming of Rhodo-Leukochroic ancestry—the type of Indian who to-day is usually called an "Indo-Āryan," or the Nordic type of Western European (say the so-called Anglo-Saxon), who also, according to the tenets of present-day ethnology, comes of Āryan lineage—*pace*, of course, the further fact that the very idea of an original Āryan race, in the old sense, is now said to have been given up?

The view still held and taught in orthodox scholarly circles is that the 5 *janāhs* mentioned in the *Rig-Veda* under the names Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs, were "the Āryas"; that the Kūrūs, or Krivis, and Bhāratās were the same 5 ethnoi in later times, but under different names and different skies; that they established themselves in Madhyā-deśa under the style of the "Kūrū-Pāñch'ālas," and there developed the culture now commonly associated with historical Āryavarta, and which is therefore commonly called "Āryan culture"; and that into this so-called "Āryan pale" were ultimately admitted the communities referred to by say Professor A. A. Macdonell and Mr. Ramāprasād Chanda as the "Dasyūs and Dāsas," out of whom, it is said, eventually developed the caste known as the Sūdras. Well,

as I have shown in previous papers, the evidence cullible from available records in support of the belief that the Āryas proper ever entered the Indus Valley at all, is astonishingly meagre; whoever the real Āryas were, it is now as clear as daylight that at any rate the Pūrūs, Yādūs, Tūrvaśas, Anūs, and Drūhyūs were certainly *not* Āryas; it is also equally clear that the Dasyūs were simply a branch in India of the barbarous and widely scattered "Wolf-Folk," Tokhs, or Dahyūs, of Airyo-Tūrān and still earlier Si-Nim, or Nūm-Mā; that Kūrūs, Krivis, or Kūravās, and Bhāratās were merely names under which the Dasyūs in course of time became known; that they persistently strove to establish an ascendancy over the Pūrūs, Tūrvaśas, Yādūs, Anūs, Drūhyūs, and *Niṣādas*; that eventually they evolved into the Kūrūs—and the 5 ethnoi just named appeared as the Pāñch'ālas—of whatever was politically represented by the historical name "Kūrū-Pāñch'ālas"; and that it was these metamorphosed Dasyūs who, under the name of Kūrūs, in Kūrū-land, were responsible for the creation, development, and spread of the so-called "Āryan Culture," and in particular for what are known as *Historical Brāhmanism* and *Caste*, and for the vice-like grip that the last-named institution managed in time to secure upon practically the whole of humbler India. These things being so, the expression "Indo-Āryans," or "Indo-Āryas," as conventionally applied to certain inhabitants of present-day India, is perfectly meaningless, especially in view of the widespread *Niṣādan* basis of Indian humanity.

On the other hand, the Nordic type of Western European (more especially the so-called Anglo-Saxon) above alluded to, undoubtedly—at least to a considerable extent, evidenced and measurable by the fact that he is to-day still Rosy-Blond in appearance—comes of old Rhodo-Leukochroic, which was at one time identical

with the original specifically Airyānian, and Āryan, stock.'

Secondly, with regard to racial experiences, or training. After the rise of Madhyā-deśa—all records for the preceding ages having, as we have seen, been practically destroyed—the history of the peoples of ancient India (more particularly ancient Northern India), and of the development of Indian mentality, was written in terms of *Historical Brāhmanism* and *Caste*: or rather, the materials for such an eventually written, or writable, history, were preserved in a carefully manipulated form by the dominant Cult—with an eye, of course, to their own exclusive interests. Whatever were the natural mental faculties of the peoples, the masses, in pursuance of a deliberate and callously sustained policy, were kept in a perfectly appalling state of the densest and most hopeless ignorance and degradation.

Per Contra, the Nordics of Western Europe (and more particularly the Anglo-Saxons, as wholly and absolutely distinct from the Germans), brought up from the time they first arrived in the West in an invigorating atmosphere of personal freedom, were supremely fortunate, not only in that respect, but also in the priceless legacies which they inherited from (*inter alia*) the cultures of Greece and Rome; and in this connection special mention may be made of the glorious *intellectual heritage* that came to them from ancient Hellas—herself an exquisite re-embodied expression of still more ancient Rhodo-Leukochroia. But wherein, for them, really lay its value? In its *spirit*, which was the same as theirs. For, as F. S. Marvin says, the Greek Sophos "was a person of intellect above his fellows, who applied his mind freely to the facts of the world around him, not without the guidance of others, but without subservience to tradition or authority, and anxious to use his knowledge for the common good."

In short, he represented *independence, free enquiry, and progress*, in the mental realm—more especially in connection with science, philosophy, and art.

It is commonly supposed that the difference between the method of ratiocination adopted by the Occidental mind, and that adopted by the Oriental (or let us say the Indian) mind, consists in this : that, whether functioning intuitively or merely intellectually, the latter first forms a general concept, apprehending it positively, though perhaps more or less indefinitely, and next, if necessary, looks around for particular definite objective facts ; and that, should the facts harmonize with the general concept, well and good ; but that, if they do not fit in with it, then they are regarded as, comparatively, no longer worthy of serious attention—the concept persisting, undisturbed : whereas, refusing to entertain anything *à priori*, the Western mind first collects, arranges, and investigates all the facts, or particular premisses, that it can get hold of, then sees whether these particular premisses, when thus co-ordinated, constitute or suggest anything in the nature of a general concept, and finally, but then only, admits the existence, and perhaps the validity, of the general concept so evolved. To a certain extent this is true : but it is not an adequate statement of the case. Quite as much in the Orient (including India) as in the Occident, there are minds which reason *inductively, i. e.*, infer the general from the particular ; but it is equally true that, as much in the West as in the East (again including India), there are also minds which reason *deductively, i. e.*, arrive at particular conclusions from general *à priori* conceptual premisses. Broadly, however, it may perhaps be said that the Western mind demands *stricter proof* than does the Indian mind. Yet, even then, the question arises : What is meant by “proof” ? Possibly, in this connection, the Indian mind

has a tendency to find more satisfaction, or at least sooner to place its faith, in a general intellectual or intuitional concept, than in those particular premisses which some Western minds do undoubtedly insist on first establishing before they will have anything to do with any general concept. In short, the Indian mind perhaps more readily accepts a general concept, as both premiss and conclusion, than does the Western mind, which is possibly more prone to fight shy of it, unless approached from previously established particular premisses. This would seem to suggest that the Indian mind is *normally* dreamier and lazier than the Western mind, though capable of spasmodic outbursts of concentrated practicality and extraordinary energy. But it is not really a question of either dreaminess as opposed to practicality, or apathy as opposed to energy. Much more probably the truth lies in the very different and very unfortunate, *past experiences* of the Indians, as peoples—resulting, as I have said, in a pronounced tendency to unbounded and easily captured *credulity*. Again: what about the final general concept drawn by way of conclusion by so-called “Scientists” from their “proved” particular premisses? That this *always* commends itself either to enlightened reason, or even to what is called common sense, cannot for a moment be admitted. Lastly—though this holds as truly of East as it does of West—a preference is certainly accorded to the *inductive* method in professionally scientific and scholarly circles, and is more or less adopted as a pose by sciolists—no general concept being, by them, ever accepted as an original premiss, but only as a conclusion necessarily following from previously verified particular premisses: except, of course, in the occasional shape of an auxiliary preliminary hypothesis, assumed provisionally with a view to giving research-operations a start. But one can grub

about among preliminary particular premisses—as the Germans delight to do, and as some of our own imitative “Scientists” do—and yet draw a wrong conclusion from their totality, however verified and co-ordinated. In my opinion, the much vaunted “strictly scientific” and prudishly “scholarly” method—the total rejection of the general concept as an original *à priori* premiss—is a fetter upon the faculties of the mind; and numbs, if it does not kill, all promise of any real progress in thought and knowledge—which latter, be it never forgotten, is not always merely of the *Mind*. It is sometimes a *memory of the Soul*.

Again, one frequently hears it stated that, as between Western and Eastern (say Indian) mentality, the distinguishing characteristic of the latter is its “Spirituality.” Now, first, what is really meant by this term? Let me explain what *I* mean by it. Mentality, in general, may be regarded as consisting of three main divisions or departments—not, of course, demarcated by clearly defined boundaries, but, after the manner of the several so-called “kingdoms” of evolving life, practically appreciable as occasionally inter-merging sections of one continuous process; or rather different planes, all permeating each other, of one organically unified whole. These three mental departments are—(1) the Emotional, (2) the Intellectual, and (3) the Intuitional. For the purpose of getting into touch with, and functioning in, its environment (whatever that may be—phenomenal or transcendental), each such department has its own special set of faculties. Further, the environment just mentioned consists of (1) the so-called *Existential* World—phenomenal, transient, and possessed of (as distinguished from Reality) a merely derivative Actuality, which is based on, rooted in, and wholly dependent upon, the World next mentioned, and (2) the so-called *Subsistential* World—noumenal, eternal

and real, *i. e.*, as consisting of self-subsistent Living-Substance, having in itself Life, or True Being. It is not, however, as might perhaps be supposed, the higher intuitional faculties alone which are capable of corresponding with this essential transcendental environment. Provided the individual organism is sufficiently advanced evolutionally, the other faculties can and do function in it too. But, whatever the particular mental faculties with which it functions, every individual organism is not able, or perchance does not desire, to set up for itself vital inter-relations with the *Subsistent* World. Some (indeed most) organisms stop short at functioning, *i. e.*, finding their needs and interests, *i. e.*, "living," in the merely *Existential* World. They do not know of—hence, they are no-wise interested in—any other life. The illusory and transient "Present," the *pseudo* "Now," is their "All." Again, though, for the purpose of functioning, or living, in the *Subsistent* World, the faculties of the organism are wielded by the Mind, just as much as when the functional operations are taking place in the merely *Existential* Realm, yet, when they go on in the *Subsistent* Realm, that which benefits by the operations is the Soul, not the Mind; whereas, when the functional operations take place within the merely *Existential* Sphere, the benefit more ordinarily goes to the Mind, not the Soul. Nevertheless, by a mysterious process conducted within its own deepest interior, it is possible for the highly evolved organism to convert the product of its functional operations, even in the *Existential* Realm (which product may be called "Objective-, or *Mind*-, Knowledge"), into "Substantial-, or *Soul*-, Knowledge"—the result of the organism's functional operations in the Realm of Living-Substance, True Being, or Eternal Reality. For it is only by thus transmuting the Objective into the Substantial, that the former

becomes assimilable pabulum fit for the nourishment and vitalizing of the Soul, as distinguished from the Mind. Now, when the capacities or desires of the organism are limited to the setting up for itself of inter-relations of a transient and non-real though actual nature with the above-mentioned merely *Existential* World, *i.e.*, with its mutable, passing, phenomenal, derivative environment, the organism may be said to "find its life" (here really only its *existence* and temporary interests) on the merely Objective Plane. On the other hand, when those capacities or desires reach forth to the setting up by the organism for itself of vital inter-relations with the above-mentioned *Subsistential* World, *i.e.*, its eternal, noumenal, non-derivative environment of Real Substantial Being, the organism may be said to be *living* on the Substantial Plane—to have, in short, what is conventionally called "Eternal Life." This is what I mean by "Spirituality," as I conceive it to have been understood by the old original Kshatriyan, pre-Brāhmanistic, and genuinely *Āryan* Mind and Soul. It is Character, Essential Being, Reality. For "Substance," as I use the term—"Spirit." The merely *Existential* life, or inclination towards it, may be called "Objectivity" (emotional, intellectual, or intuitional, as the case may be), or "Materialism," or "Carnality," or "Worldliness"—or by any other suitable name wherewith we prefer to label it. The *Subsistential* Life, or the inclination thereto, is accordingly what I mean by the expression "the Spiritual Life."

Now, as a matter of fact (all conventional views, expert or popular, to the contrary notwithstanding), there is just as much, or just as little, "Spirituality," or "Spiritual Life," to be found in the Occident as in the Orient. Were it true that the distinguishing characteristic of the Indian mind is its "Spirituality," we should see that mind—if not actually, or as a rule, striving, through its

threefold faculties, to set up for its owner vital inter-relations with the *Subsistential* World—at least revealing proclivities in that direction, rather than in the direction of his merely *Existential* environment. But, for those who know their Orient, and in particular their India, can it honestly be said that that is what we do in fact see? Go to any part of the country that you like, get into touch with any one or more of its numerous heterogeneous communities, and will you not find that the thoughts, the converse, and the strivings of say 90%, even amongst the higher castes and better classes, are as keenly and exclusively, or at least dominantly, concentrated upon the things of this transient and non-real, though very actual, sub-lunary world as are those of any similar aggregation of humanity in the Occident? Verily, between the denizens of the two hemispheres, there is little or nothing to choose. Whether there, in the West, or here, in the East, the majority are all equally obsessed by, or immersed in, thoughts relating to this ever-mutating, illusory, and impermanent life. Some are living it on the Emotional Plane, gross or refined, as the case may be, others are on the Intellectual Plane—again of sorts. And yet others, perhaps, have attained to the Intuitional Plane. But, whatever may be their differences in these respects, they are *all* absolutely alike in one respect. They are all functioning in the merely *Existential* Realm—all are linked with the nature and destinies of transient Objectivity—none are truly *living*; because none are seeking their interests in, *i.e.*, corresponding or communing, and so identifying themselves, with their higher transcendental environment—that self-subsistent World of Eternal Substance, or Spirit, wherein alone, nay, which alone, is *Life*.

There is, indeed, a frame or attitude of mind, or kind of mental activity, with which the word "Spirituality"

has somehow or other come to be associated. It has, however, nothing whatever in common with "Spirituality" in the sense in which I have just been using the term. One meets with it in every stratum of the Ecclesiastical World; in Society circles, and in conventionally Scholarly circles; in what are sometimes called Pious circles; nay, also amongst whole communities who have acquired a reputation for being specially learned, or at least intellectual, intuitional, or even emotional. It is sometimes a mere pose. But, pose or not pose, it is really only a sort of super-refinement, or super-celerity in the mental functioning of those who, however excellent their intuitional, intellectual, or emotional faculties, are only capable, or at any rate desirous, of, or accustomed to, carrying on mental operations in their purely Objective environment, the merely *Existential* Realm—not their Substantial environment, that *Subsistent* Realm of self-subsistent and therefore eternal Spirit, which alone is Reality and Life. Thus, however refined, or quick, or profound, may be the activities of the faculties of a mental organism, yet, if, in spite of the terminology used, those activities are going on, not in the *Subsistent*, but in the merely *Existential*, Sphere, they may, it is true, in the circles and communities just referred to, be found conventionally associated with the word "Spirituality," in the spurious illegitimate sense above described: but, outside those popular and conventional *milieus*, they are really indications, not of "Spirituality" at all, in the true sense of the term, but only of "Objectivity." We are all liable to fall into the pit of mistaking our emotional, intellectual, or intuitional subtleties and flashes for this particular superficial *pseudo*-type of "Spirituality."

Again: I have spoken of the mysterious process, conducted in the deepest interior of the individual psyche,

whereby it is possible for some people to convert the result of their mental experiences in the merely *Existential* Realm, *i.e.*, their *Mind-Knowledge*, into *Soul-Knowledge*. We may call this the power of *Substantializing or Spiritualizing the Objective*. Well, similarly, but by a process conducted on reverse lines, it is equally possible (indeed, it is perhaps much more common) to *Objectivize, nay, even to Materialize, the Substantial or Spiritual*. Thus, in connection with the popular and otherwise conventional misuse of the word "Spirituality" already alluded to, take for instance certain types of the more or less affected and "precious" chatter that is sometimes to be heard in Society circles, or on the lips of individuals who pose as, or have acquired a reputation for, being specially and peculiarly literary, artistic, or pious. What they are talking or writing about may indeed be *said* to relate to things truly "Spiritual"; their remarks may be ultra-refined and ultra-profound; their thinking strikingly quick, subtle, and vivid; and the words and phrases they use seemingly appropriate. But, granting all this, is there any *life* in their converse, as distinguished from mere *liveliness* or *sprightliness*? In what *Realm* are their mental faculties really coruscating, whether intuitionally, intellectually, or emotionally? The World of Substantial Being? Or the merely formal and Existential World of Objectivity? Therein lies the test. Or take that deadly Degeneration which, in course of time, has attacked and sucked the life out of every one of the great historical Religions—all, when originally founded, based on a then sufficiently full and perfect revelation of the Eternal Verities: hence, all, at first, divine, because purely "spiritual" in character. To what is their common and invariable fate attributable? What but to the mechanical, soulless, life-destroying influence of an idolatrous, *i.e.*, a grossly or subtly materializing, or at any rate formalizing and objectivizing,

self-centred and aggressively dominant priesthood? (For the worship of mere creatures, human or otherwise, of concrete stocks and stones, and of ikons, pictures, and so forth, by superstitious peoples in various rudimentary stages of development, is not by any means the *only* mental attitude with which the word "Idolatry" is properly associable.) Let Memory or Imagination probe back into the depths of historical or even mythological antiquity as far as she will or can. Begin, if you like, with the alleged esoteric faith of remote old Atlantis, and trace down the ages through Taoism, Osirism, Orphism, Mithraism, Mar-dūkism, Vedism, Historical Brāhmanism, Būddhism, Āhūrā-Mazdism, and Āshā-ism, to Islām and Christianity. Every one of these was *originally* divine in character, because "spiritually" based, in the true sense of the phrase. But the development in evolution of the human soul proceeds in stages, corresponding broadly to the evolution of human mentality. In every age there are always countless multitudes (in fact, the majority of mankind for the time being) whose minds are incapable of even forming any conception of, much less understanding, what is really connoted by the term "Spirituality." In the very nature and course of things, therefore, such individuals are absolutely shut off from what I have called "Soul-knowledge"; and they are certainly incapable of living "the Spiritual Life." In other words, they are not really *living*. They are only *candidates for Life*—blundering through its portals, Time, Space, and Causality—there encountering experiences on the merely Objective Plane, *i.e.*, in the merely *Existential* Realm, and gaining a certain amount of what I have called 'Mind-Knowledge.' In order to acquire and maintain complete control over these multitudes, the Priestly Orders (many of whom are in precisely the same more or less rudimentary stage of development in evolution), being worldly, selfish, and

inordinately ambitious, have ever been astute and quick to see that their corporate and personal interests are best advanced by operations conducted along the line of least resistance. In other words, they have invariably represented Religion to the masses as *Religiosity*, i.e., in the only guise in which the latter (and indeed they themselves to a very great extent) are, for the time being, capable of understanding it—as a matter of “Objectivity,” apprehended, of course, through the instrumentality of their mental faculties, whatever these may happen to be—emotional (of a gross or refined order), intellectual, or intuitional (in various degrees of subtlety)—yet all ever functioning, not in their Substantial, but only in their Objective, environment; hence, not in the *Subsistential* Realm of Being, and therefore in no manner or degree connected with “Spirituality,” as understood in the genuinely Āryan and only proper sense and applications of that much mis-used term.

A little way back I alluded to the complementary processes of (1) *Substantializing the Objective*, and (2) *Objectivizing and even Materializing the Substantial*. With the former, everyone who lives, or tries to live, the Spiritual Life, is necessarily more or less familiar. As a race, the Rhodo-Leukochroic Airyānians of Airyāvō-Vaēja, and the Āryas proper, say of Zarah-Lake land, were probably better acquainted with it than were any other division of humanity. Of the latter process, *Historical Brāhmanism* is undoubtedly one of the most outstanding and striking examples. In certain fields of literature—e.g., Sanskrit literature—and in Scholarly circles (both European and Indian), when Indian Religious and Philosophical Systems are the subject of discussion, one frequently comes across remarks in recognition, and even laudation, of its wondrously super-eminent “Spirituality.” As a matter of fact, however, not only was *Historical*

Brāhmanism not specially distinguished for its "Spirituality," as I conceive the only true and proper connotations and applications of the word. It was and is a direct and absolute *negation* thereof—though admittedly intensely and complexly *metaphysical*. Vedism, *i.e.*, pre-Sapta-Sindhavan Vedism—the religion of the old Āryas proper—with its profoundly and sublimely esoteric doctrine of the *Ātman*, as enshrined in the hearts and illumined understandings of the original Kshatriyas (ere yet any such personality as a Brāhman existed, or had even been heard of), *was* truly "Spiritual," and therefore divine. Those grand old Āryan aristocrats *had* what I have spoken of as "Soul-Knowledge." Born into this merely *Existential* World, they were obliged, of course, to take it as they found it, to ascertain and obey its laws, and to live its life as best they could. But, far beyond its utmost bounds, their mental faculties (emotional, intellectual, and intuitional) also reached forth to, got into touch with, and functioned naturally and easily with, another and very different environment, one the nature of which transcended the conditions and limitations of the phenomenal, ever-changing, and impermanent environment wherewith they normally corresponded—that *Subsistential* Realm of eternal and absolutely independent Substance, or Spirit, wherein alone is Reality or Life. Moreover, even in connection with their Earthly lives upon the Objective Plane of mere *Existence*, they knew how, in the innermost recesses of their subjective being, to transmute the result of their mental and other experiences in the transient, phenomenal World of Time, Space, and Causality into assimilable pabulum suitable for the sustenance of their spiritualized psychic natures—in short, to Substantialize the Objective and Material.

Briefly, the doctrine of the *Ātman*, as understood by its original custodians and exponents, the old Āryan

pre-Brahmanistic Kshatriyas, may be said to have taught that there is no existence, or rather *subsistence*, except the Kosmic Principle of Life, World-Soul, or Higher Self, known as *Param-Ātman*, or *Brahma*, immanent in, yet transcending, all *Existence*. That is the sole Reality—all else that we call Existence being merely "Phenomenon," or "Appearance," "Actuality," "Māyā," or "Illusion." Hence, there is no *essential* difference between that Sole Knower, the *Param-Ātman*, and the Microcosmic Principle of Existence, the Individual Soul, Lower Self, or *Jiv-Ātman*. The complete apprehension of this, constitutes that "Right knowledge" possessed by the Soul, which confers upon us *Mukti*, or, in other words, frees us, not from Existence, but from the *domination* of the conditions and limitations of Existence, reveals us to ourselves as inhabitants of eternally subsistent Reality, *i.e.*, Dwellers in the *Now* (as distinguished from the *Present*), and so, not only unveils for us the Be-All and End-All of Life, but indicates to us the only *Uses* whereto such Soul-Knowledge should, and will necessarily, be put by the spiritually illumined *Jiv-Ātman*. When, in full and perfect realization of all above briefly out-lined, the *Jiv-Ātman* can reverently say "Aham Brahma asmi!" *i.e.*, "I am Brahma!" he has reached the Goal, for he has become *essentially* identified with "the All."

Out of these fine old Āryan Kshatriyas, however—probably some time during the period of the *Brāhmaṇas*, when only the Brāhmanic Order first came into existence—certain individuals pertaining to those Kūrū- or Dasyū-dominated communities who in the distant past had been known as the Kāssi-descended "Dark Warrior Clans" (*Śvāva*, *Dhūmra*, *Kṛṣṇa*), succeeded in worming their splendid secrets. Then, among these same later *soi-disant* "Kūrūs"—and within a clique of which one Viṣvāmītra

seems to have been the leading spirit—was organized that portentous *State Hierarchy* which, in course of time, developed into the dread phenomenon known as *Historical Brāhmanism*. But, once possessed of a knowledge of the doctrine of the *Ātman* and all the other esoteric secrets of the ancient Kshatriyas, this Hierarchy arrogated to themselves the sole right to expound that knowledge, actually excluding therefrom those Royal Souls who had originally revealed it to them; and finally, under the direst penalties in case of disobedience, prohibited the masses, then beginning to be styled Sūdras, from even attempting to read the Vedas. But of what *nature* was this knowledge of the *Ātman*, whereof the newly-arisen Kūrū Hierarchy thus possessed themselves? Was it *Soul-Knowledge*? Or was it *Mind-Knowledge*? It was merely the latter. In seeking to obtain it, they had acquired, not what they sought, not the real thing, but something else—not the genuine article, but an *ersatz*. For, in this case, the capacity of the Kshatriyas to communicate, was strictly limited by the capacity of the Hierarchy to receive. In other words, being in no manner or degree spiritually-minded, the Hierarchy had only succeeded in *Objectivizing the Substantial*. But how so? Were they not pre-eminently civilized and cultured? Were not the Kūrūs highly developed—emotionally, intellectually, and even intuitively? They were. Notwithstanding their Dasyū identity; despite their descent from the barbarous old Kāssi; by that time they had *acquired* all the gifts and graces and outward culture-habiliments of their evolutionally more advanced tribal associates. But here a little further explanation becomes necessary. For the question still remains to be answered: If even the *Jiv-Ātmanic* mental organism can, in a manner and to a degree, get into touch with the Substantial World, and yet, despite its frequently high development, be incapable

of establishing *vital* inter-relations therewith, *how are those vital inter-relations ever initiated?* We shall find that the solution of this problem lies in the secret of what is called *Involution*. For it is the *Divine Spirit, ever hidden even in the conditioned organism*, which really sets up the communication.

The *Existential* Realm, the Phenomenal World of so-called "Creation," is the result of a stupendous kosmic process of voluntarily imposed *Involution* on the part of Living-Substance, or Spirit, into conditions and limitations of Time, Space and Causality. Christian theologians have a partial grasp of the idea in the shape of what they call the *Kēnōsis*. Logically this eternal act of self-sacrifice necessarily precedes *Evolution*. Hence, before ever Evolution even begins, Spirit (which is Life) subsists in the *Existential*, or Phenomenal World, even in its lowest plane—but, as it were, buried, hidden, shackled. It is the conditions and limitations obscuring and fettering the Divine Victim, thus self-immolated, which gradually unfold, *and whose unfoldment really constitutes Evolution*. But, until Evolution has done its work, Spirit in the Phenomenal Sphere is neither manifest nor operative. In other words, "the Divine" is practically conspicuous by its absence. Indeed, it is this that gives rise to what is called *Evil*. The Epiphany of the Divine in Existence only takes place when, through Evolution, Spirit's obscuring and fettering enwrapments have been burst and thrown aside.

Accordingly, until these are so discarded, what gets into touch even with the *Subsistential* World (say when the Spiritual Life is ostensibly being led by the individual organism, or *Jiv-Ātman*, or when Spiritual subjects are being superficially discussed) is—not the Spirit (*Ātman*) hidden and inoperative there, but—the *Jiv-Ātman*, the conditioned and limited organism of the Phenomenal

World. More exactly, it is the faculties (intuitional, intellectual and emotional) of the conditioned organism which so get into touch. At this stage the sole result of their functional activities, even in the *Subsistential* field of operation, is *Mind-Knowledge*. So far, the Substantial can only be apprehended and assimilated in an Objective, perchance a Materialistic, form. But, when the conditions and limitations have fallen away, through Evolution, and the ever-inherent Divine Spirit in the individual organism has become both manifest and free to operate, then—but only then—*no longer the conditioned organism, as such, but the freed Divine Spirit* (still, however, using the intuitional, intellectual, and emotional faculties of the *Mind* as instruments) gets into vital touch with, and functions organically in, the *Subsistential* World, and apprehends it *as it is*—i.e., as Living-Substance, or Eternal Spirit, in other words, Reality and Life. For only the Spirit itself can discern the things of the Spirit.

The Kūrū Hierarchy above referred to had not, in the *Brāhmaṇa* period, attained to this stage of progress. They were not yet in the *Evolutional*, but still only in the earlier *Involutional*, stage—a stage normally and necessarily associated with ubiquitous manifestations of what is called “Evil,” and in particular characterized by *Selfishness*, giving birth to *Malevolence*, on the part of the individual organism.

How do we know this? We know it, in part, by observing the specific *uses* to which *Historical Brāhmanism* did in fact put its Objectivized cognitions, its Mind-Knowledge, of the Substantial. What those uses were, need not be stated here. Too well, alas, are they known to students of Indian (especially Northern Indian) history, and to anyone acquainted (and who is not?) with the conditions of existence which are still to this day the lot of the bulk of India's 315 million inhabitants.

Obviously, if, by any means, one group of men can trick or force the rest of their kind into believing that the only Reality is that whereof knowledge is open to that group alone, and is acquired by the exercise of faculties which that group alone possesses : in a word, a Reality in respect of which each member of that group, to the exclusion of the rest of surrounding humanity, is universally permitted to say : "I am 'it' !"; that group, not merely from a so-called "spiritual" point of view, but also from a worldly point of view, immediately vaults into a position of supremacy. In very truth it becomes "the All," or at any rate the only "All" that is of any account on Earth. Now this—no less—is what *Historical Brāhmanism* actually succeeded in doing. Nay, it is still, in many respects (probably unrealized by modern enlightened India), enjoying the fruits of its success. But at what a cost, estimated by the misery and degradation of its own countless kith and kin ! Presented in another form, what the doctrine of the *Ātman* boils down to, is this—

"Brahma is all : every other man, every creature, nay, every objective thing, whether vegetal or inorganic, is simply *I* under conditions other than those familiarly associated with myself : and I am Brahma !"

So stated, of course, the doctrine *obviously proclaims that all men are essentially equal !* But this was an idea that *Historical Brāhmanism* could never possibly permit to spread, or even to arise. It was therefore suppressed. Not only so : unhesitatingly and unscrupulously, it was eventually actually *inverted !* Furthermore, the right of the Brāhman alone to say : "Aham Brahma asmi !" —and that not in the true old Kshatriyan spirit, but in the inverted and perverted sense that crept in with the rise and establishment of *Historical Brāhmanism* and *Caste*—was

bājāo'd throughout the length and breadth of Bhārata-Varsha.

The significance of the Brāhmanistic doctrine of "the nothingness of this Earthly life and its tangled sordid affairs," lies, of course, exclusively in its application. As preached to the simple non-Brāhman "Worldling," the text is a glorious one—when the object is to exalt the "Unworldly," *i.e.*, the Brāhman, at the "Worldling's" expense. We can now glimpse the spirit in which emphasis was laid on the saying: "Aham Brahma asmi!" May we not imagine the interpretation proceeding somewhat on these lines? The Brāhman—and he alone—is "the All." His concern—his peculiar, nay, his exclusive, concern—is with the "Substantial World," the "Realm of Substance." Why, then, should he not *possess* the "Substance?" Is it not his right? In the name of wonder, logic, and everything else, why should he not *have* "All"—at any rate the best, or at least as much of it as he can manage to extract from a doped and adoring humanity? "Property, rank, precedence, power—everything that is of the 'World'—they are naught—resign them!" "To whom?" asks the Worldling. "To Brahma!" replies the Brāhman. "And 'Aham Brahma asmi!'" My point is this. Here we see how *Historical Brāhmanism* originated; who the ethnos really was that originated it; what it stood for; and the uses to which it in fact put its knowledge and power. Just as the Kūrūs were not Āryas, but the old-time Kāssi-descended Dasyūs transmogrified, so the spirit which animated *Historical Brāhmanism* and its heartless offspring *Caste*, was not the Āryan spirit. Nor was the Culture of Madhyā-deśa Āryan Culture. Wherever Āryanism proper was or is to be found, it was never in so-called "Āryavarta": and the expression "Indo-Āryans," or "Indo-Āryas," as popularly applied to certain of the inhabitants of modern India,

and especially to such of them as can trace, or think they can trace, their ethnic descent to a Madhyā-deśan source, is absolutely meaningless.

But, as already emphasized in a previous paper, with the evolution and establishment of *Historical Brāhmanism* and *Caste*, and all that they have to answer for, Bengal had nothing whatever to do. In that connection her hands are unsullied—her conscience clear. Too long, however, has she revelled in the illusion that her greatness lies in her past, as supposedly bound up with Āryanism and a fanciedly Āryan Madhyā-deśa. It does not. It subsists in *her own True-Self*, and in the unimaginably splendid future that awaits her—in virtue, no doubt, of the present nature of that True-Self, but only as and when she *finds* it, and *realizes* it.

The Revenue Policy of Shivaji

BY

SURENDRA NATH SEN, M.A.

Ranade was not the only scholar to point out that
Shivaji's liberal revenue system. "Like the first Napoleon, Shivaji in his time was a great organiser and a builder of civil institutions."¹ Scott Waring, writing in the first decade of the 19th Century, observes "while Shivaji carried on his predatory warfare, he was not inattentive to the growing interest of the state. The lands in the Konkan were secured and defended."² That was not all. The lands were secured and defended and suitable measures were taken for the extension of cultivation and improvement of agriculture. Jervis tells us that according to the popular traditions, Shivaji's subjects enjoyed plenty though not peace. "In the midst of all this confusion, warfare and general disloyalty, the state of the revenue and population is said to have prospered."³ The reason is not hard to find out. Shivaji introduced a flexible system that long survived the overthrow of his dynasty, and as Mr. Pringle Kennedy says—"The peasant knew what he had to pay and he seems to have been able to pay this without any great oppression."⁴

¹ Ranade, R. M. P., p. 115.

² Scott Waring—History of the Mahrattas, pp. 96-97.

³ Jervis, p. 93.

⁴ Kennedy—History of the Great Moghuls, p. 125.

Shivaji adopted Malik
Ambar's system.

It is certainly very creditable of the great Mahratta soldier that his subjects should enjoy plenty, when the country was harried and plundered by the ruthless Moghul soldiery and should multiply, though a devastating war was scattering death on all sides. But all that Shivaji had to do was to follow in the footsteps of another great man. It is true that Shivaji cannot claim originality. But originality is not an indispensable factor in statesmanship. All that is expected from a statesman is that he should discern the needs of his time and adopt suitable means to meet them. Whether these measures are his own, does not matter. Sir Robert Peel simply accepted the ideas of his political opponents when he abolished the Corn Laws, but that does not affect, in the least, his reputation as a statesman. Akbar, one of the greatest of Indian rulers, frequently revived the long-forgotten measures of some of his less known predecessors and with what effect is known to us all. Shivaji also had the keen discernment of a statesman and he could appreciate the good points as he was fully aware of the defects of the existing government. He found that Malik Ambar's revenue system with a few slight modifications would suit his country best, and he revived the system without any hesitation.¹

What Todar Mul did for the north, Malik Ambar did for the south. The great foreigner who had served his adopted country so well, had to work almost under the same circumstances as Shivaji. While defending his master's tottering kingdom against the Moghul onslaughts, the great Abyssynian had to organise its exhausted resources. He worked with an open mind and adopted the revenue

Malik Ambar's System.

¹ Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Volume.

Shivaji made no secret of it. See Rajwade, M.I.S., Vol. XXVII, p. 33.

system of his own enemies. On the eve of its fall, the Nizamshahi kingdom saw a set of excellent regulations, but there was no one after Malik Ambar to work them out. Like Todar Mul, he divided the arable lands into four separate classes according to fertility, ascertained their produce, roughly it is true, and fixed the assessment once for all. He, however, did not want the peasants to pay in kind. While a fixed permanent assessment was made a commutation or money price was also fixed for ever. Malik Ambar can, therefore, be justly called the Cornwallis of Southern India. After fixing a money rent, Malik turned his attention to the collecting agency. With one stroke of his pen, he did away with the intermediate revenue agency which had been gradually assuming the character of a farming system. He then made the Patil and other revenue officers hereditary, but at the same time made them responsible for the full realisation of Government dues.¹ Such in short was Malik Ambar's revenue system, and as some of Shahaji's *jagirs* had previously formed part of the Nizamshahi dominions, the people there were not unfamiliar with it. Nor was there any lack of officials who had seen it in its actual working. Dadaji Konddev, when he reclaimed the waste lands of his master's *jagirs*, did nothing but revive the wise regulations of the great Abyssynian.²

But Shivaji was no blind imitator. He was, if anything, a lover of strict method. And Shivaji did not blindly imitate. Malik Ambar's system in certain respects lacked it. While, therefore, accepting its principles, Shivaji did not commit himself to all its details. Malik Ambar had not carefully surveyed the lands, and the survey-work was fraught with many difficulties more or less serious. There were different

¹ See Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Volume, and Jervis, pp. 66-68.

² Bombay Gazetteer—Poona Volume.

standards and units of measurement and Shivaji had first to find out a standard unit before he could order a systematic survey.¹ Then again, accurate measurement was impossible with a rope. The length of a rope was liable to slight variations in different seasons. So the measuring rope had to be rejected. Some Mahomedan rulers had substituted the rope by "*tenab*" or measuring chain. But Shivaji replaced it by a *kathi* or measuring rod.² The *kathi* was to be five cubits and five fists (*muthis*) in length. The length of the regulation rod was fixed in *tansus* also. Twenty rods square made a *bigha* and one hundred and twenty *bighas* a *chavar*. The unit of measurement being thus fixed, Shivaji ordered a survey settlement,³ and the work of surveying Konkan was entrusted to no less an officer than the celebrated Annaji Datto, Shivaji's Sachiv.

-It can be safely asserted that the survey work was done with the utmost care; Annaji Datto, Annaji Datto's Survey, for example, refused to rely on irresponsible Government officials, whose lack of local knowledge and necessary energy disqualified them for the work. He, therefore, issued a circular letter to village officers urging them to undertake this important work with the co-operation of some of their co-villagers, whose interests were directly involved. A copy of this old circular letter

¹ See Sabhasad, p. 32.

² Jervis enumerates the following—The gocharma oxhide of land, the moora, the karika, and so forth, that is lands requiring a khundee, moora, mun, karika and so forth of seed to sow them, by which rule the produce was estimated and the Government share fixed. Jervis, pp. 36-37.

³ Whether a map also was prepared, we do not know. Everything depends on the interpretation of मुलखाची जमीन मोजणी करून धुरंग जाड चावर करून आकार केला (Sabhasad, p. 32). The word धुरंग is unintelligible and Rao Bahadur Sane gives us दुरंगजाड as an alternative reading. If we accept this second reading the sentence may mean that a thick bicolour map was drawn up. But in those days paper was so scarce that it does not seem possible. I have no knowledge of any map or chart of Shivaji's time coming down to us.

has come down to us, and has been deciphered and published by Mr. V. K. Rajwade. As this is the only documentary evidence of the manner in which the bighaoni survey of Konkan was conducted by Annaji, I think it will not be out of place to quote the document here in full:—

A Kaulnama from Rajshri Annaji Datto to the Desmukh, and Deshkulkarni and Mokdam, Patil, and Rayas of Tarf Rohidkhore in the Subha of Maval, dated Surusan Tisa Sabain Alaf. (1678) You came to the presence at camp Lakhevadi and (represented) that in the *vatani* districts of His Majesty, the rayats should be encouraged by the confirmation of their Kauls and fixing the rent of the lands. Having confidence, * * * and taking into consideration the remissions made, we grant the following terms for the land. From the year San Saman (it is the practice to realise) half the produce, from the last year the lands were remeasured according to the bighaoni system and the rent was levied and it was settled that of the lands * * * * the inspection (*pahani*) of what places had one year been made, and the revision completed, and a plot, originally a first-class land, had (now) deteriorated, then * * * such a settlement was not made after an understanding with the rayats. Therefore you petitioned that a settlement should be made (about the rent). Thereupon the following agreement is made that in the present year * * * * was almost over, and the last one month only remained * * *. The agreement about the rent of San Sabaina * * * (produce) should be estimated—such was the agreement made. If some Brahman or Prabhu Karkuns are appointed for this work, then what will those lethargic people do? Into how many blocks are village-lands divided, what are the crops grown in the village, what rent should be realised, what (do those) poor men (know about that?) * * *.

Therefore, as you are the responsible officers of the district (this work has been) * * * thrown upon you. Therefore, you should from to-day * * * perform the survey work of your district. For this work, the Desmukh and the Deshkulkarni and the Mokdams and officers * * * accompanied by a few rayats, should, with one accord, go from village to village, and ascertain that the produce of such a village is so much, the land (in it) * * * so much. Of the (arable) land the first, second, and third class plots * * * are so many. After carefully ascertaining (these things) and making an estimate of the crops grown, you should, after a proper enquiry, find out what may be the probable produce if (more) labour is applied, and put that amount (under that class of) lands * * *. You should make your estimate after examining (proper) evidence in the following manner—that at a certain place Malik Ambar's (estimated) produce—was so much, of that the autumnal or the first harvest of the first, second, third, and the fourth class lands is so much, of the second or the vernal crop so much. After determining the (produce of) the two harvests, you should state that in so many bighas are such and such crops (cultivated). After making these entries (under the heading) of each particular village, if there are a few peasants * * * then according to the above order, you should make an estimate of the whole Tarf, whether in land revenue or village dues, and to do this work, time of a year from to-day, has been given to you. You must in the meantime, inspect the whole Tarf, village by village, field to field and carefully ascertain their yield and write to me. I shall (thereafter) come and inspect three villages of three (different) sorts in your Tarf one * * * hilly, one marshy and one with black soil * * * and the villages near their boundary having been inspected according

to the practice of the Karkuns * * * having corrected (and) (comparing that ?) * * * your total and what may be the produce of one village * * * and making it ready according to that * * * if the total under each item becomes $1\frac{1}{4}$, $1\frac{1}{2}$ or double as much, then in that way. * * * $1\frac{1}{2}$, $1\frac{1}{4}$, and double * * * having been proved correct and you are to (realise accordingly) * * * should do if * * * do so then * * * it will be all right if it tallies * * * settlement * * * settlement to be made * * * agree * * * (agreement) to this effect has been made * * * we are agreeable * * * the cultivation of the district * * * Give such an assurance * * * from the huzur.¹

It is a pity that time has not left this document intact and the rotten and torn borders of the paper with the indistinct letters have made it impossible for Mr. Rajwade to decipher all the words. Many gaps have yet to be filled up mainly by conjecture. But it appears from what has been read that the estimate of these village officers was not accepted without a proper examination. Annaji Datto himself revised their work. In every district, he visited at least one village of each description, estimated its yield and then compared with the figure submitted by the village worthies. It was the interest of these villagers not to over-estimate the possible revenue, consequently the king alone was the only losing party, if any error, in these estimates, remained undetected.

It is to be noted that this circular letter was issued in 1678 only two years before Shivaji's death. It is, therefore, clear that this survey settlement could not be finished in his life-time and had, in all probability, commenced late in his reign. Before discussing the principle of the

This Settlement made late in Shivaji's reign.

assessment made on this occasion we should try to find out what taxes, cesses, and extra duties (or abwabs) an ordinary peasant was expected to pay in the earlier days of Shivaji and before him.

We have however no ready-made list of these taxes and cesses like the one enumerating the
 Taxes enumerated. cesses and duties of the Peshwa period that Elphinstone gives us. We can, however, frame a fairly complete list for the Pre-peshwa period also, from the Sanads or grant deeds published in Mr. V. K. Rajwade's Marathyantha Itihasanchi Sadhanen, Mawji and Parasnis's Sanads and Letters and the Transactions of the Bharat Itihas Sansodhak Mandal. No less than fifty taxes and abwabs and cesses have been found in these papers. They were—

1. Beth Begari—(forced labour).
2. Farmaysi—A tax first levied by the Moghul officers.
 It was generally levied for purchasing local products, ordered by the Emperor.
3. Belekati—Perhaps an abwab levied on the stone-workers.
4. Payposi—Cannot be positively identified; probably a tax paid in kind by the shoe-makers. The shoemakers claimed the special right of paying their dues in kind.¹
5. Mejbani—Literally dinner tax.
6. Mohimpati—Expedition cess—a similar tax is mentioned by Kautilya.
7. Kharchapati.
8. Telpati—Oilcess—perhaps levied for illumination on festive occasions.
9. Tup—A tax in kind perhaps levied on manufactures of ghee.
10. Faski—A toll levied on green vegetable-seller.
11. Sadilvar.

¹ Rajwa—M. I. S., Vol. XX, p. 112.

12. Tutpati.
13. Id Subrati—Jervis thinks, it was a tax paid in kind by oilmen for illumination on the occasion of Id.
14. Ranbheri.
15. Ut—A cess levied on transport camels.
16. Ambe—A tax levied on the produce of mango-trees.
17. Karujati.
18. Hejib—literally means, an envoy. It is however not clear whether this extra cess was levied for entertaining foreign envoys or for meeting the expenses of sending an embassy to a foreign court.
19. Pathevari—Is it Patwari—tax levied for village officers?
20. Ashvajakati—Tax on transport horses? or duty on sale of horse?
21. Setsara—Tax on arable land.
22. Barhad Taka.
23. Sel Bail—A duty on transport cattle
24. Jangampati—A Jangam is a Lingayet. Jangampati was a tax levied on the Lingayets.
25. Peskasi—Same as the Paishkush of the Moghul period.
26. Pati Sike Humayun—Sike is a seal. This tax must be analogous to Bat Chatapai of the Peshwa period.
27. Kar-i-Humayun—Tax imposed for celebrating the royal birth-day.
28. Thane Bhet.
29. Dasrapati.
30. Huzur Bhet.
31. Helpati.
32. Ahisthan.

33. Virahisthan.
34. Mohtarfa—A tax on shop-keepers. Many cesses, however, fall under this general heading.
35. Thaljakati—Custom duties imposed on commodities while in transit through land.
36. Palbhara—May be an impost on green vegetables.
37. Ulphapati—A religious cess.
38. Bakrid.
39. Sardeshmukhpati—Same as Sardeshmukhi.
40. Mushahira—Same as Rasad of the Moghul rulers.
41. Ganykhandi.
42. Dani—A tax in grain.
43. Pasodi—A piece of blanket exacted from every Dhangar who manufactured it.
44. Teji Bhati.
45. Jhad Jhadoda—A cess in kind levied on the fruits of village trees: generally collected at the rate of one per hundred mangoes or tamarinds.
46. Bargujar.
47. Inampati—An occasional tax imposed in times of exigency on Inamdars.
48. Akhduldivani.
49. Kar Imarati—A tax to meet building expenses.
50. Vihir Huda—An extra tax on lands watered from wells.

Mention is made of another abwab Sinhasanpati or coronation tax levied at the time of Shivaji's coronation.¹ Most of these taxes do not appear in Elphinstone's list and had been abolished by Shivaji or his successors.

Annaji Datto at first fixed the rent at 33 per cent. of the gross produce.² But Shivaji afterwards wanted a consolidated rent of 40 per cent. when all the taxes and extra cesses had been

Rent.

¹ Rajwade, M. I. S., XVI, p. 12.

² Jervis, p. 94.

abolished. Neither Tagai, nor the Istava principle was unknown in his time. The latter system can be traced even to the days of Kulluka Bhatta¹ and the former was very common under the Moghul government. "Cattle should be given to the new rayats that may come. Grain and money for (buying) seeds should be given. Grain and money should be given for their maintenance and the same should be realised in two or three years according to the means of (the debtor)."² In this way, says Sabhasad, new settlers were encouraged to come and settle in Shivaji's dominions. We know how easy terms were offered by the Peshwas inviting immigrants specially for encouraging new industries and for founding a new market town. Rent free land was granted for the latter purpose by Shivaji's minister Moro Pant.³ It is also certain that though extra cesses had been abolished, the custom duties were retained. No one could travel without a passport from a competent authority and Fryer mentions a customs officer stationed at Kalyan.⁴

We know, from many published documents, how much the peasant had to pay for each bigha he cultivated, during the Peshwa period. No such document of Shivaji's time has, however, come down to us. Major Jervis, has quoted exact figures, in his work on Konkan, but from what sources we do not know. It will not, however, be improper to quote these figures here, and the reader may accept them for what they are worth. Says Jervis—"It is commonly

The actual Rent.

¹ Jervis, p. 23.

² Sabhasad, p. 32.

³ Rajwade, M.I.S., Vol. XV, p. 98.

⁴ Till on the right, within a mile or more of Gullean they yield possession to the neighbouring Sevagi, at which city (the key this way into that rebel's country). Wind and tide favouring us, we landed at about nine in the morning, and were civilly treated by the customer in his Choultry, till the Havaladar could be acquainted of my arrival. Fryer, p. 123.

believed indeed that (Shivaji) he measured and classified all the lands and then ascertained the amount of their produce from one or two villages from each muhal of the Auchil-garh, Rajpooree, Rygurb, Soowurndroog, Unjunvel, Ratnagiri, Veejydroog Districts, for three successive years, from which data he established the rates, half in kind, half at a fixed commutation rate differing in each Taluka, to be paid by the Beegah of each sort of land. The classification of the ricelands, mule or d hemp, under 12 heads ; the four first still retaining their former well known distinctions. Uwal, first and the best sort ; Doom or Dooyom second sort ; Seem, third sort ; Charoom or Charseem fourth sort. The first was assessed at $12\frac{1}{2}$ mans, the second at 10, the third at 8, the fourth at $6\frac{1}{4}$ mans * * * * . The remaining eight descriptions of land went by the following names, discriminating their respective qualities, and were assessed at the annexed rates :—1st Raupal, on which small stunted brushwood grows ; 2nd Khurwut, land in the neighbourhood of sea or rivers, sometimes called salt bhatti lands ; 3rd Bawul, rocky soil ; 4th Khuree stony soil ; 5th Kureyat or toorwat, land cultivated with pulse, hemp, etc. ; 6th Manut lands with roots of large trees still uncleared, as near Indapur and Goregaon.

| | | | |
|---------------------|-----|----------------|--------------------|
| Raupal | ... | 8 | maunds per Beegah. |
| Kharwut | ... | $7\frac{1}{2}$ | " " " |
| Bawul | ... | $6\frac{1}{4}$ | " " " |
| Khuree | ... | $6\frac{1}{4}$ | " " " |
| Kureyat 1st sort | ... | $6\frac{1}{4}$ | " " " |
| Rutoo | ... | 5 | " " " |
| Toorwat or Kathanee | ... | 5 | " " " |
| Manut | ... | 5 | " " " |

Subsequently the wretched cultivators planted small spots on the most rocky eminences, wherever a little water lodged, and the least position of soil favoured the

growth of rice ; this is frequent about Unjanvel and Ratnagiri Talooks and have been classed under two heads both called the Sirwat, the former assessed at $3\frac{3}{4}$ maunds, the latter the half of that ; the produce of the first kind, would be about 16 bushels per Beegah.”¹

Vajat jamin or uncultivable waste lands were generally excluded when a village was assessed.² But

as cultivation progressed and spread
Special rates for special cultivation. with the progress of agriculture and

there was a great demand for arable lands, hilly tracts and waste lands of all descriptions were generally brought under the plough. At first, they were exempt from assessment, but ultimately these were also taxed at a moderate scale. Jervis says that these Wurkus or Dongur lands were assessed by the Hul, Nangur, or plough, and not by the bigha. In some instances, however, six or seven bighas of such lands were counted as one for revenue purposes. The rent of such lands varied not only with their fertility, but also with the nature of the crops raised. Major Jervis gives us the following scale—

“ Nachnee was assessed at $3\frac{3}{4}$ maunds per Nungar in superior soil and 3 maunds in inferior soil.

Wuree at 3 maunds and $2\frac{1}{2}$ maunds. Hureek at 3 maunds.

Other kinds of inferior produce at $1\frac{1}{4}$ maunds.”

Besides the principal harvest, the peasants often raised a second crop on the first class lands. These second crops were also assessed at a special rate according to their nature and deteriorating effect on the land. Jervis gives the following scale.

Turmeric—five maunds per bigha, each bigha being $\frac{3}{4}$ (ths of) the actual measurement.

¹ For these figures see Jervis, pp. 94-97.

² Rajwade, M.I.S., XX, p. 94.

Hemp—five maunds per bigha, each bigha being $\frac{5}{4}$ actual measurement. Sugarcane cultivation assessed from $6\frac{1}{4}$ maunds to $3\frac{1}{8}$ of raw sugar per bigha.¹

We have seen elsewhere how special consideration was made by the Peshwa Government for such costly plantations as those of sugarcane, cocoanut and betelnut. The planter had to wait long for any profit and so did the Government. This was however a common practice in the Deccan, and we may expect that a similar principle existed in Shivaji's time also.

The provinces under Shivaji's rule were styled Swarajya in contradistinction with Muglai or provinces under other (generally under Mahomedan) rulers. The Swarajya for revenue purpose was divided into a number of Prants consisting of two or more districts. There were in all 15 Prants under Shivaji's Government according to Ranade.² These were—

Revenue Divisions.

1. Prant Maval
2. Wai
3. Satara
4. Karad
5. Panhala
6. South Konkan
7. Thana
8. Trimbak
9. Baglan
10. Wanagad.
11. Bednore.
12. Kolhar.
13. Shrirangapatam.
14. Karnatick.

¹ Jervis, pp. 94-97.

² Ranade, R.P.M., pp. 117-118.

15. Vellore.

16. Tanjore.

But we get a bigger number in a Jabta¹ drawn in the earlier years of Chhatrapati Shahu. The document written partly in Persian and partly in Marathi is supposed to be in the handwriting of Shankarji Malhar. It gives the boundary and the divisions of the Swarajya as understood in Shahu's time. The following are the Prants enumerated in Shahu's Jabita Swarajya :—

1. Subha Ramnagar including Ghanderi.
2. Subha Jawher Prant.
3. Subha Prant Bhibandi (12 Talukas)
4. Subha Kalyan (20 Talukas)
5. Cheul Subha (6 Talukas)
6. Subha Rajpuri (12 Talukas)
7. Subha Javli (18 Talukas)
8. Subha Dabhol (11 Talukas)
9. Subha Rajapoor (18 Talukas)
10. Subha Kudal (15 Talukas)
11. Subha Prant Bhimgad (5 Talukas)
12. Subha Prant Akole (5 Talukas)
13. Subha Poona (6 Talukas)
14. Supe Baramati.
15. Indapur.
16. Subha Prant Mawal (13 Talukas)
17. Subha Prant Wai (4 Talukas)
18. Subha Prant Satara (6 Talukas)
19. Subha Prant Karhad (9 Talukas)
20. Subha Prant Khatao including Kasba Khatao
(11 Talukas)
21. Subha Prant Man (4 Talukas)
22. Subha Prant Phaltan Mahal.
23. Subha Prant Belgaum.

¹ Mawji—Jabita Swarajya—J. B. Br. R. A. S., Vol. XXII, p. 30.

24. Subha Samp gaon.
25. Subha Gadag.
26. Subha Laxmeshwar.
27. Subha Nawal ghund.
28. Subha Kopal.
29. Subha Halyal.
30. Subha Betgiri.
31. Subha Malkapur (4 Talukas)
32. Subha Prant Panhala (10 Talukas)
33. Subha Tarle (5 Talukas)
34. Subha Ajera (51 Parganas)
35. Subha Prant Junnar (24 Talukas)

Some of these may be later additions, but this list, we think, fairly represent the divisions of Shivaji's kingdom. Shambhaji had no mind to improve the administration and Rajaram had no leisure. It is not, therefore, probable that many changes had been made in the revenue divisions of the kingdom before the accession of Chhatrapati Shahu.

Shivaji had done away with the agency of such old hereditary officers as the Patil and the Kulkarni in the village and the Desmukh and the Deshpande in the district. They were left in enjoyment of their old dues, but the work of revenue collection was entrusted to new officers directly appointed by the King. The country had been divided by the Mahomedan Government for revenue purposes into Mouja, Pargana, Sarkar and Subhas; Shivaji abolished or to be more accurate, modified these divisions. In his time, the country was divided into Moujas, Tarfs, and Prants. The officer in charge of a Tarf was styled as Havaladar, Karkun or in some rare instances Paripatyagar. It is interesting to note that in old Hindu inscriptions we often come

Revenue Officers.

across an officer styled Danda Nayak or Dandanath¹ who was, perhaps, as his designation implies, the predecessor of the Marhatta Paripatyagar. The officer in charge of a Prant was variously designated as Shubhedar, Karkun or Mukhya-deshadhlkari. Over several Prants was sometimes placed an officer, called Sarsubhedar to supervise the work of the Subhedars. These officers like the Kamavisdars and the Mamlatdars of the Peshwa period had to look after all branches of the administration. The Subhedar's staff consisted of the usual compliment of eight officers, *viz.* :—

1. The Dewan.
2. The Mazumdar.
3. The Fadnis.
4. The Sabnis.
5. The Karkhanis.
6. The Chitnis.
7. The Jamdar ; and
8. The Potnis.

The Subhedar usually had an annual salary of 400 *Hons* a year, with a palanquin allowance of another four hundred, while his Majumdar's pay varied from one hundred to one hundred and twenty-five *Hons* a year. The Majumdar also enjoyed the proud privilege of carrying a sunshade² on public occasions, and a small allowance was sanctioned by the Government for its upkeep. A Havaldar in charge of a small village had often to be contented with a paltry allowance of three to five *Hons* only a year.

The Kamavisdar and the Mamlatdar under the Peshwa regime, though appointed for a short term, were generally allowed

District and provincial officers often transferred.

¹ Ep. Ind., Vol. III, p. 37.

² Abdagir.

to retain their office for life, and frequently to transmit it to their heirs. No public office was hereditary under Shivaji's administration, and like the Magistrates and Commissioners of British India, his Karkuns, Havaldars, and Subhedars were as a rule transferred from District to District and Province to Province. It can be clearly proved by a list of officers carefully compiled by Mr. Bhashkar Vaman Bhat from the official letters and documents published in the 15th, 16th, 17th, 18th, and the 20th volumes of Mr. Rajwade's *Marathyaneha Itihasanci Sadhanen*.¹ In Mr. Bhat's list, we find that the following officers were in charge of the several districts for the years marked against their names :—

HAVALDAR.

Nimb (Pargana)

Yesaji Ram ... 1676 A.D.

HAVELI.

Anaji Kanho ... 1676 A.D.

KOREGAUV.

Bhimaji Malhar ... 1676 A.D.

TARE SATARA.

Kukaji Bayaji ... 1675 A.D.

Mahadaji Anant ... 1676 A.D.

Tukaji Prabhu ... 1677 A.D.

It is a pity that we are not in possession of a complete list of Havaldars, and we do not know whether in other

¹ *Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal, Tritiya Sammelan Vritta*, pp. 128-131.

districts also, officers were changed so often as in Satara. Our information about the Subhedars and the Sar-subhedars is, however, more satisfactory and the working of the principle of short term appointment and constant transfer can be very conveniently proved by the following instances from Mr. Bhat's list:—

SUBHEDARS.

WAI PRANT.

| | | |
|---------------------|-----|-----------|
| Yesaji Malhar ... | ... | 1676 A.D. |
| Do. ... | ... | 1679 A.D. |
| Do. ... | ... | 1687 A.D. |
| Do. ... | ... | 1690 A.D. |
| Do. ... | ... | 1696 A.D. |
| Annaji Janardan ... | ... | 1697 A.D. |

JAWLI.

| | | |
|--------------------|-----|-----------|
| Viroram ... | ... | 1664 A.D. |
| Viththal Datto ... | ... | 1671 A.D. |
| Do. ... | ... | 1672 A.D. |
| Ambaji Morden ... | ... | 1676 A.D. |
| Gopal Rayaji ... | ... | 1677 A.D. |
| Kasi Rangnath ... | ... | 1680 A.D. |

PRANT KOL.

| | | |
|-------------------|-----|-----------|
| Ganesh Jogdev ... | ... | 1672 A.D. |
| Venkaji Rudra... | ... | 1677 A.D. |

PRANT PUNA.

| | | |
|--------------------|-----|-----------|
| Tryambak Gopal ... | ... | 1679 A.D. |
| Vinayak Umaji ... | ... | 1681 A.D. |

It is also certain that this principle survived Shivaji and continued down to the Peshwa period.

The principle survived Shivaji.

In support of this view Mr. Bhat has produced the following list of Mudradharis or officers in charge of the Sajjangad fort:—

| | | |
|---------------|-----|---|
| 1676 A.D. ... | ... | Jijoji Katkar. |
| 1682 A.D. ... | ... | Do. |
| 1689 A.D. ... | ... | Makaji Katkar. |
| 1692 A.D. ... | ... | Barhanji Mohite. |
| 1699 A.D. ... | ... | Do. |
| 1708 A.D. ... | ... | Girjoji Bhonsle. |
| 1709 A.D. ... | ... | Do. |
| 1709 A.D. ... | ... | From the 11th Falgun Yesaji Jadhava. |
| 1712 A.D. ... | ... | Satbaji Dabal. |

Mr. Bhat further points out that Ambaji Morden who was Subhedar of Jawli in 1676, occupied the office of the Subhedar of Satara from 1683-1685. Madhaji Shamraj, Subhedar of Jawli from 1706-1708 was formerly in charge of Prant Satara and Mawal.

From the multiplicity of their duties, these officers were liable to corruption. Public opinion, in those days, was not offended if a Havaldar went out of his way to take a small present from a traveller for granting his passport or from an aggrieved petitioner for redressing his grievance. Dr. Fryer, who visited the Mahratta dominions towards the close of Shivaji's career, has left a quaint account of such an occasion—"When I came before the Governor," says the Doctor,¹ "I found him in state though under an Hovel where were many Brachmins with Accompt Books, writing at some distance, near his Privy council, with whom he seemed to advise. I was placed on his left

¹ Fryer, p. 127.

districts taken by him from Bijapur, which had been under the management of farmers and direct agents of government, probably experienced great benefit by the change.

Besides land revenue and custom duties, a small income was derived from mints. The
Licensed Mints. Peshwas did not permit free coining, but the goldsmiths usually obtained license for mints under certain restrictions that must have been the practice in the Pre-peshwa period also. Shivaji never tried to control the currency and plainly told the English ambassador, that "he forbids not the passing of any manner of coins, nor on the other side can he force his subjects to be losers; but if their coin be as fine an alloy and as weighty as the Moghuls and other princes he will not prohibit.¹ The result was that all sorts of foreign coins were current in Shivaji's kingdom and even in his own treasury could be found few or no coin of the Rayagad mint. Sabhasad says² that Shivaji had no less than 400,000 of Shivarai Hons at the time of his death, but these Shivarai Hons were in all probability of Vijayanagar origin, for only 2 or 3 Shivaji Hons have yet been discovered. Sabhasad enumerates no less than 32 different kinds of gold coins and 6 different kinds of silver coins while giving an account of Shivaji's treasures. These were—

GOLD COINS.

- (1) Gambar.
- (2) Mohar.
- (3) Putli.
- (4) Padshahi Hon.
- (5) Satlamis or Satramis.

¹ Fryer.

² Sabhasad, p. 95.

- (6) Ibhrami.
- (7) Shivarai Hon.
- (8) Kaveripak.
- (9) Sangari Hon.
- (10) Achyutrai Hon.
- (11) Devrai Hon.
- (12) Ramchandrarai Hon.
- (13) Guti Hon.
- (14) Dharwari Hon.
- (15) Falam (Fanam)
- (16) Pralkhati Hon.
- (17) Pav Naiki Hon.
- (18) Adwani Hon.
- (19) Jadmal Hon.
- (20) Tadpatri Hon.
- (21) Afraji Hon.
- (22) Tribulari Hon.
- (23) Trisuli Hon.
- (24) Chandavari (Tanjori) Hon.
- (25) Bildhari Hon.
- (26) Ulaphkari Hon.
- (27) Mahamad Shai Hon.
- (28) Veluri Hon.
- (29) Katerai Hon.
- (30) Devajvali Hon.
- (31) Ramnathpuri Hon.
- (32) Kungoti Hon.

SILVER COINS.

- (1) Rupees.
- (2) Asrafi.
- (3) Abashis.
- (4) Dabholi Kabri.
- (5) Chouli Kabri.
- (6) Bassora Kabri.

Some of these coins were of non-Indian origin, 'bhrami for instance, came from distant Irak.'

Shivaji had his mint at Rayagad. But his first coins were not probably issued before 1774.

Shivaji's Mint. A large number of copper coins were issued and no less than 25,000 of these were collected and examined by Rev. Mr. Abbott.² But very few gold and silver coins of Shivaji are known to-day probably because they were never struck in large number.

Shivaji had no good mechanic for working the mint.

The irregular shape of the coins and misshapen alphabets of the legends show the crude method of their manufacture. The writer of the Bom-

Crude method in the work of the Mint.

bay Gazetteer (Nasik volume) gives the following account of the working of the Chandor mint, closed in 1830—"A certain quantity of silver of the required test was handed over to each man who divided it into small pieces, rounded and weighed them, greater care being taken that the weights should be accurate than that size should be uniform. For this purpose scales and weights were given to each of the 400 work-men, and the manager examined them every week. When the work-men were satisfied with the weight of the piece, they were forwarded to the manager who sent them to be stamped. In stamping the Rupee an instrument like an anvil was used. It had a hole in the middle with letters inscribed on it by a work-man called batekari, and a third man gave a blow with a six pound hammer. Three men were able to strike 2,000 pieces an hour, or 20,000 in a working day of ten hours. As the seal was a little larger than the piece, all letters were seldom inscribed."³ The Chandor mint was opened

¹ Fryer, p. 210.

² J. B. B. of A. S., XX, p. 109.

³ Bombay Gazetteer, Nasik Volume, p. 429.

long after Shivaji's demise. But that the description holds good with respect to Shivaji's mint also, can be proved by a simple examination of Shivarai coins. The small Shivarai Hon in the museum of the Bharat Itihas Sanshodak Mandal, for example, lacks the compound letter "tra" (त्र) in the word Chhatrapati evidently because the circular piece had originally been hammered on a seal of much larger size.¹

The goldsmiths in charge of the mint could evidently boast of very little learning. In the copper coins only we find no less than eight different spellings of the word Shri Raja Shiva Chhatrapati. The Rev. Mr. Abbott gives the following eight variations in the spelling of this word on Shivarai pice:—

| | |
|--------------------|------------|
| 1. Ob. श्रीराजाशिव | R. छत्रपति |
| 2. „ श्रीराजाशिव | „ छत्रपती |
| 3. „ श्रीराजाशोव | „ छत्रपति |
| 4. „ श्रीराजाशौव | „ छत्रपती |
| 5. „ श्रीराजासिव | „ छत्रपति |
| 6. „ श्रीराजासिवा | „ छत्रपती |
| 7. „ श्रीराजासोव | „ छत्रपति |
| 8. „ श्रीराजासौव | „ छत्रपती |

The small Shivarai Hon of the Bharat Itihas Sanshodhak Mandal's museum has on the obverse the figures of Shiva and Bhavani seated side by side, and on the reverse the name of Shivaji inscribed in the following manner:—

श्री व
रा (modi) ज छ (त्र)
पती

Through the kindness of Mr. D. V. Potdar, the Joint Secretary of the B. I. S. Mandal, I obtained an opportunity of examining this really rare coin, but it had already

¹ Pancham Sammelan Vritta, p. 121.

hand, and desired my interpreter to acquaint him my errand, withal intreating his favour for my secure passing the Hill; he made it a piece of difficulty and told me I must return to Bimly for orders, to whose Havaldar he was accountable; not to him of Gulleon, which was within half a day's journey from whence I set forth. Hearing this I bore myself as sedately as I could, having been informed of the advantage they take of a disturbed countenance; and sweetened him with his own authority being sufficient, telling him of his master's kindness to the English, and their friendship towards him, which worked him to an yielding temper; yet he scrupled, my canister, or Trunk, might be lined with pearl, my horse sold to the enemy, hoping to suck somewhat out of me; I replying what I had brought were at his liberty to search, and that I went only on an amicable account to (cure a) sick person, and should be as ready to serve him if required, his fury was quite pawled; but perceiving an hungry look to hang on them all, and suspecting lest they should serve me some dogtrick, I made a small present, and signing the pass, dismissed me with a bundle of Pawn, the usual ceremony at parting." The hungry look and the weakness for presents are, perhaps, pardonable, but another charge that the English Doctor brought against Shivaji's revenue officers is too serious to be overlooked.

Public officers in the 17th century whether Asiatic or European were not overscrupulous. But
Corruption and
Tyranny. good kings, as a rule, kept a vigilance over them. Shivaji in particular was served by a very efficient Intelligence department. It is an old practice in India to employ spies to watch over the conduct of government servants.¹ The work of the

¹ Vide Kautilya's Artha Shastra, translated by R. Shama Shastry.

district and provincial officers was supervised by Pant Amatya and Pant Sachiv. Ranade tells us that "The District accounts had to be sent to these officers, and were there collected together, and irregularities detected and punished. These officers had power to depute men on their establishments to supervise the working of the District officers."¹ Shivaji, moreover, was very keen about the success of his government and wanted that his administration should compare favourably with those of his Mahomedan neighbours.² But all his cares and sound regulations were fruitless indeed, if his revenue officers really worked as arbitrarily as Fryer says they did. "They are neither for public Good or Common Honesty, but their own private interest only. They refuse no base offices for their own commodity inviting merchants to come and trade among them and then rob them, or else turmoil them on account of customs; always in a corner getting more for themselves than their master, yet openly must seem mighty zealous for their master's dues: so that trade is unlikely to settle where he hath anything to do; notwithstanding his country lies all along on the seashore, and no goods can be transported without his permission; unless they go a great way about, as we are forced to do."

This is by no means the worst that the English traveller has to say against the Mahratta officers.

Fryer's charges.

He continues—"It is a general calamity, and much to be deplored, to hear the complaints of the poor people that remain, or are rather compelled to endure the slavery of Shivaji: The Desies have land imposed upon them at double the former rates and if they refuse to accept it on these hard conditions (if monied men) they are carried to prison, there they are famished almost to death; racked and tortured most inhumanly

¹ Ranade, R. M. P., p. 125.

² Rajwade, M. I. S., Vol. 8, p. 23-25.

till they confess where it is: They have now in Limbo several Brachmins, whose flesh they tear with pincers heated red-hot, drub them on the shoulder to extreme anguish (though according to their Law it is forbidden to strike a Brachmin). This is the accustomed swace all India over, the princes doing the same by the Governors when removed from their offices, to squeeze their ill-got estates out of them; which when they have done, it may be they may be employed again: And after this fashion, the Desies deal with the combies; so that the great fish prey on the little, as well by land as by sea, bringing not only them, but their families into Eternal Bondage."¹ Fryer was of opinion that even Bijapur rule was milder than that of Shivaji.

If Fryer's account is borne out by facts, the state of the country was terrible indeed. But Fryer examined. Fryer had made only a short trip through Shivaji's dominions and his stay there was by no means long. It does not appear probable that his account was based on personal experience or first hand knowledge of any other kind. Shivaji is still adored as an ideal king, and people referred to his institutions with admiration in days of anarchy and misrule. Traditions may be exaggerated, but they are never baseless. Traditions attribute all sorts of good institutions to such good rulers as Alfred and Elizabeth, but legends have not hitherto paid any tribute to the memory of such bad kings as John or James II. It is a very important point that the memory of Shivaji is still cherished by the people of Maharastra as that of a great and good king. If he had really tortured his Brahmin officers with red-hot pincers and they, in their turn, had dealt out similar treatment to the Desais, Shivaji would not have been revered as an

¹ Fryer, pp. 146-147.

incarnation of Shri Shambhu Mahadev. We have already seen how the great Mahratta had striven to liberate the poor peasant from the tyranny of the Deshmukhs and the Deshpandes; it therefore seems improbable that he should allow his officers to force lands on the Desais at an exorbitant rate. Far from molesting Brahmins, Shivaji never offered any insult to holy men and holy places of his Mahomedan enemies. Although many temples and idols were defiled and desecrated by the Mahomedan bigots, Shivaji never failed to send any copy of the Koran he might come in possession of, to some of his Mahomedan officers. Even Khafi Khan, an inveterate enemy of the Mahratta hero, paid him an unwilling compliment on that account.¹ Dellon, a French Doctor, who visited the western coast about the same time as Fryer, remarks that, "His (Shivaji's) subjects are pagans, like himself. But he tolerates all religions and is looked upon as one of the most politic princes in those parts."² Shivaji styled himself as *Go Brahman Pratipalak*, the protector of Brahmins and cows, and could hardly, with any consistency to his professed ambition, overlook the conduct of his officers, if they really tortured the Brahmins. Fryer's story therefore seems to be baseless. Corruption there certainly existed and instances of tyranny and misrule doubtlessly occurred. Shivaji in the midst of those wars of conquest and defence could hardly get any time for improving his government. But Fryer seems to have dipped his brush in black too frequently while painting the picture of Shivaji's country. Grant Duff³ says—"The Mahomedan writers and one contemporary English traveller, describe his country in the worst possible state; and the former only mentions him as a depredator and destroyer; but those

¹ Elliot and Dowson, Vol. VII.

² Dellon, pp. 56-57.

³ Grant Duff, Vol. I, p. 188.

been described by Mr. Bhawe in the fifth Sammelan Vritta of the Mandal.

But neither land revenue, nor custom duties, and the income from the mints added so much to the treasury of Shivaji as Chouth, Sardes mukhi and spoils of war.

Chouth and Sardes-
mukhi.

Even in normal times, he depended more on his army than on his civil officers for the necessary finances. It was on this account that he has been branded as a robber chief both by his contemporaries and by the posterity. But the great Mahratta King had no other alternative. He had to brave the enmity of the Moghuls and the Sultan of Bijapur—not to count the pinpricks that he had often to bear from such minor powers as the Habshis of Janjira, the Portuguese of Goa, and the petty semi-independent chiefs like the Koliraja. He had to organise an army and defend his newly conquered territories; he had to build innumerable forts; fortify submerged rocks and difficult passes; he had to fit out a fleet to stop the piracy and the depredations of the Siddi's navy; he had to buy arms and ammunition, and he needed money for these works. Nature was by no means munificent to the Mahratta. The valleys yielded but scanty return to the strenuous exertions of the Mahratta peasant. It would have been impossible for Shivaji to finance his army and navy from the limited resources of his native land alone, even if he had taxed all his ingenuity to enhance them. Consequently he had to make war “furnish the means of war.”

But Chouth and Sardes mukhi were quite different from spoils of war. They were more or less permanent demands. Shivaji's claim to Sardes mukhi was based on a legal fiction. He claimed to be the hereditary Sardes mukh of his country and had put forth his

The nature of the
Chouth and Sardes-
mukhi.

claim early in his career. If his claim had been acknowledged, or if he had succeeded in obtaining a *farman* in its support, there would have been no legal flaw whatever in his demands. This imperial sanction, however, could not be obtained before Shahu's accession to his grand-father's throne, and in Shivaji's time at least Sardesmukhi was not recognised as his *watan*. The Chouth was nothing but a tribute, exacted by the strong from the weak. The Raja of Bednore and the Chief of Soonda agreed to pay Chouth in 1678, because they had no option in the matter. Shivaji had invaded their principalities with a strong army and any refusal would have been sternly punished. The Mahrattas obtained a legal right to levy Chouth, when the diplomacy of Balaji Vishwanath, secured for Shahu an imperial recognition of that oft-repeated claim. This legal sanction would have been of little avail, if it had not been backed by the lance of the Mahratta horsemen. Nothing short of any expedition would make any chief or king, either Hindu or Mahomedan, admit Shivaji's claim to a quarter of his revenue and nothing but a strong army could enforce punctual payment. It was therefore nothing but a military contribution levied by a power without being in formal occupation of the country and without observing the legal forms specified by modern International Law.

The great Mahratta scholar, the late Justice Ranade, however, does not admit that the Chouth was a military

Ranade's views. contribution only, without any moral or

legal obligation on the part of the Mahratta government to protect the country from the invasion of any other power, or to restore peace and order in the country. He was of opinion, that the policy underlying the exaction of Chouth was the same as impelled Lord Wellesley to enforce a Subsidiary Alliance on his weaker neighbours,

"The demand for Chouth was subsequently added with the consent of the powers whose protection was undertaken against foreign aggression, on payment of fixed sums for the support of the troops, maintained for such service. This was the original idea as worked out by Shivaji and it was this same idea, which in the Marquis of Wellesley's hand bore such fruit a hundred and twenty-five years later." This is Ranade's interpretation of the Chouth policy.¹

It is true that Shahu had, in return of the grant of Chouth, bound himself "to maintain a body of 15,000 horse in the emperor's service, to be placed at the disposal of the Subhedars, Foujdars and officers in the differnt districts" and to maintain peace and order. But neither Shahu, nor the Peshwas ever cared to assist the Subhedar of the Deccan unless it served their own interest. Shivaji had also often offered to serve the Delhi Government but he had exacted Chouth at the point of his sword; the emperor did not expect that Shivaji would ever look after the interest of the Delhi power and Shivaji also knew that no treaty would serve him better than his own strong arm. It cannot therefore, be denied that the Mahratta kings exacted Chouth without undertaking the least responsibility for the welfare of the country, and it should also be remembered that they never expected the Chouth-paying governments to give up their diplomatic liberty. Here lies the fundamental difference between the subsidiary system and the exaction of Chouth.

The English Company always held themselves responsible for the defence of their ally's realm, while they expected him to renounce all diplomatic relations with other

¹ Ranade, R. M. P., p. 225

powers. Moreover the Mahrattas never maintained any extra regiment or battalion when they received Chouth from a prince, nor had the amount of tribute any relation to the possible expense that might be incurred in the defence of the Chouth-paying territories. I do not, however, hold that the Mahratta statesmen had no idea of a subsidiary arrangement—such an arrangement was made with the Raja of Bundi by the Peshwa; but that was long after the demise of Shivaji.

The Chouth was, therefore, nothing but a contribution exacted by a military leader. But are such exactions sanctioned by International Law? The ancient Romans, while extending their empire, had set no limit to their capacity. “*Bellum alit Bellum*”—war must pay for war—was their favourite maxim. But pillage has not ceased to be an inevitable characteristic of war with the disruption of the Roman Empire. Even in the 19th century, so late as 1865, General Sherman’s campaign had been accompanied by the systematic pillage of the territories he marched through.¹ Requisition which is only a variation of contribution is also sanctioned by the most modern laws of war and was practised, though unwillingly, by no less a man than George Washington.² Shivaji also could plead as urgent a necessity as Washington. Both of them had been fighting for their country’s liberation and both of them were surely in need of money. Washington requisitioned the property of his unwilling fellow-citizens and Shivaji levied contributions on the enemy subjects. It served two ends at once. It not only weakened the enemy he was fighting, but at the same time added to his own resources.

¹ Bentwitch, p. 28.

² *Ibid.*, p. 10.

Shivaji's kingdom was a military state, if we are allowed to style it so. It was in a state of chronic warfare. Even for its finances, Shivaji depended more on war than on the processes of peace. The wealth amassed in the ports of his enemies, by their commercial enterprise, flowed into Shivaji's exchequer, as a reward of his military prowess. The result of this policy was the inevitable ruin of trade and commerce. Surat, the premier port of western India, lost its trade forever. But while plundering his enemies' lands, Shivaji took good care to protect his own country from a similar calamity. It was absolutely impossible that his attempts in this direction would be crowned with complete success. But he did all that was practicable. His statesmanship converted the hardy soldiers of Maharastra into excellent civil administrators. Shivaji did not aspire to be a legislator, indeed, he had no leisure for such work. But he revived some of the best regulations of his predecessors, and made slight improvements upon them. It does not seem possible that he had been able to achieve much reform. We also do not know how far the spirit of these regulations was observed in their actual working by Shivaji's officers. The public opinion of the time did not condemn bribery and corruption, and we are afraid, Shivaji's officers were not much better, if not actually worse, than their successors of the Peshwa period. His country saw no peace till the overthrow of the Moghul power. Shivaji never had had more than a couple of peaceful years at a time and even that not more than once in his life. It is futile to expect that commerce and agriculture could have prospered under these circumstances. But Shivaji's regulations were well-suited to the needs of the country. The assessment was flexible and varied from year to year. Whatever might have been the annual yield, a considerable share was left to the

Conclusion.

peasants. In the years of scarcity, they could expect relief from the state. Consequently they had good reasons to devote their attention to agricultural pursuits, but it is quite probable that the prospects and honour of a military career had stronger charms for the hardy peasant of the Ghat ranges.

The Aryans of India

BY

BIJAYCHANDRA MAZUMDAR, B.A.

At Oxford in September, 1908, I threw out some suggestions for the first time, in a paper I read in the Third International Congress for the History of Religions, as to how the problem relating to the origin of the Aryans of India should be tackled. I promised then a fuller treatment of the subject in a paper entirely devoted to it, but certain physical troubles which came over me soon afterwards, seriously interfered with the carrying out of my wishes. The subject as dealt with now, is presented with all its imperfections.

I speak with no uncertain sound when I say that I know of no theory hitherto promulgated relating to the origin of the so-called Aryans, which can even be tentatively accepted to work out the problem. I have no theory of my own to present; I only propose to show briefly that even the latest theory associated with the noted name of a scientist, has been built partly upon the old foundation which was once laid by some philologists with flimsy materials. To point out errors and difficulties is no constructive work, but it is needed as a step in aid of execution of the work.

Now we all know that the word *Ārya* (of which *Aryan* is but the anglicised form) occurs only in the Vedic and Avestic traditions; the propriety of extending the term by the philologists to other groups of peoples, speaking languages closely related to *Cbhāndasa* and *Zend*, has been very rightly questioned by many; if, however,

language is not made co-extensive with blood, if the term in question ceases to have a general ethnic significance, we may very well use the term to denote all the groups of languages which bear close linguistic affinity. Certainly the ethnologists do not formulate any genetic affinity between the speakers of different groups of Aryan tongues, but they use the term merely to denote the unknown community of dim past, with whom, they think, the *Aryan language* as the parent tongue originated; the phrase 'The Aryans of India,' as is the title of my paper, has been used however to denote the community of the Vedic fathers, no matter whether they were or were not descendants of some unknown or unknowable people of some unknown region.

All enquiries regarding the Vedic fathers begin with the question, Where did they or rather their ancestors the Aryans of India come from? We question the relevancy and propriety of the question itself. If it is a corollary of the general proposition of ethnic investigation regarding the original centre of human evolution and the migration of man from the original cradle-land to the different parts of the globe, the enquiry may be held legitimate. If, however, we know that India was fully populated in all ages of human activities, the special need must be stated for bringing in hordes of foreign people either during the historic or the pre-historic times. As the area of 12,000 sq. miles (which is exactly the area of the Presidency division in Bengal) was quite sufficient for the old Egyptians to develop a great civilization, and as the Babylonians (exposed on three sides to the attack of the Barbarians) could nurture within a small area a high culture of their own, the vast country of the Punjab extending from old Gāndhār to the Sarasvati may very easily be conceived to have been the nurture ground of the Vedic civilization. I name the Punjab not actually

to formulate any theory, nor to make the spot the cradle-land of the Aryans of India, but merely to suggest that a quest for an 'Elsewhere' does not necessarily arise to explain the appearance of the Vedic fathers in India. I examine presently the facts which the supporters of an 'elsewhere,' put forward to shew that the ancestors of the Vedic fathers could not be autochthonous in India. I do not mean to be exhaustive, nay, I do not care to be exhaustive in noticing and criticising all the theories on the subject; for example, I do not halt to discuss the Arctic Home theory of Mr. Tilak of Indian political fame, which (even if we overlook all other vital defects) confronts us with this mystery that only the Indian branch of the descendants of the very remote Arctic ancestors could store up memory of the physical phenomena of the Arctic Zone for its reproduction after many thousand years. Nor is it worthwhile to refer to the patriotic opinion of our Pandits who invariably make India the home of all origins. If India has really been the cradle-land of Aryan culture, facts have to be adduced to prove it.

When in 1861 the renowned Sanskrit scholar Max Müller raised a vision of the past by the charm of his words, and saw before him not only a comfortable house in Central Asia accommodating under its roof the remote ancestors of all those peoples who now speak one form or another of the so-called Aryan tongue but also the remote descendants of those remote ancestors migrating in successive swarms to people almost the whole of the world, the subject of anthropology did not become popular, and the writings of Darwin and his contemporary worthies were regarded as horrid things outside the circle of genuine scientific men; that many thousand years before the then supposed date of Aryan dispersion, all the known quarters of the globe became fully populated, was not known to the distinguished philologists of

metaphysical training. One touch of the magical wand of philology made the whole world kin; but to break the spell it was soon found out that the groups of European peoples speaking Aryan tongues, trace their ancestry to the settled dwellers of Europe from the Neolithic times at the latest, who were not speakers of any Aryan speech. The 'bubble' of the theory of Max Müller has 'burst,' but Central Asia beyond the Oxus is still held in a manner to have been the cradle-land of Aryan civilization. To explain how Aryan culture has been superimposed upon various groups of European peoples, a migration of that culture through lands lying beyond the zones of Semitic and Mongolic influences has been formulated: so far so good. But why is it that the land through which culture passed on to Europe, should be held to be the cradle of the culture itself. It is said with some force of reason no doubt, that the social life of that now-extinct culture-propagating group of men, as may be reconstructed with the help of some common words as are in stock of all the groups of Aryan languages (European as well as Asiatic), points to the land in question as the home of the original culture. Indians and Iranians, according to this theory, were similarly aryanised by drift of culture from Central Asia. Certainly, if a culture group ethnically distinct from the Europeans, could impress upon the Europeans the indelible marks of its civilization, we may easily hold, as Keane does, that Northern India and Iran are indebted to Central Asia for their language and religion. The principal merit of this theory is, that not being in conflict with some well ascertained facts of ethnology, it explains how various ethnically distinct peoples of Europe and Asia agree essentially in the matter of language. We are not required moreover, according to this theory, to think out the physical characteristics of those people

with whom what is called the Aryan culture originated, for, to use the very language of Keane, "As well seek in the raised dough the leaven of fermentation, as try to determine a primitive Aryan type."

This theory which may very well be associated with the name of Keane, is certainly very plausible; it must be admitted, however, that if there be scope enough to set up a rival theory, if the possibility of formulating another theory of equal plausibilities has not been removed by the theory in question, we cannot say that the theory can be accepted as highly probable. I suggest and discuss another theory which is capable of explaining matters with equal success.

The need for an elsewhere for the Vedic fathers does not strictly arise, if we accept the theory brought to prominence by A. H. Keane. The question however arises: Is the Aryan culture a borrowed garment which a section of the Indian people wears, or is it a garment of that particular community's own weaving in India? Let us accept the proposition for a general discussion on the subject, that the culture of our investigation originated in India. I have already suggested that the area of the tract of Northern India which is known to have been the field of activities of the early Vedic fathers, is wide enough for the growth of an old-time civilization; if we again extend the area to the upper valley of the Ganges, the country from Kandahar to the Ganges (highly suitable for the growth of primitive civilization) becomes more extensive and favourable than the region of Central Asia which is supposed to be the Aryan cradle-land. Then again, it is an important fact to consider, that if we can accept the situation that the people of Central Asiatic or Eurasiatic tract came to India being impelled by some circumstances to do so, why can we not formulate with equally good reasons, that in the first place, the rude and

restless hordes of Central Asia came under the direct influence of the civilization of Northern India on the north-western frontier, and in the second place, the Central Asiatic tract itself was vitalised by the expansion of the civilization of India? Regarding the expansion of Indian civilization in old times, something will have to be stated later on. Let us notice at first that Northern India in all probability became a centre of evolution of a civilization of good type in prehistoric times. I refer to Keane's excellent popular work on ethnology in which it has been stated on the authority of all the leading ethnologists, that those who developed the Mongolic physical type for themselves in the new region of their new evolution, had to proceed through India. It is doubtless that those who had to leave India were under some pressure to do so, for the fertile lands of India could never prove an unfit place from any point of view. We can easily infer that those who remained in Northern India after the dispersion of the superfluous population, were eminently fit both physically and mentally to evolve a new human type in pleistocene days. The very natural presumption is that the descendants of those people who were in India in pleistocene times, became the progenitors of Northern Indian civilization; to rebut this presumption very strong evidence is required to be adduced.

The strongest argument that may be raised against the radiation of the Aryan culture from India is the social life of the primitive Aryans as is reconstructed to-day on the basis of linguistic palæontology. It may be asserted that the physical conditions of the cradle-land and the social life of the people as are disclosed by the words which are found common in the stock of various groups of peoples, point strongly to a rude nomadic life in Central Asia. I try to meet this argument by adducing a relevant familiar example of spread of culture by

social contact. Many hill tribes of India, we know, have forgotten their tribal speeches and speak now some Aryan vernaculars, and have adopted to a certain extent the Pauranic religion of the Hindus; the *object and ideas* with which these peoples are familiar in their rude home, are generally expressed in the words of the Aryan speech, but the words indicating objects and ideas regarding which they have no knowledge, or they cannot form any conception in their minds, are not and cannot be in use with them; it will be quite wrong if by taking common factors of the speeches of the rude tribes and their civilized neighbours a reconstruction is attempted, either of the social life or of the physical characteristics of the home of an imaginary *ancestral group* of civilised and uncivilised peoples of our example. It is admitted on one hand that the culture of the primitive Aryans 'leavened' the rude prehistoric masses and raised a great part of humanity to higher social plane; and it is stated on the other hand (quite inconsistently I think) on linguistic evidence, that before their dispersion the Aryans "were a rude pastoral people, possessing cattle, sheep, goats and watch dog, but with scarcely rudimentary knowledge of agriculture." That they were 'half troglo-dytes' and rude in many other respects, has also been the inference. That this picture of life does not very well accord with the fact that the primitive Aryans effectively stimulated the progress of others and made those with whom they came in contact to adopt their language, should be pretty clear to the minds of the scholars. On comparing the grammatical structure of the Vedic with that of the Greek language, where the two languages essentially agree, we can see that previous to the date of 'dispersion' the language of the Aryans attained a high degree of excellence; no doubt because of this excellence many less-expressive and clumsy languages went to the wall.

Now we have to be reminded that a well-developed language signifies high thoughts, and high thoughts depend upon a social life of high order. Rude tribes full of nascent life and freshness of vigour may easily adopt a ready-made good language (which they may not themselves evolve) and may impose that upon others in their restless migratory movements. The theory suggested by me explains perhaps some factors of our problem better.

I adduce one fact, and one fact only, to support the view that those who carried Aryan culture to Europe did very likely borrow that culture from some people on the north-western frontier of ancient India. We know that the words indicating cardinal points as occur in Indo-Iranian languages do not occur in the Aryan groups of European languages, while in two European groups the word indicating south (*Dakṣiṇa*) is in use in its secondary or rather tertiary meaning. I discuss the significance of this fact in adducing my evidence.

It must be admitted by the ethnologists and psychologists that the Aryans who attained the sort of culture as is inferred universally from the stock of their common words, could not but have formed the primary notion of directions when they dispersed from their cradleland.

The words *Uttara*, *Dakṣiṇa*, *Purva*, and *Pāścīma* are wholly peculiar to the language of the Indian Aryans. It cannot certainly be said that the great culture group of the Aryans could not form the notion of the cardinal points before they came to India; nor can it be imagined that the words of their primitive notion were changed by them, when they proceeded to settle in different countries. I think, it will be conceded that from the names given by the people to the four directions, we may obtain some information either of some important physical aspect of their country or of some memorable movements of those people. We learn in the ancient history of

Egypt how the surroundings of the Nile valley conditioned and determined the ideas and notions of its inhabitants. Regarding the notions of cardinal points of the Nile-dweller, Dr. Breasted writes in his 'History of Egypt': "The river, the dominant feature of his valley, determined his notion of direction; his words for north and south were down-stream and up-stream." This shows that at the time of forming primitive notions, the Egyptians were in their own valley. Ethnologists are also unanimous in giving support to this proposition.

Let me now consider the words indicating directions as were and are being used in India fully and in Iran partly. There is a suggestion that the words denoting directions had their origin with reference to the sun. Purva (first) and Paśchima (last) may be explained by the rising and the setting of the sun, but the names for the two other directions are not in harmony with the idea connected with the movements of the sun. It is not possible that the words of one particular primary notion were formed differently with reference to different unconnected conditions. Conceding even the point that the directions were determined with reference to the sun, it cannot be explained why the names of directions derived from the movements of the sun, are not common to all the Aryan languages of the world.

'Uttara' which is the word for north means 'upper' or 'higher.' 'Udichi,' the synonym of 'Uttara,' conveys also the idea of 'up' or 'high.' To the north of India lies the Himalayas, which must have proved a barrier to the Aryans from whatsoever side they might have come. If it be supposed that in the course of their migration the Aryans came to the foot of the Himalayas, they could call that direction by the name 'up' or 'high.' But if the Aryans came into India from Central Asia, the direction in which the Himalayas lay, could not be called 'north.'

The ethnologists give us the fact that at the foot of the Himalayas to the north-east, there was a centre of extensive prehistoric culture. If we imagine that proceeding from the southern direction,—from the original home of the human species—a community came to the north-eastern region of India, and after developing their prehistoric culture in that region, proceeded towards the west, where lay before them the newly formed lands of great fertility, we can explain the names of all the directions with reference to the then physical features of India; when a swarm of people came to the spot of the aforesaid neolithic culture, by advancing from the south, the impassable Himalayas must have proved to be significantly high or ‘uttara.’

Dakṣiṇa or Dakṣa (south) is derived from the root Daks (to grow)+inan; thus the original meaning of the word is associated with Daks (to grow). ‘The meaning ‘right’ is later in origin and from it is derived the tertiary meaning ‘skill.’ It can be seen that the word ‘Dakṣiṇa’ to signify ‘right’ is associated with only a few words, and in some cases the meaning ‘skill’ is predominant as in the use of it in the compound ‘Dakṣiṇa-hasta.’ The word ‘Dakṣiṇa’ alone does not signify right side. Let me refer to the early Vedic use of the word Dakṣa. The Vedic goddess Aditi (very rightly interpreted by Max Müller, consistently with the meaning given by Yāska and Sāyana as the visible infinite,—the boundless expanse of the earth) is the daughter of Dakṣa. The Ādityas (including Dakṣa, the father of Aditi) are again said in the Vedas to be the sons of Aditi, who is ‘Ādinā devamātā’ according to Yāska. Is it because that according to grammar the word Āditya can be derived from ‘Aditi,’ that this confusion was made? Or, have we to accept the philosophical explanation given by Roth (‘Muir’s Sanskrit Text,’ Vol. V) that the Aditi (eternity or the eternal) is the element which

sustains, and is sustained by the Ādityas? What is to be noted specially here, is that Aditi and Dakṣa are closely related to each other. When according to the physical conditions of India in the prehistoric and the early historic times, the people could not proceed beyond the north-western limits of India, and the Himalayas offered a barrier to the north, the people who actually developed neolithic culture at the foot of the eastern Himalayas, had to resist successfully the aggression of other hordes constantly pouring in from the south. South was then the only direction which was vast and which teemed with population. South could therefore be best described by a word which meant the father of Aditi, the visible infinite. The word 'Dakṣa' or 'Dakṣiṇa' could thus come to signify the southern direction. The visible infinite, or the impalpable or abstract idea of space lay to the south, while the Himalayas lay to the north to signify the idea 'up' or 'high.'

I do not care what value may be attached to the explanation I have offered of the names of two directions, North and South, but there is no denying of the fact that the words denoting cardinal points as are in the Indo-Iranian stock, are not in use in European languages. What is again very striking and significant is, that the secondary or rather the tertiary meaning of the word Dakṣa (south) occurs in some European languages: in India we get the full-bodied original word Dakṣiṇa from the root Dakṣ, and the provincial variant of the term to signify exactly south, occurs in the Avestic language in the form Dashina, while the tertiary meaning 'skilful' derived from the secondary significance 'right' occurs in Greek and Latin in the forms Dexios and Dexter respectively. It is almost definitely clear that those who had *other words* to indicate cardinal points got or rather adopted the term Dakṣa when the tertiary meaning of the term came into use in India;

it is also easily conceivable that those who adopted or borrowed the Aryan language could afterwards translate their own original words indicating cardinal points by some words of the Aryan language.

Some remarks regarding the names of two other directions (East and West) are also offered to obtain further light on this point of great interest.

Purva or Prāchī and Paschima or Pratichi are the names for the east and the west. Purva also means 'first,' 'prior formed' and 'past.' It is opposite to 'Nutana' or new. Compare the use 'Purvebhiḥ' in contrast with 'Nutanaiḥ' in the second Rik of the very first Sukta of the Rigveda. Paschima (Paschadbhavah=born last, from pascha + dimach) has the radical meaning 'after,' and it signifies west as well as what is last in time or space; while Prāchī (from prāk, first), the synonym of Pūrva, signifies 'east.' If the pre-historic men of Northern India are the progenitors of the Vedic seers of the historic times, they could easily name the directions east and west according to their later migratory movements. If we refer to the oldest mantras of the Vedas, we find that the god Indra is the oldest god of the Aryans of India. This god was not accepted by the Iranians and he is not found as a god among the European groups speaking Aryan languages. This old Indra of the Indian Aryans got the name 'Prāchīpati.' The significance of the mention of the god in the Tel-el-Amarna inscriptions will be discussed in connection with the proposition of the spread of Aryan culture.

As to the Indian tradition of early movements I refer here to a saying of the Kṛiṣṇa-Yayurveda which runs as: Prāchīna vamsam karoti devomanusyaḥ diso vyābhajantaḥ; Prāchīm devā, daksinaṁ pitarāḥ, Pratīchīm manusyā, Udīchīm Rudrāḥ.

Whatever may be the value of this tradition, we get an old-time notion of the Hindus that the 'Pitarāḥ' or the

earliest human ancestors came to north from the southern direction; it is also implied that in the eastern region higher culture was evolved and acquaintance was made with the gods, and the modern men (mere 'manuṣyāḥ') proceeded at a later time to enjoy the west, while the dreadful Rudras ruled the high and inaccessible north.

To appreciate fully the deep significance of the Indian tradition referred to above, we have to be reminded that the Vedic documents do not favour the view that the authors of the Vedic mantras came to India from 'elsewhere.' It is very curious indeed that if the Vedic ancestors either came from elsewhere or were stimulated in the matter of their progress by any outside influence, the traditions retained in the Vedas do not disclose such a state of things, though the preservation of such traditions of momentous early movements has been the trait of many nations, old and modern. All the Vedic scholars agree that the Vedas do not show that the Aryans of India had any knowledge whatsoever of the world outside; Prof. E. W. Hopkins has very rightly observed (J. A. O. S., Vol. XIX) that the majority of the Vedic hymns bear evidence of their having been composed in the region farther east than the Punjab. Now on the other hand we notice that it has been a tradition with the Aryans of India that the land of the Pitris is in the south; to offer homage or libations to the Pitris the Hindus have to sit facing the south without fail; it is the customary rule that the Hindus should not lie down to sleep with his feet to the south. This deep-seated feeling of veneration regarding south, could not have been generated without a cause.

I have left out the consideration of the question as to what was likely the relation of the old Iranians with the authors of the Vedic culture, for this highly important subject requires a thorough independent treatment. Perfunctory though the treatment will be, I have to notice

a few facts regarding the Iranians about the correctness of which the scholars generally do not entertain any doubt; they are: (1) Zend is closer to the Vedic language of a comparatively later time, with some survivals of earlier linguistic forms of the Vedic language. (2) A clear distinction in class names by the terms Brahmana, Ksatriya and Vaisya as does not occur in the earliest Vedic record, occurs (no matter whether to signify caste distinction or not) in the Avesta. (3) The Iranians speak of their displacement from the original Aryan home, but it is not suggested that this displacement was caused by the Aryans of India; the Indian records do not know of any such schism. (4) Indra who appears to be the oldest of the Indian gods, is not a god of the Iranians. On the last point I have to add a few words to explain some facts relating to the expansion of Indo-Aryan culture.

I have suggested that Indra Prāchipati is the oldest god of the Indian Aryans. This statement can be very successfully proved: (1) Those Suktas of the Rigveda, which have been pronounced to be the oldest by the scholars after judging by the test of language and metre, recognise Indra as the principal god; (2) Indra appropriates the largest number of Suktas of the Rigveda; (3) Dr. Bloomfield has rightly remarked as follows in his 'Religion of the Veda' in connection with the Soma sacrifice and Jyotistoma:

"The gods of the Vedic pantheon are all interested in these ceremonies; each has a fairly definite share in them. Indra, the god who figures more frequently than any other, has part in all three pressings (of soma drink); but the midday pressing belongs to him exclusively."

(4) It has also been remarked by Dr. Bloomfield (*ibid*, p. 89) that Indra always figures as the principal god and that while all other gods are rather impalpable and uncertain in outline, "on a pinch we could imagine

a statue of the most material of the Vedic gods, Indra." The gods who are impalpable in nature and can be easily detected as representatives of natural forces or elements, are creations of higher and consequently later æsthetic conception; (5) Indra was always regarded as the king of gods (*devarāja*) even after his overthrow by *Kṛiṣṇa-Viṣṇu*; (6) In the early Buddhistic period we find no other god so much revered as the 'Sakka' of the oldest tradition.

I proceed next to consider what evidence may be obtained of the expansion of the Indian culture in ancient times, to determine as far as we can, first the antiquity of Indian civilisation, and secondly the place of India in the history of ancient culture of the world. What reasonable inference may be drawn from the inscriptions discovered at 'Tel-el-Amarna' in Egypt and at *Boyhazkyoi* in Mesopotamia, is what I consider first. An isolated colony of the people of Aryan culture at Mittani in Mesopotamia, on the frontier of Babylonia and Assyria, has been a puzzle to many; how such a colony could be established at a time not later than 1400 B. C. in a land of living and powerful Semitic influence, we do not know; we can know however, that the language and the religion disclosed by the inscriptions of the colonists, point distinctly to Indian origin of the culture of the people. The contention that the people of Mittani got their culture from the Iranians, is utterly untenable, for the forms of the words of the inscriptions and the names of the gods are wholly Indian and quite dissimilar to Iranian; Indra has never been a god of the Iranians, and *Nāsatya* appears in Iranian traditions as an enemy of the Avestic gods and is always in the singular number in the provincial Iranian form *Nāhatya*. Indra whom I have shown to be the indigenous early god of the Indians, occurs in the Mittani record as *In-da-ra*; it is highly interesting that

the rule of Svāra-bhakti observed in Chhāṇḍasa in pronouncing Indra, is noticeable in the Mittani record; the readers may find on reference to Arnold's 'Vedic Metre' that if Indra is not pronounced as In-da-ra a metre will prove defective in the Vedas as in Rv., m. i, 167, 10; here the metre requires that the line 'Vayam-adyendrasya preṣṭhā' should be read as 'Vayam adya Indarasya pra iṣṭhā.' Looking to these facts, it will be reasonable to accept the view of Jacobi regarding the origin of the colonists; he observes: These tribes, being neighbours and perhaps subjects of Vedic tribes who had reached a higher level of civilisation adopted the Vedic gods, and thus brought the Vedic worship with them to their new homes in Mesopotamia (J. R. A. S., 1909, at p. 276).

We get evidence that gods and forms of words peculiarly Indian, having been developed on the soil of India, could travel in ancient times to Mesopotamia, as many tribes could be influenced by Aryan culture on the north-western frontier of ancient India. We may again observe that the Kassites who dominated Babylonia by about 1800 B. C. pronounced the Aryan words not according to the Iranian fashion, but wholly according to the Indian methods; for example, their semi-god *Suriyas*, is exactly equivalent to *Sūrya* in pronunciation. It is highly probable that the Kassites proceeded to Babylonia after being leavened with the Aryan culture of India. Ancient India could expand and did expand, and it is not an unlikely proposition that the tribes of Central Asia proceeded to Europe after being aryanised by the culture of the Aryans of India. Along with these facts I mention, for what it is worth, the opinion of the ethnologists that the physical remains of the primitive Greek people appear "to present a very close resemblance to those of the high-caste Hindus" of to-day. (Keane's 'Ethnology,' p. 109.) It may be remarked in this

connection that the Greeks alone of the European peoples of Aryan culture developed an early civilization.

I notice now a few other facts which do not perhaps constitute such an evidence in the matter as may be declared strong; but I refer to them as I think that if they be considered along with the facts stated before, the cumulative effect of the whole evidence may not be insignificant. What the philologists have given us regarding the time of Aryan dispersion and of the growth of Aryan civilisation is altogether a matter of guess unsupported by facts; better it is that in respect to this time we should say we do not know, as Dr. Bloomfield has said regarding the Vedic times. Centres of Neolithic culture have been discovered in India in the east and in Persia to the north and north-east of the Persian Gulf; how the descendants of the makers of the culture fared in prehistoric age, alike in India and Persia, we do not know. We know however one fact which forces us to suppose that powerful peoples lived in Iran and India in ancient glorious days of Babylonia and Assyria. When previous even to 3000 B. C. the Babylonians required good stones and wood for building material, they had to go to the north-western corner of Asia Minor to collect them by travelling a very long distance and crossing a desert on the way; they could not perhaps get into Assyria for good stones as the Assyrians were powerful at that time; but why was it they could not lay their hands upon the materials available in their neighbourhood to the east, must be pondered over. Similarly the Assyrians, mighty enough to keep the Babylonians at arm's length and who at a later time conquered Babylon and other lands to the west, remained for long in the unfertile country of theirs, without attempting either to encroach upon the land of Persia proper, or to push on a conquest towards Kandahar or Gāndhāra. It is wonderful that

the mighty Assyrians waged bloody war in the west to possess uninviting countries, but did not proceed to their near east which could be easily subdued at a later time (according to the old theory relating to the origin of the Aryans) by some rude hordes of Central Asia, which rude hordes (according to the old theory) were not strong in number when getting into India. Is it not then very likely, that when the Babylonians and the Assyrians were creating their civilisation, the eastern tracts, indicated above, were neither *res nullius* nor occupied by weak and disorganised barbarous peoples.

The religion of the Aryans were such in the old days that temples and other such monuments were not required to be built; moreover, the early records of Northern India (devoid of good stones) must be very hard or rather impossible to trace; circumstantial evidence and probabilities of things, are what we have to depend upon.

Hinks suggested in 1848 that some grammatical forms of the old Sumer people are dissimilar to Semitic forms, and identical with some Aryan forms; I do not know what value is to be attached to the suggestion, but we cannot overlook the long list of Aryan words prepared by Hommel, for we see in it that previous to the Kassite invasion, Aryan words flowed into the land of the Semites. Professor Sayce pointed out long ago that in the Semitic language of the Assyrians the word *Mitra* occurs to signify the sun; it is also noticeable that the name of the people as is after their deity, is Asura and this non-Semitic word is not again Ahura of Iranian pronunciation. Since all broken fragments have to be gathered together to reconstruct the forgotten past, I draw the attention of the scholars who are not merely philologists, to the proposition which I advance in this paper, not to build any theory but to reconsider the whole question.

On the Karmā Dharmā Festival of North Bihār and its Mundā Analogues

BY

SARAT CHANDRA MITRA, M.A.

In the district of Saran in North Bihār, the women-folk perform a *vrata* or ceremonial worship known as the Karmā Dharmā. This worship is performed on the eleventh day in the light fortnight of the Hindi month of Bhādo (August-September). On this day, the celebrant of the worship digs two small ponds, one of which is filled with water, and the other with milk. Then she plants, in the space intervening between these two small ponds, a clump of *kuśa* grass. Then she twines as many stalks of *kuśa* grass with the hair of her head, as she has brothers. This done, she drinks a little of the water from the pond and then hears the following legend which is recited by the officiating Brāhmaṇa priest. As the text of this legend in Hindi has not yet been printed, I am publishing the same in Appendix A of this paper, and the English translation thereof in Appendix B hereof.

Thereafter she takes off the blades of the *kuśa* grass twined with her hair. This worship is performed in the evening of the day prescribed for its performance. In the morning of the next day, she throws away the flowers, etc., used in this worship into the neighbouring river,

and presents the food-offerings used in this worship to the Brāhmaṇa priest who had officiated at this worship. The water and the milk of the two aforementioned ponds and the clump of *kuśa* grass are also thrown into the river.

This ceremonial worship is performed by the women-folk under the belief that, by performing it, they themselves *and their brothers will be relieved from their troubles.*

The celebrant of this worship may take fruits, etc. (फलाहार), after performing the *pūjā* and hearing the legend mentioned below. But she should remain fasting in the morning of the day of worship. If she abstains altogether from taking food on the day of the celebration of this worship, she should take food in the morning of the next day after touching a *sidhā* (offering of rice, pulses, vegetables, etc.) and presenting it to the officiating Brāhmaṇa priest.

We should now try to find out if any festival, similar to the foregoing one, is performed among any other race of Indian people. Curiously enough, we find that the Mundās—a Dravidian race of people which lives in the district of Ranchi in Chota Nagpur—have a festival which is analogous to the aforementioned Karmā Dharmā festival current in the district of Saran in North Bihār. This Mundā festival is also known by the name of Karmā. [It is also called the Karam festival.¹] It is held on the eleventh day of the Hindi month of Bhādo. [But it is not stated whether this festival is held by the Mundās on the eleventh day of the light or dark fortnight of the month of Bhādo. The author of *The Mundās and Their Country*, however, in his account of this festival, says that it is held on the eleventh day of the light fortnight

¹ Vide *The Mundās and Their Country*, by Sarat Chandra Ray, M.A., Calcutta : 1912. Pp. 478-479.

in the month of Bhādo (August-September).¹ It lasts for 3 or 4 days and is celebrated with much drinking of the rice-beer known as *handeyā* and the performance of a good deal of dancing and the singing of songs. [The author of *The Mundās and Their Country*, however, says that it is celebrated on one day only, and that, throughout the night of its celebration, singing, dancing and uproarious drumming are kept up vigorously either in the courtyard of the celebrant's house or at a place adjoining it. He further says that, on the morning of the next day, the branches of the *Karam* tree (*Nauclea parvifolia*) are conveyed in procession by a number of young men to the accompaniment of singing and music and thrown into a tank or a stream.³]

On the day of this festival, a branch of the *Karam* tree (*Nauclea parvifolia*) is planted by the Mundā in the courtyard of his house. [The author of *The Mundās and Their Country*, however, says that the head of the Mundā family celebrating this festival brings two branches of the *Karam* tree and, in the evening of the day prescribed for the worship, plants them side by side in the courtyard of his house.³] The members of the household, who are celebrants of this festival, have to fast the whole day long. The *pāhān* or Mundā priest worships the branch of the *Karam* tree with the sacrifice of a fowl; and the womenfolk wave an offering of betel-leaves and areca-nuts before the same branch. [The author of *The Mundās and Their Country*, however, says that, after the two branches of the *Karam* tree have been planted in the courtyard, the Mundā celebrant of the festival presents to the deities an offering of milk, *ghī* or clarified butter and bread made of powdered rice. He further says

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 478.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 478-479.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 478.

that the *pāhān* or the village-priest has nothing to do in connection with the celebration of this festival.¹]

After waving the offering before the branch of the *Karam* tree, the womenfolk, who are the celebrants of this worship, listen to the undermentioned legend which is recited by the *pāhān* :—

There were two brothers named Karmā and Dharmā. Dharmā used to go abroad with merchandise laden upon pack-bullocks for trading purposes and to come home at intervals. Karmā used to stay at home and, whenever Dharmā was expected home, used to go a short distance ahead in order to welcome the latter home.

On one occasion on the eleventh day of the month of Bhādo, Karmā was engaged in worshipping the branch of the *Karam* tree planted in his courtyard. On the same day also, Dharmā was expected back home. But Karmā had quite forgotten this. In the meantime, Dharmā had come back and arrived at a spot close to the family-house. But seeing that Karmā, according to his usual practice, had not come to receive him, he left his pack-bullocks there and hurried home. Having reached home, he found his brother Karmā engaged in worshipping a branch of the *Karam* tree. Enquiring from the latter as to why he had not gone ahead to receive him, Dharmā began to belabour the branch of the *Karam* tree with a *lāṭhi*, and, then uprooting it, threw it away.

At this, Karmā became very much angry, but did not say anything. But shortly after this occurrence, all the paddy-crops that had been planted by Dharmā were washed away by a heavy flood.

Thereupon Dharmā enquired from the *pāhān* about the cause of this disaster. The latter told him that this loss had happened to him on account of the curse pronounced on him by his brother Karmā. Hearing this,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 478.

Dharmā again planted the branch of the *Karam* tree; and the two brothers again commenced to worship it.

After worshipping the *Karam* branch, the *pāhān* asks the female celebrants: "What benefit has accrued to you from performing this worship?" The latter reply: "*We have acquired merit for our brothers by performing this worship of the Karam tree.*"

Then the *pāhān* calls upon the womenfolk to listen to the following ætiological legend which he recites and which is set forth in Appendix C of this paper.¹

On comparing the descriptions of the aforementioned Bihāri and Mundā festivals, we find that the points of similarity between them are the following:—

(a) The name of the Bihāri festival is Karmā Dharmā; and the name of the Mundā one is Karmā or Karam.

(b) Both the Bihāri and the Mundā festivals are celebrated on the eleventh day in the light fortnight of the month of Bhādo (August-September).

(c) In both the Bihāri and the Mundā festivals, the womenfolk are the celebrants.

(d) In both the Bihāri and the Mundā festivals, a plant (in North Bihār, a clump of *kuśa* grass, and, in the Mundā country, one or two branches of the *Karam* tree) forms the centre of worship.

(e) In the Bihāri festival, the deity Vishṇu is worshipped; and, in the Mundā festival, the tribal gods (whatever their name may be) form the subject of adoration.

(f) In the Bihāri festival, an offering of betel-leaves and areca-nuts, along with the offerings of other articles, is made to the deity Vishṇu; and, in the

¹ For this account of the Karmā Festival of the Mundās, I am indebted to a Bengali article: "*Karmār Kāhinī*" which appeared at pages 208-210 of the Bengali monthly magazine *Sandēśa* (published from Calcutta) for Kārttika, 1324 B.S.

Mundā festival, the womenfolk wave an offering of betel-leaves and areca-nuts before the tribal god represented by the branch of the *Karam* tree.

(g) In the Bihāri festival, the Brāhmaṇa priest performs the worship and recites the legend connected with the same; and, in the Mundā festival, the *pāhān* or village-priest performs the rites of worship and recites the legend connected therewith.

(h) In both the Bihāri and the Mundā festivals, the womenfolk, who celebrate these festivals, listen to the legend about the two brothers named Karam and Dharam or Karmā and Dharmā, which is recited by the officiating priest.

(i) In North Bihār, the womenfolk perform this ceremonial worship under the belief that, by doing it, they themselves and their brothers will be relieved of their troubles. The Mundā womenfolk also perform it under the belief that, by doing it, they acquire merit for their brothers.

These many points of similarity between the two festivals are sufficient to show that either the Bihāris have borrowed it from the Mundās or the latter from the former. But the Bihāris could not have borrowed it from the Mundās as no members of the latter race reside in the district of Saran in North Bihār.

On the contrary, there is a considerable Hindi-speaking population in the district of Ranchi in Chota Nagpur which is the home of the Mundās. So we are compelled to come to the conclusion that the Mundās borrowed it from the Hindus of Chota Nagpur. [In this view, I am confirmed by the learned author of *The Mundās and Their Country*, who also says that the Mundās borrowed it from their Hindu neighbours.¹]

¹ Vide *The Mundās and Their Country*, p. 478.

There now remains one more point to be discussed. It is in connection with the ætiological legend given in Appendix C of this paper. This legend accounts for the origin of the following peculiarities of the under-mentioned animals and tree:—

(a) Why the paddy-bird has a slim snake-like neck and long stilt-like legs?

(b) Why the plum-tree grows up again after it has once been cut down?

(c) Why the squirrel has black stripes on its back and why it is not killed even if it falls down from a tree?

I do not know whether there are current among any other race or races of Indian people any similar ætiological legends which account for the origin of the phenomena (a) and (b) *supra*. But, as regards the animal-peculiarity (c) *supra*, it must be stated that a legend is current in Bengal to the effect that, when Rāma, the semi-mythical King of Ayodhyā, went to conquer Lankā and recover his abducted wife Sītā, the sea between Cape Comorin and Lankā (or Ceylon) was spanned by a bridge which was constructed by squirrels, that he, in token of his appreciation of the services rendered to him by these little animals, patted them on the back with the palm of his hands, and that the mark of his fingers has been left on their backs in the shape of the black stripes which we see at the present day.

Compare the foregoing legends with the under-mentioned one which is current among the Gulgulias who are a wandering tribe of Gipsies living in the Province of Chota Nagpur. The squirrels appear to have a special connection with this tribe. One of these little mammals is stated to have been their ancestor or totem, though they have ceased to venerate it at the present day. This feeling of veneration has been forgotten by them to such an extent that now the flesh of squirrels

forms their favourite article of food. There is an ætiological legend current among them to the effect that their squirrel-ancestor had seven sons who backed themselves one against the other to jump down from a palmyra tree. The first of the squirrel-brothers jumped down easily and alighted upon the ground quite unhurt. But the second brother fell heavily and was killed then and there. At the accidental death of his second child, the father of the squirrel-brothers became overwhelmed with grief and turned his anger upon his first child whom he accused of having led the others into this mischief. By way of punishment, he struck him with his hand *and left the mark of his five fingers on his back*. At the same time, he doomed him to be always classed among the lower orders of the brute-creation, with only this much qualification that he should be able to jump more nimbly than the rest of them. *It is from this incident that the squirrels have got the five dorsal stripes on their backs which they have borne ever since then.*¹

¹ *Chota Nagpore : A Little-Known Province of the Empire.* By F. B. Bradley-Birt, B.A., I.C.S., London : Smith, Elder & Co. 1903. Pp. 49-50.

APPENDIX A

HINDI TEXT OF THE LEGEND

श्रीगणेशाय नमः ।

करम् एकादशी वरत् कथा ।

सूतजी ने शौनकादि मुनियोंसे कहा :—

“जिस् कालमें पांचो पाण्डवलोग दुखमें प्राप्त रहे, कृष्णजी युधिष्ठिरजीसे प्रश्न किछिन् के आपका कष्ट दूर हो जाएगा। युधिष्ठिर जीने कृष्णजीसे पुछा कि कौन ऐसा करम् हम करें कि जिस्से हमारा राज्य मिल जाए। श्रीकृष्णजीने कहा कि यदि तुम अपना सुखको इच्छा चाहो तो करम् एकादशी वरत् करो तब अपना जो राज्य है सो प्राप्त होगा।”

“तब फिर युधिष्ठिरजीने बोला करम् एकादशी कौन चिज है, वो धरम् कौन चिज है, वो किसने पूर्वमें इस वरत् को किया है, वो किसने इस वरत् को प्रकाशित किया है, हमसे कहिये।”

“श्रीकृष्णजीने बोलिन् : ‘गौड़ देशमें’ दो ब्राह्मण जिस्का नाम करम् वो धरम् था रहते थे। वह लोग गिरहस्थी के काम करते थे जिससे अपना लड़कावालाको पालन करते थे। दोनों ब्राह्मण का विवाह हुआ था। और वह दोनों ब्राह्मण एकलाद का भाइ थे। किसि वक्तमें दोनों भाइमें झगड़ा हुआ। धरम्ने कहा हम वड़े हैं। वो करम्ने कहा हम वड़े हैं। धरम्ने कहा अगर हमारा धरम् ठिक होगा, तो तुम्हारा करम् नष्ट हो जाएगा। वो करम्ने कहा अगर हमारा करम् ठिक होगा तो तुम्हारा धरम् नष्ट हो जाएगा। तो फिर करम्ने बोला आप जो घमण्डसे हमको आप दिया तो आपका धरम् नष्ट हो जाएगा। तब फिर धरम्ने बोला आप जो हमको विना कसुर से आप दिया सो आप तुम्हारे ऊपर पड़ेगा। इस तरहसे धरम्का

आप् करम् पर पड़ा। और करम्का आप् धरम् पर पड़ा। वो इसि वजह से दोनों आदमी का दुख हो गया। इयाने धरम्का धरम् नष्ट हुआ। वो करम् का करम् नष्ट हुआ।

“तब दोनों आदमी वनमें चलते भये। तब जाते जाते वनस्थली देवीका आस्थान मिला। दोनों भाइ गते २ आस्थान पर गये। एक मुनि उसवक्त् उसि आस्थान पर बैठके तपस्या करते थे।

“उन् लोगको देखकर मुनिने वोला तुमलोग कौन हो, किस कामका वास्ते आये हो, हमसे कहो।

“तब करम्ने वोला हमलोग दोनों भाइ हैं, वो ब्राह्मण हैं, वो गौड़-देशमें रहते हैं। भाइका आप् प्राप्त होकर हम् आपके नज्दिक आये हैं। हे मुनि! हमारे उपर कृपा किजिये।

“तब मुनिने वोला यदि तुम् अपना सुख चाहो तो करम् एकादशी करो।

“तब करम् महाराजने वोलिन् इस वरत् करने का किया किया विधि है, वो कौन फल है, वो किया दान करने होगा, वो कौन देवता को पूजन करने होगा, हमसे कहिये।

“मुनिने फिर वोलिन् भादो माहिना में शुक्ल पक्षमें एकादशी तिथिमें पूजा करने होगा। दोठो गड़्हा मिट्टिमें खोदे। और एकठो गड़्हा जलसे भरे। वो दुसरा गड़्हा दुधसे भरे। वो दोनों गड़्हा का बीच में एकठो कुशका भुरको गाढ़ देवे। वो एक नया कापड़ा से उस कुशको तोप देवे। वो उहां पर विष्णु भगवानको पूजा करे। धूप, दीप, नैवेद्य, फूल, फल, पान, कसैली वो दक्षिणा चड़ावे। यदि आपन सौभाग्य चाहो, तो भक्तियुक्त् होकर पूजा करो। एक वक्त् फलाहार करो। अगर निराहार रहो तो सब्से उत्तम होगा। ऐसा विधिसे पूजा करके तुम कथा श्रुनो वो ब्राह्मण को कापड़ा, सोना वो गौ दान करो। हे ब्राह्मण! तुम अपना पत्नी के सहित इस प्रकार से वरत् करो। इह वरत् करनेसे लक्ष्मीजी तुम्हारा घरमें आकर वास करेगी। तुम्हारा भाइका आप् कुछ जाएगा। वो तुम्हारा करम् का वृद्धि होगा।”

“तब श्रीकृष्णजी युधिष्ठिरजी से फिर बोलीन् हे राजेन्द्र! तुम भी करम् एकादशी करो। इह वरत् का प्रभावसे तुम्हारा राज जो शत्रुने छिन् लिया है तुमको फिर मिल जाएगा।

युधिष्ठिरजीने इह वरत् किया, वो इस्का फल उन्को मिला। इयाने उन्को राज्य मिल गया। जो लोग विधिसे इस् करम् एकादशी वरत् को करेंगे वो हरिहर को पूजा करेंगे तब उन् लोगोंको सब पुण्य होगा वो उन् लोगोंको सब पाप्का नाश हो जाएगा।

APPENDIX B

English Translation of the Preceding Legend.

The Legend Connected with the Ceremonial Worship Known as the Karam Ekādaśī.

Obeisance to the Deity Ganeśa.

Sūtaḥ said to Śaunaka and the other sages :—

“When the five Pāṇḍava (brothers) were in a distressed condition, Kṛṣṇa told Yudhisṭhira : ‘Your distress will pass away.’ Yudhisṭhira enquired of Kṛṣṇa : ‘What act (of merit) shall I perform so that, by performing it, I may get back my kingdom.’ Kṛṣṇa replied : ‘If you wish to attain to happiness, you should perform the ceremonial worship (*vrata*) known as the *Karam Ekādaśī*. By performing it, you will get back your kingdom.’”

“Then Yudhisṭhira again said : ‘Please tell me what Karam Ekādaśī is, what Dharam is, who, in ancient times (first of all), performed this ceremonial worship (*vrata*), and who (first of all), promulgated this worship to the world.’”

“Kṛṣṇa said : ‘In the Gauda country there lived two brothers whose names were Karam and Dharam. They used to perform agricultural work by means of which they maintained their families (*lit.*, wives and children). Both these Brāhmaṇas were married and were uterine brothers. On a certain occasion, both these brothers quarrelled among themselves. Dharam said : “I am superior to you (Karam).” And Karam said : “I am superior to you (Dharam).” Dharam said : “If I am really virtuous, your acts (of merit) will be destroyed.” And Karam said : “If I am really a meritorious

man, your virtue will be destroyed." And Karam further added: "As you have, out of pride, cursed me, your virtue will be destroyed." And Dharam further added: "As you have, without any fault on my part, pronounced a curse on me, the same curse will recoil on yourself." In this way, Dharam's curse was pronounced on Karam, and Karam's curse was pronounced on Dharam. For this reason, both these men fell into troubles. That is to say, Dharam's virtue was destroyed; and Karam's acts of merit were also destroyed.'

"Then both these persons went to the forest. While going through the forest, they arrived at the shrine of the forest-goddess. The two brothers slowly went to the shrine. At that time, an ascetic was seated at that shrine and engaged in meditation. Seeing these two men, the ascetic said: "Please tell me who you are and for what purpose you have come here." '

"Then Karam replied: "We are two brothers and Brāhmaṇas and live in the Gauda country. Having been cursed by my brother, I have come to you. O ascetic! have compassion on me." '

"Thereupon the ascetic said: "If you wish to attain to happiness, perform the ceremonial worship known as the Karam Ekādaśī." '

"Then the Brāhmaṇa (named) Karam said: "Please tell me what are the rites prescribed for performing this ceremonial worship, what are the merits to be acquired from performing it, what are the offerings to be presented, and what is (the name of) the deity to be worshipped." '

"The ascetic again said: "This ceremonial worship will have to be performed on the eleventh day in the light fortnight of the (Hindi) month of Bhādo (August-September). You should dig two small ponds in the earth one of which should be filled with water, and the other

with milk. And you should plant a clump of *kuśa* grass in the space intervening between the two ponds. You should cover up this clump of *kuśa* grass with a new cloth. At that spot you should worship the deity Viṣṇu with offerings of incense, lamp, trays of rice, flowers, fruits, betel-leaves, areca-nuts and a present of money. If you wish to have good fortune, you should perform this ceremonial worship with feelings of devotion. (On the day of worship), you should take only one meal of fruits (and sweets). It will be very meritorious if you wholly abstain from taking food (on that day). Having performed this worship with these rites, you should listen to the legend and, then, present to the officiating Brāhmaṇa priest a cloth, a little of gold and a cow. O Brāhmaṇa ! you, accompanied by your wife, should perform this ceremonial worship with these rites. If you perform this ceremonial worship, Lakshmi, the goddess of wealth, will come to your dwelling-house and take up her residence there. The (effect of) your brother's curse will be destroyed, and your merit will be increased."

"Then Kṛiṣṇa, again addressing Yudhiṣṭhira, said : 'O great king ! you should also perform (the ceremonial worship known as) the Karam Ekādaśī. By the influence of this worship, you will regain your kingdom which your enemy has wrested from you.'"

"Yudhiṣṭhira performed this ceremonial worship and obtained the benefit accruing therefrom, that is to say, got back his kingdom. Those persons who will, with due rites, perform this ceremonial worship known as the Karam Ekādaśī, and worship (the deity) Harihara, will acquire all kinds of merit, and all their sins will be destroyed."

APPENDIX C

The Munda Legend about Sītā and Sītālī.

1. Once upon a time, there was a man named Sītā, and his wife was named Sītālī. One day, in a fit of buff, Sītālī left home and went somewhere. Her husband went in search of her. In the course of his search for his missing wife, he arrived at a town of which the shape was curved like that of a scythe and straight as the spindle of a spinning-wheel.

2. In a paddy-field near this town, a paddy-bird was foraging for food. Sītā enquired of this bird: "Has my wife Sītālī gone this way? Have you seen her?"

The paddy-bird replied: "I do not know Sītālī (*lit.*, *Sitāmitā*). I know only the pangs of my hunger (*lit.*, the fire of my bowels)."

At this reply, Sītā got enraged; and, catching hold of the paddy-bird and placing his feet on the bird's legs, he stretched out its neck and head. Since then, the paddy-bird's legs have become long and stilt-like, and its neck has become long and slim like that of a snake.

On account of the curse pronounced upon it by Sītā, the paddy-bird has to forage for food from morn to evening; but, notwithstanding this, its hunger is never appeased.

3. Leaving that town, Sītā wended his way and arrived at another town wherein he came across a plum-tree. He enquired of this tree: "Has my wife Sītālī gone this way? Have you seen her?"

The plum-tree replied: "Yes, I have seen her go by this way. I requested her to partake of my fruits. But she said that she could not tarry there as she had a long way to go. She only once leaned against my trunk. You will know this by the bits of her *sari* (cloth) which are sticking to my thorns."

From this Sītā concluded that his wife had really gone by that way. Being pleased with the tree, he conferred the boon of immortality upon it. As a result of this benediction, it would be seen that, though the plum-tree is cut down, it grows up again.

4. In the meantime, his wife Sītālī had arrived at another town in which she came across a milk-man and found a large number of cows and buffaloes tethered in his cattle-pen. She asked for a drink of milk from him. He pointed out a cow to her and told her to milk this cow and drink the milk. As soon as she went near this cow, the beast moved away and never allowed her to catch hold of her. Chasing this cow, she went a long way off and complained: "Ah! my deity Karam! I wanted to drink a little milk. But such is my bad lot that I have not been able to get it."

5. After a short time, Sītā also arrived at the aforementioned milk-man's cattle-pen, and enquired of the latter about the way his wife had gone. The latter pointed out to him the way she had gone.

Going in that direction, Sītā arrived at another town. There he came across a squirrel which was disporting itself on a mango-tree, and enquired of the latter about the way his wife had gone.

From the clue furnished by the squirrel, Sītā found out his wife Sītālī at a place close by. Being highly pleased with the squirrel, Sītā patted this little animal's back with his hand, and told it: "I am conferring on you the boon that, though you may fall down from a tree, you will never be killed by the fall."

As a result of this benediction, we find the black stripes on the squirrel's back and that it is never killed by a fall from a tree.¹

¹ Vide the Bengali monthly magazine *Sandesh* (published from Calcutta) for Kārtika, 1324 B. S. pp. 208-210.

Water Transport in Mediaeval India

BY

BEJOYKUMAR SARKAR, A.B. (Harvard).

A superficial view of the physical features of India would show that the country is covered with a network of natural waterways, free from the freezing effects of a severely cold climate, which make them unsuited to navigation in many other parts of the world for a considerable period of the year. The extensive plains of Northern India are blessed with three principal river systems—those of the Indus, the Ganges and the Brahmaputra, with their numerous branches and tributaries,—which make waterway communication possible over large tracts of the country during all seasons of the year. There is also a large number of rivers, the Godavari, the Krishna, the Caverry, the Nerbudda and the Tapti in Southern India, which are also navigable, though to a lesser degree and over considerably smaller areas, running as they do over rocks and valleys. These river systems, besides fertilising the soil over which they pass, have been the natural highways of commerce and colonisation from antiquity. It was along the Indus and the Gangetic valleys that the first Aryan settlers in India colonised Northern India, and disseminated their culture and civilisation; and it was along these same river banks that the great and wealthy cities of old flourished—cities like Kasi, Prayag, Pataliputra and others. From time immemorial the rivers have indeed

been one of the most important channels of inland trade and communication, in India as elsewhere, because of the advantages of easy and cheap transport. Even in the modern age, when the railroad intersects all parts of the land, the rivers carry not an inconsiderable volume of traffic in both the country boats and the steamships. It is the object of this paper briefly to enquire into the system of river transport and communication in Mediæval India, roughly from the 11th to the 18th century A. D.

We begin with the Punjab where we have the first important notice of water communication during the period under review in the description of the famous River battle at Multan between Sultan Mahmud and the Jats. According to the *Tubakat-i-Akbari* of Nizamuddin Ahmed, the last expedition of Sultan Mahmud was directed against the Jats of the Salt-Ranges, who had molested his army on its march from Somnath (1025 A. D.). It is stated that when Mahmud reached Multan, he "ordered 1,400 boats to be built, each of which was armed with three firm iron spikes, projecting one from the prow and two from the sides, so that everything which came in contact with them would infallibly be destroyed." With this fleet of boats Mahmud attacked the Jats, who, having intelligence of the enemy's arrangement, sent their families into the islands, and launched, according to some, 4,000 boats, and according to others 8,000 boats, manned and armed, ready to engage the Muhammadans," and completely routed them.¹ Doubts have been expressed by some critics regarding the truth of the large number of boats that took part in this naval action. They find it difficult to believe that it could be possible for the Jats to collect

¹ Elliot, *History of India*, Vol. II, p. 478.

such a huge flotilla of boats in so short a time as soon as they received intelligence of Mahmud's intentions. It would not however appear incredible and excite astonishment when we consider the very extensive scale of commercial operations on the rivers of the Punjab, which, even three centuries before the beginning of the Christian era, enabled Nearchus to perform his famous voyage down the Indus to the Persian Gulf, in a fleet of nearly 2,000 vessels collected from the Punjab waters.¹ We also learn from the *Ain-i-Akbari* that the principal means of locomotion in the Punjab was still by boats, the inhabitants of the Circar of Thatta alone (in Sindh) having no less than 40,000 vessels of various construction.²

In the latter part of the fourteenth century (A. D. 1372) Firoz Shah Tughlak led an expedition against Thatta, in which he is said to have collected and used a fleet of as many as 5,000 boats in which his army descended the River Indus and in a few days reached Thatta.³ The numerous hordes of Pathan and Mongol invaders from the time of Sultan Mahmud, who led his first Indian expedition against Jaipal in 1001 A. D., to that of Babar (1526-30) who appeared in India through the North-Western passes, had to depend almost entirely on ferries or bridges of boats to cross the mighty rivers of the Punjab, which goes to indicate that there must have been a considerable amount of river traffic in the Land of the Five Waters.

Coming to the time of Akbar, we have more adequate and interesting information regarding inland water transport in the various parts of the Empire. According to

¹ Vincent, *Commerce of the Ancients*, Vol. I, p. 12; Robertson, *Disquisition concerning Ancient India*, p. 196.

² *Ain* (Jarrett's translation), Vol. II, p. 338.

³ *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, Elliot, Vol. III, pp. 321-22.

Abul Fazl, during Akbar's reign was organised, on an efficient basis, the "Office of Meer Behry," or Admiralty, which had four principal objects in view:—(1) *First*.—The building of ships and boats for inland navigation. Vessels were built of various sizes and construction and for various purposes. There were those built for the transport of elephants, and those of such construction as to be employed in sieges, while others were made convenient for the conveyance of merchandise. The Emperor had also pleasure-boats built with convenient apartments, and others on which there were floating-markets and flower-gardens. While on this point, Abul Fazl observes: "Every part of the Empire abounds in boats; but in Bengal, Cashmeer, and Tata, they are the centre upon which all commerce moves;" (2) *Secondly*.—To look to the supply of men, of experienced sailors, who were versed in the nature of tides, knew the depths of channels, the coasts to be avoided, and the character of the prevailing winds, and were skilful swimmers, and were capable of undergoing fatigue and hardships; (3) *Thirdly*.—To watch the rivers for which an active and resolute man was appointed, who settled everything relative to the ferries, regulated the tonnage, and provided travellers with boats on the shortest notice. He was to allow those who were not able to pay at the ferries to pass over gratis; but no one was permitted to swim across a river. It was also the duty of this officer to prevent boats from travelling in the night, except in cases of urgent necessity. Nor was he to allow goods to be landed anywhere except at the public wharfs; (4) *Fourthly*.—The imposition, realisation, and remission of duties. Akbar is said to have remitted transit duties equal to the revenues of a kingdom. Nothing was exacted upon exports and imports excepting a trifle taken at the ports which never exceeded $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., and which was

so inconsiderable, that merchants regarded it as a perfect remission.¹

The *Ain-i-Akbari* also gives some interesting details regarding boat hire and ferry rates in Akbar's time. "The watermen employed in navigating boats in rivers have never less than 100 nor more than 500 *dams* each per mensem." "If a boat and people are hired, the rate for every thousand maunds is one rupee per cose. If only the boat is found by the owner, and the hirer pays the boatmen, it is only one rupee for two cose and a half." The following were the Rates :

For crossing at the Ferries :

| | | | |
|--------------------------|-----|-----|---|
| An elephant | ... | ... | 2 <i>dams</i> . ² |
| A cart loaded | ... | ... | 4 " |
| „ empty | ... | ... | 2 " |
| A camel loaded | ... | ... | 1 " |
| „ without a load | ... | ... | $\frac{1}{2}$ " |
| A horse or an ox loaded | ... | ... | $\frac{1}{2}$ " |
| An ox without a load | ... | ... | $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| An ass or an yabu loaded | ... | ... | $\frac{1}{4}$ " |
| A man | ... | ... | 1 $\frac{1}{4}$ <i>cheetel</i> . ³ |

And at many ferries a man passes free.⁴

It is also interesting to note in this connection that one of the principal duties of the *Kotwal* in Akbar's reign was to "see that particular ferries and wells are kept separate for the use of women only."⁵

Regarding the Punjab we have already noticed that in Akbar's time the inhabitants of this part of the country carried on the principal part of their communication with

¹ *Ajeen Akbery*, Gladwin's translation, Vol. I, pp. 231 ff.

² *Dam*, at first called *Paisah*, 40 *dams*=Re. 1. *Ain* (Blochmann), Vol. I, p. 31.

³ Blochmann's *Jetal*= $\frac{1}{2}$ of a *Dam*; *Ain* (Blochmann), Vol. I, p. 31.

⁴ *Ajeen* (Gladwin), Vol. I, pp. 233-34.

⁵ *Ibid*, p. 302.

one another by water and that the Circar of Thatta alone had boats of various kinds, large and small, to the number of 40,000. An idea of the amount of river traffic on the Indus valley may also be obtained from the *Badshah Nama* which records a furious storm at Thatta in 1636 A.D., that uprooted many huge trees and blew down 'nearly a thousand ships laden and unladen,' and brought heavy losses upon the ship-owners.¹ The carriage of goods in Kashmir also, according to Abul Fazl, was chiefly effected by means of boats, where the 'boatmen and carpenters drive a thriving trade.'² Of river navigation in the Punjab, we have the following further testimony from some of the prominent European travellers in India during the 17th century. William Finch (1609-11), the merchant companion of Hawkins, observes that from Lahore, down the Ravee and the Indus, "go many boats, of sixtie tunne or upwards for Tatta in Sind.....being a journey of some fortie dayes."³ Sir Thomas Roe, the celebrated English ambassador to the court of Jahangir, says: "According to such relations as I have gotten, the River of Syndu were most comodious of all others, to which from Lahore anything may pass by water."⁴ It is also stated in the *Khulasatu-t-Tawarikh*, a Persian manuscript of 1695 A.D., translated by Prof. Jadunath Sarkar, that in the province of Thatta there are many kinds of boats, and that the people depend mainly on them for purposes of conveyance, so that "merchants bring goods and stuffs from Multan and Bhakkar to Thatta in boats over this river. Nay, even travellers in this country and large armies do not travel to Thatta

¹ Elliot, *History of India*, Vol. VII, p. 61.

² *Ain-i-Akbari*, Vol. II, p. 351.

³ Purchas, *His Pilgrimes*, Vol. IV, p. 52. See also De Laët (1631 A.D.) tr. Lethbridge, *Calcutta Review*, Vol. LII (1871), p. 77.

⁴ *Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe*, Vol. I, p. 96. Roe's Syndu River is 'the mouth of the famous Indus,' as he observes later.

except by way of the river.”¹ Alexander Hamilton, who travelled in the East Indies for some thirty-five years from 1688 to 1723, and can therefore claim a good deal of knowledge about eastern affairs, has, in his “*New Account of the East Indies*,” the following appreciative words regarding navigation in and the vessels of the Punjab:—“... all share the benefits of inland navigation. Their vessels are called kisties, of several sizes. The largest can load about 200 tons. They are flat-bottomed, and on each side cabins are built from stern to stem, that overhang about two foot; and in each cabin is a kitchen and a place for exoneration, which falls directly in the water. Those cabins are hired out to passengers, and the hold, being made into separate apartments, are let out to freighters.... And indeed in all my travels I never saw better conveniencies of travelling by water.”² It was this flourishing boat traffic, which led to the prosperity of Lahori-Bandar as an important mediæval sea-port on the Indus—the Karachi of modern India,—with a large harbour, “into which ships from Persia, Yemen, and other places put” to carry the very fine cotton linen and printed goods, earthen pots, sugar, sugar candy, iron, olive oil, the ‘most excellent and faire’ leather, and various other products of Sind, once ‘a very rich and fruitful land,’ and the Punjab.³ The first steam vessel, the *Snake*, was launched on the Indus—the first that navigated any Indian river—cir. 1820 A.D.⁴

The greatest stir of commercial life and activity, both inland and foreign, was however felt in Bengal, which had been rightly famed for her abundant agricultural

¹ *India of Aurangzeb*, pp. 68, 71.

² Pinkerton, *Voyages*, Vol. VIII, p. 307.

³ *Travels of Ibn Batuta* (1341 A. D.), p. 102; Linschoten (1583), Vol. I, p. 56; Manucci (1655-1717), Vol. I, p. 59.

⁴ *Good Old Days of Hon'ble John Company*, Vol. II, p. 26.

and industrial wealth throughout the period under our review. Paundravardhan and Gaur in the Malda District, and Rampal in Vikrampur, Dacca, were the important centres of trade and industry under the Pala and Sena Kings long before the advent of the Muhammadans. These regions being greatly intersected by rivers and creeks naturally gave a great impetus to boat building, and a large amount of traffic was carried on by means of boats and sailing vessels. "In the Kalimpur copper-plate inscription of Dharmapaladeva there is a reference to bridges of boats built for the transport of armies, and also to an officer called Tarik, who was the general Superintendent of boats. In some of the copper-plate inscriptions of the Sena Kings, also, there is mention of naval force as an element of their military organisation."¹ Coming to the Muhammadan period, the earliest important reference to river navigation of any note that we have is regarding the naval expedition of Ghyasuddin Balban (1266-87 A.D.) against Tughril Khan, the Governor of Bengal. The Governor having rebelled and declared his independence, on the failure of two previous attempts, the Sultan resolved to march against him in person, and "ordered a large number of boats to be collected on the Ganges and the Jumna.....Proceeding into Oudh, he ordered a general levy, and two lakhs of men of all classes were enrolled. An immense fleet of boats was collected, and in these he passed his army over the Sarau (the Saraju or Gogra). The rains now came on, and, although he had plenty of boats, the passage through the low-lying country was difficult." Tughril fled from Lakhnauti, was pursued, defeated and slain.² The next important notice about river transport is in connection

¹ Prof. Radhakumud Mookerji, *History of Indian Shipping*, etc., p. 220.

² *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, Elliot, Vol. III, pp. 115-21.

with the two military expeditions of Sultan Firoz Shah Tughlak (1351-88 A.D.) against Bengal, which had declared its independence in 1340 and was never subdued, in both of which "many barrier-breaking boats (*Kistiha-i-Bandkushan*) were used, in which his whole army, consisting of a lac of troops, had to embark in crossing rivers round the islands Ekdala and Sunar-gnaw."¹ Hussain Shah (1498-1520), the most prominent of the independent Pathan rulers of Bengal, himself maintained a powerful fleet, with which he once invaded Assam.² The capital city Gaur was in those days probably the most famous inland mart of Bengal to which flocked merchants from various parts of the country. There is an interesting reference in one of the old folk-songs of *Gambhirā*, a Saivite festival in the modern Malda District (Bengal), that a merchant of the name of Dhana-pati "sailed from Delhi to Gaur in ships that occupied so much of the river that there was scarcely any room left for bathing or taking water."³

We have already seen that in the reign of Akbar elaborate regulations were made regarding the various functions of the office of *Meer Behry* or the Admiralty. The Naval Department was most efficiently organised in Bengal, and had under it, at the time it was established by Akbar, 3,000 war vessels (afterwards reduced to 768), besides the large number of vessels or boats that were required to be furnished by the Zemindars in return for the lands they held as *jaigir*.⁴ This powerful naval establishment—the Imperial *Nowarra*—was necessitated by

¹ *Tarikh-i-Firoz Shahi*, Elliot, Vol. III, pp. 293 ff.

² Blochmann's *Koch Bihar and Assam* in *J. A. S. B.*, 1872, Part I, No. 1.

³ Mookerji's *Indian Shipping*, p. 222.

⁴ Taylor, *Topography and Statistics of Dacca*, pp. 193-94; *Fifth Report*, Vol. I, pp. 245-66, 270. According to the *Waki'at-i Jahangiri* (Elliot, VI, 326), the Governor of Bengal always maintained in former times 8,000 horse, one lac of foot soldiers, 100 elephants, and 400 or 500 war boats,

the nature of the configuration of Bengal, where communication with the different parts, specially the eastern and the southern, was almost entirely impracticable except by the navigation of large and extensive rivers. It was further made imperative by the hostility of many a local Zemindar, like Isa Khan, Kedar Ray, Pratapaditya and others, who maintained large and powerful fleets and often stubbornly resisted the Mogul power before they could be brought to subjection toward the close of Akbar's reign, as well as by the repeated depredations of the Arrakan pirates, both Magh and Feringi, who, under the protection of the King of Arrakan, in their *jalba* boats, constantly ravaged the inland parts of Bengal as far as Dacca and Hugly, and carried off captives. The Arrakan pirates could not however be suppressed till their protector, the King of Arrakan, was defeated, in several naval engagements, by Shaista Khan, the Governor of Bengal, and Chatgaon, the fortified retreat of the pirates, was annexed to the Mogul Empire (1666 A.D.).¹

One of the important sources of revenue for the support of the *Nowarra* was the *Mheer Baree*, a tax which was levied on the building of boats varying from 8 *as.* to Re. 1-4 *as.*, according to the size of the vessels, and on all boats arriving at or leaving the naval headquarters whose crew were not resident of the district. The river toll was originally confined to the city but was later extended to the country, where it was exacted by the Zemindars from every boat that passed their estates.

¹ Jadunath Sarkar in *J. A. S. B.*, June, 1907. The *jalba* or the *jaliā* boat is variously styled as the gallevat, the galley, and the galeass, etc., by the European writers. Schouten gives the following description of the 'jaliasses.' These "are very long and narrow boats, apparently constructed principally with a view to swiftness. Indeed they cover long distances on the rivers. They carry no sails, but they have as many as thirty-eight or forty oars." Vol. II, p. 66.—Bowrey, p. 140, note.

"Though extremely oppressive and injurious to the inland trade," the water duty "was considered useful in leading to the detection of dacoits, as a registry of the boats, manjees, and boatmen belonging to each district was kept by the Zemindars." The duties levied on the boats sailing from Dacca, the head-quarters of the naval department, were :—

| | | Rs. | As. | |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|----------|
| To Murshidabad | ... | 0 | 8 | per oar. |
| „ Calcutta | ... | 0 | 10 | „ |
| „ Benares | ... | 1 | 8 | „ |

while those on boats arriving at Dacca from these places, were :—

| | | Rs. | As. | |
|------------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----------|
| From Murshidabad | ... | 1 | 0 | per boat. |
| „ Calcutta | ... | 2 | 0 | „ |
| „ Benares ¹ | ... | 4 | 0 | „ |

This brief review of the military aspect of water communication is sufficient to give us an idea as to what must have been the development of the means of river transport for the peaceful operations of trade and industry, specially in a place like Bengal, intersected as it always has been by numerous natural waterways and noted for its vast and varied wealth in raw and finished products throughout the length and breadth of India, and beyond. A land, which produced 'most plentiful' quantities of rice and sugar, 'so cheap that it were incredible to declare,' manufactured stuffs of cotton and silk, 'the best and cheapest,' salt, saltpetre, scented oils, opium, lac, etc., which, after adequately meeting the needs of local consumption, was sufficient for foreign export, whose

¹ Taylor, *Topography of Dacca*, pp. 198-99.

numerous ports like Satgaon, Hugly, Pipli, Chatgaon and others always bristled with commercial life and activity, and where some of 'the richest merchants' were to be found, could hardly have attained this glorious state of prosperity, unless the means of internal transport and communication was sufficiently developed, and it was made practicable to transfer goods from one part of the country to the other.¹ We have however little direct evidence regarding this, saying what we have already noted above, before we come to the 17th century. The *Ain-i-Akbari*, a valuable mine of information with regard to all economic matters during the sixteenth century, states, as we have already seen, that in Bengal, as in Kashmir and Thatta, the boats were "the centre upon which all commerce moves." There were also the bullock-carts and pack-animals, from time immemorial the chief means of land transport in all parts of India, to facilitate the transport of merchandise by land.²

From the beginning of the 17th century however we have some references to inland water transport by European writers to which we shall now refer. In his *Journal* written by John Jourdain, one of the servants of the English East India Company, in 1611 A.D., the writer observes in connection with the salt trade: "There is yearlie carryed from Agra to Bengala above 10,000 tonns of salte in greate barges of four and five hundred tonns apeece."³ Peter Mundy, probably the most prominent of the European travellers in India in

¹ Varthema (Cir. 1505 A.D.), p. 212; Linschoten (1583 A. D.), Vol. I, pp. 94-97; Bernier (1656-68), pp. 437 ff.; Bowrey (1669-79), pp. 132-34; Hamilton (1688-1723) in Pinkerton's *Voyages*, Vol. VIII, p. 415.

² For an account of the system of land transport in India during the mediæval period, see the writer's article in the *Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Volume*, No. 1.

³ Jourdain, p. 162. The salt was obtained from "the doab of Sindh Sagar" (between the Jhelum and the Indus) which is still famous for her vast deposits of

the first half of the 17th century (1628-34 A.D.), says that Great Lighters or Barjes of 3, 4, or 500 tons each regularly plied between Agra and Bengal, as far as Dacca, touching on the various important inland river stations like Etwa, Allahabad, Patna, etc., transporting chiefly salt and diverse other kinds of merchandise, and that many of these Lighters or Gabares (Gabbarts or Patelas) as he calls them, served also for transporting great men with their household and household stuff, and had houses in the middle for the women. Some of these great boats had "several rooms, able to carry a pretty village with all their inhabitants and goods; such is their hugeness."¹ Mundy also refers to the many pleasure boats he saw at Agra and Patna, which were owned by the nobles and other great people, and were their principal conveyance by water. They were what are now commonly known as the *Bajrā* or the *Mayurpankhi*, as will appear from the following description: "Theis boats I cannot resemble to any thinge better than a Gaefish (garfish), extraordinarie lowe, longe and slender, with 20, 25 or 30 oares of a side, all severally painted, some greene, some redd and blew, etts. The place where the great man sitts is either fore or in the midle, in a Curious Chowtree made of purpose. When they rowe to any place, they are stuck full of Flaggs there, hanginge downe on the prow, which shoots forward a mightie way, as doth the Sterne afterward on, both ends sharpe alike. I say, on both sides of the prow hang downe many of those Cowe Tailles so much esteemed. They use a Cheere

rock-salt. In the 17th century, "several lacs of maunds" of salt were obtained every year only from Khuhra and Keohra, two of the largest mines near Shamsabad; and the Imperial Government is said to have received a royalty from them amounting to the total revenue of other places.—*Khulasatu-t-Tauarikh, India of Aurangzeb*, pp. 100-101.

¹ *Travels of Peter Mundy*, Vol. II, pp. 87, 224. See illustration No. 17 for the Gabare. From Praye (Prayag), "many boats descend the river to Bengal"—*De Laet, Calcutta Review*, LII, 89.

to their Guing (? going), as wee doe in our Barges, one giveinge the word first and then all the rest answere."¹ Mundy also found on the Chambal in Rajputana "many great passinge boates, both ends lookeing upwards like a halfe moone or as you use to painte Shipps of auntient tymes, or Noahs Arke."² Some more interesting descriptions and representations of boats, that are 'amongst the best of the kind for the period,' are to be found in the *Geographical Account of Countries round the Bay of Bengal* by Thomas Bowrey, an English traveller in India during A.D. 1669-79. He gives the following descriptions of some of the boats then in use in Bengal: (1) The *Olocko*. "They row some with 4, some with 6 owers, and ply for a faire as wherries doe in the Thames;" (2) the *Budgaroo* (*Bajrā*) or Pleasure Boat. It has a convenient room at the stern, and is much used by the grandees and other great people; (3) the *Purgoo*. These they use "for the most part between Hugly and Pyplo (Pipli) and Ballasore. With these boats they convey goods into the Roads on board English and Dutch &c. ships. They will live a longe time in the sea, beinge brought to anchor by the sterne, as their usual way is"; (4) the *Boora*. It is "a very floaty light boat, rowinge with 20 or 30 owers. These carry saltpeeter and other goods (from Hugly) downewards, and some trade to Dacca with salt; they also serve for tow boats for the ships bound up or downe the river"; and (5) the *Patella*. These are boats "that come downe from Pattana with saltpeeter or other goods built of an

¹ Mundy, Vol. II, pp. 158, 224; see illustration No. 11. See also Stavorus *Voyages to the East Indies* (1768-78 A.D.), Vol. I, pp. 465-67, for a similar description of the *bajrā* and the *mayurpankhi* in Bengal. According to Wilcocke, the translator of these *Voyages*, the *mayurpankhi* sometimes extended to "upwards of an hundred feet in length, and not more than eight feet in breadth," and was "very expensive, owing to the beautiful decorations of painted and gilt ornaments, which are highly varnished, and exhibit a considerable degree of taste."

² Mundy, Vol. II, p. 63.

exceedinge strength and are very flatt and burthensome," each carrying down 4, 5, or 6,000 Bengal maunds of 82 lbs. each.¹ Bowrey also mentions that a very considerable amount of traffic was daily carried on in the great *bazars* of Hugly, where could be bought and sold all sorts of commodities of Bengal, Orissa and Patna, and the diverse imports from foreign parts.² According to Alexander Hamilton, the town of Hugly "drives a great trade. because all foreign goods are brought thither for import, and all goods of the product of Bengal are brought hither for exportation...It affords rich cargoes for fifty or sixty ships yearly, besides what is carried to neighbouring countries in small vessels."³ Regarding the navigation of the River Hugly Bowrey observes: "Up and downe the same a very considerable merchandize is drove, and very beneficiall, especially to the English and Dutch nations, haveinge excellent conveniences for carryinge theire European commodities up into the inland towns and citties, and the like for bringinge downe the commodities purchased in this or some other kingdoms."⁴

The *Gentleman's Gazette* of Calcutta records a furious hurricane at the mouth of the Ganges on October 11, 1737, which blew down a large number of houses, and it was computed that "20,000 ships, barges, sloops, boats, canoes, etc., have been cast away."⁵ In his *Memoir*

¹ Bowrey, pp. 225-29. For illustrations, see Plates XIII and XV. A hundred years later (1770 A.D.), Stavorinus notices some boats (called *Burs*) in Bengal, that "can load fifty thousand pounds weight of merchandize and more," and others, called *Pulwaks*, which "are very long, low, and narrow.....are not calculated for the conveyance of goods.....are very expeditious for passing from one place to another." The rooms in the *Bajrās*, according to Stavorinus, "are from six to seven feet in height, and are as commodious as if they were in a house."—*Voyages to the East Indies*, Vol. I, pp. 465-67.

² Bowrey, p. 168.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 168, note 3.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 166.

⁵ *Good Old Days of Hon'ble John Company* (compiled from newspapers and other publications by W. H. Carey from 1600 to 1858), Vol. I, p. 38.

of *Hindusthan* (1787 A.D.), Rennell observes that considering the very large amount of traffic that is carried on in Bengal it is no wonder that the inland navigation gives "constant employment to 30,000 boatmen."¹ These contemporary records would give us a fair idea as to the nature and extent of water transport in Bengal during the 18th century. Finally, we have the following interesting information regarding boat hire and the duration of voyage between Calcutta and other parts in the year 1781, as furnished by the "*Good Old Days of Hon'ble John Company.*"

Boat Hire (cir. 1781 A.D.)

| | Rs. |
|--|---------|
| For a <i>budgerow</i> ² of 8 <i>dandees</i> , per day | 2 |
| " " 16 " " | 6 |
| " " 24 " " | 8 |
| | Rs. as. |
| For a <i>woollock</i> of 4 <i>dandees</i> per month | 22 0 |
| " " 5 " " | 25 0 |
| " " 6 " " | 28 0 |
| For a boat of 250 maunds per month | 29 0 |
| " " 400 " " | 40 0 |
| " " 500 " " | 50 8 |

¹ Rennell, *Memoir of Hindusthan*, p. 255. See also Stavorinus, who says: "For carrying goods, carts of a very simple construction are made use of..... But the transporting of goods is mostly effected by water, through the numerous channels and creeks, with which the country (Bengal) is intersected."—Vol. I, p. 468.

² In days previous to steam navigation, the *budgerows* were the principal conveyances of Government officers and other great people, proceeding to the North-Western provinces and the different parts of Bengal where water communication was possible.

Duration of Voyage.

| | | | |
|-----------------------|----|-----|------|
| To go to Murshidabad | is | 25 | days |
| Patna | ,, | 60 | ,, |
| Benares | ,, | 75 | ,, |
| Cawnpore | ,, | 90 | ,, |
| Fyzabad | ,, | 105 | ,, |
| Malda | ,, | 37½ | ,, |
| Rungpore | ,, | 52½ | ,, |
| Dacca | ,, | 37½ | ,, |
| Chittagong | ,, | 60 | ,, |
| Goalpara ¹ | ,, | 75 | ,, |

The time taken to cover the distances between Calcutta and Murshidabad, Patna, etc., as indicated above, appears to be unusually long from what we know of boat journeys between the same places at the present day. We also find that in the time of William Hedges, a Company's servant (1682 A.D.), it took about 11 days by boat to go from Hugly to Dacca by way of Kasimbazar.²

Steam vessels appear to have been first introduced in Bengal in 1823 A.D.³

The materials for studying the transportation systems of Southern India are rather meagre; and here we are on less secure ground. But from what we know of South Indian economic conditions in the mediæval period, the following observations may perhaps be made in this connection. Southern India developed very little communication on her inland waters. The rivers of the Indian peninsula have never been much navigable except within a few miles of their mouths. The various country

¹ *Good Old Days*, etc., Vol. II, p. 15.

² *Diary of William Hedges*, Vol. I, pp. 36-42.

³ *Good Old Days*, etc., Vol. II, p. 18.

junks and vessels of the South seem to have been mainly used in the loading and unloading of ships in the numerous ports that studded the extensive range of the Indian sea-board; and the principal part of inland transport seems to have been effected by means of carts and pack-animals. This probably explains the comparative silence of mediæval writers on inland navigation in the South. From the earliest times South India has been chiefly celebrated for her trans-oceanic commerce; and it was to this ocean navigation that her attention was principally directed, and she early developed the arts of shipping and ship-building. For internal trade, besides land transport, she depended on coasting voyage which was so easy and convenient to her. The numerous mediæval ports from Lahori-Bandar to Chatgaon traded with one another and thus found an easier outlet for their saleable merchandise. The important centres of trade and industry in the South, moreover, were generally located near the sea-coasts probably to overcome, to some extent, the difficulties of transportation. We can here allude only to a few references of any note regarding boat traffic in the South. Pyrard de Laval, a French traveller who visited India in the year 1607 A.D., speaks of the *Manchoué* he saw at Goa, as being a large gondola which was rowed by 8 or 9 men. "It is very comfortable, being built in the form of a carriage, saving that it has no opening at the sides."¹ The *manchoué* was probably the same which Fryer calls a "baloon."² Peter Mundy refers to many country "junks" at Surat, each having a carrying capacity of as much as 1,000 and 1,200 tons. They generally navigated the mouth of the Tapti, and were a necessary adjunct of the most celebrated of the Indian

¹ *Travels of Pyrard de Laval*, Vol. II, Part I, pp. 42-43.

² Fryer, *A New Account of East India and Persia*, Vol. I, p. 182.

ports in his time.¹ Bowrey gives an account of two classes of boats, the *Massoola* and the *Cattamaran*, which were merely planks sewn together with coir or logs of wood joined together and securely fastened like a raft, which were mostly used on the Coromandel coast for fishing and for lading and unlading ships. They were most suited to brave the breakers on the beach; and they can still be seen in their primitive condition engaged in fishing along the Madras sea-board, and even at Puri. The *massoolas* were flat-bottomed, and could convey only very light goods, as bails of calicoes or silks, not exceeding 6 or 8 at a time. The *cattamarans* carried heavier weight of from 3 to 4 tons each.² John Fryer who visited India during 1672-81 A. D. landed at Masulipatam in one of these country boats. These he describes as being "as large as one of our ware-barges and almost of that mould, sailing with one sail like them, but paddling with paddles instead of spreads, and carry a great burthen with little trouble; outliving either ship or English skiff over the bar."³

Besides the numerous large and navigable rivers, there were also many artificial waterways in India during the period under review. These were however constructed mainly for the purposes of irrigation; and it is not known how far they were navigated. Some of the more important of the canals built during the period were the following:—(1) The famous Jumna and Sutlej Canals constructed about the year 1355 A. D. over a total length of nearly eighty *kos* during the reign of Firoz Shah Tughlak⁴; (2) Ali Mardan's Lahore Canal built by 'an adept' in canal construction about the year 1640 A. D.⁵;

¹ Mundy, Vol. II, p. 30.

² Bowrey, pp. 42-43; see Plate VIII.

³ Fryer, Vol. I, p. 79.

⁴ Elliot, *History of India*, Vol. III, p. 300.

⁵ *Ibid*, Vol. VII, p. 67.

and (3) Malijal Canal in the Dinajpur District of Bengal (18th century A. D.), which is said "to have carried a considerable volume of water."¹ There were also many artificial channels in the South constructed by the great Chola Emperors (10th and 11th centuries A. D.), and the Kings of Mysore (17th century A. D.).²

¹ *Bengal District Gazetteer (Dinajpur)*, p. 93.

² *Imperial Gazetteer*, Vol. IX, p. 304; Vol. X, p. 374; K. Aiyangar, *Ancient India*, pp. 185-87.

দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায় ।

(জীববর্গের স্বরূপ ।)

অনেকের মনে এই একটা ধারণা বদ্ধমূল হইয়া উঠিয়াছে যে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য যে অদ্বৈতবাদের ব্যাখ্যা করিয়াছেন, তাহাতে বস্তু বা জীবের কোন স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব স্বাকৃত হয় নাই। শঙ্করাচার্য্য জীবের স্বরূপকে উড়াইয়া দিয়াছেন। জীব যে সকল অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা গুণ দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়, ঐ সকল ধর্ম বা গুণ সমষ্টিই—জীব। ঐ সকল গুণ বা ধর্ম বিশিষ্ট যে, সেই জীব। ঐ সকল ধর্ম বা গুণ ছাড়া, জীবের আর কোন স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ নাই। সমুদ্র-বক্ষে বায়ু দ্বারা উৎক্ষিপ্ত তরঙ্গ, বুদ্ধদাদির শ্মায়া, এই সকল ধর্ম বা গুণ,— আসিতেছে, যাইতেছে; উঠিতেছে, পড়িতেছে। ইহাদের নিজের কোন উদ্দেশ্য নাই, কোন অভিপ্রায় নাই। এক ব্রহ্মবস্তু আপনাকে এই সকল ধর্ম বা গুণরূপে বিভক্ত করিয়া, জগদাকারে বিকাশিত রহিয়াছেন। সুতরাং, এই সকল ধর্ম ব্যতীত, আর অপরের কোন স্বরূপ থাকিবে কি প্রকারে? অনেকে মনে করেন, শঙ্করাচার্য্য নাকি এই কথাই শিক্ষা দিয়াছেন।

“Its resolution of human life into a series of acts mechanically related keeps it at what we must describe at a low level.” “The only personality that matters is that of the fettered soul, and to him his personal existence is the very bond he seeks to break.”

এই সকল ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়ার সমষ্টিই জীব। এই সকল কর্ম, জীবকে সংসারে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছে। এই সকল কর্ম বা ধর্ম বা বিকার সমষ্টিতে নষ্ট করিতে পারিলেই জীবের জীবন চলিয়া যাইবে; জীব মুক্ত হইবে। যতদিন এই সকল কর্ম রহিয়াছে, ততদিন জীব আপনাকে একটা ‘জীব’

বলিয়া মনে করিতেছে । জীবের এই প্রতীতি, নিতান্ত ভ্রমমূলক । কেন না, ব্রহ্মাইত এই সকল ধর্মরূপে অভিব্যক্ত রহিয়াছেন । সূতরাং জীবত মিথ্যা । এই প্রকারে শঙ্করাচার্য্য নাকি, এই সকল ধর্ম সমষ্টি ব্যতীত আর স্বতন্ত্র কোন স্বরূপ জীবের, স্বীকার করিতেন না । ইহাই অনেকের ধারণা !

এখন আমরা এই বিষয়টী পরীক্ষা করিয়া দেখিতে অগ্রসর হইব । শঙ্করাচার্য্য কি, অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা গুণ বা বিকারগুলির সমষ্টিকেই ‘জীব’ বলিয়া মনে করিতেন ; না, তিনি এই সকল ধর্ম ছাড়া প্রত্যেক জীবের এক একটা স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে,—ইহাই মানিতেন ? বিষয়টী বড় গুরুতর । তাই আমরা, এই বিষয়টীতে, পাঠকবর্গের মনঃসংযোগ প্রার্থনা করিতেছি ।

(১) তোমাকে আমি জানিতে পারিতেছি ; তুমি আমার জ্ঞানের ‘বিষয়’ হইতেছ ; সূতরাং তুমি আমার ‘জ্ঞেয়’ । তুমিও আমাকে জানিতে পারিতেছ ; আমি তোমার জ্ঞানের বিষয় হইতেছি ; সূতরাং আমিও তোমার ‘জ্ঞেয়’ । এই প্রকারে, আমরা পরস্পর পরস্পরকে জানিতে পারিতেছি । আবার, তুমি যেমন আমার উপকার বা অপকার করিতে পার ; আমিও তোমার উপকার বা অপকার করিতে পারি । এইরূপে, আমরা পরস্পর পরস্পরের উপকার বা অপকার ক্রিয়া উৎপাদন করিতে পারি । কেন এরূপ হয় ? এরূপ হইবার কারণ এই যে, তোমাতেও যে বস্তু আছে ; আমাতেও সেই বস্তুটী আছে । উভয়ের মধ্যেই একটা বস্তু সাধারণ । সে বস্তুটী কি ? উহা প্রাণ-স্পন্দন । তোমাতেও প্রাণ-স্পন্দনের অংশ বিশেষ ; আমাতেও প্রাণ-স্পন্দনের অংশবিশেষ রহিয়াছে । এই জগুই, তুমি আমার অংশ (Part) ; তোমাকে আমি জানিতে পারি ; এবং তোমার আমি উপকার বা অপকার করিতে পারি । আবার, এই জগুই, আমিও তোমার অংশ ; আমাকে তুমি জানিতে পার ; এবং তুমি আমার উপকার বা অপকার করিতে পার। একই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন, আমার দেহেন্দ্রিয়রূপে আমাতে আছে ; উহাই আবার তোমার দেহেন্দ্রিয়রূপে তোমাতে আছে । বাহিরেও, এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন বিষয়রূপে অবস্থান করিতেছে । একই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন সকল

* “পরস্পরোপকারোপকারকভূতং জগৎ সর্বং পৃথিব্যাদি । যচ্চ লোকে পরস্পরোপকারোপকারক-ভূতং, তৎ... একসামান্যস্বকং...দৃষ্টং ।...ভূতানাং শরীরান্তরুদয়েন উপকারাৎ মধুজং ; তদন্তর্গতানাং

জীবে আছে বলিয়াই, পরস্পর পরস্পরের অংশ, পরস্পর পরস্পরের জ্ঞেয় এবং প্রত্যেকে প্রত্যেকের উপকার বা অপকারে সমর্থ। কিন্তু, তুমি আমার অংশ বা জ্ঞেয় হইলেও, তোমার সবটাকে আমি সাক্ষাৎসম্বন্ধে জানিতে পারিতেছি না। তুমি আমার অংশ বটে ; কিন্তু অংশ ছাড়াও, তুমি কিছু অধিক। আমিও তোমার অংশ বা জ্ঞেয় হইয়াও, তদপেক্ষা আমি আর কিছু অধিক। এই জন্মই তুমি আমার সবটাকে সাক্ষাৎ সম্বন্ধে জানিতে পার না*। তোমার যেটুকু অধিক, সেইটাই তোমার ‘স্বরূপ’। এই প্রকার, আমার যেটুকু অধিক, সেইটাই আমার ‘স্বরূপ’। আমি আপন স্বরূপে ঠিক থাকিয়াই, তোমার অংশ বা জ্ঞেয় হইতেছি। তুমিও আপন স্বরূপে ঠিক থাকিয়াই, আমার অংশ বা আমার জ্ঞানের বিষয় (object) হইতেছ। সকল জীবের সম্বন্ধেই এই কথা। সকল জীবই, সকল জীবের অংশ ; কিন্তু তাহা হইয়াও, সকল জীবেরই একটা একটা ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে। তোমার দেহেন্দ্রিয়, আমার দেহেন্দ্রিয়ার সম্পর্কে আসিলে, আমাতে কতকগুলি ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়ার অভিব্যক্তি হয় ; কিন্তু, আমার যেমন ‘স্বরূপ,’ আমার ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়াগুলিও সেই স্বরূপের অনুযায়ী হইয়াই উৎপন্ন হয়*। এইরূপ, তোমাতে যে ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়াগুলির অভিব্যক্তি হইবে, তাহা তোমার যেমন ‘স্বরূপ,’ তাহারই অনুরূপ হইবে। জীবের যেমন ‘স্বরূপ’ বাহার ; তাহার ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়াও তদনুরূপই হইয়া থাকে। যে জীবের যেমন স্বরূপ, যেমন স্বভাব ;—প্রাণ-স্পন্দন সে জীবে তদনুসারে তাহার ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়া উৎপন্ন করে। এই

তেজোময়াদীনাং করণদ্বেনোপকারাৎ মধুদ্বং—ইত্যাদি (বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ২।৫।১)। “আদিত্যাক্ষিহ্নৌ পুরুষৌ একস্ত সত্যস্ত (প্রাণস্ত) অংশৌ”।—বৃহৎ ভাষ্য*। তন্ত্বেব সত্যস্ত ব্রহ্মণঃ (প্রাণস্ত) অধিদেবতমধ্যাক্ষক আয়তনবিশেষঃ (অংশৌ) উপদিষ্টঃ” (ব্রহ্মসূ, ৩।৩।২০)

* “কার্যকরণমু-র্ভৈঃ সংল্লেষো মূর্ত্তস্ত ; স তু ক্রিয়াহেতুর্দৃষ্টঃ”। “ন তু সাক্ষাদেব তত্র ক্রিয়া সম্ভবতি”। “কার্যকরণসংঘাত-ব্যতিরিক্তং, কার্যকরণাবভাসকং চ জ্যোতিঃ”। “ভূতভৌতিকমাত্রাঃ স্তস্ত সংসর্গকারণভূতাঃ বিদ্যন্তে ...বিবিক্তঃ স্তেন জ্যোতীরূপেণ” —ইত্যাদি, বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ৪।৩।

† “শব্দেন বিষয়েন শ্রোত্রামন্ত্রিয়ে দীপ্যতে ; শ্রোত্রেন্দ্রিয়ে সংগ্রহীণ্ডে, মনসি বিবেক উপজায়তে, তেন মনসা বাহ্যং চেষ্টাং প্রতিপদ্যতে ।...গন্ধাদিভিরপি ভ্রাণাদিযু অন্তর্গৃহীতেষু প্রবৃত্তিনিবৃত্তাদয়ো ভবন্তি”। ...“চক্ষুরাদীশ্চেব দর্শনাদিক্রিয়াকর্তৃনীতি চেৎ ? ন ; ভিন্নকর্তৃহে প্রতিসন্ধানানুপপত্তেঃ। মনসোহপি বিষয়ত্বাৎ (জ্ঞেয়ত্বাৎ)। জ্ঞেয়ত্বাৎপ্রাপত্তিঃ। তস্মাৎ অন্তঃস্থং ব্যতিরিক্তং জ্যোতিঃ ;”—বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ৪।৩।৬ & c.) “যন্তু পরিশিষ্টো বিজ্ঞানময়ঃ আত্মা—যদর্থোয়ং দেহলিঙ্গসংঘাতঃ, স উচ্যতে” (২।৫।১৬)

জগুই, তোমাতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা গুণ, আমাতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা গুণের সঙ্গে মিলে না ; পৃথক্ হয় । কেন না, তোমার ‘স্বরূপ’ হইতে, আমার ‘স্বরূপ’ ভিন্ন । এই জগুই প্রত্যেক জীবের ও প্রত্যেক বস্তুর গুণ ও ধর্মাদি ভিন্ন ভিন্ন দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় † । জীবের যদি আপন আপন স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব না থাকিত, তাহা হইলে, ধর্মের বা গুণের ভেদও পৃথিবী হইতে উঠিয়া যাইত । কেন না, কতকগুলি ধর্ম বা গুণ লইয়াই যদি জগৎসংসার হয়, তাহা হইলে—এগুলি মনুষ্য-জাতীয় ধর্ম বা গুণ, ওগুলি অশ্ব-জাতীয় ধর্ম বা গুণ, সেগুলি বৃক্ষ-জাতীয় ধর্ম বা গুণ,—এ প্রকার ধর্ম বা গুণের যে স্বরূপতঃ ভেদ দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়, সে ভেদের কারণ নির্ণয় করা অসম্ভব হইয়া উঠে । সুতরাং, এই ধর্ম বা গুণাদি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, এক একটা স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব প্রত্যেক জীবেরই আছে, ইহা স্বীকার করিতেই হইবে ‡ । এই জগুই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন, প্রত্যেক জীবে উহার আপন আপন ‘স্বরূপ’ অনুসারে, ধর্ম বা গুণাদির অভিব্যক্তি করিয়া থাকে ।

আমরা দেখিতে পাই, প্রাচীনকালে বালাকি নামে একজন ঋষি-তনয়, এই অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা বিকারগুলিকেই ‘জীব’ বলিয়া ধরিয়া লইয়াছিল । জীবের যে স্ব স্ব ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে, তাহা সে বুঝিত না । সে মনে করিত, এক প্রাণ-স্পন্দনই সর্বত্র নানা ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়ার আকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়া রহিয়াছে এবং এই ধর্মগুলিই জীব । অজাতশত্রু নামক ক্ষত্রিয় নৃপতি, বালাকির এই ভ্রমের অপনোদন করিয়া দিয়াছিলেন । তিনি বুঝাইয়া ছিলেন যে, ‘বিজ্ঞানময়’ জীবের—অভিব্যক্ত ধর্মগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, আপন আপন স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে † । প্রাণ-স্পন্দন—দেহেন্দ্রিয়রূপে ও

* “...মমতবতাদি-বিশেষানুপপত্তে: চ, সর্বব্যবহারলোপপ্রসঙ্গঃ” । গুণাদয়োপি বধ্যাসম্ভবং ভেদহেতবো যোজয়িতব্যঃ ।...একস্থাপি প্রাণস্ত অভেদেপি,...ব্যাবৃত্তাঃ গুণাঃ শিষ্যস্তে ।” (বেদাং সূত্র, ৩৩, ৫৮) । “বিদ্বজ্জগদ্ব্যপিত তু অধ্যাত্মাধৈবভেদাৎ প্রযুক্তিভেদো ভবতি” । “নহু এবং সতি...ধর্ম্মাঃ সর্বৈ সর্বত্র সঙ্গীর্ঘ্যে ন...একত্রেপি...উপাসনভেদো, ধর্ম্মব্যবস্থা চ ভবতি” (৩৩, ১২) ।

† “কুটস্থনিত্য এবায়ং বিজ্ঞানঘন আত্মা...মাত্রাভিস্ত অস্ত ভূতেন্দ্রিয়লক্ষণাভিঃ অবিভাকৃতাভিঃ অসংসর্গো বিদ্যম্ ভবতি । সংসর্গাভাবে চ তৎকৃতস্ত (i. e. সংসর্গকৃতস্ত) বিশেষবিজ্ঞানস্ত (i. e. অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্মাদেঃ) অভাবঃ.....স বিজ্ঞান-ধাতুরেব কেবলঃ”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১৪, ১২

‡ “প্রাণ একো দেব ইত্যুচ্যতে ।...স একঃ পুরুষবিধঃ...হিরণ্যগর্ভঃ...স্বর্গাদিপ্রবিভক্তকরণঃ । একং চ অনেকং চ ব্রহ্ম এতাবদেব, নাতঃ পরমস্তি, প্রত্যেকঞ্চ শরীরভেদেহু পরিসমাপ্তং কর্তৃত্বভোক্তৃ চ—ইতি

সূর্য্য-চন্দ্রাদির তেজ, আলোক, শব্দ স্পর্শাদি বিষয়রূপে—পরিণত হইয়া, প্রত্যেক জীবকে ও বস্তুকে পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছে। বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়যোগে, যে জীবের যেমন স্বরূপ তদনুসারে, সেই জীবে ধর্ম্ম বা ক্রিয়ার অভিব্যক্তি হইয়া থাকে। ব্রহ্ম হইতেই এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে। ব্রহ্ম-চৈতন্য, এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। অজাতশত্রু দেখাইয়াছিলেন যে, ধর্ম্ম বা বিকার গুলিই সব নহে। জীবের যেমন এই ধর্ম্মগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে; ব্রহ্মেরও তরূপ একটা স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে।

(২) শঙ্কর সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন যে, প্রত্যেক জীবের একটা স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ আছে। অণু বিষয়ের সহিত সম্পর্কে আসিলে, বা অণু কোন বস্তুর বা জীবের সহিত সম্বন্ধে আসিলে, ঐ স্বভাব হইতে কতকগুলি ধর্ম্ম বা গুণের অভিব্যক্তি হইয়া থাকে। পাঠক, শঙ্করাচার্য্যের এই সিদ্ধান্তটী বিশেষ করিয়া মনে রাখিবেন। তাহা হইলেই আমরা পাইতেছি যে, জীবের একটা স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ, এবং সেই স্বভাবের অভিব্যক্তি বা বিকাশ।—স্বভাব এবং সেই স্বভাব হইতে অভিব্যক্ত কতকগুলি ধর্ম্ম বা গুণ বা ক্রিয়া। স্বভাব এবং সেই স্বভাবের এক অবস্থা হইতে অবস্থান্তর-প্রাপ্তি। শঙ্করাচার্য্য আমাদিগকে, জীবের স্বভাব এবং সেই স্বভাব হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম্মগুলি সম্বন্ধে এই প্রকারে তাঁহার অভিমত ব্যক্ত করিয়াছেন—

(a) “বস্তুর যেটা স্বরূপ, সেটা অণু কাহারও উপরে নির্ভর করে না; অণু কাহারও অপেক্ষা রাখে না। যাহা অপর কাহারও অপেক্ষা রাখে না, তাহাই বস্তুর স্বরূপ। কিন্তু যাহা অণুর অপেক্ষা রাখে; যাহা অণু কোন বস্তুর উপরে নির্ভর করে, তাহা কখনই বস্তুর স্বরূপ হইতে পারে না। কেন

অবিদ্যাবিষয়মেব আত্মত্বেন উপগতঃ গার্গো ব্রাহ্মণঃ বক্তা। তদ্বিপরীতান্নদৃক্ অজাতশত্রুঃ শ্রোতা।..... তস্মাৎ আদিত্যাদিব্রহ্মভ্যো এতেভ্যঃ অবিজ্ঞানময়েভ্যো পিলক্ষণঃ, অস্মো অস্তি বিজ্ঞানময়ঃ ইত্যেতৎ-সিদ্ধং।” (বৃহৎ ভা°)।

“উত্তরগ্রন্থপ্রবৃতিঃ (জীবন্ত) সংসারি-ধর্ম্ম নিরাকরণপরী লক্ষ্যতে।.....কিং তর্হি? অবস্থারহিতত্বং অসংসারিত্বঞ্চ বিবক্ষতি”—বেদান্তসূত্র, ১।৩।৪২।

“আদিত্যে পুরুষঃ, চন্দ্রমসি পুরুষঃ—ইত্যেবমাদয়ঃ পুরুষাঃ নির্দিষ্টাঃ।...ক্রমঃ, পরমেশ্বর এব এতেষাং পুরুষাণাং কর্ত্তা।.....কর্ত্তৃরক্ এতেষাং পুরুষাণাং ন পরমেশ্বরাদিত্যন্ত স্বাতন্ত্র্যেণ অবকল্পতে।...যে ব্যাক্যাস্তি ব্রহ্মভূতিমতাঃ পুরুষাঃ কীর্ত্তিতাঃ, তেষাং অত্র ব্রহ্মস্থাপনায় বিশেষোপাদানং”—ইত্যাদি, ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।৪।১৬।

না, উহা ত সেই অগ্নি বস্তুটী না থাকিলে, থাকে না। একটা বস্তু হইতে যে বিশেষ বিশেষ ধর্ম উৎপন্ন হইতে দেখা যায়, উহা অগ্নি কোন বস্তুর সহিত সংসর্গের ফল। এই বিশেষ বিশেষ ধর্মগুলিকে ঐ বস্তুর বিকার বলা যায়”*।

(b) “সর্বত্রই আমাদের দুই প্রকার বুদ্ধি উপস্থিত হইতে দেখা যায়। এক, ‘সৎ’-বিষয়ক বুদ্ধি; অপর, ‘অসৎ’-বিষয়ক বুদ্ধি। উভয় প্রকার বোধের মধ্যে, আমাদের ‘সৎ’-বিষয়ক বোধটী কখনই এক একবার এক একরূপ হয় না; উহা সর্বদাই একরূপ থাকে। কিন্তু ‘অসৎ’ বিষয়ক বোধটী সর্বদাই রূপান্তর ধারণ করে। মৃত্তিকা এবং মৃত্তিকার বিকার ঘট-শরাব প্রভৃতি। এস্থলে, আমাদের মৃত্তিকার বোধটী নিয়ত একরূপ থাকে; কিন্তু ঘট-শরাবাদি বিকার-বিষয়ক বোধটী পরিবর্তিত হয়। এ স্থলে মৃত্তিকাকে বস্তুর স্বরূপ বলা যায়; কিন্তু উহার ঘট-শরাবাদি বিকারকে স্বরূপ বলা যায় না।”

এইরূপে, বস্তু বা জীবের ‘স্বরূপ’ এবং সেই স্বরূপ হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা বিকার-গুলি সম্বন্ধে বিবরণ দিয়া, শঙ্করাচার্য্য কি প্রকারে উভয়ের মধ্যে (contrast) দেখাইয়াছেন, তাহাই আমরা পাঠকবর্গের সুবিধার নিমিত্ত একত্র সংগ্রহ করিয়া এস্থলে প্রদর্শন করিতেছি :—

(i) সকল বস্তুরই একটা ‘স্বভাব’ বা স্বরূপ আছে। বস্তুর স্বভাবটী, দেশ-কাল ও অবস্থার ভেদেও, পরিবর্তিত হয় না, রূপান্তর ধারণ করে না। সুতরাং উহা ‘নিত্য’। কিন্তু অগ্নি বস্তুর সংযোগ বশতঃ উহাতে যে সকল ধর্ম বা বিকার উৎপন্ন হয়, সেই ধর্ম বা বিকারগুলি পুনঃ পুনঃ পরিবর্তিত হয়, রূপান্তর গ্রহণ করে, সুতরাং উহার ‘অনিত্য’। বিকারগুলি এক অবস্থা হইতে অবস্থান্তর প্রাপ্ত হয়, সুতরাং উহার পরস্পর ‘ব্যাবৃত্ত’

* “সতো বিশেষঃ কারকপেক্ষঃ, বিশেষশ্চ বিক্রিয়া। যদ্বি যন্ত ন অন্ত্যাপেক্ষঃ স্বরূপং, তৎতত্ত্ব তত্ত্বং—স্বরূপং। যদন্ত্যাপেক্ষং, ন তত্ত্বং;—অন্ত্যভাবে অন্ত্যবাৎ”—তৈত্তিঃ ভাষ্য, ২।৮। “নৈতৎ সদ্ধাখ্যং (ব্রহ্ম) খেন রূপেণ ব্যভিচরতি...নাপি আত্মীয়েন”—গীতা ভাষ্য, ২।১৭।

+ “সর্বত্র বুদ্ধিঃ সর্বত্রোপলব্ধঃ,—সর্বত্র সর্বত্র বুদ্ধিরিতি। যদ্বিষয়া বুদ্ধিঃ, ন ব্যভিচরতি, তৎ—সৎ। যদ্বিষয়া ব্যভিচরতি, তৎ—অসৎ। সর্বত্র যে বুদ্ধী সর্বত্রোপলভ্যেতে সমানাধিকরণে—সন্ ঘটঃ, সন্ পটঃ, সন্ হস্তী ইত্যেবং সর্বত্র। তয়োবুদ্ধ্যোঃ ঘটাদি-বুদ্ধিঃ ব্যভিচরতি...ন তু সর্বত্র বুদ্ধিঃ। তয়ো ঘটাদিবুদ্ধি-বিষয়ঃ অসন্ ব্যভিচারঃ; ন তু সর্বত্র বুদ্ধিবিষয়ঃ অব্যভিচারঃ”—গীতা ভাষ্য, ২।১৬।

(Mutually exclusive)। কিন্তু বস্তুর স্বভাবটী, সকল অবস্থান্তরের মধ্যেও ‘অনুগত’ (continued identity) থাকিয়া যায়* ।

(ii) সর্বত্রই ইহা দেখিতে পাওয়া যায় যে, বস্তুর ধর্ম বা গুণগুলি অন্য কোন বস্তুর সংযোগে উৎপন্ন হয় । ইহাকে শঙ্করাচার্য্য ‘কারক-ব্যাপার’ বা ‘নিমিত্ত-কারণ’ বলিয়া নির্দেশ করিয়াছেন । আমরা ইহাকে stimulus বা stimulating cause বলিতে পারি । কিন্তু বস্তুর যেটী ‘স্বভাব’ বা ‘স্বরূপ,’ তাহা কোন ‘নিমিত্ত-কারণের’ অপেক্ষা রাখে না ; উহা কাহারও দ্বারা উৎপন্ন হয় না ।

(iii) অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা ক্রিয়া বা গুণগুলিকেই, বস্তুর ‘স্বভাব’ বলা যায় না । বস্তুর যেটী স্বভাব, সেটী এই সকল ধর্ম বা গুণ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র । ধর্মগুলিই যদি বস্তুর স্বভাব হয়, তাহা হইলে এই ধর্মগুলির পরিবর্তন ও সম্ভব হইত না, এবং বস্তুকে বা জীবকে এই ধর্ম বা বিকারগুলি হইতে বিযুক্ত করাও সম্ভব হইত না । কেন না, যাহার যাহা স্বভাব, সে সেই

* “ন চ স্বাভাবিকো ধর্ম এব নাস্তি পদার্থানাং ইতি শকাং বক্তুং । ন চ স্বাভাবিকাং স্বভাবাং অন্তঃ নিত্যং কল্পয়িতুং শকাং” ।

“নহি ক্রিয়ানিবৃত্তিঃ অর্থঃ নিত্যো দৃষ্টঃ” (বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ৪।৪।৬) ।

“ন চ পদার্থস্বভাবো নাস্তি । নহি অগ্নেঃ উষ্ণ-স্বভাবাৎ অন্ত্রনিমিত্তং, উদকস্ত বা শৈত্যং” (৪।৩।৬) ।
‘কারকবিশেষোপাদানেন ক্রিয়াবিশেষ মুৎপাদ্য লক্ষ্যঃ ; স তু অপ্রাপ্তপ্রাপ্তিলক্ষণঃ অনিত্যঃ’ (বৃঃ ভাঃ, ১।৪।৭) ।

“ন হি যন্ত যঃ স্বভাবঃ নিশ্চিতঃ, স তঃ ব্যভিচারতি কদাচিদপি” (২।১।১৫) ।

“যদ্ব্যকো যঃ পদার্থঃ প্রমাণেন অবগতো ভবতি, স দেশকালাবস্থান্তরেণপি তদ্ব্যক এব ভবতি । স চেৎ তদ্ব্যকত্বং ব্যভিচারতি, সর্বঃ প্রমাণব্যবহারো লুপ্যত” (২।১।২০) ।

“অবস্থাত্রয় সাক্ষী একোহব্যভিচারী, অবস্থাত্রয়েন ব্যভিচারিণাম সংস্পৃশতে” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।১৬) ।

† “কাধ্যাকারেণ কারণঃ ব্যবস্থাপরতঃ, কারকব্যাপারস্ত অর্থবস্ত্বং আয়াতি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।১৮) ।
“কর্মহি কারকমনপেক্ষা নাস্ত্বানং প্রতিভতে :...ক্রিয়ায়াহি কারকাত্মনেকনিমিত্তোপাদানস্বাভাবাৎ... কর্মণাং কাক্ষিতকারকত্বাৎ” (বৃহৎ ভাঃ, ১।৪।১৩) “সাধ্যস্তহি সাধনাদেবণা ক্রিয়তে...আত্মা চ আত্মদ্বাদেব ন কেনচিৎ সাধনেন উৎপাদ্যঃ বিকার্যো বা” (৪।৪।২২) । “সর্বত্রহি কারকসাধ্যাক্রিয়া... কারকভাবে অনুপপত্তিঃ ক্রিয়ায়াঃ” (২।৪।১৪) ।

“যৎ কদাচিদিব্যাক্র্যতে...অনান্তত্বং তদিতি, অন্ততেহভিব্যক্তিপ্রসঙ্গঃ, তথাচ অভিব্যক্তিসাধনাপেক্ষতা । ...ইদন্ত আত্মভূতমেব...নিত্যভিব্যক্তত্বাৎ” (৪।৪।৩) ।

স্বভাবকে পরিত্যাগ করিয়া থাকিবে কি প্রকারে ? সুতরাং বস্তুর স্বভাব ও তাহার ধর্ম, এক জিনিষ নহে* ।

(iv) অথ কোন বস্তুর সহিত সংসর্গে আসিবার পর, তদ্বারা উদ্ভিক্ত হইবার পর, এই ধর্মগুলি উৎপন্ন হয় । অথ বস্তুর সহিত সংসর্গ না জন্মিলে, নিমিত্ত-কারণ (stimulating cause) উপস্থিত না হইলে, ধর্মগুলি উৎপন্ন হয় না । কিন্তু বস্তুর বা জীবের যেটা ‘স্বভাব,’ সেটা, এরূপ কোন সংসর্গ বা নিমিত্ত-কারণের অপেক্ষা রাখে না । স্বভাবটা নিত্য ; সুতরাং উহা কোন কারণান্তর দ্বারা উৎপন্ন হয়, ইহা বলা যাইতে পারে না† ।

(v) বস্তুর একটা ‘স্বভাব’ পূর্ব হইতেই না থাকিলে, অপর বস্তুর সংসর্গে, উহা হইতে ধর্ম-গুলি উৎপন্ন হইবে কিরূপে ? সুতরাং বস্তুর একটা স্বভাব পূর্ব হইতেই ছিল, ইহা বলিতেই হইবে । নতুবা, ধর্ম-গুলি বা বিকার-গুলি শূন্য হইতে উৎপন্ন হইল, ইহাই বলিতে হয় । এই জন্তই ভাষ্যকার “অসৎ-কার্যবাদে” খণ্ডন করিয়াছেন । এই খণ্ডন দ্বারাও বুঝিতে পারা যায় যে, তিনি জীবের বা বস্তুর একটা স্ব স্ব ‘স্বভাব’ আছে, ইহা স্বীকার করিতেন । তাহা না হইলে, এই ‘অসৎ কার্যবাদ’ খণ্ডন করিবার কোনই প্রয়োজন ছিল না‡ ।

* “আত্মনস্ত...কাম কৰ্ম্মভ্যাং বিবিক্ততা উক্তা” (বৃহ’ ভাষ্য, ৪।৩।১২) ।

“স্বভাবশ্চেৎ ক্রিয়াস্তাং, অনির্মোক্ষতৈব জ্ঞাৎ, ন তু স্বভাবঃ অতঃ বিমোক্ষ উপপাদ্যতে (৪।৩।১৫) । “ন তু স্বভাবিকেন ধর্মেণ কন্তুচিং বয়োগো দৃষ্টঃ । নহি অগ্নেঃ স্বভাবিকেন প্রকাশেন উজ্জ্বল বা বিয়োগো দৃষ্টঃ ।...অসতি অণুসংসর্গে, যো ধর্মো যন্ত দৃষ্টঃ, স তৎ-স্বভাবত্বাৎ ন তেন বিয়োগ মর্হতি” (৪।৩।৮) । “নহি তদ্ব্যবস্থায় সতি, তৈরেব সংযোগ বিয়োগো বা দৃষ্টঃ (৪।৩।৯) ।

† “ন হি সোহন্তি লোকে পরমার্থতঃ, যো নি মন্তব্যঃ ভাবান্তরমাপদ্যতে, নিত্যশ্চেতি” । “ন চ পারমার্থিকং বস্ত কৰ্ত্তুং নিবর্তয়িতুং বা শক্যতে” (বৃহ’ ভাষ্য, ১।৪।১৩) । “নহি অগ্নেঃ-উষ্ণত্বাভাব্য অণুনিমিত্তং, উদকস্ত বা শৈত্যং” ।

“স্বভাবিকশ্চেৎ অগ্নুষ্ণবৎ আত্মনঃ স্বভাবঃ, স ন শক্যতে পুরুষব্যাপারানুভাবীতি বক্তুঃ ; ন হি অগ্নে রৌক্ষ্যং প্রকাশো বা অগ্নিব্যাপারানুভাবী, অগ্নিব্যাপারানুভাবী, স্বভাবিকশ্চেতি বিপ্রতিবন্ধঃ—ইত্যাদি” (বৃহ’ ভাষ্য, ৪।৪।৬) ।

“অধিক্রমত্বাৎ নিত্য...অকৰ্ম্মসম্বন্ধী” (৪।৪।২৩) ।

‡ “এবমপি প্রাগদিক্ত অলঙ্কারকস্ত কার্যন্ত কারণেন সম্বন্ধো নোপপাদ্যতে, দ্বয়ান্বিত্যং সম্বন্ধস্ত” ইত্যাদি, (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।২।১৭) ।

“যন্ত তু পূনঃ প্রাপ্তপত্তেঃ অসৎ কার্যং, তন্ত নিবিশয়ঃ কারকব্যাপারঃ জ্ঞাৎ, অভাবন্ত বিষয়দ্বানুপপত্তেঃ”—ইত্যাদি (২।১।১৮) । “ন চ পদার্থস্বভাবো নান্তি ইতি বক্তুং শক্যতে”—বৃহ’ ভাষ্য” ।

এই সকল যুক্তি দ্বারা আমরা পাইতেছি যে, জীবে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম-গুলিকেই যে জীবের স্বরূপ বলিয়া শঙ্করাচার্য্য সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন, তাহা নহে। তিনি, ধর্মগুলি হইতে জীবের স্বরূপ যে স্বতন্ত্র,—তাহাই সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন।

(৩) কারণ এবং কার্য্য,—ইহাদের মধ্যে সম্বন্ধ কি, ইহা দেখাইবার জন্য, শঙ্করাচার্য্য বেদান্ত দর্শনের দ্বিতীয় অধ্যায়ের একটা সম্পূর্ণ পাদ ব্যয় করিয়াছেন। দর্শন শাস্ত্রে “কার্য্য-কারণ” কথাটা দুই প্রকার অর্থে ব্যবহৃত হইয়াছে। পাঠকবর্গকে সে কথাটা বলিয়া দেওয়া আবশ্যক। বিকারগুলি একটা অবস্থা হইতে অপর একটা অবস্থা ধারণ করে। পূর্ববর্তী অবস্থাটাকে, উহার পরবর্তী অবস্থার ‘কারণ’ বলিয়া নির্দেশ করা যাইতে পারে। কিন্তু বিকার-গুলি একটা বস্তুর ‘স্বরূপ’ হইতেই অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছে। বস্তুর এই স্বরূপটা ঐ দুই অবস্থার মধ্যেই অনুগত থাকে। পূর্ববর্তী অবস্থাটা বিনষ্ট হইয়া, পরবর্তী অবস্থা ধারণ করার সময়ে, বস্তুর যেটা প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, সেই স্বরূপটা বিনষ্ট হইয়া যায় নাই। পূর্বাবস্থার মধ্যেও স্বরূপটা ছিল; বর্তমানের যে অবস্থাটা আসিয়াছে, তাহার মধ্যেও সেই স্বরূপটা আছে। এই স্বরূপটাকেও ‘কারণ’ শব্দে নির্দেশ করা যাইতে পারে। শঙ্করাচার্য্য আমাদের স্পষ্ট করিয়া বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, তিনি যেখানেই ‘কারণ’ শব্দটা ব্যবহার করিবেন, সেইখানেই, ঐ পরবর্তী অর্থে ব্যবহার করিবেন; পূর্বোক্ত অর্থে ব্যবহার করিবেন না। অর্থাৎ, তিনি বস্তুর বা জীবের স্বরূপটাকেই ‘কারণ’ বলিবেন। আর, অণু বস্তু সংসর্গে, ঐ স্বরূপ হইতে যে সকল ধর্ম বা বিকার অভিব্যক্ত হয়, সেগুলিকে তিনি, উহার ‘কার্য্য’ বলিবেন*। এই নিয়ম ঠিক করিয়া লইয়া তিনি, কারণ বা বস্তুর স্বরূপ এবং উহা হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা বিকারগুলি,—এই উভয়ের মধ্যে পরস্পর কিরূপ সম্বন্ধ, তাহার বিচার করিয়াছেন। এই বিচার দ্বারাও আমরা বুঝিতে পারি যে, তিনি ধর্ম বা বিকারগুলিকেই যে বস্তু বা জীবের স্বরূপ বলিতেন ইহা নিতান্তই অসত্য কথা। অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম-গুলি হইতে

* “যেষাং বীজাদি স্বরূপোপমর্দোল্ল্যভ্যতে, তেষাং নানাবৃক্ষমৃদানাং পূর্বাংস্থা উত্তরাবস্থায়াঃ ‘কারণং’ অভ্যুপগম্যতে; অনুপমৃদমানানামেব অনুবায়িনাং বীজাদ্যবয়বাং অঙ্কাদি ‘কারণ’-ভাবাভ্যুপগমাৎ।—অতঃ কুটস্থাদেব কারণং কার্য্যমুৎপত্ততে”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।২।২৬

স্বতন্ত্র যে জীবের একটা একটা স্বরূপ আছে,—তিনি তাহাই সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন। তাহা না হইলে, কারণ ও কার্যে সম্বন্ধ কিরূপ, এই সম্বন্ধ নির্ণয় করিবার কোনই প্রয়োজন ছিল না।

(৪) এই স্থলেই আমরা শঙ্করাচার্য্যের আর একটা মূল্যবান যুক্তির দিকে পাঠকের দৃষ্টি আকর্ষিত করিতে চাই। ক্ষুদ্র হইতে উচ্চ পর্য্যন্ত, বস্তু বা জীবের মধ্যে যে নানা শ্রেণীর বস্তু বা জীব আছে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য ইহাও বলিয়া দিতে ভুলেন নাই। একথাটাও লোকে প্রণিধান করিয়া দেখে না। শঙ্কর বলিতেছেন—

“যদি বস্তুর বা জীবের ধর্ম্ম বা বিকারগুলিই যথা-সর্ববশ্ব হয় ; যদি ধর্ম্ম বা বিকারগুলি ছাড়া, বস্তু বা জীবের আপন আপন ‘স্বরূপ’ না থাকে, তাহা হইলে আমরা সর্ববত্রই এরূপ কেন দেখিতে পাই যে,—কতকগুলি বিকারের মধ্যে আগাগোড়া ‘মুক্তিকারই’ স্বরূপ ফুটিয়া উঠে ; আর কতকগুলি বিকারের মধ্যে আগাগোড়া কেবল ‘সুবর্ণেরই’ স্বরূপ ফুটিয়া উঠে ; আবার, অপর কতকগুলি বিকারের মধ্যে আগাগোড়া কেবল ‘অশ্বেরই’ স্বরূপ ফুটিয়া উঠে, অপর কাহারও স্বরূপ পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠে না ? ইহার তবে কারণ কি ? সব যদি কেবল ধর্ম্ম বা বিকার মাত্রই হয়, তাহা হইলে সকল বিকারের মধ্যেইত, সকলেরই স্বরূপ পরিস্ফুট হইতে পারিত। কিন্তু তাহা ত কখনই হয় না। যে ঘট নিশ্চয় করিতে ইচ্ছুক, তাহাকে মুক্তিকাই সংগ্রহ করিতে হইবে ; সুবর্ণ সংগ্রহ করিলে চলিবে না। আবার যে কর্ণ-কুণ্ডল নিশ্চয় করিতে চায়, তাহাকে মুক্তিকা লইলে চলিবে না ; সুবর্ণ-সংগ্রহ করাই উহার পক্ষে আবশ্যক হইবে। সুতরাং, এক একটা বিকারের যে সকল অবস্থার ভেদ হয় ; ঐ সকল অবস্থারই মধ্যে যখন আগাগোড়া একটা নির্দিষ্ট বস্তুরই*

* (১) “ন চ মুদঘিতাঃ শরাবাদয়ো ভাবাঃ, তস্মাদি-বিকারাঃ কেনচিৎ অভ্যুপগম্যন্তে। মুক্তিকারাদেব তু মুদঘিতান্ ভাবান্ লোকঃ প্রত্যোতি।...বীজাদেব অঙ্কুরো জায়তে, ক্ষীরাদেব দধি—ইত্যেবং জাতীয়কঃ কারণবিশেষাভ্যুপগমঃ অর্থবান্ ত্রাং। নির্বিশেষস্ত তু অভাবস্ত কারণত্বাভ্যুপগমে, শশবিষাণাদিভ্যোপি অঙ্কুরাদয়ো জায়েরনঃ ; ন চৈবং দৃশ্যতে।...সর্বস্ত চ বস্তুনঃ সেন সেন রূপেণ ভাবাত্মনৈব উপলভ্যমানত্বাৎ” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।২।২৬)।

(২) “দধিষট্ৰুচকাত্তর্থাভিঃ প্রতিনিয়তানি কারণানি ক্ষীরমুক্তিকাসুবর্ণাদীনী উপাদীয়মানানি লোকে দৃশ্যন্তে। ন চ দধ্যতিভিঃ মুক্তিকা উপাদীয়তে, ন ঘটর্থাভিঃ ক্ষীরং। অবিশিষ্টে হি প্রাপ্তংপত্তে, সর্বস্ত সর্বত্র অসদে, কস্মাৎ ক্ষীরাদেব দধি উৎপত্ততে, ন মুক্তিকারঃ ? (২।১।১৮)।

স্বরূপ পরিস্ফুট হইতে থাকে দেখা যায়, উহাতে আর অপর কোন বস্তুর স্বরূপ পরিস্ফুট হয় না, তখন প্রত্যেক বস্তু ও প্রত্যেক জীবের যে একটা একটা পৃথক পৃথক ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে, এই তত্ত্বই প্রমাণিত হইতেছে। এই মূল্যবান যুক্তি হইতে আমরা পাইতেছি যে, শঙ্কর-মতে, অভিব্যক্ত ধর্ম বা বিকার-গুলিই যে বস্তু বা জীব, তাহা নহে; বস্তু বা জীবের যেটা ‘স্বরূপ,’ সেটা এই ধর্ম বা বিকার হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। আর, প্রত্যেক জীবের ও প্রত্যেক বস্তুর একটা একটা আপন আপন ‘প্রতিনিয়ত’ স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে*। লোকে না বুঝিয়া বলে যে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য জীবের স্বরূপ, বস্তুর স্বরূপ উড়াইয়া দিয়াছেন!! বস্তু বা জীবের স্বরূপ-গত এই ভিন্নতা আছে বলিয়াই, যাহার যেমন স্বরূপ, উহা হইতে অভিব্যক্ত ধর্মগুলিও ঠিক তদনুযায়ী হইয়া থাকে। অশ্বের স্বরূপ হইতে, তুমি কখনই মানুষের ধর্ম অভিব্যক্ত হইতে দেখিবে না। স্বরূপ ভিন্ন বলিয়াই, গুণ বা ধর্ম গুলিও ভিন্ন ভিন্ন দেখিতে পাওয়া যায়। যাহার যেমন স্বভাব বা স্বরূপ, তাহা হইতে অভিব্যক্ত গুণ বা ধর্মগুলিও সেই স্বভাবানুরূপই হইবে। এই জন্যই জগতে, গুণ বা ধর্মগুলির মধ্যে এত বিভিন্নতা দেখা যায়†।

(৫) আমরা পূর্বের বলিয়াছি যে, প্রাণশক্তি ব্রহ্মেরই শক্তি। বটবীজে যেমন উহার শক্তি ওতপ্রোত ভাবে অবস্থান করে, প্রাণও তদ্রূপ ব্রহ্মে ওতপ্রোতভাবে অবস্থিত ছিল। উহাই তাঁহা হইতে স্পন্দনাকারে অভিব্যক্ত হইয়াছিল। এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দনের মধ্য দিয়াই, পরমাত্মার জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য্য অভিব্যক্ত হয়, পরিস্ফুট হয়। ইহাই তাঁহার জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য্য বিকাশের দ্বার‡। আবার, এই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন নিজের কোন প্রয়োজন সাধন করিতে

* শঙ্কর ইহাকে “প্রতিনিয়ত” কারণ বলিয়াছেন। ইহা দ্বারা আমরা বস্তু বা জীবের *Grades of Individual beings* পাইতেছি। প্রত্যেক বস্তু বা জীবের আপন আপন নির্দিষ্ট স্বভাব আছে।

† বস্তু বা জীবের যদি স্বরূপটাকে উড়াইয়া দেওয়া যায়, তাহা হইলে, এই ধর্মগুলির ‘সাক্ষর্য’ উপস্থিত হইবে, ধর্মগুলির ‘ব্যবস্থা’ থাকিবে না। ভাষ্যকার অন্তত্ব ইহাও বলিয়াছেন (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।৩।১২)।

‡ “স ‘প্রাণমসৃজত’ ইতি। তত্র চ আশ্রয়েতেন্তজ্যোতিঃ সর্বদা অভিব্যক্ততরং”। “স্বাধারেষু জঙ্গমেষু চ তৎসমানং চৈতন্যস্বকং জ্যোতিঃ।...সদ্বাদিক্যাং আবিস্তরদ্রোপপত্তেঃ। আদিত্যাদিবৃ সঙ্ঘং অত্যন্ত-প্রকাশং...অতঃ তত্রৈব আবিস্তরং জ্যোতিঃ, ন তু তত্রৈব তৎ অধিকং।...তুল্যোপি...স্বচ্ছ স্বচ্ছতরে তারতম্যেন আবির্ভবতি”—(গীতা, ১৪।১২)। “চিন্তোপাধিবিশেষবতারতম্যাং...উত্তরোত্তরং আবিষ্কৃতন্ত তারতম্যাং ঐশ্বর্য্যশক্তিবিশেষৈঃ” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।১।১১)।

পারে না। ইহা আপনাই হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, চেতন-পরমাত্মার প্রয়োজন বা মহান্ উদ্দেশ্য সাধনার্থ, সূর্য চন্দ্রাদিতে তেজ, আলোকাদিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত এবং জীববর্ণে দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত। কি সেই প্রয়োজন? প্রত্যেক বস্তুতে ও জীবে, উহাদের আপন আপন স্বভাবানুযায়ী, জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য ও সৌন্দর্য্যাদির বিকাশই সেই মহান্ উদ্দেশ্য*। জগতে অভিব্যক্ত এই সকল জ্ঞান, ঐশ্বর্য্য, সৌন্দর্য্যাদির দ্বারা, তাঁহারই স্বরূপের কিছু পরিচয়, কিছু আভাস আমরা প্রাপ্ত হই। প্রাণ যদি, সূর্য্যচন্দ্রাদিতে তেজ, আলোকাদিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত না হইত, এবং উহা যদি প্রত্যেক জীবে দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিরূপে অভিব্যক্ত হইতে না পারিত, তাহা হইলে জগতে জ্ঞান, ঐশ্বর্য্য, সৌন্দর্য্যাদি পরিস্ফুট হইতে পারিত না। ব্রহ্ম, প্রাণের মূলে সর্ব্বদা উপস্থিত থাকিয়া, উহাকে আপন কার্য্যে প্রেরণ করিতেছেন। তাই উহা সকল জীবকে পরস্পর পরস্পরের সঙ্গে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছে, পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আনিয়াছে। সুতরাং প্রাণ, তাঁহার মহান্ অভিপ্রায় সাধনের যন্ত্র বা উপায় হইয়া রহিয়াছে†।

প্রত্যেক জীব (যত ক্ষুদ্র হউক না কেন) আপন আপন দেহেন্দ্রিয় নির্মাণ করিয়া লইয়াছে। বিশ্বব্যাপ্ত প্রাণ-স্পন্দন সর্ব্বত্র বর্ত্তমান। উহা দ্বারা জীব,—আপন আপন স্বরূপ অনুসারে, আপন আপন জীবনের মুখ্য অভিপ্রায় সিদ্ধ করিবার অনুকূল ভাবে, দেহেন্দ্রিয়ের গঠন করিয়া লয়। জীবদেহস্থ ইন্দ্রিয়, মন, বুদ্ধি প্রভৃতি সকলেই, মিলিয়া গিশিয়া, একত্র, জীবের আপন

* “মুখ্যোপি প্রাণঃ রাজমন্ত্রিবৎ...সর্ব্বার্থকরত্বেন উপকরণভূতঃ, ন স্বতন্ত্রঃ...আদিশব্দেন সংহতত্বা-
চেতনত্বাদীন্ প্রাণস্ত স্বাতন্ত্র্যনিরাকরণং হেতুন্ দর্শয়ন্তি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র; ২।৪।১০)। “প্রাণঃ সর্ব্বাধিকারি স্থানীয়ঃ
রাজত্বইব “বৃহ” ভা, ৪।৪।২) “অগ্নিবায়ুর্দেহাদিকং জগৎ...অস্মাদেব ব্রহ্মণো বিভাৎ নিয়মেন স্বাধ্যাপারে
প্রবর্ত্ততে” (১।৩।৩৯)। “সংহতত্বাৎ পারার্থোপপত্তিঃ প্রাণস্ত (২।১।১৫)। “শরীরেণৈব (জীবেন) এষাং
প্রাণানাং সম্বন্ধঃ”। “প্রতিক্রিয়া বর্ত্তিনঃ প্রাণস্ত” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।৪।১৩ ১৫)। “সংহতানাং পারার্থাৎ দৃষ্টং...
তাদর্শেন অনুপরতব্যাপারঃ...তদপগমে ইতবলং বিধ্বস্তং ত্রাৎ...বদার্থাঃ বৎপ্রবৃত্তাশ্চ সংহতানাং ক্রিয়াঃ,
ন অন্তঃ সিদ্ধাঃ”—কঠ ভাষ্য।

+ “যচ্চ পরস্পরোপকায়োপকারকং জগৎ সর্ব্বং পৃথিবাদি, তৎ এক-কারণ-পূর্ব্বকং, এক সামান্যাত্মকঞ্চ
দৃষ্টং” (বৃহৎ ভাষ্য)।

এই যে সকল জীব, সকল বস্তু,—পরস্পর পরস্পরের ক্রিয়া ও প্রতিক্রিয়া করিতে পারিতেছে, প্রাণই
তাঁহার কারণ। প্রাণই সকল জীবে ও সকল বস্তুতে উপস্থিত থাকিরা উহাদিগকে বাঁধিয়া রাখিয়াছে।
নতুবা উহারা পরস্পর সম্বন্ধে আসিতে পারিত না।

মুখ্য এক উদ্দেশ্য সাধনার্থ, পরস্পর সংহত হইয়া, ক্রিয়া করিয়া থাকে*। প্রত্যেক জীবেরই একটা একটা স্বরূপ আছে; আপন জীবনের একটা মুখ্য উদ্দেশ্য, মুখ্য প্রয়োজন আছে, তাহারই জন্ত এই দেহেন্দ্রিয় নির্মাণ। স্বাবর-রাজ্যে, বৃক্ষাদিতেও চেতন আত্মা আছে। বৃক্ষাদিরও আপন আপন স্বরূপ আছে; আপন আপন উদ্দেশ্য আছে। এই উদ্দেশ্য সিদ্ধির অনুকূল ভাবে,—বাহ্য উদ্দেশ্যের প্রতিকূল তাহার বর্জন এবং বাহ্য উদ্দেশ্যের অনুকূল তাদৃশ সামগ্রীর গ্রহণ করতঃ—প্রত্যেক জীব আপনার দেহেন্দ্রিয় নির্মাণ করিয়া লইরাছে। একই প্রাণ-স্পন্দন, বাহিরে, বিষয়াকারে এবং জীবে দেহেন্দ্রিয়াকারে পরস্পর পরস্পরের উপরে ক্রিয়া করে। তদ্বারা জীবের ‘স্বরূপ’ হইতে, সেই স্বরূপের অনুযায়ী, বিবিধ ধর্মের বা গুণাদির অভিব্যক্তি হয়†। অতএব আমরা দেখিতেছি যে, শঙ্কর-মতে, প্রত্যেক বস্তু বা জীবের একটা স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে। ভাষ্যকার সর্বত্র বারম্বার বলিয়া দিয়াছেন যে, স্বতন্ত্র না হইলে, আপন প্রয়োজন সিদ্ধির অনুকূল করিয়া, দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিকে “সংহত” বা মিলিত করা (organised) সম্ভব

* “সর্বস্বকানি তাবং করণানি সর্বস্বকপ্রাণ-সংশ্রাং। তেবাং অধ্যাত্মাধিভৌতিক পরিচ্ছেদঃ প্রাপিকর্ষজ্ঞানভাবনানিমিত্ত...আরভ্যমানে দেহে জন্মেনে স্থাবরে চ কর্মবশাৎকরণানি লক্ষ্যবৃত্তানি সংশ্রুন্তে।” (বৃহৎ ভাঃ ৪।৪।৩)।

“তচ্চ একার্থবৃত্তিভেদে সংহননং, অন্তরেণ অসংহতং চেতনং ন ভবতি” (তৈঃ ২।৭)।

“দেহেন্দ্রিয় মনোবৃত্তীনাং সংহতানাং, চৈতন্যাত্মপারার্থেন নিমিত্তভূতেন, যৎ স্বরূপধারণং, তৎ চৈতন্যাত্মকৃতমেব”—গীতা ভাষ্য, ১৩।২২।

+ “জীবেন চ প্রাণ যুক্তেন, অশিতং পীতঞ্চ রসতাং গতং, জীবৎশরীরং, বৃক্ষং চ, বর্জয়ৎ, রসরূপেণ,—জীবন্ত সম্ভাবে লিঙ্গং ভবতি জীবস্থিতি-নিমিত্তোরসঃ, জীবকর্মান্বলিঙ্গঃ, জীবোপসংহারে ন তিষ্ঠতি...বৃক্ষস্ত রসশ্রবণশোষণাদিলিঙ্গং জীববৎ...চেতনাবস্তুঃ স্থাবর ইতি”—ছান্দো ভাঃ, ৬।১১।২।

† “জ্যোতিরাদিভিঃ রয়াজ্জিহ্মানানোভিঃ দেবতাভিরিষ্ঠিতং (অনুগৃহীতং), বাণাদিকরণজাতং স্বকার্যেণ প্রবর্ততে।...সতীষপি প্রাণানামিষ্ঠিতাণীষু দেবতাবু...শারীরৈণৈব এবাং প্রাণানাংসম্বন্ধঃ...স পুরুষঃ দর্শনায় চক্ষুঃ, আত্মা স গন্ধারজ্ঞাণং ইত্যাদি”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।৪।১৪-১৫।

‡ “বস্তু পরিশিষ্টো বিজ্ঞানময়ঃ—যদর্থোয়ং দেহলিঙ্গসংঘাতঃ”—বৃহৎ ভাঃ, ২।৫।১৪ “শরীর-হৃদয় (বুদ্ধি মনসী)—বারম্বা (প্রাণভেদাঃ অপানাদয়ঃ), অস্থোন্ত প্রতিষ্ঠাঃ; সংজ্ঞাতেন নিয়তাঃ বর্তন্তে—বিজ্ঞানময়স্বার্থ-প্রযুক্তাঃ ইতি”—৩।৩।২৬।

“বাহ্যকরণানুগ্রাহকানাং আদিগ্যাদিগ্যোতিবাং পরার্থত্বাৎ, কার্যাকরণসম্ভাতত্বং, অচৈতন্ত্বে স্বার্থানুপপত্তেঃ, স্বার্থজ্যোতিব আত্মনঃ অনুগ্রহাভাবো, অয়ং সংঘাতঃ ন ব্যবহারায় কল্পতে”—বৃহৎ ভাষ্য, ৪।৩।৭।

হইতে পারে না । সুতরাং সকল জীবেরই একটা একটা ‘উদ্দেশ্য’ আছে ।

(৬) অণু দুই প্রকারে শঙ্করাচার্য্য জীবের যে স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে, তাহা দেখাইয়াছেন । এ স্থলে, সংক্ষেপে তাহাও উল্লিখিত হইতেছে :—

(i) বাহ্য বস্তুর উপলব্ধি ।—

ইন্দ্রিয় বর্গের সহিত বাহ্য বিষয়ের সম্পর্ক হইলে, ইন্দ্রিয়ের ক্রিয়া উদ্ভিক্ত হয়; এবং ঐ সকল ক্রিয়া আবার মনের ক্রিয়ার উদ্বেক করে । ঐ ক্রিয়া দ্বারা, আত্মায় তদনুরূপ বিজ্ঞানের অভিব্যক্তি হইয়া থাকে । এই প্রকারে, অণু বাহ্য বস্তু বিষয়ক বিজ্ঞান ও অভিব্যক্তি হয় । এই বিজ্ঞানগুলির প্রকাশক আত্মা, এ সকল হইতে স্বতন্ত্র । কেন না, সাদৃশ্য ও বৈশাদৃশ্য বিচার ব্যতীত, বস্তুর উপলব্ধি সিদ্ধ হইতে পারে না । কেহ আমাকে হস্ত দ্বারা স্পর্শ করিল, আবার জানু দ্বারা স্পর্শ করিল । এ স্থলে আমি দুই প্রকার স্পর্শ-জ্ঞান পাইতেছি । এই স্পর্শানুভূতিটা হস্তজনিত, আর ঐ স্পর্শানুভূতিটা জানু-জনিত, এই যে বৈশাদৃশ্যের বিচার, ইহা কে করে ? যে জ্ঞানটা উপস্থিত হইয়াছে, উহার ত আপনি আপনাকে পৃথক করিয়া লইতে পারে না । এ জ্ঞানটা, ঐ জ্ঞানটা হইতে পৃথক—এই যে বিচার, এতদ্বারা স্বতন্ত্র আত্মার ক্রিয়া প্রকাশ পায়* । আবার, অতীতকালে একটা বিজ্ঞান উপস্থিত হইয়াছিল ; সেটা এখন আর বর্তমান-কালে ত উপস্থিত নাই । বর্তমানে অপর একটা বস্তু-বিজ্ঞান উপস্থিত হইল । এখানে, যে আত্মা অতীত-কালে একটা বস্তু-বিজ্ঞান লাভ করিয়াছিল, বর্তমানকালে অপর একটা বস্তু-বিজ্ঞান লাভ যদি, সেই একই আত্মা না করে, তবে কে এই দুইটা কালের উপলব্ধি হইবে ? অতএব একই আত্মাতে দুইকালের দুইটা বিজ্ঞান আসিয়াছে† । সুতরাং ঐ দুই বিজ্ঞান হইতে, ঐ দুই বিজ্ঞানের উপলব্ধি আত্মাটী নিশ্চয়ই স্বতন্ত্র । বর্তমানে দৃষ্ট বস্তুটী, অতীতকালে দৃষ্ট বস্তুর সদৃশ

* “চক্ষুঃকোপি অগোচরে পৃষ্ঠতোহপ্যনুসৃষ্টঃ কেনচিৎ, হস্তস্তায়ংস্পর্শঃ, জানোরয়মিতি—বিবেকেন প্রতিপদ্যতে...তজ্জাতেন কূতো বিবেকপ্রতিপত্তিঃ ?” (বৃ° ভা°, ১।৫ ।

+ “একস্ত হি বস্তুদর্শিনঃ বস্তুস্তরদর্শনে সাদৃশ্য-প্রত্যয়ঃ স্তাৎ” (বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৩।৭) ।

“কথং হি ‘অহমদোহ দ্রাক্ষঃ—ইদমিদানীং পশ্যামি’ ইতি চ পুরোত্তরদর্শিনি একশ্লিষ্টসতি প্রত্যয়ঃ স্তাৎ ?”

—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।২৭।২ ।

কি বিশদৃশ, ইহা স্থির করিতে হইলে, একই আত্মাতে—পূর্বদৃষ্ট বস্তুর স্মৃতি এবং বর্তমানদৃষ্ট বস্তুর জ্ঞান—উভয়ই থাকা চাই। সুতরাং এই সকল বিজ্ঞান হইতে আত্মাকে ‘স্বতন্ত্র’ হইতেই হইবে। এই বিজ্ঞানগুলি ভিন্ন ভিন্ন ; কিন্তু আত্মা ‘এক’*। এই প্রকারে, আত্মার স্বাভাব্য ও একত্ব পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠে।

(ii) ইন্দ্রিয় ও প্রবৃত্তির শাসন—

আত্মার উত্তমে, পুরুষকারের বলে, মানুষ যখন আপনার মনে উপজাত কাম-ক্রোধাদি প্রবৃত্তির বেগ দমিত করিতে সমর্থ হয়, তখন আত্মা যে এই সকল প্রবৃত্তি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ও স্বাধীন তাহাই প্রমাণিত হয়। ইহা না হইলে, যেমন যেমন আমাদের চিন্তে প্রবৃত্তির বেগ উপস্থিত হইত, তখন তখনই ঐ প্রবৃত্তির বশীভূত হইয়া, রজ্জু-বন্ধ বলীবর্দের মত আমরা চালিত হইতাম। আবার যখন ‘প্রেম ও শ্রেয়ের’ মধ্যে বিবাদ উপস্থিত হয়, তখন যে ধার্মিক পুরুষেরা আপন পুরুষার্থ সিদ্ধির উদ্দেশ্যে প্রেমকে পরিত্যাগ করতঃ, শ্রেয়কে গ্রহণ করিয়া, তদনুসারে আপনার সমুদয় আধ্যাত্মিক শক্তির প্রয়োগ করিয়া থাকেন, এ স্থলেও আত্মা যে স্বতন্ত্র ও স্বাধীন কর্তৃত্ববিশিষ্ট, তাহা নিঃসন্দেহে প্রমাণিত হয়*।

ভাষ্যকার এইরূপে, অভিব্যক্ত বিজ্ঞান ও প্রবৃত্তি প্রভৃতি হইতে মানুষের যে একটি স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে, তাহা প্রমাণিত করিয়াছেন।

(৭) এ সম্বন্ধে আর আমরা অধিক কথা বলিব না। যে সকল বৃত্তি প্রদর্শিত হইল, ইহা হইতেই ভাষ্যকারের মত বিশেষ ভাবে বুঝিতে পারা যাইতেছে। তথাপি বিষয়টির সম্পূর্ণতার নিমিত্ত, আমরা অতি সংক্ষেপে

* “তেনেদং সদৃশমিতি দ্বয়ান্তরাং সাদৃশ্যস্ত, ক্ষণভঙ্গবাদিনঃ সদৃশয়োঃ সৌর্ভঙ্গনো গ্রহীতুরেকস্ত অভাবাং, সাদৃশ্যনিমিত্তং প্রতিসন্ধানমিতি মিথ্যাপ্রলাপ এব স্মৃতাং” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২২।২৫)। “বর্তমানপ্রত্যয় একঃ, অতীতশাপরঃ...বর্তমানাঙ্গীতয়ো ভিন্নকালত্বাং...তো প্রত্যয়ো ভিন্নকালো; তদুভয়প্রত্যয়বিষয়-স্পৃক্ একঃ” (বৃ ভা, ৪।৩।৭)।

+ “প্রতীক্ষিয়ার্থং রাগদেবৌ অংগস্তাবিনৌ ; তত্র অয়ং পুরুষকারস্ত...বিষয় উচ্যতে ।...যদা : রাগদেবৌ তৎপ্রতিপক্ষেণ নিয়মহতি, তদা শাস্ত্রদৃষ্টিঃ পুরুষো ভবতি, ন প্রকৃতিবশঃ”—গীতা ভাষ্য, ৩।৩৪।

“পুরুষার্থান্বাদনপ্রতিপত্তৌ অসামর্থ্যা পরবশীকৃতচিন্তস্ত” (বৃ ভা)।

“শ্রেয়ঃ-প্রেয়সী ভিন্নপ্রয়োজনে...প্রেয় এব আদন্তে বাহুল্যেন লোকঃ।...বিবেকো সম্যক্ মনসা আলোচ্য জ্ঞানলাবণ্যে বিবিনক্তি...বিবিচ্য চ শ্রেয় এব অভিবর্গীতে, প্রেয়সোহভ্যাহিতত্বাৎ শ্রেয়সঃ”—কঠভাষ্য।

আরো কয়েকটা যুক্তির প্রণালী পাঠকবর্গের সম্মুখে উপস্থিত করিতেছি । এই যুক্তিগুলির বিশেষ বিবরণ মূল ভাষ্যে পাঠক দেখিতে পাইবেন ।

(i) স্বরূপতঃ সকল জীবই ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ । কেন না, ব্রহ্ম-চৈতন্য, কোন পদার্থে কম বা কোন পদার্থে বেশী, এভাবে ত উপস্থিত নাই । তিনি সকল বস্তুতে, সকল জীব, পূর্ণরূপে সর্বদা উপস্থিত আছেন । সুতরাং স্বরূপতঃ সকল জীবই ব্রহ্ম-স্বরূপ । কিন্তু তাঁহার যে প্রাণশক্তি জগদাকারে পরিণত হইয়াছে, এই প্রাণ দ্বারাই তাঁহার জ্ঞান-ঐশ্বর্য্য-সৌন্দর্য্যের অভিব্যক্তি হইয়া থাকে । প্রত্যেক জীব এই প্রাণকে আপন আপন দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদিরূপে গড়িয়া লইয়াছে । যে জীবের দেহেন্দ্রিয় যত উন্নত, সেই জীবের তাঁহার জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য্য তত উন্নতভাবে অভিব্যক্ত হইতেছে । ইহাই জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য্য অভিব্যক্তির তারতম্যের একমাত্র হেতু* । জাগরিত-কালে যখন এই বিশ্ব-পট, আপন বৃকে নামরূপাদি অঙ্কিত করিয়া, জীবের সম্মুখে আপন বক্ষঃ প্রসারিত করিয়া উপস্থিত থাকে, বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়বোগে জীবের যে সকল বিজ্ঞান ও ক্রিয়ার নানা প্রকারে অভিব্যক্তি হয়, তখন জীবের স্বভাব-সিদ্ধ জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য্য, উহাদের দ্বারা প্রচ্ছন্ন হইয়া পড়ে । জীব যখন নিদ্রামগ্ন, কিন্তু মনের সংস্কার প্রবুদ্ধ হইয়া স্বপ্ন দর্শন করিতে থাকে, তখনও উহার স্বভাবসিদ্ধ জ্ঞান ও ঐশ্বর্য্য প্রচ্ছন্ন হইয়া পড়ে । কিন্তু গাঢ়-সুষুপ্তির সময়ে, বাহ্যিক ও মানসিক কোন বিকারই আর প্রবুদ্ধ থাকে না ; তাই তখন জীব আপনার যেটী প্রকৃত স্বভাব, সেই স্বভাবে নিমগ্ন হইয়া যায় । সুষুপ্তির এই বোধের দ্বারা জীবের যে একটী স্তম্ভ স্বভাব আছে, সেটী পরিস্ফুটভাবে প্রমাণিত হয়† ।

(ii) উষ্ণতা ও প্রকাশই অগ্নির স্বভাবসিদ্ধ স্বরূপ । কিন্তু অগ্নি যখন ভস্মাচ্ছন্ন হইয়া উঠে ; কিংবা যখন কাষ্ঠের মধ্যে অগ্নির স্বরূপটী লুক্কায়িত থাকে ;—তখন অগ্নির স্বভাবগত উষ্ণতা ও প্রকাশ তিরোহিত হইয়া পড়ে ।

* “স্বাবরেষু জগন্মেষু চ তৎ সমানং চৈত্ব্যাক্ষকং জ্যোতিঃ...সম্বাদিক্যং আবিস্তরদ্বোপপত্তেঃ । আদিত্যাদিষু হি সত্ত্বং অত্যন্তপ্রকাশং, অতঃ তত্র আবিস্তরং জ্যোতিঃ...ন তু তত্বে তৎ অধিকং ইতি । তুল্যোপি মুখসংস্থানে...আদর্শাদৌ স্বচ্ছৈ স্বচ্ছতরে চ তারতম্যেন আবির্ভবতি” (গীতা ভাষ্য, ১৫।১২) ।

† “স প্রাণমস্বজত । তত্র চ আত্মচৈতন্যজ্যোতিঃ সর্বদা অভিব্যক্ততরং” (বৃ’ ভা’) ।

“চিত্তোপাধিতারতম্যং...আবিস্কৃতস্ত তারতম্যং ঐশ্বর্য্যশক্তিবিণেবৈঃ” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ১।১।১১) ।

+ “ন কদাচিৎ জীবস্ত ব্রহ্মণা সম্পত্তির্নাস্তি, স্বরূপস্ত অনপরিহার্য্যং । স্বপ্ন-জাগরিতয়োঃ উপাধি-সম্পর্কবশাৎ পররূপাভিভাবাপেক্ষা, সুষুপ্তোঃ স্বরূপাভিভাববিহীন্যতে” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।২।১) ।

দেহেন্দ্রিয়যোগে যখন বিষয়বিজ্ঞান জীবে উদ্ভিত হয়, তখন জীবেরও তদ্রূপ জ্ঞান, ঐশ্বর্য্য, সৌন্দর্য্যশক্তি তিরোহিত হইয়া যায়। তখন জীব, ঐ বিষয়কেই ভাবে; শব্দ-স্পর্শ, ধন-জন লইয়াই একান্ত উন্নত হইয়া উঠে। হায়! তাহার মনে আইসে না যে, এ সকল অপেক্ষাও সে, নিত্য জ্ঞান ও নিত্য ঐশ্বর্য্যের চির-অধিকারী!!! তাই জীব যদি, একান্ত মনে, চিত্ত-প্রণিধানে, ভগবদ্-ধ্যানে চেষ্টিত হয়, তাহা হইলে ভগবৎ-প্রসাদে পুনরায় সে, নষ্ট সম্পত্তির উদ্ধারে সমর্থ হইতে পারে*। এই যে জীবের সম্পত্তি, ইহা বৈষয়িক সম্পত্তি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র। এ সম্পত্তির ক্ষয় নাই। এই সম্পত্তির উদ্ধার করিতে পারিলে, আর কোন বস্তুর আকাঙ্ক্ষা উদ্ভিত হইবে না, সকল কামনা পূর্ণতা লাভ করিবে। সংসার-দশায় জীব, আপনার স্বরূপ ভুলিয়া গিয়া, আপনাকে নানা ধর্ম্মবিধিটি বলিয়াই মনে করিতেছে। আপনাকে নানা ক্রিয়ার কর্তা, সুখ-দুঃখাদির উপভোক্তা বলিয়াই মনে করিতেছে। কিন্তু তখন সে আপনাকে এই সচল ধর্ম্ম হইতে স্বতন্ত্র বলিয়া বুঝিতে পারিবে। তখন সে আপনাকে ব্রহ্মরূপ বলিয়া, “নোহং” বলিয়া, বোধ করিতে পারিবে। তখনকার দেহেন্দ্রিয়ের সামর্থ্য্য নিরতিশয় উন্নত হওয়ায়, উহার সম্পর্কে, আপনার স্বরূপেরও পূর্ণ অভিব্যক্তি হইবে†। কিন্তু যদি তুমি, আত্মার সেই স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বভাবের’ কথাটা একেবারে ভুলিয়া, উহাকে “কর্ত্ত্ব ও

* নোহং তু জীবন্ত জ্ঞানৈবর্গ্যতিরোভাবঃ, দেহেন্দ্রিয়-মনোবুদ্ধিবিসয়বেদনাদিবোধ্যং ভবতি। যথা অগ্নেঃ দহন-প্রকাশনসম্মতাপি অরণ্যবতঃ দহন-প্রকাশনে তিরোহিতে ভবতঃ, যথা বা ভস্মচ্ছন্নস্ত, এবং জীবন্ত...জ্ঞানৈবর্গ্যতিরোভাবঃ।...অনন্ত এব জীবঃ ঐশ্বর্য্যং সন্ দেহবোধ্যং তিরোহিতজ্ঞানৈবর্গ্যো ভবতি”— ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৩।২।৬।

“তৎপুনস্তিরোহিতং নং, পরমেশ্বরমভিধায়,তা, যতমানস্ত জন্তোঃ...ঐশ্বর-প্রসাদাং সংস্কৃত কস্তচিদিব আবির্ভবতি” (৩।২।৬)।

+ “ন হি আত্মনঃ একত্ব-নিত্যত্বাভাবগতো নত্যাং ভূয়ঃ কাচিদাকাঙ্ক্ষা উপজায়তে, পুরুষার্থসমাপ্তিবুদ্ধ্যুৎপত্তেঃ...তথৈব চ তুষ্টিমুত্তবাদিদর্শনাং” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।৩।১৪)। “ন হি সম্যকদর্শনে নিস্পন্দে যজ্ঞাস্তরং কিঞ্চিং শাসিতুং শকাং” (৪।৩।১২)। “ন তৎস্বরূপব্যতিরিক্তং অস্ত্রদন্ত কিমিচ্ছন, কস্ত বা আত্মনো ব্যতিরিক্তস্ত কামায়?” (বৃ' ভা' ৪।৩।১২)।

† “কর্ত্ত্ব-ভোক্তৃ-স্বভাবে সতি আত্মনি, অসত্যং বিভাগম্যয়াং ব্রহ্মত্বত্যাগং, ন কথঞ্চন মোক্ষং অতি আশা অস্তি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।৩।১৪)। “পুণ্যকর্ম্মোদ্ভবৈঃ বিবিধৈঃ কার্য্যকরণৈঃ সংযুক্তে জ্ঞাননি

ভোক্তৃত্ব স্বভাব” বলিয়াই ধরিয়া লও, উহাকে নানা ধর্ম্মবিশিষ্ট ও নানা ক্রিয়াবিশিষ্ট-স্বভাব বলিয়াই মনে কর, তাহা হইলে, যার যাহা ‘স্বভাব’ তাহা হইতে কোন দিনই উহাকে বিচ্যুত করা যাইবে না ; উহা চিরদিনই ঐ স্বভাবাবিশিষ্ট রহিয়া যাইবে* । অতএব জীবের যেটা প্রকৃত স্বভাব, সেটাই সর্বদা ভাবনা করিতে হইবে† । সেই স্বভাবটী, ঐ সকল ধর্ম্ম হইতে স্বতন্ত্র এবং উহা ব্রহ্মস্বরূপ ব্যতীত অন্য কিছু নহে ‡ ।

(iii) শঙ্করাচার্য্য আরো একটি মূল্যবান সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন । তিনি বলিয়াছেন যে, প্রত্যেক বস্তু বা জীবের একটি ‘স্বরূপ’ এবং একটি ‘সম্বন্ধিরূপ’ আছে । অর্থাৎ প্রত্যেকেরই একটি স্বতঃসিদ্ধ স্বরূপ ; এবং অন্য বস্তুর সহিত সম্পর্কে আসিলে উহাতে যে ধর্ম্মাদির অভিব্যক্তি হয়, সেটাই উহার ‘সম্বন্ধিরূপ’ । সম্বন্ধিরূপটা অনিত্য, পরিবর্তনশীল ; কিন্তু স্বরূপটী নিত্য এবং সদা একরূপ । আমরা ইহা দ্বারাও, জীবের যে সম্বন্ধিরূপ ব্যতীতও, একটি স্বতন্ত্র স্বরূপ আছে, তাহা পাইতেছি। সুতরাং আমরা দেখিতেছি যে, শঙ্করাচার্য্য জীবের স্বরূপকে উড়াইয়া দেন নাই ।

(৮) । আমরা দেখিয়া আসিয়াছি যে, জীব আপন আপন দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি নির্মাণ করিয়া লয় এবং এই দেহেন্দ্রিয় দ্বারাই বাহ্য বিষয় বর্গের সঙ্গে সম্বন্ধে

প্রজ্ঞাসেধাশ্রুতিবৈশারদ্যং দৃষ্টং” (বৃ’ ভা’, ১।৪।২) । “নাধননামথ্যাত্তু তত্ত্ব পূর্ণতা সম্পাদ্যতে” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।১।২৪) ।

* “কর্তৃত্ব-ভোক্তৃত্ব স্বভাবে সতি আত্মনি, অসত্যাং বিভাগম্যায়ং ব্রহ্মাত্মতাং, ন কথঞ্চন মোক্ষং প্রতি আশা অস্তি”—ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।৩।১৪ ।

“ন চ স্বাভাবিকেন ধর্মেণ কত্চিৎ বিরোগো দৃষ্টঃ” (বৃ’ ভা’ ৪।৩।৮) ।

“ন হি অগ্নেঃ স্বাভাবিকেন প্রকাশেন উষ্ণোণ বা বিরোগো দৃষ্টঃ” ।

+ “পূর্বদিদ্ব-কর্তৃত্বভোক্তৃত্ববিপরীতং হি এষপি কালেচ্চ অকর্তৃত্বভোক্তৃত্বরূপং ব্রহ্মাহমশ্রুতি... ব্রহ্মবিদবগচ্ছতি” (ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ৪।১।১৩) । “সংসারিণঃ সংসারিত্বাপোহেন ঈশ্বরাত্মকং প্রতিপিপাদয়িষিতং” (৪।১।৩) ।

‡ “আত্মা নিরংশঃ ; তথাপি তস্মিন্ অধ্যারোপিতং বহুশব্দঃ—দেহেন্দ্রিয়মনোবুদ্ধিবিষয়বেদনাদি-লক্ষণং...তৎক্রমেণ অপোহতি” ইত্যাদি (৪।১।২) ।

¶ “একত্বৈপি স্বরূপ-সম্বন্ধিরূপাপেক্ষয়া অনেকশব্দপ্রত্যয়দর্শনাৎ”—ইত্যাদি, ব্রহ্মসূত্র, ২।২।১৭ । তৃতীয় অধ্যায়ে, এ সম্বন্ধে বিস্তৃতরূপে বলা যাইবে [Pantheism কেবল মাত্র এই ‘সম্বন্ধিরূপ’ লইয়াই ব্যস্ত ; স্বরূপের কথা মোটেই স্বীকার করে না]

আসিয়া, নানাপ্রকার বাহ্য বিষয়-বিজ্ঞান লাভ করিয়া থাকে । বাহ্য বিষয়-বর্গ, আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয়বর্গের সঙ্গে সম্বন্ধে না আসিলে, শব্দ-স্পর্শাদি বিজ্ঞান গুলি উৎপন্ন হইতে পারে না * । এস্থলে বেদান্তের ইহাই সিদ্ধান্ত যে, দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি নির্মাণ করিয়া লইয়াছে বলিয়াই যে, জীবের স্বরূপটা সম্পূর্ণ-রূপে—নিঃশেষে (Exhaustively)—দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদির আকারে পরিণত হইয়া গিয়াছে, তাহা নহে । যেটী আত্মার প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, সেটী এই দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ; এবং বাহ্য বিষয়ের সঙ্গে দেহেন্দ্রিয়ের সম্বন্ধ হইয়া যে সকল বিজ্ঞান উৎপন্ন হয়, সেই বিজ্ঞানগুলি হইতেও, সেই স্বরূপটা স্বতন্ত্র ।

আবার, স্বপ্নদর্শনকালে আমরা যে সকল অনুভূতি লাভ করিয়া থাকি, তাহাকে শ্রুতিতে স্বপ্ন-বিজ্ঞান বলে । এই স্বপ্ন-বিজ্ঞানগুলি, জাগরিত কালের বিজ্ঞানগুলিরই অনুরূপ ; সেই গুলিরই স্মৃতি মাত্র † । এস্থলেও বেদান্তের সিদ্ধান্ত এই যে,—বাহ্য বিষয় দর্শন কালে (জাগরিতাবস্থায়) লব্ধ বিজ্ঞানগুলি হইতে, আত্মা প্রকৃতপক্ষে যেমন স্বতন্ত্র ; তেমনি স্বপ্ন-দর্শন কালে লব্ধ স্বপ্ন-বিজ্ঞানগুলি হইতেও, আত্মা প্রকৃতপক্ষে স্বতন্ত্র ।

এইটী বুঝাইবার জন্য বেদান্তে, জাগরিতকালের বিজ্ঞানগুলিকেও যেমন আত্মার ‘জ্ঞেয়’ বা ‘দৃশ্য’ বলা হইয়াছে ‡, সেইরূপ আবার স্বপ্নকালের অনুভবগুলিকেও আত্মার ‘জ্ঞেয়’ বা ‘দৃশ্য’ বলা হইয়াছে § । সুতরাং

* “শ্রোত্রাদীনী ইন্দ্রিয়ানি—মাত্রাঃ । মাত্রাণাং স্পর্শাঃ—শব্দাদিভিঃ সংযোগাঃ । তে শীতোষ্ণ-স্বথ-দুঃখদাঃ”—গী° ভা° । “শব্দেন বিষয়েণ শ্রোত্রমিন্দ্রিয়ং দীপাতে । শ্রোত্রেন্দ্রিয়ে সন্দীপ্তে, মনসি, বিবেক উপজায়তে ; তেন মনসা বাহ্যং চেষ্টাং প্রতিপদ্যতে” । “গন্ধাদিভিরপি ভ্রাণাদিষু অনুগৃহীতেষু প্রযুক্তিনিবৃত্তাদয়ো ভবন্তি”—বৃ° ভা° ।—ইত্যাদি ।

† “জাগ্রৎ-প্রজ্ঞা অনেক সাধনা বহিবিষয়েবাবভাসমানা মনঃস্পন্দনমাত্রা সতী, তথাভূতং সংসারং মনসি আধত্তে ।...তন্মানঃ তথা সংস্কৃতং...সপ্নে...জাগ্রদবভাসতে...দর্শন-স্মরণে এব হি মনঃস্পন্দিতং”—মা° ভা°, ১।৫ ।

‡ “তস্মাৎ দেহাদিলক্ষণাংশ্চ রূপাদীন, এতেনৈব দেহাদি-‘ব্যতিরিক্তেনৈব’ বিজ্ঞান-স্বভাবেন আত্মনা বিজ্ঞানান্তি লোকঃ ।...যদি হি দেহাদি সংঘাতো রূপাত্মকঃ সন্ রূপাদীন বিজ্ঞানীয়াং, তর্হি বাহ্যে অপি রূপাদয়ঃ অছোজ্যং স্বং স্বং রূপকং বিজ্ঞানীয়ঃ । নচৈতদস্তুি”—কঠ° ভা° ৪।৩ ।

§ “যস্মাৎ দৃশ্যন্তে দ্রষ্টুং বিষয়ভূতাঃ...লোকাঃ, তথা স্বপ্নেহপি, তস্মাৎ অছোজ্যংসৌ দৃশ্যেভ্যঃ স্বপ্ন-জাগরিত লোকেভ্যঃ দ্রষ্টা...বিশুদ্ধাঃ”—বৃ° ভা°, ২।১।৮ ।

আত্মা, এই উভয় প্রকার বিজ্ঞান গুলিরই ‘জ্ঞাতা’। জ্ঞাতাকে উহার জ্ঞেয় হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ও ভিন্ন হইতেই হইবে *। অতএব, কি জাগরিত-কালে, কি স্বপ্নদর্শন-কালে,—উভয় অবস্থাতেই আত্মার ‘জ্ঞাতৃত্ব’ পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠে। এই প্রকারে, বেদান্তে আত্মাকে ‘জ্ঞাতা’ বলিয়া সিদ্ধান্ত করা হইয়াছে। আত্মা যে কেবলমাত্র ঐ সকল অনুভূতির সমষ্টি, তাহা বলা হয় নাই †।

আবার, বাহিরের বিষয় বর্গ আমাদের ইন্দ্রিয় বর্গের সঙ্গে সম্বন্ধে আসিলে, আমাদের অন্তরে কাম-ক্রোধাদি ও সুখদুঃখাদি বৃত্তি-গুলি উদ্ভিক্ত হইয়া উঠে। এস্থলেও বেদান্তের সিদ্ধান্ত এই যে, এই সুখদুঃখ কাম-ক্রোধাদি বৃত্তিগুলির সমষ্টিই আত্মা নহে। তাহাই যদি হইত, তাহা হইলে এগুলি দমন করা সম্ভব হইত না; ইহারাই আমাদের পশুত্ব চালিত করিত; বিষয়-সুখ-লাভের আশায় আমরা চিরকাল ঘুরিয়া বেড়াইতাম এবং তাহাই জীবনের উদ্দেশ্য (End) হইয়া উঠিত ‡। কিন্তু মানুষের জীবন পশুর জীবন নহে। আত্মা, এই সকল প্রবৃত্তিকে আপনার প্রাকৃত উদ্দেশ্য-সিদ্ধির অনুকূল পথে চালিত করিয়া লইতে সমর্থ §। এতদ্ দ্বারাও বেদান্ত,

* “জ্ঞেয়েন জ্ঞাতুঃ সংসর্গানুপপত্তেঃ। যদি হি সংসর্গঃ স্ত্যং জ্ঞেয়মেব নেপপদ্যতে।...জ্ঞেয়ক সর্বং ক্রোড, জ্ঞাতৈব নেত্রজঃ”—গী° ভা°, ১৩২ “হষ্টু ই দুঃখমর্থান্ত ভূতং”—বৃ° ভা°।

+ আত্মার স্বরূপটি যে স্বতন্ত্র, এ কথাটা ভুলিয়া গিয়া, আত্মাকে ঐ সকল বিজ্ঞানের সমষ্টি মাত্র মনে করাই “অবিজ্ঞা দ্বার” সংঘটিত হয়। এই জঘন্য, ভাগ্যবিবাহাও স্বপ্নাবস্থাকে প্রবৃত্তিতে ‘অবিজ্ঞা-কৃত’ বলা হইয়াছে। “স্বরূপপ্রচ্যবনন্ত আত্মনঃ জ্ঞানং-স্বপ্নাবস্থাঃ প্রতিগমনঃ”। অতএব, ভাগ্যবিবাহাও স্বপ্নাবস্থাতেও, স্বরূপটির স্বতন্ত্রতার কথা ভুলিলে চলিবে না।

‡ “দেহমাত্রসাধনা রতিবাহুসাধনা ক্রীড়া, লোকো ক্রীড়িঃ সশীড়িঃ ব্রীড়ঃ ব্রীড়দর্শনাং। ন তথা বিদ্বঃ; কিং তর্হি? আত্মবিজ্ঞাননিমিত্তমেব।.....শব্দাদিনিমিত্ত আনন্দঃ অবিদ্বদ্বাং। ন তথা অস্ত্র বিদ্বদ্বাং; কিং তর্হি? আত্মনিমিত্তমেব সর্বং সর্বদা”—ছা° ভা°, ৭২৩১২

“যোহি বহিমুখঃ প্রবর্ততে পুরুষঃ...ন চ তত্র আত্যন্তিকং পুংস্বার্থং লভতে, তং আত্যন্তিক-পুরুষার্থবাহিনং, স্বাভাবিকং কাব্য করণ সংযাত-প্রবৃত্তি-গোচরং বিদুষীকৃত্য, প্রাহার্যশ্রোতন্তয়া প্রবর্তন্তি”—ব্র° হৃ°, ১।১।৪।

§ “(১) দুশি-কর্ম্মতাপসিনিমিত্তাহি জগতঃ সর্বপ্রবৃত্তিঃ—‘অহমিদং ভোদ্যে, পশ্যামি...এতদর্থমিদং করিষ্যে’—ইত্যাত্মা অবগতিনিষ্ঠা অবগত্যবসানৈব”—গী° ভা°, ৬।১০।

আত্মার যেটা প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, সেটা যে এই সকল প্রবৃত্তি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, তাহাই সিদ্ধান্ত করিয়াছেন ।

এই সকল আলোচনা দ্বারা, জীবের যে আপন আপন একটা স্বরূপ বা স্বভাব আছে তাহাই পাইতেছি ।

(৯) আর এক প্রকারে ভাষ্যকার, আত্মার স্বরূপের কথাটা আমাদের বুঝাইয়া দিয়াছেন । সেইটা বলিয়া, এ সম্বন্ধে আমাদের বক্তব্য শেষ করিব ।

বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়-যোগে যে সকল বাহ্য অনুভূতি ও আন্তর প্রবৃত্তি উৎপন্ন হয়, তৎসমস্তই আত্মার বিশেষাবস্থা । ইহার আত্মার আংশিক অভিব্যক্তি বা অসম্পূর্ণ বিকাশ মাত্রঃ । এগুলি, কাহার আংশিক অভিব্যক্তি ? আত্মার যেটা প্রকৃত ‘স্বরূপ,’ সেই স্বরূপেরই ইহার অসম্পূর্ণ বিকাশ মাত্র । ইহার যখন স্বরূপের অসম্পূর্ণ বিকাশ, তখন স্বরূপটা যে এ সকল হইতে স্বতন্ত্র, তাহা বুঝাই যাইতেছে । যাহা পূর্ণ, দেহেন্দ্রিয়াদি দ্বারা তাহারই অপূর্ণ আংশিক অভিব্যক্তি হইতেছে । হোমার দেহেন্দ্রিয়, মন-বুদ্ধি প্রভৃতি যেরূপ উন্নত, উহাদের দ্বারা আত্মার স্বরূপটিরও তদনুরূপ বিকাশই হইবে । অথচ, আমরা এই অভিব্যক্ত শব্দস্পর্শাদি বিজ্ঞান ও সুখ দুঃখ কামক্রোধাদি বৃত্তিগুলির সমষ্টিকেই, আত্মা বলিয়া ধরিঃ । লইয়া, সংসারের সকল ব্যবহার সম্পাদন করিয়া থাকি । এগুলি, আত্মার আংশিক অভিব্যক্তি মাত্র ; ইহারাই আত্মা. নহে । যাহা প্রকৃত আত্মা, তাহা এগুলি হইতে স্বতন্ত্র ;

(২) অশ্রিত্বোপাধিঃ স্বার্থঃ সর্বোঃ প্রভৃতিঃ বার্থাঃ প্রসঙ্গোহন । ন চ দেহান্তর্ভূতেনাত্মত্ববৎ
 * শব্দ্যঃ কল্পয়িতুঃ । ন চ ২র্থার্থঃ স্বার্থঃ, দুঃখার্থঃ বা দুঃখঃ আত্মাবগত্যবসানার্থঃ সর্বব্যবহারস্ত”
 গী’ ভা’ ১৮।৫০ ।

(৩) ঐন্দ্রিয়িক চেষ্টাঃ সংহিতঃ কার্য্য করণৈঃ নির্বর্তমানাঃ দৃষ্টান্তে । তচ্চ একার্থবৃত্তিভেদে
 সংহ নং, নাস্তরেন অনাহতঃ চেতনঃ সত্ত্ববৃত্তিঃ—‘ই’ ভা’ ২।৭ [‘একার্থবৃত্তিভেদে সংহননঃ’—i. e. Each
 and all co-operating for the realisation of a common Purpose].

* “বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়োপাধি সম্বন্ধজনিতেন অন্তঃকরণগতাব্যক্তি-‘বিশেষ বিজ্ঞানেন’ বিজ্ঞানময়ন্তাং বুদ্ধিং
 জাগরিতকালে ব্যাধোতি ।” “বুদ্ধাঙ্গুপাধিবিশেষ-যোগাৎ ‘উভূতস্ত’ বিশেষবিজ্ঞানস্ত—ইত্যাদি, ব্র’ ২”
 ৩২, ৩৪। “তদন্তঃকরণোপাধিস্থত উপলব্ধঃ প্রজ্ঞানরূপস্ত ব্রহ্মণঃ ‘উপলব্ধ্যার্থাঃ’ যাঃ অন্তঃকরণঃ-বৃত্তয়ঃ

এগুলির অন্তরালে*। এগুলি আত্মা হইতে অভিব্যক্ত কতকগুলি ধর্ম বা গুণ বা বিকার। এগুলি, আত্মার আংশিক বিশেষাবস্থা; আত্মার স্বরূপের অসম্পূর্ণ পরিচয় প্রদান করে। এইগুলিই আত্মা নহে। অথচ আমরা এই গুলিকেই আত্মা বলিয়া ধরিয়া লইয়াছি। এগুলি ছাড়া আবার আত্মা কোথায়?†। প্রকৃতপক্ষে, এগুলি আত্মা নহে; আত্মা হইতে ‘অন্য,’ ভিন্ন। এগুলি—‘অনাত্ম’ বস্তু; আত্মা নহে, আত্মার অভিব্যক্তি বা বিকাশমাত্র।

যাহা প্রকৃত আত্মা নহে; যাহা আত্মা হইতে ভিন্ন, আত্মা হইতে ‘অন্য’; সেই অন্য একটা বস্তুকে আত্মা বলিয়া মনে করাটাই আমাদের একটা প্রকাণ্ড ভুল। ভাষ্যকার, এই ভুলকে নাশ করিবার উপদেশ দিয়াছেন। যাহা প্রকৃত আত্মা নহে, কিন্তু আত্মা হইতে ‘অন্য’—ভিন্ন—একটা বস্তু; যাহা ‘অনাত্ম,’ যাহা আত্মার আংশিক অভিব্যক্তিমাত্র; তাহাকেই লোকে সর্ববদা আত্মা বলিয়া ব্যবহার করিতেছে। এই অনাত্ম বোধের নাশ হইলেই,

বাহ্যাস্তব্বিধির-বিবর্তাঃ তা উচ্যন্তে—ত্র° ভা°। এগুলি, স্বরূপের আংশিক অভিব্যক্তি বা বিকাশ বলিয়া এ গুলিকে বেদান্তে আত্মার ‘প্রতিবিম্ব’ শব্দেও নির্দেশ করা হইয়াছে। “ভিন্নমিব বস্তুস্তরং পরমান্বনঃ...ইতরোহসৌ পরমান্বনঃ অপরমান্বা, চন্দ্রাদেবির উদকচন্দ্রাদিপ্রতিবিম্বঃ”—বৃ°।

N. B. ‘প্রতিবিম্ব’ শব্দের প্রয়োগ দ্বারা ই বুঝা যায় যে, প্রতিবিম্বের অন্তরালে যেমন ‘বিম্ব’ থাকে, তদ্রূপ, এগুলিরও অন্তরালে একটা প্রকৃত ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে।

* “(a) এবং মনোময়াদিভিঃ পূর্বপূর্বব্যাপিভিঃ উত্তরোত্তরৈঃ সূক্ষ্মৈঃ আনন্দময়ান্তঃ...আত্মবস্তুঃ সর্বৈ প্রাণিনঃ। এবং—

(b) তথা স্বাভাবিকেনাপি...অবিকৃতেন...পঞ্চকোষাতিগেন...আত্মবস্তুঃ। স হি পরমার্থতঃ আত্মা সর্বোবাং।”

আবার—(a) স পুরুষঃ ক্ষেত্রজঃ ভূতমাত্রাসংসর্গবশাৎ...প্রবিভক্তঃ (অনুভবঃ)। ... (b) স পুরুষঃ যেন স্বাভাবিকেন আত্মনা সম্পরিষক্তঃ একীভূতঃ সর্বাত্মা...ন বাহ্যং কিঞ্চন স্বতী দ্বঃখীতাদি বেদ”।—বৃ° ভা°.

আবার—(a) “ব্রহ্মরূপদর্শনার্থং ভূমৈব নির্দিষ্টতে অহঙ্কারেণ। এবং—

(b) অহঙ্কারেণ দেহাদিসংঘাতোহপি আদিষ্টতে অবিবেকিভিঃ।”—ছা° ভা°, ৭।২৪ ও ২৫।

+ পরমার্থতো ব্রহ্মস্বরূপতাপি সতোহস্ত জীবন্ত, ভূতমাত্রাকৃত-পরিচ্ছিন্নান্নময়ান্নাদর্শনঃ... অনাত্মনঃ আত্মত্বেন প্রতিপন্নত্যাং, অন্নময়ান্নান্নাত্মো ‘নাহ্মোহহমশ্মীতি’ অভিমন্ততে”—তৈ° ভা°, ২।১।

আত্মার যেটা প্রকৃত স্বরূপ, তাহা ফুটিয়া উঠিবে* । ভাষ্যকারের এই সিদ্ধান্ত হইতে আমরা বুঝিতে পারিতেছি যে, অভিব্যক্ত গুণ, ধর্ম বা কর্মাদি ছাড়া, আত্মার একটা স্বতন্ত্র ‘স্বরূপ’ আছে । পাশ্চাত্য পণ্ডিতেরা যে মনে করেন যে, শঙ্কর-মতে, গুণ, ধর্ম, কর্মাদির সমষ্টিই জীব, এ ধারণা ণ নিতান্তই ভ্রমপূর্ণ ।

কি প্রকারে এই অনাত্ম-বোধের নাশ করিলে, আত্মার প্রকৃত স্বরূপটি পরিস্ফুট হইয়া উঠিবে, তদ্বিষয়ে শঙ্করাচার্য্য কি বলিয়াছেন তাহা সংক্ষেপে বলিয়া, আমরা আমাদের বক্তব্য শেষ করিব ।

এই যে আত্মা হইতে অভিব্যক্ত—গুণ, ধর্ম, বিকারগুলি, এগুলি যখন আত্মারই আংশিক বিকাশ, তখন,—এগুলিকে সেই আত্মা হইতে একেবারে স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লইয়া—একেবারে পৃথক্ করিয়া লইয়া—এই গুলিকেই আত্মা বলিয়া মনে করিবে কিরূপে ? এগুলি যখন আত্মারই অভিব্যক্তি, তখন এগুলিকে কি আত্মা হইতে স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লওয়া, পৃথক্ করিয়া লওয়া—সম্ভব ? কেন না—

ইহাকেই শঙ্কর—‘ব্যবহারিক আত্মা’ বা ‘উপাধিবিশিষ্ট’ আত্মা বলিয়াছেন । ইহাই ‘কর্তৃদ-ভোক্তদ-গুণ’বিশিষ্ট Passive জীব ; ইহাই—Emperical বা Actual জীব । জীবের বাহ্য প্রকৃত ‘স্বরূপ’, তাহাকে ‘অন্তর্বাদী’ বা Active controller বলা হইয়াছে । ইহাই—‘বিজ্ঞান-ক্রিয়াজিহ্মসংযুক্তিতাত্মা’ । এইটাই প্রকৃত Transcendental আত্মা ।

- * (a) “যং ‘অন্তঃগ্রহণং’ জাগ্রৎ-স্বপ্নয়োঃ...তৎ অবিচ্ছাদিতং ।
- (b) “ ‘স্বরূপপ্রচ্যবনন্ত’ আত্মনঃ জাগ্রৎ-স্বপ্নাবস্থায় প্রতিগমনং বাহ্যবিষয়প্রতীক্ষাঃ” ।
- (c) ‘অন্তঃ-সম্বন্ধকালব্যাহিত্য’ স্বাভাব্যগতঃ স্মৃপ্তে ।
- (d) বাহ্যবিষয়সত্ত্বচিত্ততয়া ‘স্বরূপাভাব’ দর্শনং ।
- (e) বিচ্ছিন্ন অবিচ্ছাদিতঃ ভূতমাত্রোপাধিসংসর্গজঃ ‘অন্তঃস্বাভাসঃ’ তিরস্কৃতঃ । পরমাত্মস্বরূপাৎ ‘অন্তঃস্বাভাসঃ’ প্রত্যবভাসমানঃ ।
- (f) ‘অন্তঃদর্শনাপবাদাচ্ছ বিচ্ছাদিবিষয়ে সহশ্রণঃ শ্রমন্তে ।
- (g) বাহি ব্রহ্মবিচ্ছিন্না স্বাত্মপ্রাপ্তিঃ সা...অনাদিবিশেষাত্মনঃ আত্মদেহন্যারোপিতস্ত ‘অনাত্মনঃ’ অপোহার্থা ।
- (h) ‘অন্তঃপোহেন’ অতর্ক্যাদ্যারোপেণ সংসারোপরমঃ কর্তব্যঃ । —ইত্যাদি সর্বত্র এইরূপ ।

+ এই গ্রন্থের ৫৩ পৃষ্ঠার উক্ততাংশ দ্রষ্টব্য ।

(a) যে যাহার অভিব্যক্তি, যে যাহার স্বরূপের পরিচয় দেয়, তাহাকে সেই স্বরূপ হইতে পৃথক্ করা যায় না। *

(b) এ গুলি যখন আত্মা হইতে উৎপন্ন, তখন এগুলি অবশ্যই 'কার্য্য' এবং 'আত্মা' ইহাদের 'কারণ'। কার্য্যকে কি কারণ হইতে পৃথক্ করিয়া লওয়া সম্ভব? সূৰ্ণ-কুণ্ডলকে তুমি কি সূৰ্ণ হইতে বিচ্যুত করিয়া লইতে পারি ?

(c) এগুলি ত আত্মারই বিশেষ-অবস্থা। যাহা 'বিশেষ,' তাহা 'সামান্যের'ই অন্তর্ভুক্ত। সামান্যই, উহার বিশেষাবস্থাগুলির মধ্যে অন্তর্ভুক্ত থাকে। সামান্যের বুকেই, উহার বিশেষগুলি গ্রথিত থাকে। সামান্যই উহার বিশেষ-গুলিকে বাঁধিয়া রাখে। সুতরাং তুমি বিশেষাবস্থাগুলিকেই পৃথক্ করিয়া লইবে কিরূপে? তরঙ্গ-ফেন-বুদ্বুদাদি—সমুদ্রজলেরই বিশেষ বিশেষ অবস্থা বা আকার। জলকে ছাড়িয়া, ইহারা থাকিতে পারে কি ? ‡

(d) একটা বিশেষাবস্থা গ্রহণ করিলেই যে বস্তুটী, অপর একটা 'স্বতন্ত্র' বস্তু হইয়া উঠে, তাহা নহে। তুমি কতকগুলি বিশেষাবস্থা দেখিবা মাত্রই, উহাদিগকেই একটা স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু বলিয়া—আত্মা বলিয়া—ধরিয়া লইতেছ।

(e) যে বস্তু হইতে অপর একটা বস্তু উৎপন্ন হয়, অভিব্যক্ত হয় ;—সেই অপর বস্তুটী তাহা হইতে বিভক্ত হইয়া থাকিতে পারে না। ঘটকে মৃত্তিকা হইতে বিভক্ত করিয়া লওয়া যায় কি ? §

* "যতপি কথ্যায়না উদ্রিচ্যতে, তথাপি যৎস্বরূপং পূর্ণতঃ পরমাত্মভাবঃ 'তন্ন জহাতি', পূর্ণমেব উদ্রিচ্যতে।"—বৃ° ভা°, ১৫।১।

+ যন্ত চ যস্মাদাত্মলাভঃ ভবতি, স তেন অপ্ৰবিভক্তো দৃষ্টঃ, যথা ঘটাদীনাং মুদা"—বৃ°, ১৬।১।
"কারণাৎ...ব্যতিরেকেণ অভাবঃ কার্য্যন্ত অবগম্যতে"—ব্রহ্ম° হৃ°, ২।১।১৪

‡ "বিশেষণাঞ্চ সামান্যে অন্তর্ভাবাৎ...সামান্যংহি...বিশেষান ধারয়তি স্বরূপপ্রদানেন...সামান্যানন্ত-বিক্রান্তাংশ বিশেষণামদর্শনাৎ"—বৃ°, ১৬।১। "সামান্যন্ত গ্রহণেন তদগতা বিশেষা গৃহীতা ভবন্তি। ন তু তএব নির্ভিত্তি গ্রহীত্বং শক্যন্তে" (বৃ°, ২।৫।৫)।

§ "ন চ বিশেষ দর্শনমাত্রেন বস্তুন্যত্র ভবতি...স এবৈতি প্রত্যভিজ্ঞানাৎ"—ব্র° হৃ°, ২।১।১৮

¶ "যচ্চ যদাত্মনা যত্র ন বর্ততে, ন তৎ তত উৎপত্ততে"। "যন্ত চ যস্মাদাত্মলাভঃ স তেন অপ্ৰবিভক্তো দৃষ্টঃ"—ব্র° হৃ°, ২।১।১৬ ইত্যাদি।

(f) এই গুণ বা ধর্মগুণি যখন আত্মার স্বরূপেরই আংশিক বিকাশ, তখন সেই স্বরূপ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লইলে ইহাদিগকে বুঝা যাইবে কিরূপে ? ইহারা বিকাশ করিবে কাহাকে ? *

(g) ইহারা যখন আত্মার স্বরূপেরই বিকাশমাত্র ; আত্মার স্বরূপের কিঞ্চিৎ পরিচয় দিবার জন্যই অভিব্যক্ত ;—তখন ইহারা ত স্বাধীন, স্বতন্ত্র বস্তু হইতে পারে না । ইহারা আত্মারই প্রয়োজন সাধনার্থ উৎপন্ন হইয়াছে । সুতরাং ইহারা “পরার্থ” । যাহারা অন্যের প্রয়োজন সাধন করে, তাহাদিগকে স্বতন্ত্র, স্বাধীন বস্তু মনে করিবে কি প্রকারে ? †

(h) এই অভিব্যক্ত গুণগুণি ত ‘আগন্তুক’—বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়যোগে অভিব্যক্ত । আগন্তুক বলিয়াই ইহারা অনিত্য । যাহা অনিত্য, তাহাকে আত্মা বলিবে কিরূপে ? ‡

এই সকল কারণে, ভাষ্যকার বলিয়াছেন যে, এগুলিকে আত্মা হইতে পৃথক করিয়া লওয়া যায় না ; সুতরাং এই গুলিকেই আত্মা বলিয়া মনে করাও কখনই যায় না ।

প্রকৃত আত্মা যেটা, সেটা—এগুলির অন্তরালে অবস্থিত । ইহারা সেই আত্মারই আংশিক অভিব্যক্তি । ইহারা সেই আত্মা-স্বরূপেরই আংশিক, অসম্পূর্ণ পরিচয় দিয়া থাকে ।

তুমি তোমার ইন্দ্রিয়, মন, বুদ্ধি প্রভৃতিকে যতই মার্জিত করিতে সমর্থ হইবে, ততই তদ্বারা সেই আত্মা-স্বরূপের উন্নত-তর বিকাশ হইতে থাকিবে ।

* “সর্বেষাং স্পর্শানাং যুহু-কর্কশ-কঠিন-পিচ্ছিলাদীনাং...স্পর্শসামান্যমাত্রং তস্মিন্ প্রবিষ্টা। স্পর্শবিশেষাঃ তদ্ব্যতিরেকেণ অভাবভূতা ভবন্তি...ন বিভাগযোগ্যা ভবন্তি” ইত্যাদি, বৃ. ২।৪।১১। “তৎস্বরূপব্যতিরিক্তং অশ্বদন্ত কিমিচ্ছন ? (৪।৪।১২) ।

† “যৎ দেহেইন্দ্রিয়াদীনাং...স্বরূপধারণং...তৎ পারার্থেন নিমিত্তভূতেন...আত্মকৃতমেব”—গ. ভা. । ইত্যাদি দ্রষ্টব্য । “দর্শনাদিক্রিয়ানিসৃতাধীনানি তু চক্ষুরাদি—করণানি । ইদঞ্চাত্মা আত্মনঃ সামর্থ্যাদবগম্যতে”—ছা. ভা. ৮।১২।৫।

‡ “ন হি আত্মা আগন্তুকঃ কশ্চিৎ, যয়ঃ সিদ্ধহাং ।...আগন্তুকং হি বস্তু নিরাক্রিয়তে, ন স্বরূপং” ইত্যাদি, ব্র. সূ. ২।৩।৭ “যৎ কদাচিদভিব্যক্ত্যতে, অনাত্মভূতং তৎ, অত্মতোহভিব্যক্তিপ্রসঙ্গ...তথা চ অভিব্যক্তি-সাধনাপেক্ষতা । বিভ্রমানকেৎ, তস্ত আত্মভূতমেব তদিতি নিত্য্যভিব্যক্তহাং”—বৃ. ভা. ।

ভাষ্যকারের ইহাই মহান্ সিদ্ধান্ত* । এই গুলিই আত্মা নহে ; ইহার আত্মার ‘স্বরূপের’ পরিচায়ক, স্বরূপবিকাশের দ্বার বা সাধন । তোমার ইন্দ্রিয়, তোমার চিত্ত যতই সদ্-প্রধান হইতে থাকিবে ; যতই তোমার চিত্ত রাগ-দেবাদি বর্জিত হইয়া, বিশুদ্ধ ও পবিত্র হইতে থাকিবে ততই আত্মার ‘স্বরূপের’ উন্নত-তর বিকাশ হইতে থাকিবে ।

পরিপূর্ণ ব্রহ্মবস্তু, মানবাত্মায় উপস্থিত রহিয়াছেন । তিনিই আপনাকে মানবাত্মার মধ্যে প্রকাশিত করিতেছেন । তাই, মানবাত্মায় পূর্ণতা-লাভের আকাঙ্ক্ষা অন্তর্নিহিত রহিয়াছে । তাই, মানব আপনার মধ্যে, ব্রহ্মের পূর্ণ জ্ঞানৈশ্বর্যের বিকাশ দেখিতে চায় ।

সংসারস্থ মানবের এইটাই বিশেষ লক্ষণ যে, সংসারের কোন বস্তুতেই ইহার আকাঙ্ক্ষার তৃপ্তি সম্পাদন করা যায় না । সংসারের কোন ভোগেই ইহার আকাঙ্ক্ষা মেটে না । এক ভোগ সমাপ্ত হইলে, অপর ভোগের আশায় আবার আকুল হইয়া উঠে । বিষয়েন্দ্রিয়-জনিত কোন সুখই, ইহার পূর্ণ তৃপ্তি জন্মাইতে পারে না । ইহার কারণ কি ? কেন এই অতৃপ্তি ? কেন এই উত্তরোত্তর-বর্দ্ধিগী আকাঙ্ক্ষা ?

এই অতৃপ্তিই প্রমাণ করে যে, আত্মার মধ্যে—সংসারাতীত, বিষয়াতীত কোন বস্তু নিহিত আছে,—যাহাকে আত্মা চায়, যাহাকে না পাওয়া পর্যন্ত

* “আত্মনোহপকারকস্ত কার্য-করণ সংঘাতস্ত স্বভাবেন সর্বতঃ প্রবৃত্তস্ত—সন্মার্গে এব নিয়োগঃ (গী°, ১৩।৭)” । “বিশিষ্টঃ কার্য-করণেঃ সংযুক্তে হি জন্মানি সতি, প্রজ্ঞামেধাস্ব্যতিবেশারত্বং দৃষ্টং and “তস্মাৎ বিদ্যাকর্মাণি শুভমেব সমাচরেৎ, যথা ইষ্ট-দেহসংযোগোপভোগোস্তাতাং”—বৃ° ভা°, ১।৪।২ and ৪।৪।২

+ “তস্ত বিষয়োগল্লিলক্ষণস্ত ‘বিজ্ঞানস্ত’ শুদ্ধিঃ আহ্বারশুদ্ধিঃ...রাগদেহমোহৈ রসংস্পৃষ্টং বিষয়-বিজ্ঞানমিত্যর্থঃ ।...যৎ এতৎ...উত্তরোত্তরং যথোক্তমাহারশুদ্ধিমূলং—তস্মাৎ সা কার্ধা”—ছা° ভা°, ৭।২৬।১

ঐতরেয় ও বৃহদারণ্যকে এইজন্মই বলা হইয়াছে যে, এই পৃথিবী অপেক্ষা আরো ক্রমোন্নত-তর কত ‘লোক’ (Higher worlds) আছে । এই সকল লোকে গিয়া জীবকে উন্নত হইতে উন্নততররূপে, জ্ঞান-শক্তি-সৌন্দর্যাদির ক্রমোন্নত বিকাশলাভ করিতে হয় । অবশেষে সে পূর্ণব্রহ্মলাভে সমর্থ হয় ।

ইহার আকাঙ্ক্ষার নিবৃত্তি নাই। মানবাত্মার ইহাই স্বরূপ।* দেহ, ইন্দ্রিয় ও বিষয়াদির ভোগে তৃপ্তি পায় না বলিয়াই মানব, বিষয়-ভোগে বিরক্ত হইয়া উঠে এবং তাহার বিষয়-বৈরাগ্য উপস্থিত হয়। তখন সে, আপন স্বরূপ-নিহিত পূর্ণতা-লাভের নিমিত্ত ব্যাকুল হইয়া উঠে। এই আকাঙ্ক্ষা তাহাকে চালিত করণে। তখন সে তাহার সর্বপ্রকার প্রবৃত্তি, কর্ম ও সামর্থ্যকে—সেই আকাঙ্ক্ষাতৃপ্তির পথে, সেই একই উদ্দেশ্যে, শাসিত ও নিয়ন্ত্রিত করিয়া লয়†। যতদিন না মানব, আপন স্বরূপের মধ্যে, অনন্ত পূর্ণ ব্রহ্ম-বস্তুর পূর্ণ অভিব্যক্তি লাভ না করিতেছে, ততদিন তাহার ক্রম-বর্দ্ধিনী আকাঙ্ক্ষার পূর্ণ-তৃপ্তি ঘটিবে না‡। তাহাকে লাভ করিলেই, মানবের আকাঙ্ক্ষা পূর্ণ হয়, সকল কর্ম সমাপ্ত হয়; আপন পুরুষার্থ সিদ্ধ হয়।

* “তদানন্দমাত্রাবয়বদ্বারেন মাত্রিণং পরমানন্দং অধিজিগমিষ্যতি জীবঃ...পরমানন্দং ‘বুদ্ধিকাটাং’ অনুভবতি মুক্তঃ”—তৈ° ভা°, ২।৮ and বৃ° ভা°, ৪।৩।৩৩ “অকামহতৎসং তু...উত্তরোত্তর-ভূমানন্দপ্রাপ্তি সাধনমিত্যবগম্যতে”।

† “দেহেন্দ্রিয়বিষয়-ভোগেষু বৈরাগ্যং...ততঃ প্রত্যগাত্মনি প্রবৃত্তিঃ ‘করণানাং’ আত্মদর্শনার্হ—গী° ভা°, ১৩।৮

‡ “কার্যকরণ সংঘাতস্ত স্বভাবতঃ সর্বতঃ প্রবৃত্তস্ত—সম্মার্গে এব নিয়োগঃ”—গী°, ১৬।৭ বিরক্তা-ং হি এতন্নাং ব্রহ্মবিদ্যা আরম্ভব্য”—বৃ°, ১।৫।২। ইত্যাদি।

§ “আনন্দানন্দিনোঃ অবিভাগোহত্র”—তৈ° ভা°। “এব শতগুণোত্তরবুদ্ধ্যুপেতা আনন্দাঃ যত্র একতাং যান্তি...স পরম আনন্দঃ”—বৃ°, ভা°, ৪।৩।৩৩ “অতঃপরং গণিত নিবৃত্তিঃ” ॥

¶ “নহি পরমাত্মনঃ একত্বনিত্যত্বাবগতো সত্যং, ভূয়ঃ কাচিদাকাঙ্ক্ষা উপজায়তে, পুরুষার্থসমাপ্তি বুদ্ধ্যুৎপত্তেঃ...তথৈব চ বিদুর্বাং তুষ্টিমভবাদিদশনাং...নৈবযুৎপত্ত্যাদিশ্রুতীনাং নিরাকাঙ্ক্ষার্থ প্রতিপাদন-সামর্থ্যমস্তি...তথাহি উদকং জগন্মূলস্ত বিজ্ঞেয়ত্বং দর্শয়তি”—ত্র° সূত্রং, ৪।৩।১৪

‘অন্ত্য’ মিদং প্রমাণং আত্মৈকত্বস্ত প্রতিপাদকং, নাতঃ পরং কিঞ্চিৎ ‘আকাঙ্ক্ষ্যং’ অস্তি।...ন তু আত্মৈকত্বব্যতিরেকেণ অবশিষ্যমাণোহস্ত্যোহর্থোহস্তি, যঃ আকাঙ্ক্ষ্যত”—২।১।১৪

“ব্রহ্মাবগতির্হি পুরুষার্থঃ...অবগতি-পর্যন্তং হি জ্ঞানং”—ত্র° সূ°, ১।১।১ (ব্রহ্মকে জ্ঞানের ‘পর্যন্ত’ বলা হইয়াছে। পর্যন্ত—i. e. The Supreme End.)

[আত্মৈকত্ব—অর্থাৎ আত্মা ইহাতে অভিব্যক্ত বিজ্ঞানাদি কোন বস্তুকেই আত্মস্বরূপ হইতে স্বতন্ত্র করিয়া লইয়া, তাহাকেই আত্মা বলিয়া ধরিয়া লওয়া যায় না। কেননা, কোন বস্তুই, কোন কিছুই—আত্মস্বরূপ হইতে ‘অন্ত’ নহে; আত্মস্বরূপেরই বিকাশক, আত্মস্বরূপেরই অন্তর্ভুক্ত। পূর্বে ইহা আমরা

ভাষ্যকার এই প্রকারে মানবাত্মার ‘স্বরূপের’ বিবরণ দিয়াছেন । না বুঝিয়া লোকে বলে, শঙ্করের অদ্বৈতবাদে, জীবের স্বরূপকে (Personality) উড়াইয়া দেওয়া হইয়াছে !!

শ্রীকোকিলেশ্বর ভট্টাচার্য্য,

শাস্ত্রী, বিহারত, এম্-এ ।

(ত্রয়োদশঃ)

দেখাইয়াছি । ইহাকে বেদান্তে “সর্বস্বভাব” বলে । এ সকল কথা এই গ্রন্থের শেষে আরো বিশেষ করিয়া বলা যাইবে ।]

